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This thesis examines the genesis and implementation of two provisions of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act 1867: rate equalisation and the appointment of central 
government nominees to local poor law bodies. 
It is contended that while the Act pointed towards the twentieth-century state in 
that it led to a growth in government and to redistribution of the public spending burden, 
a new type of gentlemanly safeguard against elected power underpinned these 
developments. A radical call for redistribution of wealth in the metropolis, coming 
largely not from the East End but from the west, the south and the City, played a 
significant part in the genesis of the Act's innovatory restraining step of appointing Poor 
Law Board nominees to metropolitan bodies. The aim, it is argued, was to dilute the 
representative base of these bodies as some of their poor law spending came within the 
compass of the new metropolitan common purse: a step taken in the same year that the 
representative base for parliament was widened by the passing of the Second Reform 
Act. 
The thesis examines the manuscript records of the major metropolitan movement 
for rate equalisation, analyses decision-making on the Act's largest and longest-running 
poor law body, the Metropolitan Asylums Board, in its first four years, and presents a 
census-based socio-economic comparative study of this board's elected and elite 
nominated managers. The role of central government (ministers and officials) in the 
state growth that arose out of the Act is also considered. 
The conclusion reached is that in the metropolis in the 1860s the conscious, 
planned and more centralised growth of poor law services, and the accompanying partial 
redistribution of wealth from richer to poorer areas, both arising largely as a result of 
insistent reformist and radical pressure, took place within a context of gentlemanly 
ingenuity in finding new ways of retaining influence and power. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
Welcome from all sides greeted the Metropolitan Poor Bill when Gathorne Hardy, 
Conservative President of the Poor Law Board, introduced it to the House of Commons on 
8 February 1867. The measure, which had arrived in the legislature after a ten-year 
campaign to equalise poor rates in the metropolis and shorter but vigorous campaigns to 
improve services for the sick poor, became law within seven weeks. 1 The implications, 
however, of some of its provisions, and the issues they raised, were far wider than its 
benevolent First Reading reception and easy progress may seem to suggest. 
The Act set up the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, the aim of which was to 
redress partially the balance of financial liability between poor law unions in wealthier and 
in poorer areas of the metropolis. It would redistribute a proportion of the locally raised 
poor rates, to the benefit of East End unions and at the expense of the West. 
Studies referring to the Metropolitan Poor Act have focused mainly on its 
connections with the origins of the welfare state or with East End poverty and distress, or 
have noted some of its financial outcomes. 2 Yet the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, as 
well as being the financial centre-piece of the Metropolitan Poor Act and the instrument 
through which the Act's social policy goals were to be pursued, constituted in itself a 
significant redistributive development in public finance. 
The Act also offered novel answers - one of them the only element to be 
immediately controversial - to the question of who should control the new redistributed 
local spending, and in so doing raised important issues that have not since been considered 
in depth. 
A further feature of the Act not hitherto taken into account is its chronological 
conjunction with Disraeli's Second Reform Act, introduced into Parliament three days later. 
130 & 31 Vict. c. 6, Metropolitan PoorAct 1867; Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 150-179; A. E. Gathorne-Hardy 
(ed), Gathorne Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook, a Memoir (London, 1910), I, 194. Hardy wrote in his 
diary on 9.2.1867 that "so far as talking went" the Bill had received "universal approval", and that Disraeli 
thought it had made "a most favourable impression". The Bill was passed on 25 March and received the 
Royal Assent on 29 March. 2G. Ayres, England's First State Hospitals and the Metropolitan Asylums Board 1867-1930 (London, 
1971), 28,242-8; G. Stedman Jones, Outcast London (London, 1992), 249-50,253; J. Davis, Reforming 
London (Oxford, 1988), Appendix 3. 
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There are, in fact, thematic links between the two Acts in that while the Reform Act took a 
leap forwards, in terms of the representational base, the Metropolitan Poor Act took a step 
backwards. 
The Reform Bill, metamorphosing as it progressed through Parliament, produced 
household suffrage without any of the "safeguards" against democracy first envisaged; 
urban artisan lodgers were enfranchised. The Metropolitan Poor Act, on the other hand, 
reduced the power of local elected representatives to make financial and administrative 
decisions about the poor law institutions for which they were raising the rates, placed new 
services under indirectly rather than directly elected control, and appointed central 
government nominees as full members of elected poor law bodies. Although one Act 
extended liberties, the other reduced them, while offering more equal and equitable 
provision of services. 
From a twentieth-century perspective the Metropolitan Poor Act might be interpreted 
as a distant prelude to the National Health Service, the Department of Social Security and 
even institutions such as the Inner London Education Authority. It established greater 
control over health care for the poor by central government, brought the financing of relief 
for the destitute under closer central government control, and introduced the Common Fund 
financing of the education of pauper children throughout London. 
But a closer study of the genesis and implementation of the Act shows it was 
significant also in relation to the distribution of power. One of the aims embodied in the 
Act was undoubtedly to dilute the representative base of local metropolitan poor law bodies 
as some of their spending came within the compass of the new metropolitan common purse. 
Even Hardy acknowledged, in moving the Bill at the First Reading, that the nominee 
proposal was a novel one, and would be objected to. 3 
This thesis will argue that while the Metropolitan Poor Act pointed towards the 
twentieth-century state in that it led to a growth in government and to redistribution of the 
public spending burden, a new type of gentlemanly safeguard against elected power 
underpinned these developments, in the form of the nominee clauses of the Act. A strong 
3Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 163. Also 9.2.1867 in The Times, 5b; Daily News, 3a; Morning Herald, 2f; 
Morning Advertiser, 2d. Olive Anderson, "Hansard's Hazards", EHR, 112, II (1997), 1203-15, has 
emphasised recently the perils of relying solely on Hansard. 
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Radical call for redistribution of wealth in the metropolis, it will be argued, had its counter- 
balance in this innovatory restraining step, which supplemented or replaced existing systems 
of influence or control. 
II 
There is at present an historiographical gap in knowledge, and therefore in 
perception, about the genesis and implementation of the rate equalisation and nominee 
clauses of the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
The most detailed study so far of the genesis of the Act is James O'Neill's article 
about campaigns that focused on services for the sick poor. 4 O`Neill shows the range of 
philanthropic, medical and nursing influences that contributed to the passing of the Act, 
including those of the Lancet, The Times, the British Medical Journal, Florence 
Nightingale, Louisa Twining of the Workhouse Visiting Society, the Metropolitan Poor 
Law Medical Officers' Association, the Association for the Improvement of the Infirmaries 
of Workhouses, "the professional aspirations of medical men", and also the influence of 
events - the London workhouse scandals - of one of which Florence Nightingale had the 
candour to remark later that she was "so much obliged to that poor man for dying". 
However, ONeill traces proposals for funding the desired institutional reforms -a 
"general metropolitan rate" raised from "the whole area of London" - no further back than 
late 1865,5 and considers the possibility of medical and nursing figures, including 
Nightingale, having been the originators of the idea. This thesis will show that, on the 
contrary, a vigorous Radical-led metropolitan campaign for rate equalisation began in 1857 
(with even earlier roots), and that while some of its adherents supported also the later 
medical-orientated campaigns described by O'Neill, its power base lay among elected 
representatives of poor law and other local bodies. 
Gwendolyn Ayres has, similarly, focused on the medical, nursing and institutional 
aspects of the Act. While rightly describing the Act as "the most important poor law 
measure for London between 1834 and 1929 and a significant step towards the socialisation 
4J. O'Neill, "Finding a Policy for the Sick Poor", VS, 7 (1963-4), 269-80. 51bid, 274-5. 
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of medical care in this country", she suggests, less accurately, that medical campaigners in 
1865 were the major source for the "general poor rate". The equalised rate, she also notes, 
was "ardently supported" by John Stuart Mill and Sir Harry Verney ('the Member for 
Florence Nightingale'), who were both strong advocates of medical and nursing reforms. 
6 
Mill and Verney had not, in fact, been involved in the lengthy Radical campaign for rate 
equalisation, and Ayres makes no reference to the local government roots of the funding 
instrument. 
Gareth Stedman Jones, on the other hand, acknowledges the significance in itself of 
the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund as a redistributive development, 7 as opposed to its 
usefulness merely as an instrument for financing better services for the sick poor. 
However, his emphasis is on East End ratepayer and vestry pressure for rate equalisation, 
and he does not examine the wider metropolitan rate equalisation movement, which 
involved mainly local radicals from the West, the City and the South rather than the East. 
Nonetheless, his argument that the "practically complete" geographical separation of 
classes in the metropolis by 1861 - and the consequent "deformation" of charitable giving - 
led some of the rich to fear that the traditional fabric of social control was threatened, is 
relevant for the wider metropolitan context of this thesis. The vision he floats of a London 
reconstructed by the Charity Organisation Society or its fellow-thinkers "along the lines of 
an old Arcadian myth ..... under the 
firm but benevolent aegis of a new urban squirearchy" 
has some links - as Stedman Jones remarks - with metropolitan poor relief events of the 
1860s. He suggests that the 1867 Metropolitan Common Poor Fund and nominee 
guardians were part of an attempt - together with subsequent regulation of charitable giving 
- to re-establish social controls. 
8 
Although Stedman Jones touches only briefly on these provisions of the Metropolitan 
Poor Act, his interpretation in this respect is essentially the same as that underlying this 
6Ayres, op. cit., 22,28,155. 7Stedman Jones, op. cit., 250-61. 81bid., 251,252,257; Stedman Jones, Languages of Class (Cambridge, 1983), 79-80. Although Stedman 
Jones, in Languages of Class, chapter 2 (first delivered as a paper in 1975) cautions against the loose use of 
notions of social control, his own use of the concept in his earlier Outcast London (first published in 1971) 
was clearly relevant to his analysis of the metropolitan wealth-poverty divisions in the 1860s and their 
consequences. The concept is similarly relevant to the examination in this thesis of metropolitan poor law 
issues and legislation of that period. 
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thesis. Where it differs is that he examines 1860s questions of legislated power and 
control in relation to the casual poor and pressure from the East End, whereas it will be 
argued here that rate equalisation was achieved as a result of a ten-year campaign by a 
largely middle-class and tradesman metropolis-wide radical movement. The nominee 
provisions (which, very significantly, were established for more than just boards of 
guardians) and the Fund format chosen for rate equalisation represented a gentlemanly (or 
"new urban squirearchy") reaction against radical policies such as those promoted by the 
movement, and a desire to maintain control of metropolitan (as well as East End) poor relief 
as a wider common purse was introduced. 
Historiographically, metropolitan radicalism in the 1860s has received little attention. 
Stedman Jones notes that radical London artisans pursued parliamentary reform. 9 Miles 
Taylor10 concludes that Radical MPs suffered an "almost total eclipse" in the 1857 
elections, and that they were replaced by "a new breed" of London MPs who were 
adventurers and job-hunters, men from the City or "nabob-like", with East India Company 
backgrounds. His view of metropolitan municipal radicalism is that it was backward- 
looking, and of the radicalism of London MPs in the 1860s that it was "economistic" and a 
"sad terminus". This thesis will, however, show that radicalism in the metropolis in the 
1860s, both among its MPs and among local politicians involved in poor law issues, was 
vigorous and highly effective. The achievement of support for rate equalisation was a 
tribute to this political vigour. 
That metropolitan rate equalisation was not mere "economistic radicalism" but a 
major issue that continued to be significant for more than a century after 1867 is indicated 
by A. R. Ilersic's centenary report' 1 for the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants. His account, with its 1967 recommendations, echoed arguments that had 
contributed to the setting up of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund in 1867: for instance, 
9lbid., 340. 
10M. Taylor, The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-60 (Oxford, 1995), 15,92,280,282. 11A. R Ilersic, Rate Equalisation in London (London, 1967), 3-7,11,15,17,18,62. Subsequent 
metropolitan rate equalisation measures included the London (Equalisation of Rates) Act 1894 (a uniform 
6d. rate), the Local Government Act 1948 London Equalisation Scheme (precept from the Metropolitan 
boroughs), the Local Government Act 1959 London Equalisation Scheme (a common pool for 70 % of 
local government spending), and the Local Government Act 1963 (the Inner London Education Authority 
and, in 1965, the Inner London Equalisation Scheme under s. 66 of the Act). 
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that it was the "marked contrasts" between the London boroughs which provided the basis 
for equalisation, that in size and concentration of wealth the metropolis was unique among 
British conurbations and it was therefore appropriate that rate equalisation be applied to the 
metropolis alone, and that the inhabitants of the "less affluent dormitory areas" helped 
create the wealth in the central areas and should therefore be enabled to share it. 
Little attention has also been paid to the Metropolitan Poor Act's reduction of 
representative power other than that in Stedman Jones's assessment of the significance of 
the nominee provision. Brian Keith-Lucas12 shows the role played by the fear of 
democracy in "safeguards" such as plural voting, restricted qualifications for election, ex- 
officio and nominated members, and restrictions on some decisions made by "bare 
majorities", and points out that in the early nineteenth century "elected councils came slowly 
to be substituted for the nominated and co-opted bodies which had previously ruled so 
much of England". His account of nomination refers, however, to locally-generated 
processes such as the appointment of trustees and, after 1835, aldermen on borough 
councils, rather than to central government appointments, and he misses the backward step 
taken by the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
Anthony Brundage, 13 tracing the boards of guardians franchise, makes no reference 
to the Metropolitan Poor Act, and points to the 1869 arrival of a new Liberal President of 
the Poor Law Board as the stage at which central government began to show more concern 
about the actions of boards of guardians. His suggestion that poor law administration 
experienced a "relatively trouble-free" period during the years 1848-1868, the "age of 
equipoise", disregards events in the metropolis. However, the reason he gives for rural 
stability - ex-officio guardians' often more generous relief policies - needs to be considered 
in relation to the 1867 Act, because through the nominee clauses the Act aimed to 
strengthen the non-elected element on metropolitan poor law bodies. 
An analysis of the implementation of the nominee clauses is important because of the 
further clarification this might provide of the aims of central government in placing its own 
representatives on local elected boards. The historiographical debate on the nature of local 
12B. Keith-Lucas, The English Local Government Franchise 1834-94 (Oxford, 1952), 20,180-191,201-4. 
13k Brundage, "Reform of the Poor Law Electoral System 1834-1894", Albion, 7 (1975), 205. 
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political elites, based substantially on non-metropolitan areas such as Cardiff, Leeds and 
Birmingham, is clearly relevant here, and it is therefore useful to consider this in detail. 
John Davis, analysing the composition of non-poor law bodies in the metropolis, 
concludes that metropolitan vestries were in general ineffective because as governing 
groups they lacked the empowerment that accrues both to natural elites (social or 
economic) and through participatory politics. Social elites, such as the aristocracy, he 
points out, did not in general become involved in London local government (other than in a 
few instances in West End vestries), while consolidated industrial elites were a feature 
more of the factory towns than of London, which was "overwhelmingly a city of small 
masters". Participation was also reduced through the nature of the franchise qualification, 
and there was often "shopocratic" domination. 14 
E. P. Hennock considers to what extent after 1835 - when the Municipal 
Corporations Act introduced election by ratepayers - the municipal corporations were able 
to "draw on the services of those most prominent in the economic and social life of the 
town". He points out that, prior to the 19th century, local government had been, quite 
considerably, by appointment from above. Town councillors were expected to be men of 
station or respectability, of substance or property or wealth, and intelligence or education; 
even reformers expected these qualities of candidates for elected office. He cites evidence 
that these attitudes persisted as the century progressed, with widespread dismay at the 
increasing accession to local power of inferior classes of people. But there was also some 
evidence of an alternative point of view: that wealthy men, although they might be large 
ratepayers, might not be the most appropriate people to safeguard the interests of the 
smaller man: "the small tradesmen, heavily rated for their shops, whose savings were often 
invested in a house or two". In an earlier work Hennock reaches the conclusion that "the 
system of local government finance tended ..... to push a section of the inhabitants, often a 
predominantly lower-middle-class section, into municipal politics". They had interests to 
defend, and these made them " potentially hostile" to professional and large businessmen, 
the "natural leaders of the community". When a reaction against the rates by small 
14Davis, op. cit., 20-23. 
13 
INTRODUCTION 
property-owners was successful and they were elected on an economist-type programme, 
there would be "a marked deterioration in the quality of local government". 
15 
Martin Daunton disagrees with Hennock's identification of a community's "natural 
elite" as its economic leaders/large businessmen. 
16 He also questions whether this group 
were superior as local leaders, and argues that it was not "natural" for merchants and 
industrialists to want to serve on local authorities if their businesses were not affected 
significantly by the bodies' decisions. It was the class below them - small businessmen and 
small landlords - who were more often affected by local decisions. He suggests that the 
swing from small businessmen/economist control to large businessmen/improver control, for 
example in Birmingham in the mid-nineteenth century, can be accounted for partly by the 
fact that a stage was reached where industrialists would benefit economically from an 
improved infrastructure and therefore had reasons for wanting to control the local authority. 
Hennock's approach, Daunton suggests, should be reversed. The question was not why 
lower groups became the "natural leaders" at certain times, but "why the lower groups as 
natural leaders might sometimes be replaced in certain circumstances by the elite. " The 
quality of the leadership offered by both groups could also be queried. Large businessmen 
were often concerned only with the efficiency of local government, tighter accountancy 
procedures, and "treating municipal concerns like the private sector". Lower groups, on 
the other hand, might have "a wider conception of municipal functions". Daunton points 
out that in Cardiff the reverse of Hennock's interpretation applied in respect of both of these 
questions. 
While these findings by Davis, Hennock and Daunton relate to non-poor law bodies 
(and only Davis's to London), '7 the questions they raise about the calibre of local 
representation are particularly important for this thesis. The major reason given for the 
introduction of the nominee clauses was, essentially, that metropolitan guardians could not 
15E. P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Person: Ideal and Reality in nineteenth-century urban government 
(London, 1973), 308-16,332-4; E. P. Hennock, "Finance and politics in urban local government 1835- 
1900", HJ VI, 1(1963), 217-8,223; E. P. Hennock, "The Social Compositions of Borough Councils in 
Two Large Cities, 1835-1914" in H. Dyos (ed. ), The Study of Urban History (London, 1968), 316,322. 16M. Daunton, Coal Metropolis, Cardiff 1870-1914 (Leicester, 1977) 149-51. 
17J. Davis, "Modern London 1850-1939", LI, 20,2 (1995), 59, surveying metropolitan historioriography, 
notes the limited coverage of poor law local government; A. I. Tanner, "The City of London Poor Law 




be trusted to carry out their duties satisfactorily; the case presented here, however, is that 
these provisions represented a gentlemanly safeguard against the potential dominance of 
elected power on metropolitan poor law bodies as the Metropolitan Poor Act brought in 
rate redistribution and a vast expansion of services. 
Overall, a study of secondary sources shows that the genesis and implementation of 
the 1867 provisions for metropolitan rate equalisation and central government nominees on 
poor law bodies has hitherto received limited coverage. This constitutes a significant gap 
not only in metropolitan history but also in English history. An assessment of the power 
relations inherent in questions involving the public purse and electoral representation - and 
particularly in questions involving jointly both - must inevitably affect one's interpretation 
of other issues. 
III 
In order to make clear the nature of the changes brought about by the Metropolitan 
Poor Act (and in subsequent chapters to compare these with policy alternatives available to 
the government, and draw further conclusions about the Act's genesis and implementation) 
a brief account will now be given of the Act itself. 
The provisions of the Act with which this thesis is largely concerned (the financial 
and nominee clauses) are related integrally to most of its other provisions, but three distinct 
areas of change - to poor law institutions, to the control of these institutions, and to the 
financing of their activities - can be discerned. 
The Act provided for the classification of the poor - the setting up of separate district 
asylums for "the sick, insane, or infirm, or other class or classes of the poor" 18 - in place of 
the general mixed workhouse. 
180p. cit., s. 59. 
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In order to achieve such large-scale reorganisation irrespective of whether the 
parishes/ unions that owned and ran the workhouses agreed, the Poor Law Board was given 
draconian powers. The Board was enabled to unite compulsorily any poor law unions 
and/or parishes into asylum districts, to order the district managers (a new designation) to 
buy, hire or build asylum buildings of any size, to order that any building presently being 
used as a workhouse be converted to use as a district asylum, and to decide the rent or 
compensation for buildings that should be paid to guardians. Guardians and managers (and 
therefore also the Poor Law Board) would not need to get the consent of electors before 
disposing of any buildings or land. 19 
Any parishes/unions that had previously classified their own poor and provided 
separate rather than general accommodation could be ordered by the Poor Law Board to 
admit similar classes of poor from other unions/parishes, with the "source" guardians 
having the power to enter and inspect the receiving workhouse. 20 
The new asylum managers would have the same powers as guardians had in relation 
to inmates. The Poor Law Board would make the rules for admission, provision of 
medicines and surgical care, and treatment of inmates. Asylums for the sick or insane 
might also be used as medical schools, "for purposes of medical instruction, and for the 
training of nurses". 21 
Drop-in dispensaries could also be required of guardians - who would be allowed to 
borrow money to set them up - together with places for the meetings of new dispensary 
committees and for medical officers to see the outdoor sick poor. 
The Act's most disputed change of control was Hardy's "novel" proposal, the 
addition to local elected bodies of members nominated by the Poor Law Board. 22 Central 
19lbid., s. 16. 201bid., s. 50. 211bid., s. 29. 
22Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 163. 
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government's nominees were to be added to three types of institution: the new asylum 
districts, the boards of guardians and the district school boards. 
The new asylum districts would be run by corporate bodies of managers who would 
be partly elective (indirectly, from among guardians or from ratepayers qualified to be 
guardians) and partly nominated by the Poor Law Board from among Justices of the Peace 
and/or ratepayers in the district whose property had a rateable value of at least £40; this 
figure constituted a wealth boundary, in that the qualification that could be required of 
elected guardians had, for more than 30 years, been "not... exceeding ... £40". 
The Poor Law Board would have the power to prescribe the total number, 
qualifications and tenure of asylum district managers, the proportions of nominee to elective 
(to a nominee maximum of 1: 3), the number, or weighting, of elective managers from each 
union/parish, the election procedure, and the quorum for managers' meetings. 23 
Similar conditions were prescribed for nominees to be added to boards of guardians 
and school district boards, 24 and the dispensary committees were to take the appointment 
of district medical officers out of the hands of the boards of guardians. 25 
A further major change of control was that the ten metropolitan parishes still 
governed by their own Local Acts rather than the 1834 New Poor Law26 lost some of their 
individuality and independence. Henceforth they too would have to come within the 
framework of the standard 1834 boards of guardians provisions. 27 The Poor Law Board 
also gained the power unilaterally to group parishes into unions for poor relief purposes28 
without the previous restriction of having, for parishes with 20,000-plus population, to get 
the consent of two-thirds of the guardians. 
29 
230p. cit., s. 9-12. (The debates in Hansard sometimes report the proportion as being one-third of the 
whole body, or 1: 2. ) 24Ibid, s. 49 & 79. 25Ibid., s. 39-41. 264 &5 Will. IV c. 76, Poor LawAmendmentAct 1834. 27Ibid, s. 74. 28Ibid, s. 78. 297 &8 Vict. c. 101. s. 64 
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The establishment of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund was a major step, the 
significance of which (despite its limited nature) it is difficult to exaggerate, in that for the 
first time the financing of large elements of metropolitan poor relief - including health care, 
education and social support - was spread over a wider field than the parish or union. At 
the same time, however, because it was a purely administrative Fund with no local electoral 
oversight, the line of financial accountability between spenders and ratepayers was 
disrupted. 
Throughout the metropolis, parishes and unions were to be assessed for their 
contribution to the Common Poor Fund on the basis of annual rateable value of local 
property, with wealthier parishes/unions contributing more than they would have done if 
they had been collecting rates only for themselves, and poorer parishes and unions 
contributing less. The sum in the Common Poor Fund would then be distributed to 
parishes and unions as reimbursement for a wide range of poor relief expenditure. 
Reimbursement from the Fund was to be allowed for specified maintenance and other 
revenue expenditure but not for spending on capital items. Allowable expenses were the 
maintenance of lunatics and the insane poor (except for such expenditure chargeable to the 
county rate), maintenance of smallpox and fever patients, medical and surgical supplies 
(including medicine), salaries of district school officers, asylum officers and dispensing 
staff, compensation for staff affected by the Act, birth and death registration fees, 
vaccination expenses, maintenance of pauper children in schools, the relief of the destitute 
(or casual, wandering poor), and provision of temporary wards for such poor. The costs of 
running the Common Poor Fund - the salaries and expenses of the Receiver and his 
assistants - would also be borne by the Fund, despite the fact that this was a central 
government function. 30 
In terms of capital items, the Act encouraged high spending by the local bodies. 
Asylum district managers were empowered to borrow money for the buying, building or 
hiring of buildings, and to charge the capital sum and interest to union/parish poor rates 
proportionately to these bodies' maintenance contributions to the asylum; their maximum 
permitted loan was equal to a third of the annual expenditure on poor relief within the 
30, cit., s. 69-71. 
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asylum district aggregated for the preceding three years. 31 Boards of guardians were 
empowered to borrow up to one half of the total amount raised from the rates in their union 
or parish within the past three years. 32 
While capital spending such as this might lead to heavy parish- or union-borne loan 
debt, an advantage of high spending on building works required under the Act was that a 
local body might become eligible for reimbursement of indoor poor relief costs, for instance 
on the destitute or on paupers sent to the new institutions, from the Metropolitan Common 
Poor Fund. 
IV 
Hardy made a distinction between "equalising" metropolitan poor rates - which he 
said he was not prepared to do - and his chosen policy of "distributing" charges at present 
made separately in the localities, 33 but this distinction was to a considerable extent a 
matter of political semantics. 
Although the Poor Law Board's Receiver, in administering the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund, would not be required to announce regularly an equal metropolitan 
rate poundage but merely to calculate the contributions due from each local body based on 
the rateable value of property in its parish or union, the principle for both procedures was 
clearly the same: that income collected on the basis of the ability to pay should be 
distributed on the basis of (audited) need across the metropolis. 
The reason Hardy gave for his policy choice (or policy definition) was that his Bill 
would be defeated if he proposed to equalise "the rates of the whole of the metropolis". 
However, his redistribution did of course involve the whole of the metropolis, and the point 
at issue was instead the number of spending items to which equalisation should apply. The 
distinction he was really making was between the radical concept of "rate equalisation" 
around which a highly effective campaign had been conducted since 1857 and which usually 
311bid, s. 17. 32Ibid, s. 80,81. 33Hansard 8.2.1867, col. 168. The distinction was reported also in several London newspapers on 
9.2.1867, e. g. The Times, 5c; Daily Telegraph, 2f; Daily News, 3a; Morning Herald, 3b. 
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included metropolitan electoral control of the rates, and administrative redistribution 
operated by civil servants. The form taken by rate redistribution, or equalisation, in 1867 
avoided an extension of electoral control and was therefore of a piece, strategically, with 
the changes of control introduced in the nominee clauses. 
The changes introduced in the Metropolitan Poor Act's rate equalisation and nominee 
clauses were of greater significance politically than has generally been recognised. The aim 
of this thesis is to demonstrate their significance. 
20 
CHAPTER 2. The Legislative and 
Parliamentary Context 
Some of the questions relating to the Metropolitan Poor Act had been debated 
since at least the reign of Elizabeth I. When, from 1857, an insistent call grew for a 
redistributive approach to metropolitan poor relief, parliament was a major arena for 
consideration of the issues, both old and new, that underlay the Act, and the focus of a 
wide range of influences on policy-making. 
That redistribution of the poor relief burden was recognised as a policy area of 
long-standing and continuing significance is confirmed by the fact that in 1868, the year 
after the Metropolitan Poor Act was passed, the House of Commons ordered the 
reprinting of an 1850 select committee report' the sixth recommendation of which set 
the historical context: 
That the Relief of the Poor is a national object towards which 
every description of property ought justly to be called upon to 
contribute, and that the Act of 43 Eliz. c. 2. contemplated such 
contribution according to "the ability" of every "inhabitant". 
The concept was that of the legislated common purse. Essential, therefore, as a 
framework for understanding the changes brought about by the Metropolitan Poor Act 
is the Act's legislative context. The Act was also the outcome of a variety of policy- 
making processes. The debates in parliament provide insights into these processes as 
well as into some of the concerns and issues that affected the Act's key features and 
influenced its implementation. 
II 
Most of the metropolitan local poor law bodies affected by the 1867 Act operated 
under the New Poor Law - the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 (and its amending and 
1PP 1867-8, xiii, 1, Report for Select Committee of House of Lords (in Session 1850) on laws relating 
to parochial assessments. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 26.7.1850, and to be 
reprinted 9.7.1868. 
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related Acts) - as unions headed by boards of guardians. One of the aims of the 1867 
Act was to bring the other ten2 - the more independent Local Act poor law bodies - 
within 1834 conditions also. These differences in status are part of the legislative 
context of the Metropolitan Poor Act, 3 and were an important factor in conflicts of 
interest that arose whenever it seemed that a policy of metropolis-wide rate equalisation 
might require the ten "independent" parishes to be brought more closely under the 
control of the Poor Law Board. 
Under the 1834 Act guardians were directly elected but on a plural voting system 
based partly on the 1818 Vestries Act, 4 which had aimed to retain but regulate the Open 
Vestries in which inhabitants assembled for direct decision-making, and had created a 
plural voting scale of up to a maximum of six votes. The 1818 Act and its adoptive 
sister-Act of the following year, the 1819 Poor Relief Act, 5 which allowed select 
vestries to be elected on the 1818 plural scale in open vestry, had attracted much 
criticism over several decades, not only from Radicals such as Cobbett but also from 
anti-centralisers such as the Conservative Joshua Toulmin Smith6 (although John Stuart 
Mill favoured plural voting7). Particularly unpopular, on the grounds both of 
disorderliness and of ancient rights, was the use of the complex voting scale in large 
open vestry meetings. Toulmin Smith, for instance, wrote that "it gives a number of 
votes not according to the number of minds, but the amount of property..... in the true 
spirit of centralisation it treats materialism as the sole foundation and criterion for human 
good ': 8 
In incorporating the 1818 vestries plural voting scale for boards of guardians into 
the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, parliament rejected the more recent, more equal 
2PP 1867 xii, Report of Select Committee on Metropolitan Local Government, Appendix 13, Local Acts 
of the Metropolis. The parishes where poor relief prior to the 1867 Act was controlled by Local Acts 
were St. Marylebone, St. Pancras, St. George Hanover Square, St. Mary Islington, St. Mary Newington, 
St. James Westminster, St. James & St. John Clerkenwell, St. Luke Middlesex, St. Margaret & St. John 
Westminster and St. Giles-in-the-Fields & St. George Bloomsbury. 3Hansard 21.2.1867, col. 774. In the Second Reading Hardy described these Local Acts as being 
"among the greatest impediments with which the Poor Law Board have to contend". The Board, he 
said, was "constantly .... liable to be tripped up 
in courts of law" by these bodies. 458 Geo. III c. 69 and 59 Geo. III c. 85, VestriesAct 1818 and Vestries Act 1819 (known jointly as 
Sturges Bourne's Act). 
559 Geo. HI c. 12, Poor ReliefAct 1819. 
6Keith-Lucas, op. cit., 24. 
J. S. Mill, "Of Local Representative Bodies" in (ed. ) H. B. Acton, Utilitarianism, Liberty, 
Representative Government (London, 1980), 349. 
8Keith-Lucas, op. cit., 25. 
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and single franchise of the adoptive 1831 Vestries Act (Hobhouse's Act), which had 
arisen out of Radical opposition in the metropolis to the working of close or select 
vestries, and which allowed single voting for a select vestry for all ratepayers, with a 
secret ballot if demanded by five ratepayers. 
9 Most popular in London, and particularly 
in West End and adjoining "northern" parishes, the Hobhouse franchise pattern was in 
due course to be adopted in 1855 on a metropolis-wide scale for non-poor law 
government. 
The 1834 Act, having thus disregarded the franchise reforms of Hobhouse's Act 
and also the even more recent parliamentary franchise reforms of the 1832 
Representation of the People Act 10, which had given the vote to all city and borough 
£10 p. a. rateable value occupiers, set up poor law unions of parishes to be governed by 
boards of guardians elected through the six-step plural franchise, heavily weighted in 
favour of owners of land or property. There were separate voting scales for owners 
and for ratepaying occupiers, with an additional vote for owners who were also 
occupiers. The six-step scale for owners gave one vote for every £25 of annual 
rateable (rental) value, and culminated in six votes for a rateable value of over £150; 
owners were allowed to vote by proxy, and companies and other corporations were 
allowed to vote as owners. For occupier-ratepayers there was to be a maximum of 
three votes: the range was from one vote for property with an annual rateable value of 
under £200, to three votes for an a. r. v. of £400 or more. Voting was to be in writing, 
and the new central government Poor Law Commissioners would decide the method of 
collecting and returning voting papers. Further control from above came with the 
addition of all Justices of the Peace resident in the area to each board of guardians as ex- 
officio members. 
Plural voting for guardians was, clearly, a safeguard against popular control, and 
its significance, initially, included its potential usefulness in the implementation of the 
1834 Act's principles of "less eligibility" (and the labour or workhouse "tests"). 
11 
However, electoral safeguards were not unique in the metropolis to the 1834 poor law 
bodies; of the ten Local Act independent poor law bodies, eight were also appointed by 
91 &2 Will. W c. 60; Keith-Lucas, op. cit., 30,32,34. Keith-Lucas comments of Hobhouse's trail- 
blazing Act that "thus tentatively, and in the narrow sphere of the parish vestry, this guarantee of the 
voter's freedom was first introduced into general English law. Hobhouse himself, in his memoirs, 
concluded that "the Vestries Act was no bad pilot balloon for the great Act of 1832. " 102 &3 Will. IV c. 45. 
11D. Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (London, 1984), 43-49. 
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means of a "filtering" system, in that their members were elected not directly by 
ratepayers but indirectly by vestries consisting of both elected vestrymen and ex-officio 
parish officers. 12 
Furthermore, despite its franchise being heavily weighted in favour of the 
wealthy, the 1834 Act's qualifications for office as a guardian13 were significantly less 
restrictive than Hobhouse's 1831 qualifications for select vestrymen. 
14 Whereas the 
Hobhouse qualification barrier for vestrymen was to be a ratepayer at not less than £40 
rental p. a. in London and in large parishes, or an owner (with a lower ratepayer entry of 
"not less than £10" only for smaller parishes outside London), the 1834 Act required 
that the Poor Law Commissioners (later the Poor Law Board) fix a ratepaying 
qualification that did not exceed £40 rateable value. Forty pounds was therefore the 
qualification floor for the metropolitan Local Act vestrymen who indirectly elected their 
own poor law bodies, but the ceiling for the Poor Law Board when they set the 
qualification for 1834 boards of guardians in the metropolis and elsewhere; the 
Commissioners subsequently allowed a £25 qualification for poorer parts of the 
metropolis. Indeed, the difference between Poor Law Board and "independent" 
qualifications was even greater in several of the wealthier Local Act parishes with their 
own independent poor law bodies: in St. George Hanover Square, for instance, the 
vestry formula was one-third vestrymen at £150, one-third at £80, and one-third at £40, 
and in St. Giles-in-the-Field and St. George Bloomsbury it was half at £75 and half at 
£50.15 
Wealthier ratepayers in the Local Act parishes therefore stood to lose, through 
increased competition for places under the lower qualification requirement, if they came 
under 1834 conditions. On the other hand their electorate, under plural voting, would 
be more select, or less "popular". This suggests that the issue at stake in 1867 for 
Local Act parishes is likely to have been not so much fear of a radical change in electoral 
conditions as loss of local independence to the Poor Law Board. 
Ten years after the introduction of the New Poor Law the inequality of 
representation between owners and ratepayer-occupiers on the boards of guardians was 
12pp 1867 xii, op. cit., Appendix 13. 134 &5 Will. IV c. 76 s. 38. 141 &2 Will. IV c. 60 s. 26. 15PP1867 xii, op. cit. (chaired by A. S. Ayrton). Appendix 13, "Local Acts of the Metropolis", shows 
the complexity of metropolitan vestry and non-1834 poor law arrangements up to 1867. 
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reduced slightly in the 1844 Poor Law Amendment Act. 16 Although the principle of a 
six-stage plural franchise was retained, there was to be just one scale for both groups: 
rising in £50 stages from an annual rateable value of less than £50 to an a. r. v. of at least 
£250. 
At the same time an attempt was made to introduce indirect election into a new 
form of poor law body. Guardians were to comprise the electoral college that would 
vote for members of new district boards of asylums for the destitute houseless poor and 
new district boards for pauper schools that were permitted to be established under the 
Act. Furthermore, the chairman of the board of guardians in each union of the district 
could become, if willing, an ex-officio member of the local district boards. The 
members of the new district boards would have the same minimum qualifications as 
guardians: to be set by the Poor Law Board at up to £40 a. r. v. These provisions were 
not implemented but are significant because they were, in a number of respects, to be re- 
introduced in the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
Central government exerted further control over boards of guardians in the 1847 
Poor Law Board Act 17, when inspectors appointed by the Commissioners became 
entitled to "attend every board of guardians and every parochial and other local meeting 
held for the relief of the poor, and to take part in the proceedings, but not to vote at 
such board or meeting". 
While boards of guardians of the poor law unions continued to function under the 
comparatively close control of central government and retained six-stage plural voting, 
non-poor law local government bodies were given greater freedom. Outside London 
the local government (non-board of guardians) franchise had moved, for boroughs, in 
the progressive direction formulated by Hobhouse and the London radicals in the 1831 
Vestries Act when, in 1835, the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act18 introduced the 
franchise for all male occupiers who had been rated for three years, with one person one 
vote for each vacancy. Twenty years later in the metropolis the power of the 
metropolitan vestries increased as a result of the 1855 Metropolis Management Act, 19 
which set up the Metropolitan Board of Works as a first tier authority for all of London, 
including the City. MBW members were elected indirectly by the larger (Schedule A) 
167 &8 Vict. c. 101. 1710 & 11 Vict. c. 109. 
185 &6 Will. IV c. 76. 1918 & 19 Vict. c. 120. 
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vestries or the new District Boards of Works, which were themselves elected indirectly 
by the smaller (Schedule B) vestries. The new members of the MBW were in fact 
doubly or trebly elected, because they had all been elected first as parish vestrymen. 
The qualification for office as a vestryman (and therefore as a DBW and MBW member) 
was to be a ratepayer-occupier assessed at £40 or more a. r. v. (or £25 or more, if only 
one-sixth or fewer of a parish's assessments reached the £40 level. ) The franchise for 
vestry elections was simply to be a parish ratepayer who had been rated for at least the 
preceding year. Voting was single, there would be a secret ballot if demanded by five 
ratepayers, and re-election would be by thirds every May. All of these conditions of 
election and office for vestrymen (apart from the conditional lower qualification of £25 
instead of £10), were identical to those in Hobhouse's radical adoptive 1831 Act. 
The legislative situation in the metropolis, therefore, as the 1860s approached, 
was that (leaving the City aside) elected members on the four leading local government 
institutions - the Metropolitan Board of Works, the District Boards of Works, the 
vestries and the boards of guardians - were all subject to a fairly similar qualification for 
office: assessment for the poor rate at an annual rateable (rental) value of around £40, 
with some variations. 
The franchise on which they were elected was, however, very different. The 
boards of guardians franchise, with its multiple votes for the wealthier, contrasted with 
the open ratepayer franchise of parish vestry elections and the indirect elections to the 
MBW and DBWs deriving from this franchise. The boards of guardians franchise was 
to be further extended in the 1867 Poor Law Amendment Act20 to include joint stock 
or other companies, corporations, commissioners, and public trustees whose corporate 
property was rated in the parish. These organisations were enabled by the Act to 
appoint one of their officers to vote on their behalf in accordance with the value of their 
property. 
Both the vestries and the boards of guardians had non-elected but voting ex- 
officio members - clergymen, churchwardens and overseers for the one, and Justices of 
the Peace for the other. However, none of the four metropolitan institutions had central 
government's voting nominees among their number: this was the unique development 
still to be introduced into metropolitan boards of guardians and other metropolitan poor 
2030 & 31 Vict. c. 106 s. 10. 
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law bodies by the Metropolitan Poor Act. Nominated guardians were to remain for 
nearly 30 years, until the 1894 Local Government Act21 abolished both ex-officio and 
nominated guardians. This was not, however, the end of unelected members of boards 
of guardians, although it was the end of central government nomineeship: the 1894 Act 
introduced a form of co-option in which guardians themselves were enabled to elect up 
to four members, including their chairman and vice-chairman, from outside their body, 
as "additional guardians". 
In 1867 the contrast between the two new systems of voting that the metropolis's 
ten "independent" Local Act parishes were now entering - the Second Reform Acts new 
parliamentary franchise and the 1834 poor law franchise that they had to comply with as 
a result of the Metropolitan Poor Act - reflected the greater degree of social control 
incorporated in poor law governance. Under the Second Reform Act the vestry 
ratepayer franchise that had been achieved in 185522 was extended, for occupiers, to 
parliamentary elections. Anyone of full age who had been an inhabitant occupier and 
ratepayer of a house, as owner or tenant, for the preceding 12 months, was entitled to 
vote, as were lodgers if their lodgings had an annual unfurnished rental value of £10 and 
certain other conditions applied, such as that the property was not let out wholly as 
lodgings. Owners were no longer to be rated as such (apart from some lodgings 
exceptions) so their vote would depend on occupancy. All had a single vote. Voters 
for the ten new compulsorily-established boards of guardians, on the other hand, came 
within the plural voting conditions of the New Poor Law. "Ordinary" ratepayers did, 
however, experience a gain, in that for the first time, in most cases, they had a direct 
vote for their poor law body instead of being confined to choosing the vestrymen who 
chose the directors of the poor. 
The franchise and the qualification for office were, however, far from being the 
only method by which government controlled the constitution of boards of guardians. 
Changes in the power of central government to reconstruct boards of guardians of 
parishes or unions through dissolving, dividing, uniting or amending took place 
from 1834 onwards. This was significant because, as this power developed through 
legislation, central government's ability to re-shape local poor relief communities, and to 
merge or divide inefficient, troublesome or strong-minded boards of guardians of 
2156 & 57 Vict. c. 73. s. 20 (1). 
2218 & 19 Vict. c. 120, Metropolis Local ManagementAct 1855. 
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unions or parishes, was increased. In 183423 the consent of two-thirds of the members 
of the board of guardians of a union was required before the Poor Law Commissioners 
could make an order to dissolve the union or separate parishes from or add them to the 
union. This consent requirement applied not only to 1834 unions but also to those 
Gilbert24 and Local Act unions formed before the Act. Over the next 35 years 
protection against unilateral restructuring by central government was whittled away. In 
the 1844 Poor Law Amendment Act the 1834 unions lost the two-thirds consent power 
given to them ten years earlier. However, large Local Act parishes (pop. over 20,000), 
of which there were several in the metropolis, gained this right in cases where the 
Commissioners wanted to unite them with other parishes. 
The Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 was to put a halt to this gain, repealing the 
provision for guardians' consent. 25 In the same year the 1867 Poor Law Amendment 
Act26 took the new step of allowing the Board to carry out restructuring following a 
"public inquiry on the spot". The elected boards of guardians would not be involved. 
All that was required was for an application to be made in writing to the Poor Law 
Board by "one tenth part in value of owners of property and of ratepayers" for 
readjustment or division of a parish; following the inquiry on the spot, the Board would 
either confirm the restructuring in the same terms as the application, or modify it. This 
was in effect an exercise in the direct linking, in significant decision-making, of the 
electorate with central government officials, without the mediation of an elected body; 
the Poor Law Board's order would however be made provisionally, and would have to 
be submitted to Parliament for confirmation. It was this same Poor Law Amendment 
Act which, after decades of annual renewal, made the Poor Law Board permanent - 
four years before the Board's abolition and replacement by the Local Government 
Board. 
Draconian powers to dissolve any union - whether 1834, Gilbert or Local Act - 
were given in the 1853 Lunatic Asylums Act27 to any Committee of Visitors "with the 
consent of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State': These were the 
234 &5 Will. IV c. 76 s. 32. 2422 Geo. III c. 83, Act for the Better Relief and Employment of the Poor, 1782 ("Gilbert's Act"). 257 &8 Vict. C. 101 s. 66,64.30 & 31 Vict. c. 6, s. 78. 
2630 & 31 Vict. c. 106. 
2716 & 17 Vict. c. 97 s. 39. 
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county asylums for pauper lunatics run by powerful committees of JPs. In some 
respects this Act was a minor precursor of the Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 which, in 
setting up district asylums, also introduced additional central government controls on 
the boards of guardians who would be involved with the asylums. 
The history of financial changes is also significant. The 1834 common, or 
general, fund was for expenditure on facilities that the parishes would share in common: 
the purchasing, building, hiring, providing, altering or enlarging of workhouses; the 
purchase or renting of lands or buildings for poor relief purposes; the maintenance of 
workhouses and other places; payments and allowances to union officers; the 
provision of utensils and materials "for setting the poor on work", and other expenses 
incurred "for the common use or benefit or on the common account of such parishes". 
The emphasis was on "common", or shared, usage or benefit. All other items of 
parish poor relief spending would continue to be paid for by the individual parishes. 28 
Each parish would pay in to the union common fund on the basis of their average annual 
expenditure on poor relief over the previous three years. There was also provision for 
new averages to be assessed in future years. 
The major question that was not addressed here in the 1834 Act was that of 
differences in levels of wealth and poverty between parishes in a union. A parish with a 
higher level of pauperism and therefore a higher "average" on which its contribution to 
the union general fund was assessed might very well be a poorer parish in terms of the 
wealth of its inhabitants; its own poor rate assessment might also be faulty, it that it 
might be based on local undervaluation or lack regular revaluation. These issues 
relating to the need for redistribution of financial burdens within unions were addressed 
by parliament at various times over the next 30 years, and were to be among the 
stepping-stones, in the metropolis, to the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund's wider 
redistribution - not within but between unions across the whole metropolis. 
The first attempted change in funding arrangements after 1834 was significant in 
terms of later developments. The 1844 Poor Law Amendment Act29, in providing for 
the financing of the new district schools and district asylums for the destitute houseless 
28T168182,28.3.1897, Memorandum to the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, Appendix 3, 
"Subventions in relief of local taxation": All poor relief spending was raised locally until 1846, when 
Treasury funding of the salaries of poor law auditors, medical officers and teachers began; no further 
central grants had been introduced by 1867. 
297 &8 Vict. c. 101 s. 41-48. 
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poor, required the asylums' expenditure to be charged to the constituent parish or union 
on the basis of the annual rateable value of property, as assessed for the county or 
borough rate. Although the asylum provisions were the part of the 1844 Act that met 
resistance in the metropolis and were not implemented, it is important to note that this 
important but permissive funding provision introduced, potentially, two new systems in 
local finance in the metropolis and the City of London (and also certain other named 
cities, towns and boroughs). Firstly, it adopted a redistributive form of rating between 
parishes and unions within the new districts, and secondly, in doing so, it created a wider 
new redistributive rating area - larger than a parish or union, but smaller than a county. 
The district asylums were to be set up "as and when (the Poor Law Board) may see fit". 
More significant in practice because it was not permissive but compulsory was the 
1848 Poor Law Amendment Acta 0 which, 14 years after the 1834 unions and their 
common funds had been instituted, made all relief of the irremovable poor (those who 
had gained settlement in a parish because of five years residence31) and also all relief of 
"destitute wayfarers, wanderers and foundlings" chargeable to the common fund. This 
meant that for the first time the common fund was paying for some of the poor relief 
expenses of an individual parish instead of just for facilities used in common by all 
parishes, such as the union workhouse. This Act also addressed one of the weaknesses 
of the parish poor rate system in that it gave guardians the power, when requested, to 
have a valuation made of property in any parish. 
A fundamental change in funding occurred in the 1861 Poor Removal Act, 32 
when the basis of assessment of parish contributions to the union common fund changed 
from past levels of pauperism to property values. Parishes would in future be required 
to pay into the common fund in proportion to the value of all their land and property, 
whether actually rated or not. The guardians would base their calculations on the 
valuation on which the parish was assessed for the county rate. This requirement of 
proportionality of parish contributions for the large amount of expenditure now covered 
by the union common fund was a major step on the road to fully redistributive rating 
within unions. 
3011&12Vict. c. 110. 319 & 10 Vict. c. 66, Poor Removal Act 1846, s. 1. 3224 & 25 Vict. c. 55. 
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The issue of valuation, a crucial element in a fair rating system but addressed only 
marginally in 1848, was tackled in the 1862 Union Assessment Committee Act, 
33 which 
placed in the hands of the boards of guardians the responsibility for setting up annually, 
from amongst themselves, an Assessment Committee with the responsibility to 
investigate and supervise valuations. One-third of the committee were, however, 
required to be ex-officio (J. P. ) members of the board. A system for appealing against 
valuations was included, and Gilbert and Local Act unions were given the opportunity to 
apply to the Poor Law Board to be allowed to adopt the Act. (In 1869 the Valuation 
[Metropolis] Act34 made it compulsory for all non-1834 Act unions and parishes to 
appoint Assesssment Committees. ) 
The closest precursor of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund in terms both of 
time and function was instituted under the 1864 Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act. 3 5 
The holder of Houseless Poor fund was to be, somewhat incongruously, the 
Metropolitan Board of Works, which hitherto had not been involved in the poor law; its 
institutional links were with the vestries and district boards of works and its 
responsibilities were local authority matters such as sewers, lighting, streets, parks and 
traffic. The new Act empowered the MBW to raise from parishes, through its general 
rate, 36 funds for the relief of destitute wayfarers, wanderers or foundlings; relief would 
include food and overnight temporary accommodation, whether hired or provided in 
workhouse vagrant or casual wards. The funds collected through the rate would be 
placed in a metropolitan common pool, and guardians would be able to apply to the 
common pool for reimbursement of money they had spent on these facilities. The 
common pool was set up initially for six months, "during the ensuing winter", and was 
to be available only to those unions or parishes whose guardians had provided vagrant 
or casual wards "as the Poor Law Board shall direct". 
The following year the Houseless Poor Act was made perpetual, and a provision 
to inspect the wards and places of reception was added. This was, however, to be a 
short-lived "perpetual" common pool, being superseded in 1867 by the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund, to which the Houseless Poor Act's redistributive functions were 
3325 & 26 Vict. C. 103. 3432 & 33 Vict. c. 67. 
3527 & 28 Vict. c. 116. 3618 & 19 Vict. c. 120 s. 158,161. 
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transferred. The principle of a metropolis-wide common fund for poor relief had, 
nonetheless, been established by this unique venture. 
The Union Chargeability Acta? reached the statute book the same year, finally 
bringing all poor relief expenses of 1834 unions into the union common or general fund. 
No longer would parishes be required separately to fund the relief of their own poor. 
Union chargeability, or union rating, as it was commonly called, was the third stage of 
the process which had begun in 1861 with the establishment of the annual rateable value 
of property as the basis of contributions, had progressed to the setting up in 1862 of the 
union assessment committees, and was now to incorporate an equal pound rate. This 
momentous 1865 Act placed all poor relief finance on a redistributive basis within (but 
not between) unions. 
Although Local Act unions and incorporations were offered the opportunity to 
adopt the Act and come within the same framework, the ten independent metropolitan 
local poor law bodies did not do so. However, they, together with the rest of the 
metropolis, were to come within the compass, two years later, of the Metropolitan 
Poor Act's administrative Common Poor Fund. 
This study of the legislative context of the Act confirms the significance of the 
themes highlighted in the introductory chapter. The Metropolitan Poor Act extended 
the redistributive systems of the 1834 Act, the Union Chargeability Act 1865 and the 
Metropolitan Houseless Poor Acts 1864/5. The format, however- an administrative 
Fund controlled by central government - ran counter to previous developments. 
Hardy's Act also revived the previously rejected 1844 Poor Law Amendment Act 
provisions for dividing the metropolis into poor law districts -a system which provided, 
as did the 1867 Fund, an alternative to placing equalised funding under metropolis-wide 
electoral control. 
In bringing all metropolitan poor law bodies within the framework of the 1834 
Acta 8 the Metropolitan Poor Act extended still further central government's powers. 
In adding its new system of nominees to the existing New Poor Law provisions for 
plural voting and ex-officio JP-guardians, the Act also expanded, in the metropolis, 
central government's instruments for non-elected control of poor relief at the local level. 
3728 & 29 Vict c. 79. 
38LMA, Notes on formation of boards of guardians. Nine of the ten had become either single unions 
or parts of unions by 1869. 
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III 
An immense amount of material about the issues and concerns involved in the 
Metropolitan Poor Act's genesis and implementation can be found in the records of 
parliamentary debates. The object in examining some of this material is not so much to 
consider the thinking of individual parliamentarians as to illuminate the processes 
involved in the making of this public policy. 39 
To analyse the debates, a methodological framework of five policy-making 
models has been devised40 as a means of identifying and explaining the forces that 
shaped the policies41 in the Metropolitan Poor Act. The models are based on the 
following five questions about the policy making process. Was the Act the product of a 
reasoned, or "Rational", decision-making process, with a correct identification of the 
problem - metropolitan poverty and the West-East divide - leading to a logical 
solution? 42 Did the Act, on the other hand, not represent a reasoned response but the 
attempted satisfaction of the demands of various interest groups pressing for change -a 
"Pluralist" solution? Was it but one stage in a gradual "Incremental" process in which 
various poor law policy-makers took a series of "small steps away from the status 
quo, 43 seeking remedies for practical poor relief problems? Was the Act made largely 
by civil servants who were pursuing their own perception of what was appropriate for 
the metropolitan poor law situation at that time -a "Bureaucratic Power" decision- 
making process? Or was the policy-making process governed by a desire to wield 
political control over events in accordance with a particular pattern, and therefore 
related to a discernible set of principles for government -a "Political" model? 
39Hansard's 
version of the debates studied usually corresponds with reports in The Times. Where the 
accuracy of Hansard's quotations was felt to be particularly important, comparisons were made with 
4 
reports in other newspapers. See also Chapter 1, p. 8, n. 3. 
e policy-making models used here (including my own hybrid, "Political"), are derived from the 
reading of a number of works, but use has been made particularly of Martin Burch & Bruce Wood, 
Public Policy in Britain (Oxford, 1990), 24-48, who suggest ten models. 41Ibid., 24. These goals were also those of Burch & Wood. 
42The use of the term "Rational" is not intended to suggest the wider concept of "rationalist" but only 
the model of problem-solving and decision-making so-titled that is defined in much literature on policy- 
making as an objective, reasoned process. 
43Burch & Wood, op. cit., 27. 
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The Rational model of policy-making fits the public case that was made for rate 
equalisation: the identification of wealth differences in the metropolis as a problem that 
needed to be resolved in order to cope effectively with pauperism. The solution was 
inherent in the definition of the problem. If a West-East divide was causing major poor 
relief problems in the metropolis, the divide should be overcome by means of 
metropolis-wide shared and equal funding - an equalised rate. (The use of "West" and 
"East" needs to be clarified: while "West End" became - not very accurately - 
synonymous with wealth, and was taken to include some City parishes, poverty was 
identified not only with the East End but also with poorer parishes and unions south of 
the river. ) 
The question was placed explicitly on the local taxation agenda by A. S. Ayrton, 
Radical MP for the East End seat of Tower Hamlets, 44 when he moved (unsuccessfully) 
in 1857 for a Select Committee to enquire into "the causes of the inequality of the poor 
rates in the metropolitan district, and whether any measures should be adopted to render 
the rates more equal". 45 Graphically he contrasted the Spitalfields weaver with the 
"high-born lady of Belgravia or Mayfair" who wore his silk and velvet, 46 and the home 
of the sailor and dock labourer in St. George-in-the-East with that of the merchant who 
"resided with all his wealth in St. George-in-the-West". 
A year later, arguing for his Bill "to provide a remedy for the inequality in the 
rates for the relief of the poor in the metropolis", Ayrton returned with vigour to the 
attack on distinctions of class and wealth, pointing out that if a man on the verge of 
destitution were found in the streets of St. George, Hanover Square, a policeman would 
be ordered to drive him from the locality because it would be assumed that he could 
44M. Stenton, Who's Who of British Politics (Sussex, 1976); DNB vol. XXII Supplement (Oxford 
1921-2). Acton Smee Ayrton, 1816-86, MP for Tower Hamlets 1857-74, was Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Treasury 1868-9, Chief Commissioner of Works and Buildings 1869-73, and Judge Advocate- 
General 1873-4. 
45Hansard 16.6.1857 col. 1899. 46Nd116.6.1857, col. 1901; The Times version is identical. The Daily News, 17.7.1857,2d, e, 
reported this as "so again take the weavers. They were kept in Spitalfields to gratify the ladies of rank 
who resided in St. George's in the West". 
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have no business, no residence and no occupation, whereas the same man found walking 
in St. George-in-the-East would be regarded as being in his element. In the areas of 
wealth and rank were to be found all the employers, he said, and in the areas of poverty 
and wretchedness, all the employed. 47 
The case of the parishes of Bermondsey and of Southwark St. George the Martyr, 
where most of the poor employed in the docks and City commercial establishments 
lived, were similarly cited by John Locke, Liberal MP for Southwark and son of a 
Southwark tradesman. 48 The great merchants of the City, he said, who owned a dozen 
Indiamen and perhaps employed 1,000 men in loading and unloading them, merely paid 
a nominal poor rate for a small office in an alley, while "their splendid residences at the 
West End" were comparatively free from poor relief charges because there were hardly 
49 any paupers in those parishes. 
Other examples included the construction of Regent Street, which had led to the 
dwellings of "thousands of persons of the poorer class" being demolished and their being 
driven from the richer parishes to the poorer parishes in the south and east of the 
metropolis. The greatest social evil in the metropolis was the fact that "hundreds of 
thousands of the poor were huddled together in the poorer neighbourhoods, and obliged 
to live in dwellings wholly unfit for their reception, 50 Fourteen rich parishes, Ayrton 
pointed out, with a rateable value of £172,000, paid £6,950 in poor rates, while the 
same number of poor parishes with a much lower rateable value of £62,000 paid not 
only proportionately but also actually higher rates of £11,350.51 
Under the existing system, Locke suggested, the richer parishes would not allow 
dwellings for the poorer classes to be built (because this would lead to increased calls on 
the poor rate). With equalised rating, however, it would no longer be in the interests 
of a parish to prevent suitable houses being built for the poor. He recalled that when 
houses of the poor were pulled down in order to build Victoria Street, the Dean and 
Chapter of Westminster had congratulated themselves upon getting rid of 2,000-3,000 
of their inhabitants. 
47Ibid., 12.5.1858, col. 498; Daily News, 13.5.1858,3a, says a poor man was driven from the West 
End "in order that he might not become chargeable in the parish" (an accurate reflection of the 
situation, whether or not Ayrton said it). 
48Stenton, op. cit. John Locke, 1805-80, MP for Southwark 1857-80. 
49Hansard, 23.3.1858 col. 641. 
501bid., 23.3.1858. col. 641 (Locke). 
51Ibid, 16.6.1857 col. 1903 (Ayrton). 
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The House was asked to recall former times when, in all parts of the metropolis, 
low neighbourhoods had been "dotted here and there", and there had to a certain extent 
been a diffusion of poverty. However, the wealthy classes "did not like to have such a 
mass of squalid misery near them, but desired to banish it to a greater distance. " It was 
their duty, however, to follow this misery wherever it went and to hold themselves liable 
to contribute equally to its support. 52 
Ayrton presented figures53 showing that deaths from want and privation had 
risen almost 100 per cent. in the metropolis from 1848 to 1857. He added that such 
deaths "appeared" to have been most frequent in parishes where the rates were highest, 
and he contended that "all those deaths" should be laid at the doors of the wealthy 
inhabitants of the metropolis, "who were only paying 6d. in the pound for the relief of 
the poor. " 
The poverty of some East End ratepayers was another issue. In 1861 Ayrton 
pointed out54 that there were ratepayers who had to pledge their goods in order to pay 
poor rates while rich people in the West End were "rejoicing at the small sums that they 
had to contribute to the rates". 
Lord Wodehouse, Liberal peer, in moving the second reading in the Lords of the 
1861 Irremovable Poor Bi1155, gave the House the example of St. Katherine's Dock, 
which had no poor because all its labourers lived in neighbouring parishes. "The place 
in which they worked escaped from all responsibility for their maintenance in case they 
became chargeable on the poor rates.,, 56 
Again in 1865, during the debates on the Union Chargeability Bill, Locke 
pointed to the burdens placed on the East End, including the area south of the Thames. 
Recent Acts had been passed for the building of new streets and railways, and the people 
who were removed to make way for the improvements were "driven across the water 
into districts where they were crowded in the most deplorable manner". No provision 
had been made for them in the richer parishes from which they had been dislodged. He 
recalled again the example of the building of Victoria Street, when the Dean and 
Chapter, asked whether provision had been made for 2,000 displaced persons, "said 
521bid, 12.5.1858 col. 498-9 (Ayrton). 531bid., 12.5.1858. col. 501. 54Ibid, 8.2.1861 col. 238. 55Ibid, 23.7.1861. col. 1349. 561bid, 23.7.1861 col. 1349. 
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they had made no provision for them, and that they must go across the water': 
57 The 
poor had done so, and after three years had become chargeable there. In Tower 
Hamlets lived "an immense number of persons" who worked in the docks, owned by 
shareholders living in all parts of town, but became chargeable solely in the poorer 
parishes. 
An integral part of the reasoning for a poor relief policy to combat the 
metropolitan wealth/poverty divide had to be the special nature of the metropolis; if this 
argument was lost, the country gentlemen were likely to see metropolitan rate 
equalisation as the thin end of the wedge to be applied in future to the counties. 
Ayrton, for instance, when first raising the issue, said that he "must distinctly disclaim 
any intention of raising any discussion, except so far as it related to the metropolis 
itself', 58 and suggested that some Members were afraid the subject would lead to 
"investigations over a large area under circumstances that would be prejudicial to the 
landed interest". 59 The following year he contrasted the social structure of villages, 
where all classes lived near each other, with that of the metropolis, where the natural 
division was that between classes, living in their separate "quarters": for wealthy 
merchants, for manufacturers, and for artisans - as was the nature of great cities. 
60 
Although the argument, as reported, did not conform wholly with the claim that the 
wealthy were to blame for the West-East divide, the conclusion did: that financial 
liabilities ought to be borne by the metropolis at large, across the range of its "quarters", 
and not by the parish to which, by accidental circumstances, the poor had gone. 
The simple, emotive logic of the rate equalisation case could only be opposed 
effectively by redefining the nature of the problem. While Radical supporters of rate 
equalisation focused on the poverty and hardship suffered because of the wealth-poverty 
divide, some opponents argued that it was merely a "ratepayer question" about the 
distribution of rates, not hardship61 - and therefore, by implication, less emotive. 
Marylebone Liberal MP Harvey Lewis denied that it was a West-East problem: even 
Marylebone, which had many affluent residents, also contained many poor, and if rate 
redistribution increased West End rates by even a slight extent, he warned, many 
571bid, 21.2.1865 col. 485. 58Daily News 17.6.1857,2d, e. 
59Hansard 16.6.1857, col. 1900. 
60, bid, 23.3.1858 col. 627-8. 
611bid, 16.6.1857 col. 1913,1917. 
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ratepayers would be reduced to the condition of paupers. 
62 T. Sotheron-Estcourt, 
Conservative President of the Poor Law Board in 1858-9, denied that pauperism was an 
exceptional problem in the metropolis: the level, he said, was 3.9 per cent. compared 
with 4.6 per cent. in the country as a whole. 
63 
The foundation of the Rational case - that inequality actually mattered, and that it 
ought to be addressed by means of legislation - was questioned to only a limited extent. 
This was perhaps an indication of the power of the Radicals' dramatic illustrations and 
their simple, forceful reasoning. Ayrton, for instance, disposed of the charitable 
donations issue with the simple statement that "casual donations by the wealthy could 
never be accepted as an equivalent for the injustice of the present system of rating", and 
no disagreement was offered. 64 F. W. Knight, Conservative MP for West 
Worcestershire and a former secretary of the Poor Law Board, remarked briefly that the 
poor parishes "had not more ground of complaint against the rich parishes than one man 
had to complain of another being richer than himself', and the Liberal President of the 
Poor Law Board (E. P. Bouverie), admitting that "considerable inequality" existed, 
argued that "the mere fact of there being an inequality" was no reason for adjusting the 
rate (or, more emotively, according to the Daily News, "no reason for altering the 
pressure of the burden"). His fellow Liberal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (M. T. 
Baines), ventured only to deny that any great inequality existed between parishes in the 
metropolis. 65 
Provided, therefore, that rate equalisation proponents could withstand opponents' 
redefinitions of the problem and establish their own three premises effectively - that 
there was a wealth-poverty geographical divide, that it constituted a serious poor relief 
problem, and that the metropolis was different - the case for policy-making on grounds 
of reason was strong. It was on the simple logic of such arguments that the campaign 
for rate equalisation was built from 1857 to 1867, not only within but outside 
parliament. 
621bid, 21.2.1867, col. 751. 
631bid., 12.5.1858, col. 506. 
Mlbid., 16.6.1857, col. 1905. 
65p, id, 16.6.1857, cols. 1913-14,1926,1930; Daily Telegraph 17.6.1857,2b; Daily News 17.6.1857, 
2f. 
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The policy-making context was in fact somewhat more complex. Despite the 
easy passage of the Metropolitan Poor Act through Parliament it was preceded, over 
several years, by vigorous campaigns and debates involving converging or competing 
interests such as ratepayers, the poor, clergymen, local poor law bodies and the medical 
world. While the Rational model is therefore relevant in relation to the incorporation of 
rate equalisation in the Act, a Pluralist process of pressures on government from 
competing interests was also at work. 
Although the interests of poorer ratepayers were pressed frequently in the debates 
on rate equalisation and related legislation, there seems to have been no corresponding 
public attempt to support the position of wealthier metropolitan ratepayers (either 
individual or institutional) as they came under attack. The only defences offered 
(frequently and vigorously) were of the landed interest when they were accused in wider 
redistribution debates. Ayrton, for instance, suggested that the reason for the failure to 
improve the efficiency of poor law administration over the past 25 years was that such 
changes "might have a serious effect on the pecuniary interests of the great territorial 
aristocracy of this country", both within and outside the metropolis. It was because of 
this numerically small but very influential group that Ministers could not or dare not 
meet the real issues, he said. 
66 
Despite, however, the apparent reluctance of Members of both Houses to support 
the interests of wealthy metropolitan gentlemen and businessmen who paid low poor 
rates, they clearly existed. It will be argued below67 that their interests were well- 
represented within the Act. 
Middle-range ratepayers in poorer metropolitan parishes and unions could, of 
course, expect also to benefit from rate equalisation, but emphasis was generally placed 
instead on the proportionately unfair burden they had to bear, and on the sufferings of 
the poor; Ayrton, for instance, emphasised that it "really was a poor man's question". 
68 
At times the contradictions of this position for Radical MPs became apparent. For 
66Ibid., 8.2.1861 col. 237. M. Caplan, "The New Poor Law and the struggle for union chargeability", 
IRSH, 23 (1978), considers this legislative question in detail. 
67See Chapter 6. 
68Hansard 12.5.1858, col. 501. 
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instance in the debates on the Irremovable Poor Bill 1861 Locke argued against 
increasing the freedom of the poor by giving them the right to gain settlement in a parish 
after only three years residence instead of five. In Bermondsey and Southwark, he said, 
with their large numbers of paupers, the poor relief burden on ratepayers would be 
increased if paupers with the right to settlement elsewhere became irremovable sooner, 
and therefore eligible for relief from the parish or union after a shorter period of time. 69 
Ayrton agreed that the proposal "did great injustice" to the parishes that he and Locke 
represented. 70 When, four years later, the Union Chargeability Bill proposed that all 
poor relief should be paid from a union's common fund, Locke had to make a similar 
point about the effect of this proposed reform in his constituency, and he called again for 
the whole metropolis to be formed into one single union. 7' It appears therefore, that 
the battle for metropolitan rate equalisation was a solution not only to problems of 
poverty and under-funding in the East and South but also to ratepayer pressure on 
politicians arising from the contradictions inherent in more moderate reforms. 
Although it aroused widespread parliamentary anger and statements of rejection, 
Ayrton's inflammatory rhetoric on the demands of the poor and "the people", and the 
inability of poorer ratepayers to support their local poor, clearly added a significant 
element to the Pluralist pattern of pressures on government. It was not wise, he said, to 
allow men to think that they were suffering injustice at the hands of a certain number of 
wealthy noblemen and gentlemen. He warned that "the people would make themselves 
heard, but it might be in a manner that was not to be desired. Their plain sense of 
justice would prevail against all the cold philosophy of their opponents". 72 
This was, the House recognised, the language of menace. That Members were 
being threatened with the consequences of ignoring the interests of East End ratepayers 
and the poor was not denied. John Locke, supporting Ayrton's speech, pointed out that 
this was not the first time the House had been "menaced", and cited the repeal of the 
73 Corn Laws and Roman Catholic emancipation. 
Ayrton included "aggrieved ratepayers" in his graphic imagery, envisaging them 
calling to their aid "those poor people who were the victims of the present system, by 
691bid, 5.7.1861 col. 404. 701bid., 5.7.1861 col. 408. 
711bid, 21.2.1865 col. 485. 721bid, 12.5.1858 col. 502. A varying degree of the detail of this rhetoric is including in the press. 731bid., 12.5.1858,511-2. 
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denouncing to them the great and crying injustice perpetrated upon them by the wealthy 
and powerful': The question before parliament might now be considered in a calm and 
dispassionate manner, he said, "but it could not be so if the poorer classes of the 
metropolis were once induced to take it into their own hands". If the body of one of 
those who had died of starvation were to be held up before the people, he suggested, 
and they were told that this was the result of injustice, it would be very difficult to deal 
74 
with the subject in a temperate manner. 
Pressure from East End clergymen was another element in the case for rate 
equalisation, and Ayrton gave this as the reason for his motion to set up a select 
committee so soon after his election as an MP despite ministerial lack of interest. 
Comparing the East End clergy with the Church's higher dignitaries (who might be "left 
with their influence to take care of themselves") he said that these lower clergy were 
"the ornaments of their profession", received exceedingly small stipends, were well- 
acquainted with the poor and had many opportunities of examining the condition of the 
people. Their concern with rating arose, he said, from the fact that ratepayers living in 
highly-rated poor areas were refusing to give either sympathy or support to the church's 
religious and social institutions because they were "subjected to such gross and crying 
injustice" on the poor rates. Clergymen were being told by East End ratepayers to go 
to the fashionable parishes of the West End for donations. When, the following year, 
Ayrton proposed his rate equalisation Bill, he said that it was the result of "a calm and 
temperate discussion" by ratepayers "under the auspices chiefly of the clergy of the 
Established Church". 75 
While this pressure for rate equalisation from clergymen and ratepayers (from a 
wider area that just the East and South)76 was ultimately to succeed, attempts to defend 
the records of local bodies - particularly boards of guardians and Local Act parishes - 
were less effective. Attacks included Lord Robert Cecil's77 chronology of the battles 
between the Poor Law Board and the metropolitan workhouses over the past five years: 
St. Marylebone workhouse in 1855 over ill-treatment of female paupers, St. Pancras 
74Ibid., 23.3.1858 col. 633-4. 751bid., 23.5.1858, col. 631. 76Ibid, 23.5.1858, col. 631. Ayrton pointed out that support for his 1858 rate equalisation Bill came 
from "ratepayers..... representing the great bulk of the inhabitants of the metropolis, who had that 
evening presented a petition in favour of the Bill". See also Chapter 3 below. 77Lord Robert Cecil, Conservative MP for Stamford and subsequently Prime Minister (the Marquess of 
Salisbury). 
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workhouse in 1856 over atrocious conditions in the casual wards, and the outdoor relief 
system, St. Pancras and St. James workhouses over the appointment of auditors, and 
Wapping workhouse. Cecil called for the Poor Law Board to be given "greater power 
of interfering summarily with the management of the workhouses in this metropolis". 78 
Hardy, in introducing the Metropolitan Poor Bill, reminded the Commons of the 1864-6 
metropolitan workhouse scandals - the cases of Timothy Daly, an Irish labourer who had 
died in the Holborn workhouse towards the end of 1864, and Gibson, who had died in 
the St. Giles workhouse in 1865, and also of conditions in the Rotherhithe Workhouse 
in 1865, in the Strand Union workhouse in 1866 and in Paddington workhouse - and the 
"exceedingly adverse" reports by Poor Law Board inspectors. 79 
Supporters of metropolitan local bodies tried to influence policy-making 
processes on many occasions leading up to the 1867 dilution of local elected power. 
Lord Fermoy, Liberal MP for Marylebone, pointed out that the St. Pancras guardians, 
accused in debate80 of being "so hardhearted and unjust", had been among those calling 
for an enquiry into the administration of poor relief. They were doing their best to 
administer a notoriously difficult law, and he believed they had done all in their power 
to relieve distress. Alderman Thomas Sidney, former Lord Mayor of London, 
supported the call for more powers for boards of guardians to enable them to exercise 
greater discretion. 81 Liberal Sir John Hibbert, MP for Oldham and Deputy-Lieut. of 
Lancashire, regretted to see the Poor Law Board "disposed more and more to grasp the 
powers that ought to be left to boards of guardians': It did not become the dignity of 
either the Poor Law Board or the boards of guardians, he said, for the Poor Law Board 
to hold the reins so tightly. 82 The blame for the workhouse scandals lay, suggested 
Earl Fortescue (a former secretary to the Board) not with the boards of guardians but 
with the Poor Law Board: with those who had not "stimulated, rebuked and exercised 
sufficient supervision over the inspectors who were nominally in charge of the 
83 metropolis". 
78Hansard 8.2.1861 col. 237. 791bid, 8.2.1867, col. 151. O'Neill, op. cit., 271-2, gives a more detailed account of the Daly issue. 80lbid, 8.2.1861 col. 241. 81Ibid, 8.2.1861 col. 241. 
821bid, 12.6.65, col. 99. 
831bid, 17.5.1866 col. 1143. As Viscount Ebrington, Fortescue had been Liberal parliamentary 
secretary to the Poor Law Board 1847-51, and he was related by marriage to the Earl of Devon, Hardy's 
Conservative successor as President 1867-8. (See chapter 7, p. 195-6).. 
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Hardy himself did not condemn metropolitan guardians as such. The 1861-4 
Select Committee on Poor Relief, he noted, had been shown nothing implicating the 
management of metropolitan workhouses in the charges which had subsequently 
"created so much excitement". On the contrary, there had been every reason to 
suppose that the workhouses were properly managed and that the treatment of the 
inmates did not demand intervention. On the scandals, he suggested that four cases in 
which great hardship and wrong had been inflicted in a total of 39 metropolitan 
workhouses housing 25,000-30,000 people "would not strike one as remarkable". 
He remarked on the role of the press (a further channel for pluralist pressure on 
government). The four scandals, he suggested, seen "as it were, in a kaleidoscope, 
through the comments of the press", caused a sensation which was perhaps 
disproportionate to the circumstances under which they occurred, and blame had been 
imputed to the guardians not only of the workhouses in question but of the workhouses 
of the metropolis generally. Metropolitan guardians, he suggested, were watched with 
excessive scrutiny by the press. (Hardy's comments here can usefully be compared 
with David Roberts' analysis of the "real and imaginary tales of cruelty" in workhouses 
in the 1830s and 1840s told by "The Times, Lords, MPs and pamphleteers". )84 
Medical interests, on the other hand, opposed in a number of respects to the 
existing powers of the boards of guardians85 (but not to rate equalisation, which would 
fund the institutional reforms86) received almost unopposed support in parliament. The 
issues receiving the lengthiest attention in Hardy's First Reading speech were medical: 
the physical conditions in workhouses and their infirmaries, medical and nursing 
resources, and practical questions such as cubic space, ventilation and the desirability of 
draughts; the great point on which the whole question turned, the President said, was 
"ventilation". 
Florence Nightingale was cited on the training of infirmary nurses and the 
Commons was reminded in detail of the initiatives taken by the medical world - the full 
and detailed enquiry conducted by The Lancet at its own expense into the overcrowded 
841bid, 8.2.1867 col. 151,21.2.1867 col. 772-4; D. Roberts, "How Cruel was the Victorian Poor 
Law? ", HJ (1963, VI, 1), 98,101,102,103,107-7. 
85M. A. Crowther, The Workhouse System 1834-1929 (London, 1981), 160-5, gives an account of 
9-uardian/medical conflicts of interests. 
66The Times 7.3.1867,6f. Extra-parliamentary pressure included that from the Metropolitan 
Workhouse Infirmaries Association, which supported (unsuccessfully) the inclusion of infirmary 
building costs as an equalised item and the removal of the rating qualification for nominees. 
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sick departments of the metropolitan workhouses, and the roles played by the President 
of the College of Physicians and various other named and often eminent medical men 
who had visited the workhouses "by day and by night" to enquire into conditions. The 
Commons was assured (inaccurately, as it turned out) that the "extreme limit" of cost 
for the great building programme to implement the recommended improvements would 
87 be £400,000. 
The Liberal former President, Villiers, a supporter of the medical lobby, proposed 
an extension of their powers while agreeing that guardians' should be weakened. 
Nominees, he said, should be replaced by medical men, who would feel "bound to fulfil 
the duties imposed on them", would bring competence to the boards and should be paid 
to sit with the elected members. John Stuart Mill, also a strong supporter of medical 
men against local guardians, later grouped medical men together with "the sick, the 
poor, and the lunatics" as victims of the boards of guardians. Refusal by guardians to 
perform their local duties, he told the Commons, not only injured suffering and 
unprotected persons, but led to "the oppression of the medical profession' : 88 The 
previous year, at the committee stage of the Metropolitan Poor Bill, Mill and Ayrton 
took up conflicting positions on the dismissal of medical men by the central Board: 
while Mill argued for an appeal or arbitration "so that they might not be at the mercy or 
discretion of a single officer", Ayrton, supporting Hardy and the Bill against his fellow- 
Liberal, remarked that "those who wished to elevate the medical profession placed their 
claims too high". 89 
Competing Pluralist pressures, it is clear, played a major part in parliament's 
consideration of poor relief policies in the 1860s, and particularly in the genesis of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act, with local government and the medical world often ranged on 
opposite sides, the poor supported (from different perspectives) by both, and ratepayer 
interests coinciding more often with those of the local poor law bodies than with medical 
men's arguments. 
871bid, 8.2.1867, col. 153-62 & 164-6. 881bid, 21.2.1867 col. 766-7,11.3.1867 col. 1678-80 & 1685-6,18.7.1868 col. 1424-5 (debate on the 
Poor Relief Bill). 
891bid, 11.3.1867, col. 1685-6. 
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Although there is little parliamentary evidence for an Incremental approach 
(taking "small steps away from the status quo") in an administrative context, with small- 
scale internal problem-solving at the central Board leading to significant policy-making, 
there is considerable evidence for the use of incrementalism as a political tactic by 
Liberal and Radical MPs. 
Much of this has already been considered by Caplan, who suggests that the Union 
Chargeability Act 1865 was passed as a result of "piecemeal, step-by- 
step.... legislation. "90 However, (as shown in the next chapter) a metropolis-wide 
locally-based radical-reform movement, working closely with Radicals in parliament, 
played a very active part in generating political support for equalising legislation. The 
"piecemeal" interpretation, under-emphasising as it does the question of political co- 
ordination, therefore needs to be re-assessed. For instance the Metropolitan Houseless 
Poor Acts 1864 & 1865, presented to parliament by the Liberal President of the Poor 
Law Board initially as problem-solving responses to immediate needs and a small 
development out of previous policy, were a crucial stage in the ten-year co-ordinated 
political struggle in the metropolis for rate equalisation, and deserve closer attention 
than they have hitherto received. 
The immediate source of the 1864 Act was the tenacious political tactics of 
Radicals - especially Ayrton and Locke - on the 1861-4 Select Committee on Poor 
Relief. 91 Villiers, however, argued - for obvious tactical reasons - that the Bill was, in 
effect, just another small step. There was no novelty in the principle of the new Bill, he 
said: the 1844 Poor Law Amendment Ac? s92 permissive provisions 20 years before for 
setting up large asylums for the destitute houseless poor in six metropolitan districts of 
the metropolis, combining rich and poor parishes, had applied the principles of rate 
equalisation and of the metropolis bearing "the burden of the support". 93 (In fact his 
argument was inaccurate in three major respects: there had been no proposed 
metropolitan find in 1844 and no attempt at equalisation within the metropolis as a 
whole, the Act had not decreed six districts, and equalisation was intended only in the 
9OCaplan, op. cit., 274-81,285-96 
91pp 1864 ix, Report of the Select Committee on Poor Relief, Proceedings, 57. 927 &8 Vict. c. 101, s. 41-54. 
93Hansard 25.7.1864 col. 2040-1; Daily News 26.7.1864,3c, d 
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sense that the annual rateable value basis for district precepts would have created an 
equal rate within each district. The Act was also weak as a precedent because it had 
been unpopular with local bodies and ratepayers, and had not been implemented. ) 
Pushing his measure through in a thinly-attended House at the end of the session, 
Villiers described this major predecessor to the Metropolitan Poor Act as "a very short 
Bill" and one in which he "simply sought .... to give effect to the recommendations of a 
committee which had arrived at an unanimous conclusion on the subject". On meeting 
opposition, he gave the assurance that he "certainly had no intention of sanctioning .... 
the principle of the equalisation of the rating for the relief of the poor throughout the 
metropolis". The object of the follow-up Bill the following year was "merely to 
continue another (Bill) which had already expired". When, in committee, Ayrton 
moved an amendment to make the provisions of the Bill permanent, Villiers "did not in 
the least object to it", pointing out that this had been the intention prior to the last- 
minute "considerable opposition" of the previous year. 94 
The opposition clearly recognised the President's small problem-solving Bill as a 
major political measure. H. Baillie, Conservative MP for Inverness-shire, compared 
Villiers' approach to the case of "the young woman who when charged with having had 
a bastard child vindicated herself by saying it was a very small one". Although Villiers 
had called it a very small Bill it was, Baillie said, a very important one. A Bill involving 
"such a total change in the constitution of the Poor Law" should not be "shuffled" 
through the House when there were very few Members present apart from the 
occupants of the Treasury Bench. Lord Claude Hamilton said that an important 
measure involving "a totally new principle" was being smuggled through. E. P. 
Bouverie, former President of the Poor Law Board, objected to "a Bill of such 
importance" being introduced at the end of the session. It was, he said, "one of the 
most important in its principle and operation which had in the present session been 
submitted", involving a problem which was perhaps "about the most difficult of 
solution" of any that confronted the Poor Law Board. 95 
Despite Villiers' argument that the proposed common fund to resolve the "evil" of 
the destitute poor who "paraded the streets of the metropolis at night" would "only 
941bid, 19.7.1864 col. 1771; 25.7.1864 col. 2043; 26.7.1864 col. 2101-2; 5.4.1865 col. 765-7. 95Ibid, 21.7.1864 col. 1802; 25.7.1864 col. 2044. 
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amount to £5,000 for the whole metropolis"- "a trifling sum", 
96 opponents continued to 
attack the measure on the basis of its political and financial principles. For instance, 
Lord Claud Hamilton said that making the Metropolitan Board of Works the rating body 
subverted the whole system upon which the administration of poor relief was founded - 
"a combination of the principles of taxation and representation". Recognising the 
potential local government significance of the measure, he pointed out that the MBW 
had been established for sewerage, paving, draining, lighting and cleansing, and there 
was no reason why it should be introduced into the administration of poor relief. 
97 
Similarly Harvey Lewis, Liberal MP for Marylebone, suggested that the Bill sought to 
apply funds raised for one purpose - the sewage of the metropolis - to another, the relief 
of the poor. 
98 Sir John Shelley voiced his suspicion that the Bill might be the "thin edge 
of the wedge" to bring in "district rating for the whole of the metropolis". 
99 Political 
division extended to the MBW itself, where a small majority decided (to no avail) that 
they did not wish to administer such a rate. '00 
The application by Liberal and Radical politicians of "Incremental" tactics to rate 
equalisation policy-making was, it is clear, sometimes successful but usually recognised 
as such by their opponents and attacked on a political basis. The example of the 
Metropolitan Houseless Poor Acts, predecessors to the 1867 Act, suggests that despite 
the vast range of poor law legislation that appears to include some incremental elements, 
a simple Incremental model of policy-making needs to be treated with caution in this 
field. 
There is parliamentary evidence not so much for a Bureaucratic Power process at 
work in the genesis of the 1867 Act as for the fear that such power might influence the 
making or implementation of policy unduly: the "centralisation" issue. There is also, 
however, evidence in the debates that such influences were not unwelcome and probably 
existed. 
96thid., 20.7.1864 col. 1771-2; 21.7.1864 col. 1801-2. 
97lbid., 21.7.1864 col. 1796-7. 
981bid., 25.7.1864 col. 2952. 
99Ibid., 25.7.1864, col. 2051. 
100lbid., 25.7.1864, col. 2042; Daily News 26.7.1864,3c, d. 
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Leading politicians in both parties prior to 1867 were certainly willing that the 
Poor Law Board's administrative powers should grow, and from 1867 the Metropolitan 
Poor Act and its successor Acts explicitly gave the Board greatly increased quasi- 
legislative powers in the form of the right to draft powerful orders relating to the 
extensive reorganisation of metropolitan poor relief, the Board was not, however, the 
only department to expand in this way. 101 
What the debates offer are glimpses of changing parliamentary attitudes to the 
powers of the Board, and evidence that civil servants' participation in policy-making 
could be acknowledged in debates. The position in 1867, when the Metropolitan Poor 
Act was introduced to the House, was therefore somewhat different from that in 1858 
when the accusation by opponents of Ayrton's rate equalisation measure that it would 
reduce local powers was the reason he gave for withdrawing a hard-fought Bill. 102 
Nine years later, a mere scattering of Liberal MPs raised the warning cry of 
centralisation as the Metropolitan Poor Bill passed swiftly through parliament and 
Ayrton, having reached a policy compromise with the Conservative President of the 
Poor Law Board, was not among the objectors. 
Accusations of major law-making activities by the Board were sometimes imputed 
by opponents of rate equalisation as majorities were gradually achieved in the 1860s for 
redistributive legislation. Conservative Henley, for instance, in the debate on the Union 
Chargeability Bill, commenting on the role that he believed civil servants had played, 
referred to the shifting of financial burdens in the Bill as having been "so long the pet 
child of the poor law authorities". 
103 
His fellow-Conservative, Knight, brought the House into uproar two months later 
with an attack on "the officials of Gwydor House" (home of the Poor Law Board) 
during a debate on the same Bill. Their sister establishment, the Board of Health, he 
said, "which had intended to lord it over the towns in the same way as the Poor Law 
Board sought to lord it over the parishes", had been swept away, and they were afraid 
that their usefulness might be questioned too. They thought, he said, that if they could 
succeed in "smashing the parishes", their salaries would be secure, because the officials 
"knew that as long as the parochial areas and parochial officers existed there would be 
101H. Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (London, 1969), 192-3, points out the prevalence of 
delegated legislation and quasi-legislation in the middle decades of the century. 
102Thid., 16.6.1857 col. 1931; 12.5.1858 col. 515. 
103Ibid., 27.3.1865 col. 353. 
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no difficulty in returning to a cheaper and less centralised system of poor relief : 
104 
B. Smith, Liberal MP for Stockport, was one of those who expressed anxiety at the 
short tenure of ministers at the Poor Law Board. "Every two or three years the 
President was removed by a change of parties", Smith said, "and Mr. Lumley 
(permanent secretary to the Board) and two or three other gentlemen ruled the whole of 
the kingdom". 105 The veteran Conservative MP for Somerset East, Sir William Miles, 
disapproving of what he saw as a civil servants' policy-making tendency, remarked when 
the Union Chargeability Bill arrived on the Commons agenda that the House of 
Commons was too much in favour of placing everything under a central authority, and 
leaving nothing to guardians "except what poor law inspectors might advise,: 
106 
Poor Law Board ministers, however - past, present and future - showed a rather 
different perspective towards central government powers. The Earl of Devon, for 
instance, Hardy's successor as President of the Poor Law Board and the major 
Conservative hand in the implementation of the Metropolitan Poor Act, noted 
approvingly the support of civil servants for the passing of the Irremovable Poor Act 
1861107 - the first Act to incorporate redistributive annual rateable value - pointing out 
that the Bill had been recommended by two select committees of the House of 
Commons and also by "a majority of the poor law inspectors, whose authority must be 
admitted": i08 The security from dissolution that civil servants finally gained when the 
Earl of Devon removed after 20 years the shackles of annual renewal by parliament and 
made the Poor Law Board permanent in the same year that the Metropolitan Poor Act 
was passed109 was approved by Villiers who, having been President for seven years, 
thought the change would be useful in terms of staff attitudes. The annual threat of 
non-renewal was a "kind of terrorism" that crippled the Board's usefulness, he said: the 
"Minister at its head" was "always to be advised in the department to keep quiet, and to 
abstain from initiating needed reforms': 110 The implication was that the officers' 
advice was accepted. Hardy's view, as he shepherded the Metropolitan Poor Bill 
104Ibid, 11.5.1865 col. 170. 1051bid., 12.7.1867, col. 1420. 1061bid, 11.5.1865 col. 129. 
10724 & 25 Vict. c. 55, Poor Removal Act 1861. BIBL 
108Hansard23.7.1861 col. 1354. LONDON 
10930 & 31 Vict. c. 106, Poor LawAmendmentAct 1867. UNIV. 
110Hansard, 25.7.1867 col. 145. 
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through parliament, was that metropolitan guardians were not "unmanageable bodies if 
sufficient power is given to those who have to rule and regulate them". 
111 
The increased control given to the central Board by Hardy's Act was approved by 
various leading Liberals. Lord Kimberley remarked that the metropolitan guardians 
having "disregarded the rules and orders of the Poor Law Board", the Board had "very 
properly brought in a measure to remove the management of the metropolitan poor, to a 
certain extent, from the local authorities. " He was glad, he said, that the powers of the 
Poor Law Board were to be increased. 112 Lord Enfield, recently Liberal Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Poor Law Board but also a West End MP, believed that the fear of 
central power -"the bugbear of centralisation" - would vanish because of the benefits 
that would be derived. There must be something radically wrong, he suggested, in a 
system in which, year after year, "unseemly contests arose between the Poor Law Board 
and the parishes under local Acts which refused to recognise the authority of the central 
Board': 
One has to conclude that the parliamentary debates give, as one would expect, 
only brief hints about the extent of civil servant participation in policy-making, and that 
there is no undisputed evidence from this source that such participation was of the 
magnitude to be expected of a Bureaucratic Power model. Nonetheless, the fact that 
the Metropolitan Poor Act gave the Poor Law Board powerful quasi-legislative powers 
indicates that the Board's servants may for some time past have played a significant, 
even if not a dominant, role in policy-making. 113 
It is argued in this thesis that both the nominee clauses and the administrative 
format chosen for rate equalisation raised issues of political power and control, and were 
crucial elements in the Act. Evidence in later chapters will support this interpretation 
and confirm that an extension of gentlemanly political power was consciously sought 
and implemented. 
111 Ibid., 21.2.1867 col. 773-4. 112fid, 19.3.1867, col. 108. 113C. Bellamy, Administering central-local relations 1871-1919 (Manchester, 1988), 8, argues that the 
1834 Report that preceded the New Poor Law recognised "the incapacity of the centre to fund and 
manage a national system"; this factor needs to be taken into account when assessing the extent and 
nature of bureaucratic power in the three decades that followed. 
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Gentlemen in parliament were, of course, unlikely to make statements that were 
too explicit in this respect. It was to his diary, and not to the Commons, that Hardy 
confided his view on the Second Reform Act a few months later that "if the gentry will 
take their part they will be adopted as leaders. If we are left to the demagogues, God 
help us! "114 
The parliamentary debates on the Metropolitan Poor Act provide, therefore, only 
limited evidence that a process of pursuing gentlemanly power was at work in the 
genesis of parts of the Act. A form of negative confirmation that power and control 
were an issue was however given by MPs representing indignant boards of guardians 
from across the metropolis who were confronted with the possibility of having 
gentlemanly nominees added to their number. 
For instance, Liberal MPs argued that the nominee proposal would "practically 
set aside the present boards of guardians" and should be omitted (Harvey Lewis, MP for 
Marylebone), that it struck a blow at local government (Charles Butler, MP for Tower 
Hamlets), that no provision was made for nominee guardians going out of office 
(Alderman W. Lawrence, MP for London), that it "ran counter to the constitution, and 
allowed the nominees of the Poor Law Board to override the will of the representatives 
of the ratepayers" (an anonymous "hon. Member"), and that his constituents strongly 
objected to it (A. H. Layard, MP for Southwark). John Candlish, MP for Sunderland, 
argued that it was "objectionable, dangerous, a great blot on the Bill and a serious 
inroad on representative government", James Wyld, MP for Bodmin, pointed out that 
the "perfectly novel principle" of nominees would be applied to a body possessing taxing 
powers, and Alderman Andrew Lusk, MP for Finsbury, upholding "the principle of 
representation as opposed to nomination", quoted a popular song, "Oh, woodman, spare 
that tree! "115 
Although most of these arguments referred specifically to the concept of local 
government, what was being objected to was of course a potential transfer of political 
control away from existing board members and to unelected gentlemen. The fact that 
the nominee clauses were apparently greeted with much applause prior to these 
objections116 indicates that many in the House at least did not identify with the much- 
114Gathorne-Hardy, op. cit., I, 212, entry dated 9.8.1867. 115Hansard 11.3.1867 col. 1695-7. Most of these comments were reported in more than one 
newspaper. 116Stedman Jones (1992), op. cit., 254; J. R Green, Stray Studies (1903), 130. Green himself 
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attacked metropolitan guardians, whether or not they actively supported the nominee 
clauses. 
In Chapter 6- on the implementation of the gentlemanly nominee policy on the 
first, largest and most long-lasting of the Conservative government's new "district" 
boards, the Metropolitan Asylums Board - more specific evidence will be presented that 
the Political model of policy-making was a significant factor in relationship to the Act. 
Further supporting evidence will be offered in a study in Chapter 7 of the political 
leadership of the Poor Law Board. 
IV 
The provisions of the Metropolitan Poor Act considered in this thesis - rate 
equalisation and the nominee clauses - arose in differing degrees out of all five of the 
above policy-making processes. However, the welcome accorded the Bill on its First 
Reading, and its subsequent easy progress, were a result in particular of two of these 
processes: the Rational, because the argument for rate equalisation had been won some 
time before by metropolitan radicals, and the Pluralist, because the Bill took account of 
various interests. It was because of this satisfying of significant interests that Hardy 
was able to record in his diary on March 12 that "last night I got through committee 
with my Bill almost unchanged, and ended amid loud cheers. Resistance to it was 
hopeless". ' 17 Also a major element, but present less explicitly in the parliamentary 
debates, was the Political model, to be found particularly in those parts of the Act that 
represented reaction rather than reform: the Fund format for redistribution, and the 
nominee clauses. 
The Act was far from inevitable. It may in a number of respects seem to have 
developed incrementally out of an extensive range of past poor law legislation. But the 
massive institutional development programme and increased central control of 
metropolitan poor law institutions might have been achieved later, by other routes. 
Redistribution of wealth might have waited to be tackled on a national rather than a 
(Stedman Jones's source) supported putting nominees on boards of guardians, and indeed criticised the 
delay in implementing the provision in the East End, so his comment that "no provision in the Bill 
seemed more important" may have been influenced by this perspective. 117Gathorne-Hardy, op. cit., I, 195, entry dated 12.3.1867. 
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metropolitan scale. It was because of the presence of Rational, Pluralist and Political 
policy-making processes that the Metropolitan Poor Act took the form that it did in 
1867. 
53 
CHAPTER 3. The Movement for 
Rate Equalisation 
Redistribution of poor rates across the metropolis became politically acceptable 
because of the success of a campaign for rate equalisation conducted for ten years by an 
extensive radical reformist organisation that has since received little attention. 
' Credit 
for the achievement of equalised rating has instead been awarded, with varying degrees 
of justice, to a number of other candidates, including Florence Nightingale, 2 other 
leading medical campaigners3 and East End campaigners4. It was, however, several 
years before the medical and nursing campaigns for the sick poor that a vigorous and 
highly effective movement for metropolitan rate equalisation began, and the major co- 
ordinating figures, apart from one East End representative, were from the west, the City 
and the south. 
The movement's success derived to a significant extent from the nature of its 
membership, its alliances and its tactics, and these will be examined in this chapter. 
Also important were its rhetoric and arguments, and these, together with its policies, 
Kaplan, op. cit., 282, notes the role of the movement in influencing public opinion; F. E. Gillespie, 
Labor and politics in England, 1850-1867 (London, 1966), 132-3,135-42, notes that "a serious 
movement" for rate equalisation began in 1857, but her main metropolitan focus is on labour militancy. 2E. Cook, The life of Florence Nightingale (London, 1914), II, 124,133-4, says that by 1865 Miss 
Nightingale "knew perfectly well that the only way to (workhouse infirmary nursing) reform was by 
reform also in administration and finance". Poor law inspector Farnall, Cook points out, wrote to her of 
"your hospital and asylum rate", and said that Villiers, President of the Poor Law Board, had decided to 
adopt "your scheme". C. Woodham-Smith, Florence Nightingale 1820-1910 (London, 1950), 466-8, 
472-3, says that "the two basic principles for which (Miss Nightingale) had contended, were established 
.... and medical relief was to be a common not a parochial charge". F. B. Smith, Florence Nightingale - 
reputation and power (London, 1982), 170-2, reports her involvement in passing information about 
workhouses to the press in 1865, and the 1865 "heads of a bill" which she gave Villiers and which, 
Smith says, was "not original" and similar in its shape and general elements to "various schemes for 
'state medicine' promulgated by radical medical men since the 1840s". 3ONeill, op. cit., in his detailed analysis of the campaign in support of the needs of the sick poor, 
suggests that Dr. Ernest Hart's contribution may have been under-recognised, but he does not focus 
particularly on the financing of the reforms. 'A. Digby, The poor law in nineteenth-century England (London, 1989), 29, reports that the "pressure 
from the East End for an equalisation of the capital's poor rate achieved success in the Metropolitan 
Poor Act of 1867 ..... thus taxing the wealth of the West End for the relief of poverty 
in the East End". 
This reflects what Hardy himself said when moving the Bill: that he had been "petitioned repeatedly by 
persons at the East End of the metropolis to do something to bring them into a better condition" 
(Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 170), and is also supported by much other evidence about pressure from the East 
End. Stedman Jones (1992), op. cit., 250,253, says, citing contemporary East End press reports, that 
"the solution of East End ratepayers and vestries (to overwhelming rate demands).... was to press for the 
equalisation of the Metropolitan Poor Rate", and that the "campaign of the East End vestries against 
the inequality of the rates was finally satisfied by the Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867". 
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will be analysed in the next chapter. The aim is to demonstrate that this was a 
substantial movement that played a notable part in the achievement of rate equalisation. 
5 
The Association for Promoting Equalisation of the Poor Rates and Uniformity of 
Assessment throughout the Metropolitan Districts was inaugurated at a "numerous" 
meeting of delegates from City and metropolitan parishes and unions on 17 February 
1857, and its minute books run from that date until the disbandment of the Association 
on the passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act ten years later6. The 1857 launch was not 
the first metropolitan attempt at getting a redistributive campaign off the ground, but the 
new Association was by far the most effective, establishing an active base in Parliament 
and focusing on building widespread support for its aims. [The Association, later to 
become the Metropolitan and County Association for the Equalisation of the Poor 
Rates, will, for the purposes of this study, be referred to hereafter as the Rate 
Equalisation Association. ] 
The Association was an early vehicle for the sort of co-ordinated metropolitan 
political activity combining "local interests and questions of political principle"7 that, 
Davis and others suggest, did not generally appear in the metropolis until the mid-1880s. 
Although its membership was based on parish delegates, and its goals emphasised the 
needs of local ratepayers as well as of the poor, the equalisation rhetoric of the 
Association and its leading members, from the early days onwards, indicated wider 
perspectives and interests than those merely of vestrymen trying to keep the local poor 
rate down. The resolutions, reports, speeches, petitions, draft legislation, select 
committee evidence and published works of the Association and its members provide 
many examples of their articulation of taxation issues that either were, or were to 
become increasingly, part of the national debate on public finance. 
The national context included budgets in which both Liberal and Conservative 
Chancellors - in 1852,1854,1863 and 1874 - allowed for a redistributive role for 
income tax. From 1853, H. C. G. Matthew notes, income tax and death and succession 
duties (all essentially redistributive in nature) "increasingly played a preponderant role" 
in Gladstone's budgets, and in 1855 his aim was "explicit and deliberate: to bring within 
SAn article by myself in the London Journal, 22,2 (1997), "Paying for the Poor: A Middle-class 
Metropolitan Movement for Rate Equalisation 1857-67", was based on this part of the thesis. See 
Appendix I. 
6Guildhall MS 1088/1,1088/2. 
7Davis (1988), op. cit., 25. 
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the income tax the 'educated' part of the community, leaving the 'labouring part' outside 
the tax. Measures aimed at lower income tax payers in these years included a £50 and 
£150 differentiated exemption limit (Disraeli, 1852); a £100 undifferentiated limit and a 
graduated rate for £100-£150 incomes (Gladstone, 1854); an abatement allowance of 
£60 for £100-£200 incomes (Gladstone, 1863); and Northcote's 1874 election "bribe", 
an exemption limit of £150, and deduction of £120 for £150-£400 incomes. Buxton 
notes that Gladstone chose tea and sugar duties for reduction in 1866 because this 
would "tend to ameliorate the lot and improve the position of the labouring 
population". 
8 
At the local level, relating the level of taxation to the ability to pay had been part 
of the Poor Law for 350 years, and the "Law of Elizabeth"9 was cited frequently in 
parliamentary and other public debates in the 1850s and 1860s on redistribution of poor 
rates. "Ability" had originally implied income, but difficulties inherent in the assessment 
and collection of a personalised local tax by unpaid officials had resulted in the retention 
of traditional methods of levying the poor rate on the basis of the occupation of land and 
property. The concern of the Rate Equalisation Association for redistribution of the 
poor relief burden had roots, therefore, in principles of ability to pay deriving from 
centuries-old tradition and legislation. It was a concern the history of which far pre- 
dated redistributive considerations of nineteenth-century budget-making Chancellors. 10 
Nonetheless, however traditional the objectives of the Association may have been 
in essence, they were clearly in contrast with the more limited, immediate and inherently 
static goals involved in the massive but "temporary" charitable baling out of East End 
hardship by West End volunteers which occurred particularly in the harsh winters of 
1860-61 and 1866-67.11 To raise the question of the incidence of local taxation ("one 
of the great and constant preoccupations of Victorian and Edwardian politics "12) - and 
8H. C. G. Matthew, "Disraeli, Gladstone, and the politics of mid-Victorian Budgets", HJ, 22,3 (1979), 
615,619-21,623 n.; S. Buxton, Finance and politics, vol. I (London, 1888), 347. Matthew suggests 
that "political and social stability in Britain was considerably indebted to the fiscal compromise to 
which they each, in differing ways, contributed". 943 Eliz. c. 2, Poor Law Act 1601. 10J V. Beckett, Local taxation: national legislation and the problems of enforcement (London, 1980), 
3-9. 
11pp 1861 ix, Q. 3219-53; Stedman Jones (1992), op. cit., 244-6. See also W. Lubenow, The politics 
of government growth: early Victorian attitudes towards state intervention 1835-48 (Newton Abbot, 
1971), 19-22, on the philanthropic tradition; Lubenow includes an extract from an article in the 
Westminster Review, 1845, attacking "the cuckoo-cry - always charity, never justice, always the open 
purse, never the equal measure". 
'2p Offer, Property and politics 1870-1914 (Cambridge, 1981), 162. 
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particularly the wealth-poverty axis - was dynamic, in that the mere raising of the issue 
of incidence postulated radical, redistributive change. 
Of the tax comparisons of particular concern to the Association, 
13 
- inequality 
between poorer and wealthier rating districts, and the balance between local and national 
taxation - the first appeared in a number of respects to be satisfied in 1867 by the 
Metropolitan Common Poor Fund's direct, progressive and redistributive taxation based 
on annual rateable value. The second concern was, however, resolved less satisfactorily 
in terms of Association policies because of the Act's establishment of direct central 
control of the new Fund, and the power given to the Poor Law Board to place its own 
nominees on local boards where revenue and capital spending decisions were made. 
One of the reasons for the modern neglect of the Rate Equalisation Association is 
that Ayrton, the major parliamentary figure involved in the issue, chose, as a Tower 
Hamlets MP, to emphasise East End pressure for reform. When substantial support 
was needed, such as in select committees, public meetings and petitioning, it was the 
Rate Equalisation Association on whom he largely relied, but in his dramatic speeches he 
spoke only of pressure from the poor, the impoverished ratepayers and the lesser clergy 
of the East End. Similarly Hardy, anxious that his Bill should be passed, employed the 
more emotive concept of pressure from the East End. John Tosh's discussion of how 
intention and prejudice may affect the reliability of a source14 is relevant here. It will 
be shown below and in the next chapter that, contrary to such contemporary accounts, it 
was the largely middle-class radical reformist movement in the west, south and City that 
provided the major support for rate equalisation in the ten years prior to the passing of 
Hardy's Act. 
II 
The Rate Equalisation Association was set up as a body to which metropolitan 
parish vestries, boards of guardians and other local poor law bodies sent their delegates. 
Constitutionally the Association functioned at two levels: the large Central (also called 
130ffer, ibid., offers four measures of incidence: local/central, country/city, occupiers/owners, 
poor/aüluent districts. 
14J. Tosh, The pursuit of history (London, 1991), 61-3. 
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General) Committee, which met only occasionally, and the smaller, very active 
Executive Committee. The role of the Central Committee developed into one of 
validating the activities and recommendations of the energetic Executive and confirming 
the Association's broad institutional base. Most delegates went only to the general 
meetings of the Central Committee, which were held when major policy decisions 
needed to be made or confirmed by the wider body (such as the decision, in October 
1858, to expand the Association to the counties15), when the E. C. 's annual reports 
were submitted, and when the supporting bodies needed to be mobilised for a particular 
campaign; resolutions tended to be passed unanimously, and the focus was on action. 
Constitutionally, this was not an unusual structure; for instance, the United Kingdom 
Alliance, an extensive temperance organisation, functioned very similarly. 16 
Income seems to have been intended to come, initially, from a voluntary 
subscription of £10 from supporting bodies, but there seems to have been difficulty in 
getting it in; 17 from 1858 the main (and substantial) source of income was voluntary 
public subscription. 
Supporting bodies sent as many nominees to the Central Committee as they 
wished. Two or three seems to have been the average, but in some cases it was greater. 
For instance the Governors and Trustees of the Poor of St. John Southwark appointed 
"a committee" to attend the Central Committee, St. Saviour Southwark appointed a 
committee of four, St. Ann Blackfriars sent five, St. George Borough sent six, and 
Bermondsey board of guardians sent their chairman and vice-chairman -a not unusual 
choice. 18 
It was, however, the vigorous Executive Committee - appointed by the Central 
Committee but clearly almost autonomous in terms of making policy and devising 
tactics, and with the power to replenish their own numbers, that was most active. E. C. 
members met often on a weekly or fortnightly basis, and were the public face of the 
Association at public meetings and on other occasions. 
15GL MS 1088/1,5.11.1858. 
16Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians. The temperance question in England 1815-1872 (London, 
1971), 197, reports that at its first aggregate meeting the United Kingdom Alliance set up a General 
Council consisting of several hundred members who met annually, but that the "real organisers" of the 
Alliance campaign were the Executive Committee. 
17GL MS 1088/1,13.3. -8.4.1857; GL MS 1090, Rough Cash Book, 1857-60. 18GL MS 1088/1,2,17.2-17.3.1857. 
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Geographically the new Association gained its major support not from the East 
End but from the west, the south and the City. Involved from the first General 
Committee meeting of the Association on 17 February 1857, or within the first month, 
were the delegates from Kensington, Chelsea, Fulham, and St. Andrew Holborn (west), 
Lambeth, Bermondsey, St. George and St. Thomas Southwark, Wandsworth and 
Tooting (South); St. Ann Blackfriars, St. Bartholomew the Great, St. Katherine Cree, 
All Hallows, St. Dionis Backchurch and St. Olave Silver Street (City), and St. Mary 
Whitechapel and Limehouse (East). Within three months of the formation of the 
Association, delegates and/or support had been received also from Hammersmith 
(West); St. James Dukes Place and All Hallows by the Wall (City); Camberwell, 
Rotherhithe, Greenwich and St. Nicholas Deptford (South); and St. George in the East 
and St. Leonard Shoreditch (East). 
19 
This gives an initial count of 5 from the West, 8 from the City, 11 from the South 
and four from the East End: a total of 28 parishes. Although this simple head-count 
does not take into account the size of the parishes or the number and vigour of the 
delegates they sent (or the fact that in nine cases the parish was also the poor law 
authority), it nevertheless indicates that there was a wide spread of interest across the 
metropolis in the goals of the new Association, and that the parishes of the East End 
were in a small minority. 
The two great parishes of Marylebone and St. Pancras, and their neighbour, St. 
George Hanover Square, with its particularly large proportion of wealthy inhabitants - 
who stood to lose more than most, financially, from a rate equalisation policy - declined 
to participate in the movement, as did most of the smaller parishes in the heart of the 
West End. Anxiety about losing their independent Local Act status would clearly also 
have been an important factor; a spokesman for St. Pancras at the Association's 
introductory public meeting, pointing out that all parishes supporting the meeting were 
in 1834 unions, proclaimed that "if those parishes have lost their independence, we are 
not content to sacrifice ours". 20 
19GL MS 1088/1: Minute book of the Equalisation Association; GL MS 1088/2: Draft Minute Book. 20LMA MS 1089,55,80,85-7; GL MS 1089,85. The following year Sotheron-Estcourt, Conservative 
President of the Poor Law Board, warned the Local Act parishes that in a system of rate redistribution 
they would have to be placed on the same footing as the rest of the metropolis. He doubted, he said, 
whether the parishes, "attached as they were to their local Acts", would like that. (Hansard 23.3.1858 
col. 637-8). 
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The extent of interest shown in rate equalisation was in fact even wider than the 
initial list indicates, in that 150 of the 188 metropolitan parishes had "consented" to the 
introductory meeting, held two days before the Association was formally set up and 
chaired by the Lord Mayor, and 500 parochial officers had signed the requisition for the 
meeting. 21 (This large number of parishes indicates that the City of London Union, 
with its 98 parishes, was among those consenting. ) When it came to nominating 
individuals to attend the Central and Executive Committees, the figures are also sizeable 
when compared with the maximum possible. Of 38 local poor law authorities in the 
metropolis, 20 were represented geographically on the E. C., either as a whole or by one 
or more of their individual parishes. 22 
The composition of the 15-strong Executive Committee confirms that it was from 
the west, the south and the City that the predominant support came; there were only 
two East End representatives, and only one of these had a reasonable attendance. 23 
E. C. and Central Committee members were mainly small local businessmen, professional 
men, shopkeepers and tradesmen. Having been sent by their local elected bodies they 
were, clearly, involved in local government in their own areas, where they held elected 
positions (on a variety of franchises24) and had personal experience of making decisions 
on their local rates and, in most cases, on poor relief matters. 
Although the initiating move for the Association came from the Kensington 
vestry, its mover, William Gilbert, who was to become chairman of the Association, 
subsequently emphasised in one of his political publications the instrumentality of the 
Metropolitan Board of Works from 1855 in bringing metropolitan vestries together 
frequently in "combinations .... 
for the purpose of carrying out some object for their 
common good". With their post-1855 power the metropolitan vestries, when acting 
together on a subject, exercised a power "which it would be difficult, if not dangerous, 
for any government entirely to ignore", he wrote. However, Gilbert was not a member 
of the MBW, and it is clear that it was from Kensington that the actual initiative came. 
He added later, with perhaps a little exaggeration, that by getting the co-operation of so 
21 GL MS 1089,2,85. 
22Proportions of possible and actual were calculated on the basis of F. K Youngs jr., Guide to the local 
administration units of England: Southern England (London, 1979), 648-9. 23GL MS 1088/1,3.3.1857. 
24pp 1867 xii, op. cit., Appendix 13, shows the wide range of local franchises in the metropolis. 
60 
MOVEMENT FOR RATE EQUALISATION 
many vestries, the Rate Equalisation Association achieved "a perfection of organisation 
rarely to be met with in movements of a political character. "25 
Gilbert, as well as being a Kensington vestryman, was a man of intellectual as 
well as political vigour, of independent means, previously a surgeon, a member of the 
Reform Club, and later one of the honorary secretaries of the philanthropic Society for 
the Relief of Distress. He wrote not only lengthy political pamphlets but also several 
novels, some of them dealing with "his favourite subject, the deepening contrast between 
the lots of rich and poor", and was the father of W. S. Gilbert of Gilbert & Sullivan 
fame. (The younger Gilbert is reported to have said, "He thought that if I could write, 
anybody could". ) The family connection with the Rate Equalisation Association may 
have contributed, in 1873, to the younger Gilbert's hilarious political burlesque, "The 
Happy Land" . 26 
Robert E. Warwick, one of the secretaries, was a grocer and tea-dealer by trade 
but also an articulate and prolific writer and speaker on poor law affairs. He was one of 
the founders and joint secretary of the Association's largely City-based predecessor, The 
Metropolitan Association for the Abolition of the Laws of Settlement and Poor Removal 
and the Equalization of the Poor Rate, for over five years secretary of the City of 
London Union Rating Association, a guardian and former overseer and assistant 
overseer for his own parish of St. Ann Blackfriars ("the largest and poorest parish in the 
City of London Union"), and was later to become a City common councillor for St. Ann 
and a vice-chairman of the City of London Poor Law Union. His practical experience 
of the operation of poor relief included having attended "for years" the West End Relief 
Committee of his board of guardians, which every week considered 70 to 90 
applications for relief. It was probably through Warwick that papers and minute books 
of the Rate Equalisation Association have survived. 27 
25W. Gilbert, On the present system of rating for the relief of the poor in the metropolis (London 
1857); W. Gilbert, Poor law reform: proceedings of the Metropolitan and County Assocation for the 
Equalization of the Poor Rate (London, 1860); Kensington vestry minutes 1855-8, pp. 237,285; 
Kensington general business committees minutes, C18/311,59; GL MS 1089,87. 26DAVB vol. XXII Supplement (Oxford 1921-2) says that Gilbert, 1804-1890, younger son of a colonial 
broker, "became a midshipman in the East India Company's service, but his views as to the rights of 
man involved him in difficulties with the officers, and he quitted the service in 1821. " He later studied 
at Guy's Hospital, was on its staff for a short period, and was also for a time an assistant surgeon in the 
Royal Navy. Also BL MS 53117N; S. Dark & R. Grey, W. S. Gilbert: His life and letters (London, 
1924), 2; PP 1861 ix, Q. 4188. Gilbert's partly autobiographical Memoirs of a cynic (London, 1880) 
does not cover his political activities, but nonetheless demonstrates his concern for the poor. 271861 census, RG9/220/67v; PP 1861 ix, 17.5.1861,31.5.1861, and Appendix 6, paper submitted by 
Warwick; GL MS 7754, correspondence with F. W. Knight, MP, (former Conservative Parliamentary 
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Francis Hayman Fowler, the other secretary, a Lambeth architect and surveyor, 
was later a Lambeth member of the Metropolitan Board of Works for 20 years (and was 
accused by a Royal Commission in 1888 of voting and acting improperly on MBW 
committees for professional and private gain). 28 John Blachford, Vice-Chairman, of 
Fulham, was an Irish-born solicitor who had practised in London for over 40 years, and 
by 1861 had been a Fulham guardian for 14 years and chairman of the Board for seven. 
His union was "burdened with an enormous amount of pauperism", mainly Irish, and had 
a high level of summonses for non-payment of rates because of the large numbers of 
29 ratepayers who were "but just elevated above the paupers themselves". 
Another major figure on the E. C. was John Day, a multi-purpose local 
government officer in Southwark St. George, one of the parish's first guardians under 
the 1834 Act, an occasional poor law auditor and a writer on rate equalisation. Day 
had drawn up a Bill in 1853 with Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark, for national rate 
equalisation that had not survived its First Reading, and had been involved in two 
previous rate equalisation associations. His socio-economic status was lower than that 
of other leading E. C. members: he had no servants but two lodgers, and the trades of 
family members were stay-making and tailoring. 30 
There was a tendency for E. C. members from the same parish to come from 
similar occupational classes. 
31 For instance, two of John Blachford's fellow E. C. 
members from Fulham were also professionals: John E. Panter, a barrister (in a two- 
servant household), 32 and Thomas Cooper, headmaster of a 65-pupil boys' school. 33 
The fourth Fulham member, William Deller, while not a professional man, was a 
34 substantial market gardener, with 60 acres and employing 20 men. 
Secretary of the Poor Law Board) 1854/8, and paper delivered by Warwick to the annual meeting of the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in London, 1862; Tanner, op. cit., describes 
moves from 1849, in which Warwick was involved, for equalisation of rates between the parishes of the 
City of London Union. 28LMA 17.0 MBW; PRO/30/6/169; PP 18881vi, Interim Report of the Royal Commissioners 
appointed to inquire into the MBW, 69-72,77-9,91. 
18 
3 
81 census, RG11/65/11; PP 1861 ix, Q. 8239,8251,8284,8294,8342-6. 0PP 1862 x, Q. 7554-60,7631,7644-5; Hansard 26.7.1853 col. 831; 1862 London Post Office 
Directory, Commercial; 1851 census, H0107/1565/l lv; The Times 17.2.1843. 31Appendix II lists 55 delegates to the Central Committee named in the minutes, with their parishes or 
unions, and occupations where it has been possible to identify these from other sources. A few other 
unnamed delegates are referred to in reports of correspondence. 321851 census, H0107/1471/203v. 33n, id., H0107/1471/119v. 
341bid., H0107/1471/261v. 
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The small City parish of St Dionis Backchurch sent a solicitor, but the 
occupations of other members from the City reflected the square mile's retailing and 
small tradesman sector: two jewellers, a linen-draper, a hairdresser, a coffee shop 
proprietor, a printing proprietor, a tin-plate maker, a net and tent maker, the owner of a 
silk and ribbon dyeing, embossing and printing business, and a seedsman and florist 
(who was probably also leech importer, sponge dealer and herbalist). River-side 
Bermondsey sent practical entrepreneurs involved in local trades: a wharfinger and a 
young builder employing 27 men. From neighbouring Southwark came mainly 
shopkeepers and tradesmen: baker, chemist, coal merchant, tin-plate worker, 
pawnbroker, bootmaker and two woollen drapers, and also a doctor. Still on the South 
side of the river but further to the West, parishes sent three landlords, an insurance 
company manager, hop and hemp merchants, a doctor and a surveyor. 35 
There was little difference between the occupations of the south/west/City 
representation and those from the East End: a brush and turnery manufacturer, a coffee 
rooms proprietor, a stationer and a pawnbroker. The most apparent difference was 
their number. 36 
However, although the East End's secular representation was limited, East End 
parish clergy gave the Association "invaluable aid" from an early stage. 
37 When a 
meeting on rate equalisation was held in St. George in the East it was a clergyman, the 
remarkable Rev. G. H. M'Gill (who, as "An East-End Incumbent", wrote letters on rate 
equalisation to The Times) who convened it in the George Tavern in Commercial Road. 
Shortly after the establishment of the Rate Equalisation Association a separate 
association was set up in Tower Hamlets (Ayrton's constituency) with strong support 
from the clergy, and the two associations agreed to assist each other "to the best of their 
abilitiesu 38 Gilbert later wrote that "men of all shades of politics, and ministers of all 
religious sects" participated in the Tower Hamlets association, and the E. C., reporting 
in December the formation of the East End association, said that the promoters were 
"co-operating with us in the cause". 
35GL MS 1088/1; 1851 & 1861 censuses, HO 107 & RG9; P. O. London Directories, Commercial, 
1851,1861; Southwark St. George vestry annual reports 1856,1867,1858. 361851 PO London Directory, Commercial. 
37GL MS 1088/1,8.4.1857, report of the secretary to the General Committee. 38GL MS 1088/1 & 2,29.12.1857; Gilbert (London 1860), 4-5. 
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M'Gill, elected chairman in Tower Hamlets, began to attend the Rate Equalisation 
Association's E. C. meetings on a fairly frequent though irregular basis, and appears to 
have acted as liaison with Ayrton. Although in 1859-60 St. George in the East 
experienced its traumatic anti-Tractarian riots against the Pusey-ite rector, M'Gill 
appears to have concentrated his attention on rate campaigning. Suggestions by Pusey- 
ites, noted by Stedman Jones, that the riots arose partly because there was no higher 
class influence in the area do not appear at all in M'Gill's speeches or writings about the 
East End. His belief was, simply, that rate equalisation would resolve problems that 
arose from disparities of wealth. The evidence suggests that M'Gill (who was also a 
workhouse chaplain), together with other E. C, members, identified genuinely, and from 
personal experience, with the positions of hard-pressed guardians, poorer ratepayers and 
the poor. 39 
There is no evidence that the East End movement was able to draw on a range of 
support as extensive as that generated by the Rate Equalisation Association. 
40 Its 
records do not seem to have survived, but what evidence there is in the Association's 
minutes suggests that it was a smaller association owing much of its impetus to Ayrton 
and the clergy, particularly M'Gill. Whereas the Association's activities were run by a 
co-ordinated group of people on the E. C., it was largely M'Gill who took responsibility 
for initiatives in Tower Hamlets. For instance, when East-West rivalry surfaced (in a 
canvassing demarcation dispute), the E. C. as a group discussed the question of whether 
they should instruct their canvassers to continue operating or whether canvassing should 
be done "from the Tower Hamlets office as proposed by the Rev. M'Gill". M'Gill's 
proposal shortly afterwards that the two Associations amalgamate was welcomed by the 
E. C. on condition that all become members of the Rate Equalisation Association, with 
united funds. In exchange the E. C. offered M'Gill a position as one of their Vice- 
39Crockford's Clerical Directory (London, 1886); PP 1861 ix, 9.4.1861; PP 1862 x, 4.7.1862; 1861 
census, RG9/ 279/25r; G. H. M'Gill, The London poor and the inequality of the rates raised for their 
relief (London, 1858); The Times 27.8.67,6f; Crouch, "Bryan King and the riots at St. George's in the 
East" (London, 1904); Stedman Jones (1992), 248-9. The Rev. George Henry M'Gill, MA (Brasenose 
College, Oxford) was appointed perpetual curate at Christ Church, St. George in the East, in 1854, and 
was therefore incumbent of one of the four churches in the parish. His first curacy had been in 
Stockport, Lancs., during the cotton district troubles, where he had had "a great deal to do with the 
relief of those who were in a state of semi-starvation at that time". On arriving in the East End he 
found himself in a parish where, in his first winter, he recalled later, "great distress prevailed" and "no 
fewer than 20 persons were reported to have died from starvation". In 1867, shortly after the passing of 
the Metropolitan PoorAct, he was moved to Bangor-Monachorum as rector. 40Records of the Tower Hamlets Association do not appear to have survived. 
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Presidents, and his treasurer the post of joint treasurer; no other Tower Hamlets 
officers were mentioned. It is not clear whether formal amalgamation took place - 
although M'Gill did become a Vice-President later - but again, the Association seems to 
have behaved as the larger body. 41 
III 
The Rate Equalisation Association's activities showed a sharp perception of where 
its strengths and its potential for success lay - in the generation of public support for 
change, in the building of links with those who had the potential for changing the law, 
the Members of Parliament, and in the seizing of every opportunity to promote their 
cause. 
One of the most public demonstrations of the Association's consciousness of the 
importance of alliances and the building of influential support was the enrolment of over 
60 Vice-Presidents in its cause42 after it expanded constitutionally in October 1858 and 
became the Metropolitan and County Association for the Equalisation of the Poor 
Rates. 43 The vice-presidential tactic -a promotional practice that other campaigning 
organisations such as the United Kingdom Alliance had also instituted44 - had in fact 
been agreed 15 months earlier at a meeting of the Central Committee45 but not 
implemented. The Central Committee had resolved that the E. C. should "solicit 
noblemen and other influential gentlemen to become Vice Presidents of the 
Association": 
The tally of over 60 influential gentlemen included the Lord Mayor of London 
and over 30 MPs. Athough Ayrton was certainly the Association's most active 
parliamentary voice, he was listed sixth from the top in the 1860 Annual Report, and 
fourth among MPs, being preceded not only by William Cubitt, MP and Lord Mayor, 
but by a former and a present City of London Alderman: James White, MP for 
Brighton, and Alderman Thomas Sidney, MP for Stafford. It seems the Association 
appreciated the public relations power of being seen to be allied with leading City 
41GL MS 1088/1,19. & 21.1.1858. 
421bid, Annual Report for 1860; minutes 13.10.1858. 43See below, p. 74-5. 44Harrison, op. cit., 220-1; D. A. Hamer, The politics of electoral pressure. A study of Victorian 
reform associations (Sussex, 1997). 451bid, 7.7.1857. 
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representatives. When, however, the E. C. wanted to mobilise the Parliamentary Vice- 
Presidents, it was Ayrton to whom they turned for practical political organisation. They 
never did select an agreed and willing person for the top job of President. Having 60 
influential Vice-Presidents was perhaps an acceptable compromise; it certainly 
prevented the executive power of the E. C. from becoming diluted. 
Although only 11 MP-Vice Presidents were in parliament continuously from 1858 
to 1867 (election losses and other external factors taking their toll), a further eight were 
in the House for a substantial part of these years, with another eight present in the earlier 
years; all but two were Liberals or Reformers. 
46 They were mainly backbenchers, 
with only three ever holding government office: Sir Robert Collier, MP for Plymouth 
(Solicitor-General 1863-66, Attorney General 1868), John Bagwell, MP for Clonmell (a 
Lord of the Treasury 1859-61), and Ayrton himself. 
Many of the MP-Vice Presidents were doubly influential in that they had leading 
or significant positions in commerce, manufacturing and trade. For instance Robert 
Crawford, MP for the City of London, was a Director of the Bank of England (and 
previously Deputy-Governor), Chairman of the East Indian Railway and an East India 
Proprietor. Sir William Tite, MP for Bath, was Chairman of the Bank of Egypt, a 
Director of the London & Westminster Bank, and President of the Institute of British 
Architects. Herbert Ingram, MP for Boston, who met an untimely death by drowning in 
Lake Michigan in 1860, was Proprietor and Manager of the Illustrated London News. 
William Schneider, MP for Norwich and later for Leicester, was a merchant and 
shipowner. William Cubitt, MP for Andover and Lord Mayor of London 1860-62, 
was one of the founding brothers of the wealthy building firm. 
Merchants included City of London Alderman (and former Lord Mayor) Thomas 
Sidney, MP for Stafford and teadealer and importer; James White, former Alderman, 
MP for Plymouth, and a merchant chiefly engaged in trade with China; Peter Rolt, 
Conservative MP for Greenwich to 1857 and a timber merchant and contractor; Samuel 
Morley, MP for Nottingham and then Bristol, member of a firm of wholesale hosiers 
(and also a leading Radical); R. J. R. Campbell, MP for Weymouth, merchant in Bengal 
and London, and author of works on banking and exchange; William Price, MP for 
46Stenton, op. cit. Stenton's descriptions of business activities have been used. As, however, he does 
not always attach dates to non-parliamentary career information, in occasional cases the business 
information may not be applicable for the period being studied; nonetheless it has been included as an 
indication of status. 
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Gloucester, a timber merchant and later a Railway Commissioner, and William Williams, 
MP for Lambeth. 
Manufacturers included Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark and head of a 
Southwark glass manufacturing firm; E. G. Salisbury, MP for Chester and proprietor of 
extensive gasworks; Donald Nicoll, MP for Frome, merchant tailor, manufacturer of 
cloth, and partner in a Regent Street firm; and J. J. Colman, Sheriff and Mayor of 
Norwich, later to be MP for Norwich, merchant, manufacturer, and head of the mustard 
firm. 
Others in (present or past) senior magisterial or other public positions included 
Sir James Duke, MP for London, past Sheriff of London and Middlesex, past Lord 
Mayor, and Alderman; Charles Butler, MP for Tower Hamlets and Chairman of Tower 
Hamlets Quarter Sessions; Thomas Perronet Thompson, MP for Bradford, Radical 
Lieut. Colonel, and former governor of Sierra Leone; Sir Charles Napier, MP for 
Southwark, a former Admiral in the Portuguese service, commander of the Baltic fleet 
and Royal Navy Admiral of the Blue; Captain Charles Mangles, MP for Newport, Isle 
of Wight and a former captain in the East India Company's service, and John Locke, 
MP, Ayrton's closest associate on the rate equalisation issue, who became Recorder of 
Brighton. 
Also significant in the business world were almost all of the non-MP Vice- 
Presidents. Of 28 whose addresses were given as London, 17 have been identified as 
merchants, manufacturers, or wholesalers/retailers/dealers and one as a printer- 
publisher; for a further five there is a highly likely similar identification, bringing this 
category of businessmen to 23; for two only has it not yet been possible to identify an 
occupational or industrial grouping. A further miscellaneous group of six -a clergyman 
(the Rev. M'Gill), two doctors (one of them Dr. Josiah Stallard, later to become 
prominent in poor relief issues), and three from the provinces - brings the tally of non- 
MP Vice-Presidents to 31. Those who were also politically active in other fields 
included J. P. Gassiot (oporto merchant), treasurer of the radical Administrative Reform 
Association. 47 
At least two-thirds of the non-MP Vice-Presidents, therefore, and probably more, 
were men with significant business interests in London. Their fields of operation 
47Taylor, op. cit., 264-5. 
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included the wines and spirits, oporto, wool and fur trades (merchants); silk, linen, lace, 
glass and china, gloves, and hosiery (wholesale, retail, dealing and warehousing); and 
leather goods, lace, cutlery, tobacco and snuff, hats, brewing, glass and china, furs and 
skins, soap and candlesticks, furniture, oils and colours, and animal charcoal and ivory 
black (manufacturers). 48 
The enlisting of influential Vice-Presidents was, however, only one of the Rate 
Equalisation Association's wide range of tactics, and was started in the second of what 
one might term the four phases of its history. 
The first phase (involving the unsuccessful moves for a select committee and a 
Bill) began with campaigning success in the March 1857 general election. Candidates 
advocating equalisation of the poor rates had been placed at the head of the poll in 
Middlesex, the E. C. noted, and all the candidates had "openly avowed their support to 
the cause". The press had also begun to discuss the question "in a manner well 
calculated to give us valuable aid", as had clergy in the East End. It was at this stage 
that the E. C. recommended to the Central Committee that "some independent Member" 
be found to introduce a Bill in parliament: 49 a common strategy for extra-parliamentary 
radical reforms groups, 
50 and one that was to lead to a lengthy and highly productive 
relationship with Ayrton. 
The E. C. now began organising a programme of widespread petitioning and 
public meetings throughout the metropolis of a kind that was to be the hallmark of the 
Association's campaigning for ten years. It seems likely that petitioning was used both 
as an end in itself (to mobilise support) and to show parliament that there was extensive 
support for rate equalisation. 
51 Invariably members of the E. C. attended and spoke at 
the meetings, 52 and the arrangements indicate sound political organising skills. For 
instance, shortly before a "numerous meeting of the ratepayers of the City of London" 
on 7 May 1857 at the London Coffee House, Ludgate Hill, with the Lord Mayor, 
48GL MS 1088/1,18.2.61; P. O. London Directories, Commercial, 1851,1862. See also Appendix III, 
Rate Equalisation Association: non-MP Vice-Presidents, 1861. 49GL MS 1088/1,8.4.1857. 
50'Taylor, op. cit., 36. 51S Palmer, Politics, shipping and the repeal of the Navigation Laws (Manchester, 1989), 121-2, 
discusses the use of parliamentary petitions in the mid nineteenth-century. 52GL MS 1088/1,12.5. & 23.6.1857. Gilbert and other members of the EC attended meetings at 
Hackney, St. George in the East, St. George Southwark, Bermondsey, Camberwell, Shoreditch, 
Limehouse, Wapping, Fulham, Chelsea, Hammersmith, St. Clement Danes, Putney, Wandsworth and 
Bethnal Green. 
68 
MOVEMENT FOR RATE EQUALISATION 
Alderman Sidney, MP, in the chair, the E. C. met to agree the movers and seconders of 
three resolutions to be put to the meeting. These included two clergymen, three 
members of the E. C. and a City common councilman. All were passed, with a handful 
of dissentients, and following the meeting a short report, with resolutions, was inserted 
in the press as a paid advertisement. An indication of the recognition accorded the 
Association is that Lord John Russell wrote to apologise for his non-attendance, on the 
grounds that he had been out of town at the time that he received notice of the meeting, 
and Sir James Duke, MP for the City, Alderman and former Lord Mayor, sent his 
apologies because the meeting was being held on the first night of the parliamentary 
session. 53 
Ayrton's Commons motion for a select committee on rate equalisation was 
preceded four days before by an Association deputation on 12 June to the new President 
of the Poor Law Board, E. P. Bouverie, accompanied by the Lord Mayor and with a 
memorial "signed by the representatives of parishes containing upwards of 700,000 
inhabitants, and assessed to the property tax to more than three millions of money". 
The new Liberal minister, however, gave "but very little encouragement .... as to the 
support we should receive from the Government. "54 Following the defeat of Ayrton's 
motion for a committee "to inquire into the causes of the inequality of the poor rates in 
the metropolitan district, and whether any measures should be adopted to render the 
rates more equal ", 55 the E. C. sent their "best thanks" to him for the "able manner" in 
which he had advocated the question, and had verbatim copies of his speech printed. 56 
Their report to the Central Committee of the outcome of the deputation was 
favourable: that the President's replies and objections were "of so weak and 
unsatisfactory a character as to give them no cause to fear the argumentative powers of 
their opponents, but on the contrary, to give them great hopes of the ultimate success of 
their endeavours". The E. C. clearly saw the issue as one that could be rationally argued 
and won, 57 and they called for "an active system of agitation" to be carried on, "so as to 
bring before the ratepayers the importance of the movement". 58 
53GL MS 1088/1,12.5.1857. 
541bid., 7.7.1857; GL MS 1088/2 (draft minute book) says the deputation was on the 13th. 55rd 16.6.57 col. 1899. 56GL MS 1088/1,23.6. & 7.7.1857; GL MS 1090, Rough Cash Book. 
57See chapter 2, Rational process of policy-making. 58GL MS 1088/1,7.7.57. 
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The significance for poor law developments of the alliance between 
West/South/City radicals and East End MP has gone unrecognised by historians. The 
partnership between the Rate Equalisation Association and Ayrton was remarkable in 
terms of its achievements, which were built on the twin strengths of his parliamentary 
position and skills and their credibility as experienced, elected activists, office-holders 
and witnesses on the metropolitan poor law scene. Without the Rate Equalisation 
Association, Ayrton would have had to rely for campaigning support on the smaller and 
much less active Tower Hamlets Association, which appears to have functioned only 
occasionally, in response to externally generated events, and on the small and 
overstretched army of radical-minded East End clergymen. 
Defeat on the 1857 Select Committee motion was taken as an opportunity to 
use the list of Ayes and Noes59 as a checklist: while the 121 Noes are untouched, 13 of 
the 81 Ayes have been ticked, and five have been crossed out. At the next Central 
Committee meeting the E. C. reported that 13 metropolitan Members (those ticked)60 
had voted in support of Ayrton's motion, and that only one - Sir Benjamin Hall of 
Marylebone - had voted against. The five names crossed out were those of MPs who 
either died or left the Commons later in 1857; it seems likely therefore that in late 1857 
or in 1858 the list of Ayes was used for canvassing MPs still in the Commons for further 
support. This may have included the canvass for "influential" Vice-Presidents, as 15 of 
the 81 Ayes later took on that role. 
The list indicates how distant the prospect was at this stage of achieving rate 
equalisation. The Ayes were, overwhelmingly, Liberal backbenchers: only four of them 
ever held government office, either before or after the vote on Ayrton's motion. The 
sparse non-Liberal support consisted of seven Conservatives and seven Liberal- 
Conservatives (Stenton's classification). 
Front-bench Liberals led the opposition: two-thirds of the Noes (80) were 
Liberals, and of these, 26 were present, past or future front-benchers. This large 
59GL MS 1088/2. The list does not appear in Hansard, but a blue printed list of Ayes and Noes, 
a 
appearing 
to be of official origin, is pasted into the Association's Draft Minute Book. DThe 13 listed in MS 1088/2 (Draft Minute Book) were: Charles Butler (Tower Hamlets), General 
Codrington (Greenwich) - who protested several months later that he was not a supporter of rate 
equalisation, William Cox (Finsbury), Sir James Duke (City), Viscount Ebrington (Marylebone), Lord 
Grosvenor (Marylebone), Robert Hanbury (Middlesex), John Locke (Southwark), Sir Charles Napier 
(Southwark), William Roupell (Lambeth), William Williams (Lambeth), Charles Townsend 
(Greenwich), and Ayrton himself, who acted as one of the tellers for the Ayes. 
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proportion of office-holders or -seekers was headed by Lord Palmerston himself. Such 
a heavy-weight mobilisation to defeat Ayrton's proposal for a Select Committee 
suggests the government may have feared the impact on MPs of Ayrton's striking 
images of East-West disparities (images that were to become the staple of Equalisation 
Association rhetoric). Indeed, to have provoked such a turn-out can be taken as a 
measure of success. Four years before, when Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark, had 
attempted to move for leave to bring in a rate equalisation Bill (drafted with the support 
of John Day) the House had been counted out. 61 
The next step - the drafting of a Bill - led to a major difference of opinion 
between Ayrton and the Association. The Central Committee supported the E. C. in 
their interpretation of the difference: that Ayrton's less radical proposal was 
"objectionable" because it made the question "exclusively a ratepayer's question", 
proposed to equalise only half the rates, and did not tackle the poor removals issue. 
The Central Committee unanimously resolved that, having considered Ayrton's proposal 
for "mitigating the inequalities of the poor rate", it was their opinion that "nothing less 
than an equalisation of the rate on a uniform basis of assessment will do justice to the 
ratepayer or to the poor", and ordered that the E. C. 's draft Bill be passed on to counsel 
for further development. 62 
It was the more radical approach of the "West" that formed the basis for the new, 
vigorous programme of canvassing, petitioning and public meetings that the Equalisation 
Association now embarked upon, with resolutions at public meetings and petitions 
calling for "an equalised rate levied on rateable property throughout the District" [the 
metropolitan district]. Meetings were held, for instance, on the following dates in early 
1858: Jan. 20 Bermondsey, Rotherhithe and St. Clement Danes; Jan. 21 Woolwich; 
Jan. 26 Lambeth; Jan. 27 Chelsea; Jan. 28 Hammersmith; Feb. 3 Chelsea; Feb. 5 
Fulham; Feb. 9,18 East London Union; Feb. 12 Clerkenwell; Feb. 24 West London; 
Feb. 26 City of London; March 2 Marylebone. 63 Following the engagement of a 
Parliamentary agent, Richard James, detailed weekly activities were recorded in the E. C. 
minutes, including numbers of signatures obtained on petitions and voluntary donations, 
61Hansard 26.7.1853, col. 831. No further attempt was made to introduce Pellatt's Bill "To abolish the 
removal of the poor, and to equalise the rates for their maintenance, and to make other amendments in 
the laws relating to the relief of the poor", and Pellatt lost his seat in 1857. 62GL MS 1088/1,29.12.57. 
631bid., 5.1.58-16.2.58. 
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or "subscriptions", received; it may have been through the subscriptions that most or all 
of the activities of the Association were now funded. 64 A short advertisement would 
also be placed in each morning paper twice a week giving the address of the 
association's office, 32 Fleet Street, which would be open daily from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m., 
with the hon. secretaries (Warwick and Fowler) in attendance. 65 
The Association responded boldly to opposition from either parishes or the Poor 
Law Board itself. For instance, when the Clerkenwell vestry wrote that "their parish 
officers would take no steps towards holding a public meeting in that parish", the 
Association went ahead and organised a meeting in the parish to be chaired by the Rev. 
Maguire, the incumbent ; it turned out to be "a very large meeting", and the resolutions 
of the Association were unanimously adopted. When the Sunday Times reported that 
Farnall, the Poor Law Board's metropolitan inspector, had been trying to persuade 
Chelsea guardians "that the equalisation of poor rates would be of no use to them", the 
E. C. invited Farnall to meet the Central Committee "at any time and place suitable to 
himself for the purpose of discussing the question". (There is no record of Farnall ever 
having taken up the offer; his right initially to enter into such a discussion with the 
Chelsea guardians was questionable anyway. )66 
An accommodation was, however, reached with Ayrton on his draft Bill. 
Noting that their own Bill had the advantage of incorporating a representative body, the 
E. C. decided nonetheless that his would now achieve the Association's objectives; five 
amendments were submitted to Ayrton, one of which called for "as little power of 
interference as possible" to be given to the Poor Law Board. 67 
The Association now began campaigning vigorously for Ayrton's Bill. 68 A 
measure of their success by the First Reading was that Ayrton was able to tell the House 
that he understood that no metropolitan Member would oppose his motion to introduce 
the Bill, and Sotheron-Estcourt, the new Conservative President, remarked that the 
question was one which, "whether it could be fully borne out or not, nevertheless was 
641bid, 5.1.58. For instance, Richard James reported that on 15 days, from 16.12.57 to 4.1.58, he had 
obtained 4,431 signatures and £177.10s. 6d. in the parishes of St. Saviour, St. George, St. Olave, St. 
John Bermondsey, Christ Church, Lambeth, Newington, Camberwell, St. Mary Rotherhithe, Deptford, 
Greenwich and Woolwich - "which to a large extent clears the map of the Southern and South Eastern 
parts of the Metropolis. " 
b51bid, 12.1.58. 
66thid., 5,12 & 19.1.1858, and 16.2.1858. 671bid, 3.2.1858. 
68PP 1857/8 iv, 47, Poor Rates (Metropolis) Bill. 
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considered by a large number of respectable persons in the metropolis to constitute a 
grievance". 69 The Bill having passed its First Reading, the E. C. worked at increasing 
support in its weaker areas, such as some of the Local Act parishes. They rallied their 
own troops with both a promise and a warning: that Ayrton's Bill would provide a full 
remedy against the "unjust and oppressive system of which we complain", and that 
considerable opposition was expected at the Second Reading, "particularly by interested 
parties who wish to uphold the present state of things", and emphasised the breadth of 
the interests involved - both the poor and ratepayers. 
7° 
There was, again, a contrast in vigour between the well-manned and multi-faceted 
Rate Equalisation Association, with its wide local base and many activities, and the East 
End association. Although the East London Observer was editorially supportive of 
Ayrton, the only references in the paper to rate equalisation during the crucial period 
surrounding the First and Second Readings of Ayrton's Bill were extracts from the Rev. 
M'Grill's booklet on the issue, and brief comments praising Ayrton after the defeat of the 
Bill. The only advertisement on the issue was one inserted by Warwick and Fowler 
about the major central London public meeting. 71 
Twenty-two MPs presented petitions bearing a total of 36,861 signatures to the 
Commons72. The largest number of signatures came from the populous districts south 
of the river: Southwark, Lambeth, Bermondsey, Newington and Rotherhithe (14,197). 
If Clerkenwell and St. Luke are counted as west (in accordance with the E. C. 's 
perception) the West total was 8,070. Tower Hamlets raised 2,686 signatures. The 
remaining 11,908 came from the City, from East End districts organised by the Rate 
Equalisation Association such as Poplar and Limehouse, and from other districts further 
afield such as Greenwich, Putney and Wandsworth. 73 (Figure 1. ) 
Ayrton's withdrawal of his Bill at its Second Reading in the face of overwhelming 
Commons opposition74 brought to an end the first phase of the Rate Equalisation 
Association's history. In the second phase (1858-60) three major steps were taken: the 
69flansard 23.3.58. col. 635. 70GL MS 1088/1,16.3.1858,5 & 22.4.1858,4.5.1858. 
71East London Observer 24.4.1858,4d; 15.5.1858,3f; 29.5.1858,2b. 
72GL MS 1088/1,19.5.58. As a few petitions came from local bodies and were listed as single 
7 gnatures, 
the total number of signatures would have been slightly higher. 3Ibid., 19.5.1858. 
74Hansard 12.5.1858, col. 516. 
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Association went "nation-wide", the enrolment of influential Vice-Presidents began, and 
further parliamentary tactics were planned formally and embarked upon. 
From November 1858 the Association operated as the Metropolitan and County 
Association for the Equalisation of the Poor Rate. A prior circular to most of the 
boards of guardians and other local poor law authorities in England, Scotland and 
RATE EQUALISATION PETITIONS 














West. 8,070 (West End, St. Luke, Clerkenwell, Holborn, 
Marylebone, Chelsea, Fulham) 
South: 20,993 (Lambeth, Southwark, Bermondsey, Rotherhithe, 
Greenwich, Putney, Camberwell) 
East: 3,697 (Poplar, Limehouse, Tower Hamlets) 
Figure 1: Rate equalisation petitions, May 1858.75 
Ireland asking if they would be willing to support a movement to achieve rate 
equalisation through enlarged rating districts throughout the country had had an 
overwhelming response; Gilbert wrote later that letters arrived in such numbers "as to 
render it impossible for the Association, with the limited means they had at command, to 
keep up a sufficient correspondence". The wider campaign included a new manifesto, 
an address "showing that the equalisation of the poor rate is a poor man's question", and 
a further letter to the poor law unions in Ireland. A hectic schedule of meetings 
outside the metropolis was embarked upon. For instance, in one week in January 
(hardly the easiest time of year to travel) Warwick and Bennett attended a meeting in 
75GL MS 1088/1,19.5.1858. 
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Worcester (21st), Gilbert and M'Gill were in Stafford (24th), Blackford and Chester 
were in Macclesfield (25th) and Fowler and Day were in Plymouth (also 25th). In all 
of these places resolutions supporting the Equalisation Association were passed, and 
local committees were formed "for the purpose of assisting the Central Committee". 
76 
Extensive canvassing was also organised, both within the metropolis and outside. 
77 
The new, wider focus of the Association's activities was, of course, contrary to 
the metropolis-only policy that had been argued for in parliament by Ayrton and Locke. 
Relations with Ayrton appear to have cooled for a while, probably because of 
differences of opinion about the new direction; his proposals for future action were 
"adjourned sine die" by the E. C. and, rejecting their invitation to speak at a public 
meeting in Norwich, he wrote "declining to go about agitating the question of the poor 
laws": It was also at this time that the E. C. made an unsuccessful offer of the 
presidency of the re-constituted Association to 60-year-old Conservative Lord Berners, 
rural landowner, president in 1858 of the Royal Agricultural Society and a Deputy 
Lieutenant of Leicestershire, who had supported rate equalisation and abolition of the 
settlement laws from the platform of the Association's inaugural public meeting the 
78 
previous year. 
The vital partnership with Ayrton revived, however, a couple of months later, and 
their next joint activity was to be of great significance in the struggle for rate 
equalisation. The first meeting of the parliamentary Vice-Presidents was held at the 
Union Hotel, Charing Cross, on 15 February 1859, with six E. C. members and eight 
Vice-Presidents present; Ayrton, in the chair, and the Rev. M'Gill were the only two 
East End representatives present. At this meeting the framework was laid for 
parliamentary activities that were to culminate, eight years later, in the passing of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act. The major decision was tactical: to launch a two-pronged 
manoeuvre to get the issue of rate equalisation placed on the agenda of an existing select 
committee and to get the remit of this committee extended to encompass the general 
76Ibid, 7.7.1858,5.11.1858,12.11.1858,19.11.1858,21 & 28.1.1859; Gilbert (London, 1860), 9-10. 
77Ibid, 7,14 & 28.1.59. Over the Christmas period (13 Dec. -1 Jan. ) canvassing had been carried out 
in Lambeth, Islington, Hoxton, St. George-in-the-East, St. Luke, Limehouse, West London 
Union, St. Mary Newington, Clerkenwell, Brentford, Hounslow and the City. On 14 Jan. canvassing was 
taking place in Clerkenwell, St. Luke, Shoreditch, Spitalfields, Lambeth and Newington, and on 28 Jan. 
the parliamentary agent reported canvassing in Clerkenwell, Shoreditch, the City, Greenwich, 
Worcester, Stafford and Macclesfield. 781bid., 5,12, & 19.11.1858 and 1,10 & 17.12.1858; GL MS 1089,18-28; V. Gibbs (ed. ), The 
Complete Peerage (London, 1919), 158; Dod's Parliamentary Companion (London, 1859). 
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working of the poor law. The first was a variation on Ayrton's unsuccessful 1857 
motion, and the second, opening the door to discussion of a wide range of poor law 
issues, was to allow special treatment for the metropolis to be argued for and won. 79 
The formula was initially unsuccessful on the 1858-60 Select Committees on the 
Irremoveable Poor, 80 but was pursued tenaciously by Ayrton and John Locke on 
Villiers' 1861-4 Select Committee on Poor Relief and in the Commons. The major poor 
law legislation of the next few years, described by Caplan as involving a "piecemeal, 
step-by-step" process, 81 was therefore in fact the product, to a significant degree, of the 
tactics agreed at the Union Hotel in February 1859. 
In the third phase (1861-2) E. C. members gave select committee evidence (some 
of them in both years) and major public campaigning continued. For instance, an 
"influential" and "most crowded and respectable meeting" at the Guildhall, chaired by 
the Conservative Lord Mayor William Cubitt (who was to become one of the 
Association's Vice-Presidents) and attended by "a large number of the clergy, merchants, 
guardians of the poor and others" voted with only five dissentients in favour of several 
Association resolutions. 82 The wording of the requisition to the Lord Mayor for the 
meeting had confirmed the dynamic nature of the Association's response to the recent 
winter distress, calling for a meeting to consider "the causes of the late distressed 
condition of the London poor, and whether an extension of the area of chargeability and 
the equalization of the poor rate would not be the best means of providing for the relief 
of such distress in the future". 83 
One of the notable achievements of this meeting was that it succeeded in 
convincing the Lord Mayor himself. On the Select Committee on Poor Relief the 
following year John Locke recalled that Cubitt had not made up his mind on the subject 
when he went into the chair, but on leaving the chair he was "decidedly in favour of the 
791bid., 4,11 & 15.2.59. 
80PP 1857-58, xii, Select Committee on the Irremovable Poor (Conservative); PP 1859 (Session 2) vii, 
Select Committee on Irremovable Poor (Conservative), to which E. C. members John Blachford and 
John Day gave evidence in their local official capacities; PP 1860, xvii, Select Committee on Poor 
Removals (Liberal), to which one E. C. member, Henry Potter, gave evidence as vice-chairman of the 
West London Union. Ayrton was a member of all three committees. 81 Caplan, op. cit., 296. Caplan, in tracing the parliamentary battles for reform of the laws of removal 
and settlement and the achievement of union chargeability, and the role of the landed interest, considers 
the question of why reforms "so decisively rejected in 1845 became acceptable in 1865". Although 
recognising Ayrton's 1857 and 1858 contributions, he suggests of the Metropolitan Poor Act only that 
"Mr Ayrton would indeed have been pleased that so much of what he had striven for had come to pass". 82GLMS 1088/1,22.4.1861. 
83Ibid., 2.6.1862, annual report, March 1862. 
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movement"; John Day, giving evidence, agreed that Cubitt was "a very warm 
supporter". 84 
The petition arising from the meeting, subsequently signed by 26,656 ratepayers, 
was presented to the Commons by the Lord Mayor and, on his motion, referred to 
Villiers' recently appointed wide-ranging Select Committee on Poor Relief 85 
With some justification the Rate Equalisation Association, in their Fifth Annual 
Report, 86 looking back at the past year, felt they had "just cause for congratulation" at 
the progress and interest shown, both by the public and the legislature, "in the injustice, 
as well as the inadequacy, of the existing mode of raising...... funds for the relief of the 
Poor". They noted the role of winter distress in bringing to prominence the defects in 
the system of poor relief, but made the point that their own efforts had played a 
significant part in focusing attention on the inequities of the metropolitan rating system. 
Seven Association supporters appeared before Villiers' mammoth 1861-4 Select 
Committee on Poor Relief 87 in its first year, but evidence was not taken on the rate 
equalisation issue (although Warwick was able to submit a paper arguing the case in 
some detail, with tabulated figures88 and there were a few other minor references, in 
passing, to the Association). The seven formed a small proportion of the 68 witnesses 
questioned by the Select Committee from March to July 1861 on a wide range of poor 
law issues 
When, at last, the rallying call came from Ayrton in June 1862 that Villiers' 
committee was ready to receive any evidence they "might wish to give on the subject of 
the equalisation of the poor rates", 89 the E. C. resolved to send a strong contingent of 
nine. Only one of these (the Rev. M'Gill) was to represent the East End (specifically, 
Tower Hamlets). Three were to be from the three City unions, two from Southwark, 
and three from the west (Kensington, Chelsea and Fulham, and Hammersmith). Once 
again the Equalisation Association was functioning almost entirely as an organisation 
based in the West, the South and the City. 
84PP 1862 x, Q. 7723. 85GL MS 1088/1,17.3.62; 2.6.62, annual report, 2.6.1862. 861bid., 2.6.1862. 
87PP 1861 ix. They were Edward Collinson, chairman of St. George the Martyr Southwark board of 
guardians (12.3.1861), M'Gill (9.4.1861), Gilbert (16.4.1861), Potter (23. & 30.4.1861), James Harvey, 
chairman of the West London Union (14.5.1861), Warwick (17.5.1861) and Blachford (17.5.1861). 88Ibid., 2nd Report, Appendix 6. 
89GL MS 1088/1,2.6.1862. 
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In the event, six Association representatives gave evidence. 90 They were the 
only witnesses on rate equalisation, and the only non-official witnesses to come from 
the metropolis in 1862. Not even the 1862 medical officer witnesses (nor the petition 
handed in by a Poor Law inspector from the Executive Council of the British Medical 
Association "representing 2,100 medical men") focused on the rating issue; instead, 
they raised the conditions of appointment, employment and pay of medical officers. 91 
The E. C. 's warning in its fifth annual report in March 1862 that paid officers had so far 
formed a large proportion of the witnesses, turned out to have been timely: from March 
to July the proportion was even greater, with the Poor Law Board, under attack on 
several major fronts, bringing in its senior regional staff, the Poor Law inspectors. The 
42 witnesses in 1862 included seven of the Board's inspectors92 and 18 paid local 
officials, 93 bringing the "official element" to just under 60%. The intention of the 
major part of the evidence to the select committee in 1862 was, therefore, to defend the 
Board's existing practices. 
The contributions of the Rate Equalisation Association six were acknowledged in 
the select committee's 1864 Report, which noted 
that much evidence was adduced showing the unequal pressure of the 
charge for the relief of the poor in different parts of the metropolitan 
district; and various plans were submitted to Your Committee for the 
equalisation of the poor rate; and Your Committee recommend the 
general question of extending the area of rating to the further 
consideration of the House.... 94 
In phase four, 1863-7, the Rate Equalisation Association appears to have begun 
responding to events rather than taking a pro-active role; one could argue that the 
Association had done as much as it could do at that time to achieve an equal rate in the 
90PP 1862 x. They were Warwick (27.6.1862), Collinson (1.7.1862), Day (1.7.1862), Gilbert 
V7.1862), M'Gill (4.7.1862) and Pilcher, chairman of the East London Union (9.7.1862). 
Ibid., 9.5.62. 
921bid, 8.4.1862,16.5.1862,17.6.1862,2.4.1862,9.5.1862,23.5.1862,27.5.1862,30.5.1862, 
2.6.1862,3.6.1862. H. B. Farnall, the metropolitan inspector, had given extensive evidence the previous 
on 22.3.1861,3.5.1861,7.6.1861. year 31bid., 21.3.62,25.3.62,28.3.62 (two), 1.4.62 (two), 8.4.62,29.4.62,9.5.62 (two), 13.6.62,17.6.62, 
9.7.62 (three), 16.7.62 (two), 23.7,62. 
94pp 1864 ix, Report. 
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metropolis. The status of the Association and its E. C. members appears to have 
remained high, and it continued to be politically appropriate for an MP to be a Vice- 
President. For instance, the ninth annual report of the Association shows that one of 
the two new Vice-Presidents was the Rt. Hon. George Goschen, MP for the City and a 
future President of the Poor Law Board. 95 
When Villiers introduced the Union Chargeability Bill into Parliament, the E. C. 
viewed "with pleasure the success that so far attended their efforts in the cause of the 
equalisation of the poor rate" and gave the Bill their "cordial support", while reserving 
to themselves the right to any steps that might be advisable "to secure the same benefit 
to the large metropolitan parishes as the proposed Bill will give to unions". They 
agreed to campaign for a radical proposal from Ayrton, Locke and Sidney that the 
annually renewable Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act 1864 be extended to provide not 
only for the houseless poor but also for the irremoveable poor of the metropolis. If this 
had been successful it would, at a stroke, have achieved rate equalisation, although 
administered by the Metropolitan Board of Works, a body not previously involved in 
poor relief. 96 
In response to Hardy's 1867 Metropolitan Poor Bill the Association held two 
meetings of guardians, overseers and vestrymen at the London Coffee House, where it 
was agreed that attempts should be made (unsuccessfully, it turned out) to have 
additional charges placed on the intended new Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, and 
also that they should join the deputation of the "East End Association" to Hardy. 
97 
Three members of the E. C. (Warwick, Blachford and Fowler) joined the committee of 
the revived Tower Hamlets Association under the presidency of M'Gill. 98 
With the passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act the major principle underlying the 
formation of the Rate Equalisation Association in 1857 had been achieved, even if some 
of the practical details differed from proposals put forward by the Association over the 
years; the fact that the first "asylum district" to be set up under the Act was the 
95GL MS 1088/1,28.1.67. 
96Ibid., 6. & 20.3.65. 
971bid, 30.1.1867,18.2.1867,25.2.1867. 
98MH 25/18, Jan. 1867, manifesto of the Tower Hamlets Association for the Equalisation of the 
Metropolitan Poor Rates; MH25/18,25.1.1867, memorial to Hardy by "the delegates appointed by 
various metropolitan parishes and unions to take steps for obtaining an equalisation of the poor rates of 
the metropolis". Notes by a Poor Law Board official attached to the memorial listed 11 East End poor 
law bodies, nine from the west and south, "and many others". 
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metropolis-wide Metropolitan Asylums District, 
99 which conformed, at least 
geographically and in terms of its largely guardian-membership, with the Association's 
main county-based model, indicates a further campaigning success. 
100 Their 
achievement was recognised by the E. C. in typically decisive fashion. On 14 June 1867 
they agreed that the time had now arrived when the Association should be dissolved 
"inasmuch as the great object for which it was founded had been in a great measure 
effected by the passing of the Union Chargeability Act of 1865 and the Metropolitan 
Poor Law Act 1867'. 101 
IV 
In terms of tactics and alliances it is clear that for ten years the Rate Equalisation 
Association, and particularly its Executive Committee, played a significant role on two 
fronts: in the influencing of opinion, and in the battle of parliamentary tactics. It seems 
very likely that prominent among the reasons for their success when compared with the 
lack of progress of earlier attempts were (as Gilbert believed) the significant and 
powerful alliances that they built, both within and outside parliament. They could 
rightly claim success when, in 1867, they saw their goals largely achieved. 
The fact that the Association was not an East End but a metropolis-wide 
movement is important. In deriving its delegates from boards of guardians and vestries 
across the metropolis it drew on a wide constituency of political activists at the sharp 
end of implementing poor relief and settlement laws. Such poor law activists had been 
denied a wider forum through the failure to give the capital municipal status in 1835-7, 
and the limited extent of metropolitan government - only a Board of Works - established 
in 1855.102 With an active consciousness of poor law weaknesses and disparities of 
provision but no local forum for addressing such problems adequately, they underpinned 
the rate equalisation movement for ten years. This metropolis-wide grass-roots poor 
99See Chapter 6. There was no indication in the Act that a metropolis-wide body might be established. 100See Chapter 4, p. 80-83. 101GL MS 1088/1,14.6.67. 
102J. Firth, Municipal London (London, 1876), 539-43; 18 & 19 Vict., c. 120; M. B. Baer, "The 
politics of London, 1852-1858: parties, voters and representation", Ph. D. thesis (Iowa, 1976), 30, 
suggests that the "muzzling of London" demonstrated "a desire evident among conservatives in all 
Victorian parties to restrict the political power of the metropolis". 
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law radicalism enabled the Association consistently to mobilise backbench Radicals in 
parliament and also the Liberal/Radical sympathies to be found among a significant 
proportion of large businessmen. 103 
That the movement was not only substantial and extensive but also politically 
radical in its rhetoric, arguments and policies will be further demonstrated in the next 
chapter. 
103 j Vincent, The Formation of the Liberal Party (London, 1966), 35-9. 
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As has been shown above, one of the strengths of the Rate Equalisation 
Association was that it was able, because of its structure and composition, to campaign 
effectively for support for redistributive reforming policies among a largely middle-class 
ratepaying constituency. The nature of its membership, tactics and alliances were all 
significant factors in its success. However, its success in achieving support for 
metropolitan rate equalisation long before the 1865-6 workhouse scandals made the 
funding question a parliamentary priority is attributable not only to these factors. Its 
rhetoric and policies played a major role, and will now be examined. 
That the Rate Equalisation Association's position was a Radical one will be 
demonstrated in this chapter. The movement not only made a significant contribution 
to what Dicey was later to describe, in the context of other issues, as "permanent 
currents of opinion"1 - in this case, opinion about the need for more equalised spreading 
of the burden of paying for the poor and the sick - but did so within the context of 
radical discourse and policies. Comparisons with a range of alternative models for rate 
equalisation, including the much more centrally-controlled system devised by the 
Conservative government, will confirm this interpretation. The question of whether the 
system chosen did actually achieve significant redistribution of the financial burden in the 
early years 1867-70 will also be addressed. 
The strength of the Rate Equalisation Association's rhetoric and policies was, 
essentially, its simplicity. The concept of inequitability was conveyed in emotive, 
concrete images, and the policies could be summarised in two words: rate equalisation. 
However, its strength could also be its weakness, as Ayrton in 1857 and 1858, and 
others before and after him, were made sharply aware: redistribution of wealth from St. 
George Hanover Square to Spitalfields was not only a promise but also a threat. That, 
nonetheless, the Association succeeded in influencing so many of those whose interests 
were threatened by its policies is perhaps a tribute to the power of its rhetoric as well as 
to the significance of its alliances and vigour of its tactics. 
lA V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law & Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (London, 1917), vii. 
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In terms of policy-making models the Association's approach to rate equalisation 
was that of its Radical supporters in parliament: the Rational clear identification of a 
metropolitan problem based on three clear premises, 
2 leading with a simple logic to the 
proposed solution. Their major arguments were to remain common to metropolitan 
rate redistribution debate and policy-making for more than a century: 
3 the contrasts in 
needs and resources between areas, the contribution of the poor to wealth creation, and 
the unique nature of the metropolis. Even when the Rate Equalisation Association 
expanded to include the counties, its policy was redistribution within county (and 
metropolitan) boundaries. 
In one respect the Association came to occupy the middle-ground between the 
most vigorous anti-centralisers and those for whom government growth and paying for 
the poor from a centralised national rate or the Consolidated Fund held no fears. 
On the other hand its rhetoric of metropolitan wealth and class divisions was 
emotive, radical, and well-removed from middle-ground politics. The question is 
whether the Association tended to be radical in rhetoric but reformist in policy. Some 
contemporaries would not have agreed with such a distinction: Villiers, for instance 
(whether for tactical reasons or from conviction), warned the Commons that if they 
rejected his "moderate" 1861 Irremovable Poor Bill they would give great impetus to 
"the movement in favour of a general and immediate equalisation of rates throughout the 
whole country ". 
4 
While the Association was not, in fact, the initiator of the idea of setting up a 
specific mechanism for equalising the poor rate - G. L. Hutchinson was probably first in 
the field in terms of being the 19th century "originator" of the proposal - the 
metropolitan focus was original to the Equalisation Association. Indeed Hutchinson 
tried to delete the word "London" from a motion at a meeting in 1857, and attacked 
Ayrton's 1858 Bill on the grounds that in restricting its proposals to the metropolis, it 
was "too confined and selfish", asking, "If a great good is to be obtained, why should 
the metropolitan districts alone enjoy it? " The hall-mark of Hutchinson's approach for 
three decades (starting with a personal letter to the Home Secretary in 1829) was 
2See chapter 2, p. 38. 3See chapter 1, p. 11. 4Hansard 28.6.61, col. 1902. The likelihood that Villiers was referring to the Equalisation Association 
is strong, given the relevance of his comment to the Vice-Presidents in the Commons and the 
"Metropolitan and County" Equalisation Association's influential Guildhall meeting two months before. 
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painstaking, detailed statistical analysis of poor rate figures, including parliamentary 
returns which had been "buried in oblivion". His role was acknowledged by (among 
others) Thomas Wakley, editor of The Lancet and Radical MP for Finsbury 1835-52, 
John Day, Southwark member of the EC, and Alderman Sidney, MP, later Lord Mayor 
of London and one of the Association's Vice-Presidents. That Hutchinson's labours 
influenced the Association seems likely, and they had several common concerns. For 
instance Hutchinson, arguing for his own reformist county-based scheme, wrote with 
clearly intended irony that it was the antithesis of "the much-dreaded centralisation" -a 
concern with which the Association, too, had to grapple. However, the Association's 
more vigorous and ultimately more successful style appears to have influenced the policy 
"originator" himself in due course: there was a distinct hint of their style in Hutchinson's 
1858 comment about the President of the Poor Law Board that "a man with £2000 a 
year can afford to be funny. "5 
The position of The Lancet in terms of influence at this early stage, if any, on the 
policies of the Rate Equalisation Association, is more difficult to assess. The evidence 
may indicate, if anything, that it was the The Lancet that was being influenced by the 
Association, at least as far as rhetoric was concerned. For instance, in the week 
following the journal's review of Hutchinson's 1858 rate equalisation pamphlet, a lengthy 
editorial attacked the "aristocratic Bumbles" who "resolutely drive away the poor from 
the doors of the wealthy, and thrust them upon the shoulders of those who are scarcely 
above pauperism themselves", and noted that the parliamentary returns moved for by 
John Locke showed the unequal distribution of the "grievous burden" between wealthy 
St. George Hanover Square and the poor parish of Shoreditch. 6 Into the complex 
"influence" equation must, however, also be brought another significant factor 
articulated in The Lancet: the financial and professional interests of medical men. The 
reviewer of Hutchinson's pamphlet (possibly Wakley himself) pointed out that rate 
equalisation was a question "intimately connected with the duties and salaries of poor- 
law medical officers", and expressed the hope that when equalisation was achieved "the 
due interests of the poor and the proper remuneration of their medical attendants will 
5G. L. Hutchinson, The Equalization of the Poor's Rate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland (London, 1858), 11,12,25,80-3; Lancet 1858/1,630 & 1858/11,12; The limes 22.11.49.5e & 
30.4.57,12f; Gilbert (1857), op. cit., 3, noted that although the association established by Day and 
Warwick in the early fifties had not been "crowned with the success it deserved", it had, to a great 
extent, paved the way for the Equalisation Association. 6Lancet 1858/1,630 & 1858/11,12. 
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not be unheeded". To a certain extent, it seems, medical support for equalisation 
derived from more narrowly focused interest group concerns.? 
The Association's rhetoric of wealth and poverty appealed also to Charles 
Dickens, despite his disapproval of Ayrton's 1858 speech. He weighed in on the side 
not only of the poor but also of the ratepayers, drawing contrasts between "the wealthy 
ratepayers in the squares and terraces of Paddington" and "the impoverished ratepayers 
in the lanes and small streets of Saint George's-in-the-East". He also tackled the 
accusation of centralisation, mocking those who might suggest that rate equalisation was 
centralisation, that it "cuts at the root of liberty", and that campaigners against East- 
West disparities were "centralising revolutionists". With a flourish worthy of Ayrton, 
M'Gill or Gilbert, he declaimed with irony that when "the men of plush [West End 
servants] sicken in service, and can no longer give a return for what they eat, it is quite 
time that they should be off and throw themselves upon the rates of the poor parishes, 
whence they were originally drawn': 8 
At the parliamentary level even Villiers, despite his warning about a country-wide 
rate equalisation movement, employed the by now familiar comparisons, contrasting the 
poor relief burden in the wealthy parishes that contained the Bank of England and St. 
Katherine's Dock with neighbouring poor parishes where, he said, labourers swarmed. 9 
Indeed it is possible that the change of Radical rhetoric that Taylor notes in late 
1859, when "mainly through the rhetoric of Bright and other leading reformers, the 
terminology of the ..... common people versus the upper ten thousand began to re-enter 
the radical vocabulary for the first time in almost twenty years" owed a debt of influence 
to the Rate Equalisation Association's dramatic images and arguments of the previous 
three years. Radical MPs such as Bright (whose speech to the Liverpool Financial 
Reform Association included the accusation that the guilt for the tax system, "cruel in its 
operation to the poor ..... must lie at the door of the rich and powerful") would have 
been aware of the linguistic and conceptual vocabulary of the Association's rhetoric, 
7See Chapter 3, p. 72, on medical evidence given to Villiers' Select Committee on Poor Relief in 1862. 8Household Words, 1857 vol. 17,5.6.1858,577-8. Dickens did not hesitate to acknowledge his debt to 
a pamphlet by the Rev. M'Gill, but mentioned neither Gilbert, whose 1857 pamphlet he must also have 
read, nor the fact that it was Ayrton who had referred in parliament (Hansard 16.6.1857 col. 1903) to 
some of the dock company figures he quoted. 9Hansard28.6.61 
col. 30. 
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publicised as it had been not only in the Commons and the press but in extensive 
campaigning, and might very well have drawn on it themselves as a political resource. 
10 
In terms of policy, the Rate Equalisation Association's perception was that there 
were, basically, four options for raising and redistributing the poor rate: a national rate 
levied, as the present parish-based poor rate was, on real property; basing poor relief on 
the Property Tax, or Schedule A of the income tax, which was likely to bear more 
heavily on the wealthy (including "the fundholder or the mortgagee "11) than did the 
existing parish assessments12; redistribution within Poor Law unions (which in fact 
took place in 1865 through the Union Chargeability Act but did not relieve the 
metropolitan single parish unions), and redistribution within counties. 
13 
The option for which the Rate Equalisation Association campaigned - the fourth, 
redistribution within counties - was in due course to be that on which, in effect, the 
Metropolitan Common Poor Fund was based, although on a much more centralised 
basis than the Association had proposed14 
In choosing which rate equalisation route to pursue the Association gave least 
priority to a national rate, although Gilbert himself offered to "take up the question of a 
national rate"15 and perhaps at least one other member of the E. C., John Day, having 
worked with Apsley Pellatt, MP, 
16 in 1853 on his Bill for a national rate, would have 
supported such a policy. Central Committee delegates occasionally raised the question 
but achieved little support. For instance T. Burlton of Southwark suggested that the 
Association adopt this radical option, which would be "a great and permanent settlement 
of the question", but was opposed by arguments that this would result in "a storm of 
opposition", and that they should "keep clear of all entanglements". 17 One of the 
'°Taylor (Oxford, 1995), 334; Times 2.12.1859,9c-f. 
11PP 1861 ix, 17/31.5.1861, Warwick's paper on rate equalisation. 12Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 12; PP 1861 ix, 17/31.5.1861, Warwick's paper on rate equalisation. The 
"Property Tax", or schedule A of the income tax, assessed the profits from the ownership of land, 
houses, etc, such as income from landed rentals and, until 1865-6, from business activities such as 
docks, railways, gasworks, etc. (Rubinstein, New York, 1987, p. 88. ) 13Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 11-15. 14Although the London County Council was not, of course, established until 1889, the concept of the 
metropolis as a county-type area was inherent in much metropolitan campaigning in the 1860s, 
including that of the Rate Equalisation Association. 15GL MS 1088/1,25.5.58. 
16Stenton, 
op. cit. Pellatt, Liberal MP for Southwark 1852-57 and for seven years a member of the 
City's Court of Common Councillors. 17MH25/18, 
undated newspaper cutting in Poor Law Board files about the Association's ninth annual 
meeting on 30.1.1867. 
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objections expressed by the E. C. was that it would be a "simple socialistic tax". Others 
were that it would centralise 'the whole management of the poor" in the hands of 
government and increase the powers of the Poor Law Board, would reduce self- 
government and local control, and would lead to lack of accountability to local 
ratepayers and lack of a check on government extravagance. 
' 8 
These were traditional Radical arguments. 
19 Gilbert argued also that ratepayers 
would not have the power of interference "should acts of tyranny or oppression be 
practised on the poor". Warwick, always particularly strong on the need for local 
powers, argued that it would deprive ratepayers and guardians of "that small portion of 
self-government and local control left them by the act of 1834': 
20 
The property tax option, "Lord Malmesbury's proposal", was rejected reluctantly 
(with the Association having difficulty reading "a unanimous decision"21) but on more 
or less the same grounds22 and also, Gilbert wrote, because of "an apparently 
unsurmountable obstacle" - opposition by Members of both houses of parliament, who 
were "so powerfully interested against" a property tax. 
Here the Association flirted also with the idea of an alliance with the radical 
Liverpool-based Financial Reform Association, supporters of direct taxation and 
described by Matthew as the most extreme and organised proponent of direct taxation. 
They decided, however, that they could not agree with the financial case put by the F. R. 
A. (which would not have redistributed wealth to a significant extent), finding the F. R. 
A. 's data "inexplicable" despite their being "men of such talent and integrity. "23 
18Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 11. 
19Taylor, op. cit., 5-6,28,89-93. However, Taylor's view that metropolitan MPs returned to 
parliament 1847-1859 introduced "a strident parochial tone" and opposed "government plans to create 
London-wide municipal powers" cannot, it is clear, be taken to relate to the rate equalisation 
campaigning and other metropolitan policies of 1857 arrivals Ayrton and Locke. Taylor's references to 
anti-centralisation activities in the metropolis fail to make a further necessary distinction between 
different forms of support for localist-radicalism: for instance, between that of the Tory radical 
Toulmin Smith and that of the radical reformer and ex-Chartist William Newton. (See this chapter, 
below, for Toulmin Smith's opposition to the Rate Equalisation Association, and chapter 5, page 123, 
for Newton's support for Ayrton. ) Ayrton's radicalism is considered further in chapter 5. 20Gilbert (London, 1860), 11; PP 1861 ix, 17/31.5.1861, Warwick's paper on rate equalisation; 
MH25/18, newspaper cuttings accompanying letter to Poor Law Board dated 4.2.1867. 21 Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 15. 221bid., 11-12; Warwick, The Poor Laws as they are and as they ought to be: Evidence to Select 
Committee (London, 1861), Paper submitted with evidence, 24 (and also in PP 1861 ix, 17/31.5.1861); 
PP 1850 xvi, House of Lords Select Committee on Parochial Assessments (Chair: Lord Malmesbury). 23Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 12. Matthew, op. cit., 618, points out that because the FRA supported also 
heavy retrenchment, their tax proposals would not have borne heavily on the propertied classes, or 
significantly redistributed the wealth of the rich. 
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The weakness of the third option, union rating - from the point of view of 
metropolitan single parish unions - could be overcome, Warwick suggested, by some 
form of selective parliamentary grant: in effect, a Rate Support Grant. This would 
obviously, however, have involved increased central government control, which may 
have been why it was not pursued. 
It is clear that a major reason for the Equalisation Association's settling on a 
county-based model of rate equalisation was that it was less centralised; furthermore, 
their published draft version incorporated elected members. 24 The proposal also had 
some recognised Radical credentials in that as far back as 1836 Joseph Hume25 had 
argued for county taxation to be controlled by elected boards, and a version of this 
proposal had been defeated in parliament as recently as 1852.26 While Gilbert, in 
support of the county proposal, devised a rather tortuous supporting argument about 
the accumulation of wealth and the economic homogeneity of counties27, Warwick 
argued, simply and repeatedly, in speeches, evidence, correspondence and publications, 
that the introduction of county-based poor law rating, County Financial Boards, or 
County Poor Law Boards would enable rate equalisation to be achieved without 
centralisation. It was, he told the 1861 Select Committee, a plan that was "very popular 
in London" and pointed also to a "community of interests" in counties that would work 
well for the common good. 
28 
While, therefore, all four of these rate equalisation options were raised in other 
debating forums, including parliament, and union rating was incorporated in the Poor 
Law in 1865, it was county and metropolitan rating (the metropolitan area being treated 
as equivalent to a county) that underpinned the campaigning and rhetoric of the Rate 
Equalisation Association. 
Within the county-based framework there were also choices, and it is useful, in 
terms of assessing the policy relationship between the Equalisation Association's 
24GL MS 1088/1,29.12.57, report of the E. C. to the Central Committee, with the proposal that a 
Metropolitan Financial Board be elected on the same principle as the Metropolitan Board of Works, that 
is, indirectly elected from directly elected bodies, the boards of guardians; Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 15, 
30, included a "slight sketch" to show "how easily the system might be carried out". After the 
Association expanded to include the counties, the county-based equalisation policy seems to have been 
regarded as a framework rather than a blueprint. 2Stenton, op. cit.; DNB vol. X (Oxford, 1973). Hume, MP for Montrose, was for 30 years leader of 
the Radical party, until his death in 1855. 26Maccoby (London, 1935), 387-9; Maccoby (London, 1938), 15. 
27Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 13-15. 28R E. Warwick, op. cit., Paper submitted with evidence, 25. 
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proposals and the system eventually chosen by the Conservative government in 1867, to 
note these. 
The county choices (articulated in 1862 in evidence given to the Select Committee 
on Poor Relief by E. C. member John Day under questioning by three of the 
Association's MP Vice-Presidents, Ayrton, Locke and Alderman Sidney) would all have 
allowed local boards of guardians to retain their other executive and administrative 
powers, with a new county board to adjust inequalities and make the rate. The three 
options were Warwick's draft for a county financial board with members elected 
indirectly by the boards of guardians, a fairly similar county board but with the same 
constitution as a board of guardians (part elected directly by ratepayers, and part JPs), 
and Ayrton's unsuccessful 1858 Bill for a Metropolitan Rating Sessions consisting of 
JPs drawn from the three metropolitan counties and the City - which, though referred to 
in Day's evidence, appears to have been dropped by the Association following its 
Commons failure. 29 
The only element of these proposals to be incorporated in Hardy's 1867 Act was 
Warwick's indirect election of members of a board, but the new boards created by the 
Act (district asylum boards) were apparently to be lower tier rather than at "county" 
level, were to have no powers of redistribution and were to have their electoral 
composition further diluted through the addition of the Poor Law Board's nominees. In 
this context the fact that one of the districts created was the "metropolitan district" (a 
"county" area) was of limited significance for rate equalisation. The Rate Equalisation 
Association's radical-reformist choice of proposals for control of redistribution, selected 
as workable policies that might achieve parliamentary approval, were therefore almost 
entirely disregarded. 
Despite defeat on the local control issue the Association's rate equalisation policy 
was, in principle, achieved. Although not all local poor law funding was equalised in 
the metropolis in 1867, there can be no doubt that the Act redistributed a substantial 
proportion of costs and that therefore, despite the view of the Liberal President of the 
Poor Law Board in 1862 that there was "an enormous mass of opinion" against their 
29PP 1862 x, Q. 7663-4 & 7699-7704. 
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proposals, 30 the goals articulated in one of the Association's 1858 model 
resolutions31were largely achieved: 
That the Poor of the Metropolis are the Poor of the Whole Metropolitan 
Community and as such ought in the time of their distress to be relieved and 
supported by an Equalised Rate levied on rateable property throughout the 
District such Rate to be levied on one uniform basis of Assessment. 
The resolution also illustrates the Association's general approach in that it links, 
simply and directly, political principle and practical policy. The fact that the Association 
rallied around alternative county-based methods of implementing the principle of rate 
equalisation (rather than one agreed measure) should be seen as a measure of the 
difficulty of the task they faced in building a workable majority of support (at both local 
and parliamentary level), and also as an example of common political practice. In terms 
of mobilisation of support, their county-based alternatives represented a political 
strength rather than a weakness. 
In the arguments that supported the Association's extensive campaign for rate 
equalisation there had been two major fields in which the debate had to be won: the 
pro-active or more aggressive arguments on class, wealth and poverty in the metropolis, 
and the mainly reactive or defensive arguments relating to centralisation, local powers, 
and the fear that a bottomless public purse would lead to local extravagance. 
Most recognisably radical were the pro-active arguments on wealth, class and 
equality, delivered with particularly force and frequency by the chairman, Gilbert, by 
Ayrton in parliament and by the Rev. M'Gill - who maintained initially that he was not a 
member of the Rate Equalisation Association32 but clearly spoke on behalf of their 
cause and became in due course a Vice-President. 
Gilbert, in his 1860 publication, succeeded in drawing together arguments about 
the roles of capital, labour and classes, of charities, philanthropy and self-interest, and of 
the settlement laws, East-West disparities and the record of the Poor Law Board: a 
rather notable achievement. 
301bid., Q. 7666 (C. P. Villiers. ) 
31GL MS 1088/1,12.1.58. 
32The Times 25.4.1857,12d. 
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His linking theme was the increasing separation of rich and poor - through 
metropolitan improvements, through the settlement laws, through Poor Law Board 
failure to act, and through accumulation of capital. In the City union alone, he pointed 
out, "where wealth had accumulated to a fabulous amount"; there were now 10,000 
fewer of the working classes than in 1801, while in Spitalfields the growth of population 
from 27,000 to 98,000 had been of those "whose sole means of existence lay in the 
handicraft they practised", and in Whitechapel, although 1,770 houses had been 
destroyed under the pretext of improvements, the population had increased by 10,659, 
mainly of the working classes. 
33 
So complete, he said, was "the separation of the rich from the poor, of the 
employer from the employed", that in two neighbouring parishes, the one occupied by 
the employers (St. Olave Hart Street) had had a drop in the amount spent on the poor 
from £730 to £700, while the other (Whitechapel), occupied by the workmen, had had 
a rise from £17,507 to £29,299. The poor were compelled to maintain the poor: the 
dock labourer when in work had to assist the unemployed weaver, and vice versa, while 
the merchant, manufacturer and shipowner were absolved from contributing "to assuage 
the misery of those on whose exertions so much of their wealth, comfort and station was 
obtained". Frequently a tradesman "in a moderate way of business in a poor 
neighbourhood" was obliged to contribute more to the poor rate than the Bank of 
England and the Royal Exchange combined, and in the City's poorest parish (St. Ann 
Blackfriars, where Warwick lived) 20 houses were compelled to pay more to the relief 
of the poor than six of the richest parishes in the City together. 34 
He attacked also the "enormously wealthy" Inns of Court, who were exempt by 
tradition from any contribution to poor relief while their surrounding parishes were 
"frequently in a state of the most abject destitution", and suggested that, in the debate on 
Ayrton's 1858 Bill, the "most vehement" opposition from John Arthur Roebuck, MP 
and QC, "came with a peculiarly bad grace from a gentleman whose abode in the 
Temple is exempt ..... 
from rating"; Roebuck, the former leading Radical, had argued 
that contrasts between rich and poor were irrelevant, and had called on the Conservative 
President of the Poor Law Board to reject the Bill. Other Members of the Commons 
and the Lords living in the wealthier areas of the metropolis were also attacked: the 
33Gilbert, ibid., 6. 
34Gi1bert, ibid., 4,5. 
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opposition to Ayrton's Bill from such Members "whose property would be injured by the 
passing of the Bill" had been most active, Gilbert wrote. 
35 
Nonetheless, Gilbert linked his attacks on the wealthy with an insistence that it 
was government's responsibility to put things right. For instance, he accused the Poor 
Law Board of permitting the ejection of the poor and the destruction of their dwellings 
for many years "without one word of objection" and "without the slightest provision 
being made for their shelter": The separation of the employer from the employed and 
capital from labour was every day becoming more apparent, he said - not only because 
of the steady accumulation of capital (a goal which was, for instance, out of the reach of 
"fifty Spitalfields weavers", however hard they worked) but because of poor law 
legislation, which caused the rich every day to become "more distinctly separated from 
the poor". 36 
His rhetoric of capital and labour was directed particularly at the city and the 
docks. One of his examples was a City company with "a paid-up industrial capital 
exceeding a million" which rented a floor for which it paid £10 annual poor rates. While 
the profits were divided among the shareholders, he pointed out, labour - "the direct 
contributors to the wealth of the undertaking" - was left to be supported by the eastern 
parish in which they lived and actually worked. In another example of "this disgraceful 
disconnection of wealth from the labour it employs, and the poverty thereby 
occasioned", he singled out the contribution of shipping to the burden of pauperism in 
the river-side parishes For instance when in 1852-56 the shipping trade had been 
particularly active, he said, demand for labour had increased and so had pauperism, but 
all the profits had gone to the merchant and shipowner. 37 
The non-radical alternative to rate equalisation - charitable giving - was criticised. 
Quoting statistician Dr. Farr's38 conclusion on the poor rates that in terms of their being 
"the regulated almsgiving of a Christian community" they left the wealthy districts "a 
large amount of arrears to be made up by voluntary gifts", Gilbert developed this 
criticism further, suggesting, for instance, that the most generous contributors (in 
proportion to their means) to the charitable funds of the metropolitan general hospitals 
35Gilbert 
, ibid., 7,8; Hansard 23.5.1858, col. 642-3; Taylor, op. cit., 264,332. 36Gi1bert, ibid., 6,7,26-7. 
37Gilbert (1857), op. cit., 16-18,20. 38DNB 
vol. VI (London, 1973). Dr. William Farr, 1807-83, statistician at the Registrar General's 
office. 
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were retail tradesmen. A loss was frequently experienced by subscriptions of the 
wealthy and aristocratic, he wrote, "who too frequently consider it a cheap way of 
contracting for their sick servants". 
39 
When, the following year, Gilbert attempted to clarify his views on the respective 
roles of equalised rating and charity under the hard grilling of a not generally 
sympathetic select committee, 40 the fact that he was a man wearing two hats, (having 
become also one of the hon. secretaries of the Society for the Relief of Distress) gave his 
views on poor relief policies an element of insider-credibility. The authorities ought, he 
said, to take responsibility (on an equalised rating basis) for night refuges for the 
houseless poor, for the sick and the old, and for a proportion of outdoor relief, and 
should continue to apply the workhouse test to discourage "vagabonds"; he would, 
however, be "very sorry to see the poor law supply the place of charity in outdoor 
relief. "41 
The radical nature of Gilbert's political views is confirmed by the fact that he 
raised the question of redistribution through public ownership in a much later work, 
"Contrasts", written well after the passing of the 1867 Metropolitan Poor Act and the 
disbanding of the Rate Equalisation Association. Seeking a solution to the high 
metropolitan rates that had followed equalisation and arguing in support, yet again, of 
the interests of poorer ratepayers, he pointed out that the value of the land, buildings 
and revenues of the three great endowed metropolitan hospitals - Guy's, St. 
Bartholomew's and St. Thomas's - would probably be sufficient to build and largely 
maintain every metropolitan Poor Law infirmary and asylum "without the cost of one 
shilling to the ratepayer" In effect he was suggesting redistribution of the hospitals' 
inherited income to publicly owned services 42 
Overall it seems clear that the rhetoric and policies of Gilbert, both in his private 
capacity and as chairman of the Rate Equalisation Association, were radical but set 
within a framework of goals that were seen as realisable and capable of appealing to a 
wide spectrum of present and potential reformers. His involvement in philanthropic 
activities serves to confirm a personal commitment to improving the lot of the poor, but 
his rhetoric was more wide-ranging. 
39Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 29. 40PP 1861 ix, Select Committee on Poor Relief: Minutes of Evidence 16 & 19.4.61. 41Ibid., Q. 4332-4367. 
42 Gilbert, Contrasts (London, 1873), 4,9,10,307. 
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It is reasonable to assume that Gilbert and other leading Association members, as 
experienced and established local political figures, would have hesitated to embark on 
public discourse that might lose them the support for which they campaigned so hard 
from local metropolitan politicians, tradesmen and small businessmen (as well as from 
larger Vice-Presidential businessmen and MPs). Such radical style and arguments may 
therefore be interpreted not only as reflecting the views and attitudes of the proponents 
but also as evidence of anticipated constituencies of support - both locally and in the 
wider business and political world - for the radical case for rate equalisation. 
The radical rhetoric of the Rev. M'Gill, on the other hand, while often dramatic, 
appears to have been grounded in the poverty and destitution of his East End parish 
rather than in political experience, and his views on poor relief policy fluctuated. 
However, as chairman of the sister- (and at times rival) organisation in the East End, a 
member of the Rate Equalisation Association's E. C., link-person with Ayrton and Times 
letter-writer (as the anonymous "East End Incumbent) he became a highly significant 
figure in the Association's campaigning and as an element in its public face. 
In terms of political positions M'Grill was initially less worried about the possibility 
of an increase in centralisation, and when he did argue for local power, was prepared 
also to maintain or increase Poor Law Board intervention. Indeed he argued for rate 
equalisation based on Schedule A property tax valuation, suggested that the Poor Law 
Board might "settle" the level of spending each year, and said that whether such an 
equalised rate was administered by central government's treasurer or a financial board 
elected by the boards of guardians was "a matter of very little consequence"; these 
arrangements were "merely the vehicle" for achieving an equal rate. The following 
year, however, in a 36-page pamphlet supporting Ayrton's 1858 Bill (and written, it 
seems likely, with guidance from Ayrton), he argued that a national rate would 
overthrow local administration, that private charity could not meet the case, that London 
could be relieved without government centralisation and that "it is the duty of a good 
government to see that taxation is fairly and evenly distributed". 43 
Despite his relative inexperience politically, M'Gill's vigorous radical style, initially 
from the platform of The Times, was an early component in the rate equalisation debate. 
His first letter appeared at a particularly appropriate time: Gladstone and the Bishop of 
43BL 08248. c. 33, The London Poor and the Inequality of the Rates raised for their relief by an Fast- 
end Incumbent (London, 1858). 
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London had delivered speeches in a Stepney schoolroom reminding the West End of the 
poverty of the East, "removed out of sight, and, unhappily, out of mind" a little over a 
week before the Rate Equalisation Association's inaugural lively public meeting on 15 
February 1857,44 and almost as if on cue, M'Gill wrote to The Times suggesting that the 
Bishop or Gladstone should introduce a Bill into parliament equalising the metropolitan 
poor rates. 45 Perhaps Billett, churchwarden of St. Pancras, deserved to be forgiven for 
the rather wild conspiracy accusations he made at the Association's inaugural meeting 
the following week. 46 
A Times editorial had concurred with Gladstone's remarks on links between the 
West End's "splendid streets, spacious squares, and richly-embellished shops" and 
poverty in the East "removed out of sight, and, unhappily, out of mind". No great 
accumulation of luxury and wealth could ever be formed, the editorial agreed, "without 
a corresponding growth of a laborious and struggling class of poor to sustain and 
minister to it". M'Gill, however, while praising the editorial, pushed the argument 
towards a more radical position by raising the threat of social instability and the issue of 
charity versus rate equalisation. Something more than the charity of the rich was 
required, he said, to meet the chronic destitution which always prevailed in the winter. 
It was impossible for tens of thousands of starving labourers to be "efficiently relieved 
by the spasmodic efforts of even the most extensive charity". If the rates were 
equalised, all the rich would be compelled to contribute, whereas through voluntary 
charity only the liberal and the humane gave assistance. Rate equalisation was 
necessary "if the peace of London is to be preserved intact" and an inordinate increase in 
crime prevented. 
In the subsequent lively correspondence (with a cast including such anonymous 
local political commentators as "An East-End Churchwarden" and "A West-End 
Apothecary") M'Gill told The Times readers that he sympathised "most cordially" with 
the efforts of the Rate Equalisation Association "in so good a cause", and promised 
them "thus publicly, my own help in it, and that of four-fifths of the incumbents of the 
East-end of London, many of whom are ready to lend their school-rooms at once for 
44The Times 6.2.57.6f. 
45The limes 9.2.57,12e. M'Gill later told a public meeting (The Times 30.4.57,121) that the Bishop and 
Gladstone had "expressed it as their opinion that the residents of the West End of London ought to 
contribute towards supporting the poor of the East End, in order to relieve the unequal pressure to 
which the inhabitants of that portion of the metropolis were subjected". 46See below. 
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meetings of ratepayers". He also, however, argued for centralised Schedule A property 
tax valuation for the rates, and advised the Association not to decide "upon any question 
of detail"until the principle of equality of rating and of assessment had been agreed by 
parliament: an early indication of the political difficulties ahead for the Association in 
devising practical policies around which majority support could be built. 
47 
M'Gill's role as a vigorous campaigner was noted in official circles. On his first 
appearance before the Select Committee on Poor Relief he was grilled mercilessly by 
Villiers on one of his later letters to The Times on the 1860-1 East End winter distress, 
in which he had made the subsequently much-quoted statements that the Poor Law had 
"broken down" and that the Poor Law Board had "never moved a finger" to help. 48 
Villiers even accused M'Gill of having "sought to discredit the Central Board": 49 an 
accusation that seems to provide evidence as much about the Poor Law Board's own 
attitudes to its radical critics in the metropolis as about M'Gill's own position. 
As a prominent member of the East End deputation to Hardy on the eve of the 
1867 Act M'Gill, doubtless as expected, did not pull his punches. The previous day, he 
said, he had gone to the Mansion House to appeal for charity; today he came to the 
President of the Poor Law Board to ask for justice. The previous week he had seen 
men being given poor relief - "hardy, stalwart men who built the iron-clads - iron-clads 
not to protect East End industry so much as West End wealth". These men, he said, 
who had contributed to the national wealth, "looked like starving wolves" -a choice of 
image that may have evoked uncomfortable thoughts among his official listeners. 50 
M'Gill's radical campaigning style may have reflected an inner anger at more than 
just the poor rate problem. When asked, in 1862, the standard London Diocesan 
Visitation question of whether there was anything that specially impeded his own 
ministry, or the welfare of the church around him, and whether he could suggest 
remedies, he wrote with frank simplicity: "I think it is a great mistake to build churches 
in poor districts like this without adequate endowment. Christ Church is totally 
47The Times 15.4.1857,9c; 20.4.1857,6f; 25.4.1857,12d. Ten years later, at a public meeting to 
present M'Gill with a farewell testimonial, C. S. Butler, MP, realled "the immense amount of statistics 
and other information he brought to bear upon the matter in his excellent letters. " (The Times 
27.8.1867,6f. ) 
48PP 1861 ix, Q. 3192-3429. 
49PP 1861 ix, Q. 3387. 
50MI125/18,28.1.1867, 
newspaper cutting from The limes of 26.1.1867, filed at the Poor Law Board 
under "Suggestions - Miscellaneous". 
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unendowed: the people are too poor to pay pew rents and so they stay away from 
church. The Finsbury Prebend ought to provide a remedy and make these churches 
free. They would soon be full. "51 
His view of his rate equalisation achievements, as he departed after 13 probably 
stressful years in a difficult East End parish for a new and undoubtedly more restful 
rural parish a few miles from Gladstone's Hawarden Castle, was that he was "content 
with Mr. Hardy's Act as far as it went" but that the question "must not be allowed to 
slumber until the whole of the in-door poor and the sick were thrown upon a general 
fund "" 52 It seems that M'Gill had no reservations about the increased central control of 
metropolitan poor relief that the Conservative government had introduced. 
Warwick on the other hand, less dramatic in his rhetoric than Gilbert or M'Gill 
(but believing, too, that those who benefited from a man's labour "ought to bear a fair 
share of the relief required in the time of his distress"53) paid particular attention to 
defending the Association from potentially damning accusations about centralisation, 
extravagance and loss of local control: the strongest and most persistent arguments 
against rate equalisation. Opposed at one stage even to the continuation of the Poor 
Law Board, he argued that rate equalisation and a general uniformity of standards could 
be achieved without the intrusive control of central government. 
The accusation that equalisation would necessarily increase centralisation had 
been raised publicly and noisily at the earliest point in the history of the Rate 
Equalisation Association: the public meeting held two days before the Association was 
formally established at a delegate-based Central Committee meeting. 54 The accusers - 
supporters of the Anti-Centralization Union (led by its major figure, Joshua Toulmin 
Smith) and representatives from large West End parishes such as St. Pancras, 
Marylebone and St. Luke Chelsea, the "most populous and important parishes in the 
51 beth Palace Library, Visitation Returns, Tait 441/491, dated 14.6.62. 
52The Times 27.8.67,6f. 
53PP 1861 ix, Appendix 6,199. 
54GL MS 1089: 'First meeting, Feb. 15,1857, Metropolitan Association for the Abolition of the Laws 
of Setlement and Poor Removal, and for the Equalization of the Poor Rates" (a verbatim hand-written 
account of the meeting at the London Tavern which, according to reported comments, lasted several 
hours). The chairman of the Association at this public meeting was City Alderman R. B. Whiteside, 
but two days later, at the first delegate-based Central Committee meeting, he was succeeded by Gilbert; 
Day and Warwick were the joint secretaries at both meetings. 
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metropolis"55 - had opposed for several years the earlier City-based movement in which 
Warwick had been involved. 56 
In a meeting often in uproar, Toulmin presented his anti-centralisation case. It 
was a notorious fact, he said, shown by the histories of all countries, that "centralisation 
never comes forward - never makes any step in public - without first making profession 
for the public good. " He pointed out the implications of rate equalisation: that if a 
"more equitable" rating were the aim, a national rate would be by far the more equitable. 
To exclamations, he added that the word "levelling" would better represent the aims of 
the Association, and protested against those who "seek covertly to gain the ends of 
centralisation, and to involve you, in a delusion, a mockery, and a shame". 57 It was, he 
said, ignorance and selfishness if "you try to get a great end, towards which there are 
twenty or thirty steps, by smoothing over the first two or three, so that they gradually 
lead on to the twentieth step, whence they will plunge you into the abyss". 58 The 
popular and humanitarian cry of benevolence - "so easy to raise" - was always employed 
to attain an object which was really opposed to the dictates of either humanity or 
benevolence. 59 
The hint of conspiracy theory was developed further by William Billett, senior 
churchwarden of St. Pancras, "the most respectable metropolitan district". Although 
the Association's supporters would say that centralisation was not involved, this was, he 
said, "the insidious way in which things of this sort are always done. " The principle of 
centralisation during the last 30 years had made rapid and fearful strides in England. 
The government, he suggested, "never comes forward itself but it gets some cunning, 
ingenious men to come forward and do their dirty work,,. 60 
While parliamentary, Poor Law Board and Rate Equalisation Association records 
all show that such a simplistic conspiracy theory about the genesis of rate equalisation 
was inappropriate, there can be little disagreement that Smith, at least, had a valid 
perception of some of the implications for government growth of the equalisation of the 
55MS 1089,53 (J. Toulmin Smith). 
56GL MS 7754; GL MS 1089,87. Smith conducted a lengthy correspondence with the Lord Mayor 
and Warwick in 1854 about a public meeting chaired by the Lord Mayor on 15 February 1854. William 
Billett, senior churchwarden of St. Pancras, supporting Smith on 15.2.1857, said he had been "watching 





RHETORIC, POLICIES, RESULTS 
costs of caring for the poor. Indeed Warwick had in some respects unintentionally 
conceded Smith's case about the growth of centralisation three years before when he had 
argued, in correspondence, that parochial control had been destroyed by the 1834 Act, 
which had put control into the hands of the govemment-appointed auditor, and that rate 
equalisation could hardly make matters worse. 61 
The fact that even platform speakers supporting rate equalisation at this initial 
public meeting attacked centralisation is a measure of the task that Warwick faced in 
attempting publicly to reconcile a radical policy (rate equalisation) with its internal 
contradictions: the financial gain but loss of power that a local body might have to 
expect. For instance the Lord Mayor, Alderman Thomas Sidney, Liberal MP for 
Stafford, chairing the public meeting, said that centralisation had in the past few years 
tended to "sap the institutions of our free country" and John Ayshford Wise, the Lord 
Mayor's fellow-Liberal MP for Stafford, said that he would have refused to second the 
motion being put to the meeting if he had thought there was anything in it "which 
tended, in the slightest degree, to a centralising principle". 62 
The anti-centralisation case for rate equalisation became easier to argue after the 
deletion of the removal/settlement issue from the new Association's programme in the 
two days between the disorderly public meeting and the first Central Committee. 
Toulmin Smith had taken pleasure in pointing out the rating implications of the abolition 
of removal and settlement: that if the poor were free to move anywhere, the poor relief 
burden in poorer and urban areas might very well increase further, with the most 
equitable solution being the centralised policy of a national rate. 
The conjunction of these two issues had been acknowledged in the unsuccessful 
1853 Bill of John Day and Apsley Pellatt, MP, which combined abolition with a national 
rate. The Rate Equalisation Association were wise, therefore, to agree to nail their 
colours to the mast of single issue politics: rate equalisation, with only its essential 
concomitant of uniformity of assessment63 (although individual members of the E. C. 
still expressed, on occasion, their opposition to removal and settlement64) 
61GL MS 7754, letter of 1854 from Warwick to F. W. Knight, MP, former secretary to the Poor Law 
Board. 
62GL MS 1089,11,29. 
63GL MS 1089,34,63,66. GL MS 1088/1,17.2.1857. 
64PP 1861 ix, Appendix 6,202,195: Warwick called the removal and settlement laws "a curse to the 
poor", and said that they should be "entirely swept from the statute book". 
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Warwick drew up a County Financial Board model for the metropolis in order to 
refute the anti-centralisers' arguments. His "Plan for forming the Metropolis into one 
District or Union for the relief of the Poor"65 emphasised the role of the representative 
bodies, requiring each board of guardians in the metropolis (or similar body in Local Act 
parishes) to nominate someone each year to be a member of the proposed metropolitan 
Financial Poor Law Board. Each local board would also have to send its six-monthly 
estimate of its spending to this indirectly elected metropolitan board, who would 
apportion payment for the spending to each parish on the basis of the rateable value of 
its property. The metropolitan board would also have the power, on application of a 
parish or a certain number of ratepayers, to penalise local boards for "extravagance or 
carelessness". 
The strength of Warwick's objections to the existing powers of the Poor Law 
Board is indicated in his evidence to the select committee on 17 May 1861. He argued 
that although close control by the central Board had been necessary for instituting the 
1834 system, and it remained important for the poor law to be administered on a 
uniform basis throughout the country, there was now a body of paid local officials well- 
versed in principles and rules who could carry out this administration. There was now 
no need for the central Board's "interference with petty matters of detail". Any local 
difficulties could be adjudicated by the magistrates at the petty sessions, and statistical 
information could be gathered through the Registrar General. 66 
He insisted that the Poor Law Board was an unconstitutional and arbitrary body 
possessing powers "greater than the Crown, or either branch of the Legislature", 
because it issued orders which had the effect of Acts of Parliament, and suspended or 
dispensed with such orders as it pleased. Despite Villiers, in the chair, pointing out that 
the central Board could not issue a general order unless it were signed by three Cabinet 
Ministers, Warwick held firmly to this position, and maintained his view that the central 
Board was "no longer required". a view that not only he but many other guardians in 
65GL MS 7754, letter from Warwick to F. W. Knight, MP, dated 20.11.58 and enclosing a copy of his 
earlier letter to Knight of 1854; undated Plan, signed by Warwick, for a Metropolitan Financial Board; 
undated similar draft Bill, with proposed implementation date of May 1860; Gilbert (1860), op. cit., 30. 
Warwick also said in his 1858 letter to Knight that he and his colleagues had submitted to the Poor Law 
Board on 8.3.1854 a plan for the management of the metropolitan poor that bore a close resemblance to 
the subsequent 1855 Metropolitan Management Act; if correct, this suggests at the least a noteworthy 
16e 'slative competence. 
P 1861 ix, Q. 7945-7981,8029. 
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various parts of the country had already expressed by signing the 1860 petition to the 
House of Commons against the annual renewal of the powers of the Board. In a paper 
accompanying his evidence, Warwick suggested that whereas guardians were at present 
merely machines, the Association's proposed County Boards would restore local 
control. 67 
Demanding that the Poor Law Board be abolished was, undoubtedly, an extreme 
localist position; significantly, Warwick dropped this demand two years later, on the 
grounds that "a general wish" existed that the Board should continue as a court of 
appeal, though with reduced powers to interfere with the actions of boards of 
guardians. 68 
His other major line of argument, contained particularly in his 1861 and 1862 
evidence to the Select Committee on Poor Relief and his first address, in 1861, to the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, 69 was that the metropolis's 
present poor law problems had been caused by past legislation (the 1834 Act, the Poor 
Removal Act 1846 and the Poor Law Amendment Act 18487°), which had abolished 
settlement by hiring and service (affecting West End servants), created the irremovable 
poor, and apportioned union common fund charges inappropriately. The result had 
been to reverse the law of 43 Elizabeth, so that the poor rate had become a tax upon 
poverty rather than upon property. 
Warwick's arguments were grounded largely in the realities of removal, rating 
disparities and poor relief legislation, and his sober forays into wealth and class 
differences were studded with statistics and references to the law. In attacking, for 
instance, the "slavery or serfdom" inflicted on the poor, he avoided the colourful 
metropolitan imagery of some of his associates and focused on explaining the 
significance of the first settlement laws enacted under Charles II. In his lengthy 1862 
evidence on rate equalisation (and his County Financial Boards proposal) to the Select 
Committee on Poor Relief he responded to their cross-examination with detailed 
practical and statistical comparisons. In terms of Rate Equalisation Association rhetoric 
Warwick acted, perhaps unconsciously, as a complement and foil to the more 
67PP1861 ix, Q. 8005-8012,8108,7945; ibid., Appendix 6,202. 
68GL MS 7754, paper read by Warwick at a meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of 
Social Science in Edinburgh, October 1863. 
69PP 1861 ix, evidence 17.5.1861 and paper submitted 31.5.1861; GL MS 7754, paper delivered to the 
NAPSS in London, 1862; PP 1862 x, evidence on 27.6.62. 704 &5 Will. N, c. 76 s. 64; 9& 10 Viet. c. 66; 11 & 12 Viet. c. 110. 
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flamboyant Gilbert, and also as an assurance that the Association would remain on guard 
against "centralisation". 71 
Public opposition to some of the existing centralised powers of the Poor Law 
Board was expressed also by EC members Henry Potter and John Blachford. Potter, 
one of the tradesman members of the E. C. and a guardian of the West London Union, 
presented a detailed case to the Select Committee for reducing the powers of the central 
Board, and suggested that their powers in relation to boards of guardians might be 
modified to the extent that they only receive returns and give advice. 
72 Blachford, 
vice-chairman of the Association, appearing as the Chairman of the Fulham Union, made 
it clear that he saw a role for the Poor Law Board but argued that some of the orders 
issued by the central Board were so trifling that they did not require the interference of 
anybody, and others were of such importance that they ought to be made by parliament. 
He objected in principle to parliament's delegating authority to the Poor Law Board to 
make general orders. The "nation at large", he said, had a right to know what 
alterations in the law were going to be made, and the public and boards of guardians 
should have the power to be heard. 
73 
However, despite such "localist" priorities the Association, through its pursuit of 
legislated redistribution, inevitably found itself ranged at times with the central Board 
against fiercely independent local bodies such as some of the Local Act parishes. For 
instance Blachford in due course defended the Poor Law Board's implementation of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act's predecessor, the redistributive Metropolitan Houseless Poor 
Act 1864/5 (which had reached the statute book as a result of the parliamentary tactics 
agreed at the Association's first joint meeting of its parliamentary Vice-Presidents with 
the E. C. in 1859) when it came under attack from St. George Hanover Square 
guardians. This archetypal wealthy West End parish, instead of investing its rates in 
permanent casual wards, used the inefficient "ticket" system of putting the casual poor in 
private lodging-house bed (with conditional breakfast) accommodation. Answering 
condemnations of the Poor Law Board, its officers and the Act, Blachford put the blame 
instead on the policies of local guardians. 74 His support was in effect reciprocated the 
71 GL MS 7754, Warwick's 1862 paper for the National Association for the Promotion of Social 
Science, 1,2,7; 13 & 14 Charles H, Act for the Better Relief of the Poor 1662; Warwick, op. cit., 
paper submitted to Select Committee on Poor Relief, 31; PP 1862, Q. 6921-7318. 7 PP 1861 ix, Q. 4773-4920,5022-4. 
73PP 1861 ix, Q. 8249,8255,8302-3,8308,8331,8335. 
74The Times 5.2.1866,12b; 9.3.1866,5e, meeting of London guardians at St. James's Hall, called by 
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following year when the metropolitan poor law inspector, H. B. Farnall (previously an 
opponent of the Rate Equalisation Association75), using arguments that the Association 
itself might have used, said that the Houseless Poor Act was passed "to remedy the 
injustice of poverty-stricken parishes having a burden from which rich parishes were 
free". The only change it brought in, he said, was that "the payment for the houseless 
poor was spread over the whole metropolis instead of some poor parishes being 
burdened and others getting of . "76 
It is clear that the Association's policies and their arguments for rate equalisation 
were based on a conception of a more equal society in which the gulf between wealth 
and poverty would be reduced; they were therefore economic radicals. They also, 
however, adhered to concepts of freedom and political liberty that have played a major 
part in the long history of English radicalism.?? Their insistence that rate equalisation 
must not be introduced at the cost of local powers - the case put publicly by Warwick 
especially - should be seen not as diluting the contention that the Association was a 
radical movement but as emphasising it. Although historically metropolitan rate 
equalisation ultimately contributed to the development of centralised state services, the 
Association itself took its stand in the Radical tradition of resistance to unaccountable, 
over-mighty or excessive central control. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Association gathered considerable support 
from those whose own parishes or unions would not have benefited a great deal, or at 
all, from rate equalisation; there may therefore have been a significant degree of 
support for increased redistribution as a principle, regardless of the individual's own 
economic interests. Some business organisations, on the other hand, doubtless had 
financial grounds for supporting an equalised metropolis-wide rate; the London Dock 
Company, for instance, which was severely disadvantaged by parish-based rating 
because it was situated in parts of four poor parishes, made a very early donation to the 
78 Association. 
St. George Hanover Square guardians; also The Times 27.2.1867,12b & 28.2.1867,12a. 75GL MS 1088/1,7.7.1858. Farnall argued against the Association's proposals at guardians' meetings. 76The Times 1.1.1867,11d, meeting of delegates from metropolitan boards of guardians at St. Martin's 
Hall, Long Acre, called by Farnall. 77E. F. Biagini, "Popular Liberals, Gladstonian finance and the debate on taxation, 1860-1874" in 
Biagini & Reid, "Currents of Radicalism" (Cambridge, 1991), 135,137; Taylor, op. cit., 5-6. 78GL MS 1090, op. cit., 7.5.1857; W. Gilbert (London, 1857), 17; Hansard 16.6.1857 col. 1903 
(Ayrton). 
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Self-interest was in fact a campaigning issue from the early stages, and was one of 
the charges that Ayrton and E. C. members fired at their opponents; indeed it is likely 
that at least a few major figures were defensive converts to the cause of rate equalisation 
on these grounds. It was a charge denied absolutely by Sotheron-Estcourt, 
Conservative President of the Poor Law Board, on behalf of all Members of Parliament, 
when Ayrton suggested, during the debate on his 1858 Bill, that the principle of 
metropolitan rate equalisation would interfere with the pockets of many MPs and said 
that he doubted the sympathies for the poor of those "who had contrived to shift the 
burden from their own shoulders"; Sotheron-Estcourt's response was that he did not 
think Ayrton would be able to point to a single instance in which MPs "had made a 
sacrifice of principle, in order to save their own pockets. "79 
Defined more widely, self-interest doubtless included the fear of social instability: 
an issue raised particularly by the East End spokesmen Ayrton and M'Gill, but clearly 
never wholly absent in the metropolis. Ayrton's use of this shock tactic in the 
Commons may well have contributed to his later being caricatured, inappropriately, as 
an uncultured East End bogeyman: for instance, for his reference to the poorer classes 
of the metropolis taking the matter "into their own hands" and his suggestion that "the 
people would make themselves heard but it might be in a manner that was not to be 
desired". 80 
Of the E. C. members themselves it is evident that, irrespective of more complex 
theories that might be offered about personal cost-benefit analysis, 81 Gilbert, Warwick, 
M'Gill and Day, among others, having seen much hardship and distress, may have been 
motivated to a significant extent by a desire to improve the lot of the poor. John Day, 
for one, also articulated a wider historical perspective. Confident that history was on 
their side, he pointed out that places with the largest population were generally more 
79Hansard 12.5.1858 col. 497,501,503. 801bid., 23.3.1858 col. 634,12.5.1858 col. 502; Stedman Jones (London, 1992), 241-2, says that in the 
1860s "the fears of the governing classes focused primarily upon the condition of London and the 
condition of East London in particular"; Fraser (1984), op. cit., 241, makes a broader statement: that 
"from the anti-vagrant legislation of the fourteenth-century through to the uncovenanted benefit of 
1920, social policy was motivated partly by a fear of social revolution". See also chapter 2, p. 50-1 
Hardy) and chapter 7, p. 231 (Hicks Beach). 1M. Daunton, "Introduction", (ed. ) M. Daunton, Charity, self-interest and welfare in the English past 
(London, 1996), 13, summarises such approaches. 
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heavily burdened with rates, and (when) they "by-and-by, obtain more influence in the 
legislature 
...... the minority must submit to the majority" 
82 
The Association, in its pursuit of a legislative solution to poor law problems 
arising from inequalities of wealth and resources, became a powerful force in 
metropolitan politics. With an agreed policy package and, through its leading figures, 
strong "Rational model" arguments, it employed a radical discourse effectively to win 
overwhelming political support for the radical concept of rate equalisation. 
II 
The Rate Equalisation Association's proposals for implementing redistribution by 
means of elected county boards, together with a few other less widely publicised rate 
equalisation models, are useful criteria against which to assess the thinking underlying 
the Conservative government's chosen redistributive instrument and the nominee 
clauses, as are the two preceding Bills and an initial draft Bill presented to the Cabinet. 
The nominee proposals became more centralised, more extensive and less 
permissive between the Bill's appearance in Cabinet in November 1866 as the Poor 
Relief (Metropolis) Sketch of a Bill and its First Reading. The sketch shows that 
three months before the First Reading there was only one tentative nominee clause: 
a margin note against asylum boards only, saying that power to nominate from 
among JPs "may" be given to the Poor Law Board and ending: "Query: President, 
or from the Physicians, Surgeons, or Beneficed Clergy". Although not wholly 
clear in view of the apparent inclusion of the President on the list, it seems that the 
clergy and medical men were envisaged as joining JPs in having a legislated part to 
play in controlling the local elected managers. By the date of the First Reading a 
specific nominee clause had been added, with "may" amended to "shall", and "may" 
used for the additional provision of nominees on school district boards and boards of 
83 guardians. 
82PP 1862 x, Q. 7667. 83PRO 30/6/169, Carnarvon Papers, Cabinet paper dated 6.11.1866; PP 1867 IV, 261, Bill 9; PP 1867 
IV, 283, Bill 66; 30 & 31 Vict, c. 6, s. 11,49,79. 
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Other amendments were however aimed at defusing potential Liberal 
opposition before the committee stage. The proposal in both the sketch and the 
First Reading Bill that there should be separate boards of management for each 
asylum was replaced before the committee stage by boards for each district. This 
was not the only instance of Hardy making the Bill more acceptable to dissenting 
Members before they began working through the detail of the clauses. In this case 
several Members, appearing to assume that it was district boards that were being 
proposed, had argued in the First and Second Readings for a metropolis-wide board, 
and Hardy's amendment was probably the most tenable position he could adopt. 
Another departmental amendment produced by Hardy between the Second Reading 
and the committee stage involved the qualifications for office of nominee managers. 
These had been set uniformly at £100 a. r. v. in the First Reading Bill, but after 
objections from a number of Liberal Members, Hardy remarked that he did not care 
if the nominees paid a farthing in rates, and the figure was amended to £40 a. r. v. 
before the committee stage. Significantly, however, the £100 a. r. v. qualification for 
elected managers remained in the Bill until reduced in committee to "ratepayers 
qualified to be guardians" or existing guardians. Attempts to increase the range of 
poor law costs equalised through the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund were, on 
the other hand, largely unsuccessful. Between the Cabinet paper sketch and the 
First Reading, smallpox and fever asylums were added, but thereafter the only 
addition was the widening of the initial provision to include in the Fund the salaries 
of only certain specified staff. - salaries: a very limited extension when compared 
with proposals by the Rate Equalisation Association and by MPs at the committee 
stage. One of the unsuccessful proposed amendments - the inclusion of building 
purchase and development on the Common Poor Fund - would, if successful, have 
reduced the subsequent heavy spending required of individual local bodies and 
therefore also the dissatisfaction with the degree of redistribution actually 
achieved. 84 
Overall, Hardy's Act provided for more extensive control over local poor law 
bodies than initially proposed, and this was little diminished by the qualification 
amendments. Even with a lower qualification for nominees the Poor Law Board 
84Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 176-7,21.2.1867 col. 752-3,771,775,8.3.1867 col. 1623,11.3.1867 col. 
1689-92,1694-5. Also GL MS 1088/1,18. & 25.2.1867. 
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was free to appoint, if it so wished, only wealthier nominees, so Hardy's "farthing" 
comment had no real significance in terms of concessions. More significant was the 
fact that less well-to-do guardians were only enabled to sit on the new asylum 
boards as elected members because of a Radical amendment at the committee stage. 
The refusal of Hardy to yield, to any meaningful extent, on the items covered by the 
Metropolitan Common Poor Fund also indicates a concern for the interests of 
wealthier ratepayers on whom the redistributed increased burden would have fallen. 
Comparisons between the sketch, the two Bills and the Act show, therefore, that a 
concern to protect the purses of the wealthier and reduce the power of elected 
members was a constant factor in the genesis of the Act. 
Whether Hardy's Bill owed a debt to earlier Villiers plans for rate equalisation 
legislation85 is not clear, but Hardy said that it did not. He told the large and 
comprehensive deputation from the Tower Hamlets Rate Equalisation Association 
(led by Ayrton, the Rev. M'Gill and other MPs, and including leading East End 
Radicals, local politicians and major employers) a fortnight before the First Reading 
that he had found "no practical proof in the records of the office" that Villiers was in 
favour of metropolitan rate equalisation. Locke's statement that Villiers, "on being 
spoken to upon the subject, said all things could not be done at once, and they must 
wait", to some extent confirms this. 86 
Another alternative to the Association's proposals and Hardy's central Fund - 
the MBW option - was suggested to Hardy by the same deputation, 
87 but rejected. 
Basing the equalisation mechanism on the Houseless Poor Act system administered 
by the Metropolitan Board of Works88 would have placed administrative control in 
the hands of the wholly (though indirectly) elected MBW and was acceptable to the 
Rate Equalisation Association as well as to its sister organisation in Tower Hamlets. 
The Houseless Poor Act had been passed in 1864 as a result of the Association's 
parliamentary tactics, and did not contradict the major principles of its county 
financial board proposals because the MBW was an elected "county" board. 
Extending this system to include a greater (and financially more meaningful) range 
85Cook, op. cit., 134, says that Villiers' letter of 14.4.1866 to Florence Nightingale "foreshadowed 
le °islation". 8The Times 26.1.1867,6c, d; PP 1866 xxxv, op. cit. (Villiers' last annual report), gives no indication 
of pending rate equalisation legislation. 87Jbid., 6c, d. 
8827 & 28 Vict. c. 116, Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act 1864, s. l, 2. 
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of poor law expenditure would have satisfied the major Association requirement 
because the general rate out of which the MBW paid for the destitute was based on 
annual rateable value and was therefore inherently redistributive. Eleven days 
before Hardy's First Reading the E. C. added a further argument at a meeting at the 
London Coffee House: that elected MBW control of an equalised metropolitan 
poor rate was feasible in the light of "the practicability being proved, and the 
justness of the principle admitted" in the houseless poor rate. 
89 
Ayrton, in delivering the first speech in response to Hardy's Bill, emphasised that 
developing the Houseless Poor Act's common fund by adding further classes of the 
poor to it would have been an alternative approach, 
90 and the ninth annual report of 
the Rate Equalisation Association made a related point. The report, delivered to a 
general committee meeting of delegates from parishes and unions on the eve of Hardy's 
Bill, suggested that the Houseless Poor Act had proved that there was a practicable 
way of collecting a poor rate over the whole metropolitan area. 
91 
The more fully worked-out version of the MBW proposal presented in the 
recommendations of Ayrton's 1867 Select Committee on Local Government92 six 
weeks after the Metropolitan Poor Act was passed clearly also did not conform with 
Hardy's priorities. The select committee's detailed proposals for a new, largely 
directly-elected, two-tier structure, with a Municipal Council of London responsible 
for both the raising of rates and equal assessment across the metropolis, would 
effectively have implemented poor rate equalisation through the incorporation of poor 
relief in other district council functions. 
In not only disregarding the MBW option for rate equalisation but indeed 
repealing part of the Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act 1864 and transferring the 
MBW s role to the Receiver controlling the Common Poor Fund, Hardy achieved 
further central government control while managing to satisfy both the demands for 
rate equalisation (in the short term) and the need for a funding instrument for the 
Act's institutional reforms. It is worth noting, however, that the formula he rejected 
(metropolis-wide representative financial responsibility for extensive areas of poor 
8918 & 19 Vict. c. 120, Metropolitan ManagementAct 1855, s. clxi; GL MS 1088/1,28.1.1867. 90Hansard 8.2.1867, col. 176, makes this clear, but the Morning Advertiser, 9.2.1867,2e, has Ayrton 
referring more explicitly to "the act affecting casual poor". 91MH 25/18, newspaper cuttings accompanying letter to Poor Law Board dated 4.2.1867; GL MS 
1088/1,30.1.1867. 
92PP 1867 xii, Second Report. See also chapter 5, p. 130-1. 
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relief) was in effect implemented in 1888, when the new London County Council 
assumed not only the MBWs powers and duties but also a wide range of poor law 
financial responsibilities, including some of those previously carried out by central 
government. 93 
In some respects Hardy's Bill had minor similarities with the fleeting 1863 
Casual Poor (Metropolis) Bill proposed in response to a workhouse incident the 
night before by two Liberals, Viscount Raynham and Wykeham Martin, and 
Conservative Sir Stafford Northcote. Their Bill aimed to develop the un- 
implemented 1844 Poor Law Amendment Act asylum districts for the houseless 
poor into a similar but metropolis-wide district headed by an elected body and 
funded by an equalised rate. Introduced too late in the session for serious 
consideration, the Bill was withdrawn after opposition that included an attack on 
Ayrton by Charles Gilpin, Villiers' Parliamentary Secretary at the Poor Law Board 
for six years. Gilpin accused Ayrton of supporting the Bill because he wanted in 
some way or other to bring about rate equalisation, and of seeing the measure as 
"one step towards his darling object". Although its 1844-type framework may have 
influenced Hardy when he began working on his own Bill three years later, the 1863 
Bill was much closer, in terms of redistribution of power and finance, to the 
Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act pushed through parliament the following year by 
Villiers and Ayrton. 94 Northcote's role in the promotion of the measure did not 
signal an early general Conservative interest in rate equalisation, but appears to have 
arisen from his concerns about the particular "evil" involved and the "undue" burden 
of poor relief thrown on East End parishes. When compared with the 1867 Act this 
short-lived Bill serves to confirm again that Hardy pursued practical institutional 
solutions while rejecting elements that had Radical associations. 95 
A further alternative might have been for Hardy to revive elements of Ayrton's 
1858 proposal, which bore some relation to the County Rates Act 185296 but which 
9351 & 52 Viet. c. 41, Local GovernmentAct 1888, s. 8,43. 94See chapter 2, p. 40. 95pp 1863 I, 207-10; 7&8 Vict. c. 10, Poor LawAmendmentAct 1844, s. 42,48; Hansard 9.6.1863 
col. 573,10.6.1863 col. 673,8.7.1863 col. 389-98. 9615 & 16 Vict. c. 81. The Act required overseers/rate collectors to present to the vestry their returns of 
the annual rateable value of all property liable to be assessed for the county rate and then send them to 
the special rating committee of county JPs. The county-wide rate poundage was then decided by the 
county JPs and submitted to the vestries, with one month allowed for objections. 
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also proposed an 1867-type assessment of local bodies as having either an "excess" or a 
"deficiency" of funding. Any objections to this scheme on equalisation grounds were 
clearly no longer relevant, and the 1858 Conservative President's criticism97 that it 
would take rate-making away from metropolitan parishes and unions of parishes and 
place it in the hands of an "irresponsible body" of unelected JPs (in a new metropolitan 
Sessions) with minimal local consultation, was based on an argument about local 
powers that applied even more to the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund and its 
Receiver, against whose central administration there was no right of appeal. In 1858 
the local powers argument in the Commons had been employed as a means of resisting 
redistribution of wealth; by 1867, however, a rating Sessions manned by JPs would 
seem likely to have been not unacceptable to a Conservative President. Ayrton's 1858 
county pattern would also have given Hardy the opportunity - if he had been seeking 
one - to integrate equalisation with metropolitan property re-valuation. That such a 
solution was disregarded despite its advantages and its links with the County Rates Act 
suggests a determination to maintain direct central government control of metropolitan 
redistribution. 98 
A further redistribution model - by Edwin Chadwick, former secretary to the 
Poor Law Commissioners - does not appear to have been publicised but may have 
contributed to background influences on policy-making. Chadwick was in close 
contact, during the passage of the Bill, with John Stuart Mill, who showed a proposed 
amendment of Chadwick's to Hardy and also raised it in the House. 99 Chadwick 
produced a Memorandum on the Metropolitan Poor Bill100 which proposed that relief 
be paid from "a general rate" for categories of the poor such as the "general sick", 
lunatics and fever cases within the framework of the 1834 principle of classification of 
paupers. He envisaged a two-tier framework in which local bodies (towards which, as 
often, he expressed antagonism) would be of secondary importance to a central relief 
committee (or "general committee" or "Metropolitan Board") which would have powers 
to assign local buildings and local funds for the purpose of achieving classification of 
paupers. His central body would, he wrote, be conducive to economy and efficiency, in 
contrast to present fragmentary local systems. Board or committee membership would 
97Hansard 12.5.1858, col. 504-5. 98PP 1857/8 iv, op. cit. See also page IM-7 on re-valuation. 99UCL Chadwick MSS 1401/ 78-80 (5-12.3.1867); Hansard 11.3.1867 col. 1678-80. 100UCL Chadwick MSS 25,100-114, hand-written paper by Chadwick, 1867. 
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be "in part by election and in part by nomination", and he proposed a very active 
administrative role for medical men. 
Mill's views are relevant here in that, although he had not been involved in the 
rate equalisation movement (and indeed, in 1861, at the height of the Rate Equalisation 
Association's campaign, was opposed to metropolis-wide rating101), he may have 
contributed, even if only indirectly, to some of the thinking behind the nominee clauses: 
provisions which, as has been shown, were contrary to traditional Radical support for 
local control. In seeking to get on record, on Ayrton's 1866 select committee, evidence 
that related to his 1861 arguments for having "persons of a higher intellectual or social 
class" on local bodies, Mill was raising again the local member "calibre" question: a 
question that was also to be offered as justification the following year for the nominee 
clauses. Although in 1861 Mill had focused on ex-officio membership rather than on 
any concept of central government nominees (and in the process made an incorrect 
reference to an existing limitation of ex-officios to one-third of a board's 
membership102), his argument that ex-officio JPs had a "beneficial effect" and acted as 
"a check upon the class interests of the farmers and petty shopkeepers" who comprised 
the bulk of boards of guardians was related thematically, at least, to Hardy's subsequent 
nominee initiative; even his view that if "a portion of the very best minds" sat on local 
bodies they would inspire lower grade minds with their own "more enlarged ideas and 
higher and more enlightened purposes" might be translated, in practical terms, into the 
nominee policy. 
103 
Mill's activities on Ayrton's committee had included questioning East End 
vestryman W. Clark on whether it was an advantage for vestries to have "a mixture of 
various classes of persons", and asking G. H.. Drew, Bermondsey vestry clerk, if he 
thought that "the acting in concert with persons possessing still higher qualifications 
than those who now act, would be a great advantage, and that the exercise of these 
functions would be a greater means of improvement to their own minds than they have 
101J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London, 1861), 276. Mill wrote that 
"the area of rating should not be more extensive than most of the present unions". 102The first legislative reference to one-third appears in the Metropolitan PoorAct. Hardy's First 
Reading speech, The Handy Book of Parish Law (1872 edition), Keith-Lucas (1952), and an 
examination of earlier Poor Law legislation all support this conclusion. Mill's reference (BL 
8009. ccc. 39,1865) must therefore have been incorrect, though prophetic, and he may have referred to a 
local practice. It is possible that Mill's widely-published error contributed to the actual adoption of the 
one-third formula in the Metropolitan Poor Act. 103M11, op. cit., 270,274-6. 
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at present". 104 Given the sudden appearance of the nominee provisions in the 
Metropolitan Poor Act the following year, it seems at least arguable that Mill's pursuit 
of the question of the social and intellectual composition of local government bodies 
may have influenced some of the thinking that went into the Act, or, at the least, may 
have given it an element of political respectability. He certainly supported Hardy's 
nominee policy until a late stage in the Bill, when he and other metropolitan MPs were 
tackled on the issue by vestrymen from his own constituency in the Commons tea-room; 
Mill's response was to write to Chadwick asking his opinion on whether an alternative to 
nominees might be found. 105 
The Mill/Chadwick position was not, therefore, a Radical one except insofar as 
they both envisaged a London-wide body. They focused on support for medical 
professionals, their distrust of local bodies, support for the widely agreed policy of 
classification of workhouses, their desire to have gentlemen - medical or other - in 
control of poor law bodies and, in Chadwick's case particularly, a necessity for more 
centralisation. 
It is clear, therefore, that comparisons between the Metropolitan Poor Acts 
mechanisms for redistribution and closer control, the first "sketch" for the Cabinet, the 
First Reading Bill, the Rate Equalisation Association's county board models, the related 
MBW option, the 1858 Ayrton/Association Bill and the Mill/Chadwick pattern show 
that the widely acclaimed Bill that Hardy presented to the Commons was far more 
centralised than any of these alternatives, and that the Association's models (based on a 
county board or the MBW) were the most radical. 
The case for a representative element in redistribution continued to be put by 
significant metropolitan politicians well after the Act had been implemented. For 
instance in the debate on Goschen's 1870 Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 106 
Dr. William Brewer - Liberal MP for Colchester and also chairman of the first district 
board set up under the 1867 Act, the Metropolitan Asylums Board - attacked the 
"irresponsible management" of the Common Poor Fund, the "incurable vice" of which 
was that collection and distribution was not controlled by a representative body. 107 
104PP 1866 xiii, Q 1782,1785,4244,5607,2932,3103. 105UCL Chadwick MSS, 1401/78. 
10633 & 34 Vict. c. 18. 107Hansard 25.4.1870 col. 1770. 
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Two other MPs suggested that solutions other than the Metropolitan Common 
Poor Fund could have been found as a response to the need for rate equalisation and 
the boards of guardians scandals. W. M. Torrens, Liberal MP for Finsbury, supporting 
Dr. Brewer and opposing the 1870 Liberal Bill'08 which was to extend the Fund to 
include the maintenance of all indoor metropolitan poor, suggested that it would be 
possible to devise as many as 50 different re-arrangements of London to achieve rate 
equalisation while still "retaining elective institutions together with local 
responsibilities. " The Bill was another step in the direction taken by the 1867 Act of 
"centralisation and disfranchisement". Conservative W. H. Smith, MP for 
Westminster, 109 argued that the Bill lodged "an enormous power" in the hands of an 
executive department. He too suggested an alternative: the "considerable evil in some 
localities" could be better tackled by improving the character of the boards of guardians 
than by diminishing their responsibility, with the Poor Law Board operating the sanction 
of dissolving boards that acted contrary to the public interest. He had a further 
suggestion: that "one board of representatives" in London could manage all poor law 
institutions -a board that would have sufficient power to carry out its important duties 
and at the same time be accountable to its constituents. 
' 10 
Undoubtedly the new Conservative government's support for some form of 
metropolitan redistribution owed much to the rate equalisation movement's success, 
over ten years, in building a political majority for the policy. Without that majority the 
policy options would have been different: perhaps no great poor law institutional 
development programme, or perhaps further focusing on charity for the East End. 
While remaining always within the law and pursuing only the legislative route, the rate 
equalisation movement brought about an overwhelming change of opinion on poor law 
aspects of wealth differences in the capital. The nominee and Fund provisions appear 
however to have been, in essence, a reaction against, rather than a reform arising from, 
that success in changing opinion. 
10833 & 34 Vict., c. 18, Metropolitan PoorAmendmentAct 1870. 109Stenton, op. cit. W. H. Smith, 1825-91, MP Westminster 1868-85 (having defeated NO in 1868) 
and Strand 1885-91, First Lord of the Admiralty 1877-80, Secretary of State for War 1885-6, First Lord 
of the Treasury and Leader of the Commons from 1887. 110Hansard 25.4.1870 col. 1770,1774. 
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The inter-action of reform and reaction in the genesis and implementation of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act, and its effect on the nature of the change achieved, will be 
considered also in different contexts in subsequent chapters. 
III 
A further question that needs to be considered is whether, despite the flood of 
protests that soon arose at the increased poor relief burden placed on metropolitan 
ratepayers to pay for the capital's improved services, Hardy's Fund did achieve a 
significant degree of redistribution between East and West or between wealthier and 
poorer parishes and unions in the early years of the implementation of the 1867 Act. 
The memorial of protest sent to Goschen in 1869 from a meeting of deputations 
from vestries, district boards and boards of guardians of "a large majority of the parishes 
and districts of the metropolis" 
111 expressed similar complaints to those publicised in 
previous years by the Rate Equalisation Association's campaigning. The "present 
unequal method of levying the poor rates of the metropolis, " they said, was bad in 
principle and unjust in operation because an unfair burden was being thrown upon those 
parishes in which the poor "from various circumstances beyond their own control are 
compelled to congregate"; the inequality had been aggravated, they pointed out, by 
legislation in recent years which had rendered the poor "practically irremovable". 
Further, the "modicum of redress" which had been promised by the framers of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act had proved "little better than a delusion and a snare" because the 
relief granted to overburdened parishes had turned out to be "much less than was 
boasted", and such small benefit as had been achieved had been to a great extent 
neutralised by the increased expenditure resulting from the Act. The Act had probably 
also, they suggested, prevented the passing of a more suitable Act founded on "the only 
just and equitable principle - complete equalisation of the rates". The "partial change" 
effected by the Act was leading to great expenditure which, while laying an increased 
charge on the richer parishes, failed to give corresponding relief to the poorer. 
111NM5/20, 
memorial received by Poor Law Board 23.3.1869; Times 23.3.1869,10a. 
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Rejecting Goschen's proposed "mere re-valuation and reassessment" of rateable 
property as likely to confer "infinitesimally small" benefits, they made a pointed 
reference to the new reformed House of Commons: it provided a "supremely fitting 
opportunity for a vigorous effort to overcome that selfish opposition which has too long 
delayed a measure so obviously necessary and so incontestably just". 
While metropolitan ratepayers and local authorities were demanding a reduction 
in the financial demands being placed on them and criticising the Metropolitan Poor Act, 
poor law professionals were using the Act's provisions and Common Poor Fund to ask 
for higher salaries: medical men as a continuation of their long-standing campaigns for 
greater recognition of their services through increases in salary, 112 and Metropolitan 
Workhouse Chaplains113 (led in their first deputation to the Board by the Rev. G. H. 
M'Gill, formerly of the Tower Hamlets Rate Equalisation Society) in a request for pay 
equalisation for chaplains. The chaplains pointed out that the lowest stipends were paid 
in the poorest parishes although the duties there were heavier, and asked that "as the 
burden of all official salaries is now .... spread equally over the metropolis, such 
distinctions should cease to exist, and the remuneration should by the direct action of the 
Board be proportioned to the duties required". In the short term neither professional 
group was successful in adding its claims to the escalating poor relief bill. 
An assessment of the extent to which the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund 
actually redistributed local taxation in the early years will be significant not only as an 
indication of how effective the Act's financial provisions were but also as a measure of 
how meaningful the redistributive policies of both Conservative and Liberal ministers 
appear to have been. 
The system of redistribution was fairly simple. Each union or parish submitted to 
the Poor Law Board twice a year its claim under the Metropolitan Poor Act's 
expenditure heads (and initially under the Metropolitan Houseless Poor Acts also, and 
later under the Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 1870, which added the major item 
of the indoor relief of all paupers in the workhouses). The Board usually "allowed" 
most but not all of these claims. Having thus established what the aggregate income 
needed to be, the Board issued an "assessment" to each parish or union of the amount 
112NM5/18,14.11.1867, letter to the Earl of Devon from the Council of the Metropolitan Poor Law 
Medical Officers' Association, and also MH25/19,12.2.1868 and MH25/19,15.2.1868. 113NM5/18,17.12.1867,28.12.1867,8.1.1868. 
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for which it was proportionately liable, on the basis of its annual rateable value in 
relation to the a. r. v. of the whole Metropolis. If this assessment was lower than the 
local body's allowed claim, the balance would be made up from the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund, and if the assessment was higher, the local body would pay the 
excess into the Fund. Some local bodies were overall payers and some were overall 
receivers, to varying degrees. 
A comparison between Hardy's 1867 prediction to the House of Commons of 
the redistribution that would result from his measure and the actual out-turn (Figure 2 
and Table 1) shows a fairly significant difference: there was a wide band of local bodies 
that either paid or received very little out of the Fund in the year ending Michaelmas 
1868 - distinctly wider than the prediction. In part the optimistic prediction arose 
because at this earlier stage the extra-parochial places (including the Inns of Court), who 
became low payers, were omitted from the redistribution calculations altogether, thereby 
creating the impression that there would be fewer low payers. However, the prediction 
also showed slightly higher payments generally from the wealthier bodies and 
correspondingly slightly higher receipts for the poorer bodies. At the level of individual 
bodies, there were some sharp differences between the prediction and the out-turn. The 
disillusionment expressed by many Metropolitan bodies from an early stage did therefore 
have a basis in fact. 
Disillusionment would have been even greater if expectations had been based on 
the prediction in the memorial presented to Hardy in January 1867 by MPs, clergymen 
and local representatives that only five local bodies would be liable for "a material 
increase in their rates" and that 25 out of 39 would be "materially benefited". ' 14 
Poor Law Board figures over the wider period of the five half-years from 
Michaelmas 1867 to Lady Day 1870 show that the complaints of local authorities that 
the degree of redistribution was limited continued to reflect reality. Figure 3 shows the 
changes for a few of the local bodies, but the continuing pattern of a wide middle-range 
of low payers/receivers over this longer period cannot unfortunately be represented here 
graphically in a readable form, as it has been in Figure 2, because of the amount of detail 
involved. 
1145/18,28.1.1867. The five were the City, St. George Hanover Square, Paddington, Kensington 
and Islington. 
116 
RHETORIC, POLICIES, RESULTS 
The middle-range low payers included the Inns of Court, attacked vigorously and 
consistently in the past by members of the Rate Equalisation Association such as Gilbert 
Redistribution: Proposed and Actual 
Years ending Lady Day 1866 & M'mas 1868 
10000- 






Parishes/Unions: Payments & Receipts 
L66 M68 
Figure 2: Gathorne Hardy's prediction of redistribution (based on actual 
spending in the year Lady Day 1865-66) and actual redistribution 
under the Earl of Devon (in the year Michaelmas 1867 to 1868). 115 
on the grounds that despite their great wealth they made no contribution to the 
frequently destitute surrounding parishes, l 16 Lincoln's Inn, Gray's Inn, the Inner 
c 
Parishes/Unions: Payments & Receipts 
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M69 - L70 
Figure 3: Half-years ending Lady Day 1868,1869,1870 (L68, L69, L70) 
and Michaelmas 1868,1869 (M68, M69). 117 
115pP 1871 lix, Accounts & Papers, 839,8411 PP1867 Ix. Accounts & Papers. 117, Return to an Order 
of the House of Commons dated 14.2.1867. See also Table I for a detailed picture of the position for 
individual bodies. 
116 Gilbert (1860). op. cit., 7.8. 
117PP 1871 lix, Accounts & Papers, 839-47. 
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Temple and Middle Temple were payers, but hovered around the £100-£250 range 
which, distributed among its ratepayers, would have been an almost imperceptible 
increase. 
Also often in this wide middle band, sometimes payers and sometimes minor 
receivers, were local bodies in places such as such as Strand, Bermondsey, Holborn, St. 
Giles & St. George Bloomsbury, Camberwell, Rotherhithe, Hackney, some of the 
Southwark parishes and on occasion Clerkenwell, St. Marylebone and St. Pancras. The 
few consistent major beneficiaries of the Fund were mainly East End parishes such as 
Bethnal Green, Whitechapel, St. George in the East and Shoreditch, and Thames-side 
Newington St. Mary and Greenwich. The major payer, towering above all others, was 
the City, with St. George Hanover Square, Paddington and Kensington contributing 
substantially but at a much lower level - mainly in the £3,000-£6,000 range, as opposed 
to the City's £11,000-£14000. 
The pattern of redistribution therefore in the early years of the Fund's existence 
had two main elements. There was a redressing of the balance of poor relief financial 
responsibility between those areas that constituted, and had come to symbolise publicly, 
the most glaring contrasts of metropolitan wealth: the City and a few largely wealthy 
major West End parishes, and the extensive concentrations of poverty in the East End 
and some riverside areas. However, entrenched pockets of rating privilege such as the 
Inns of Court survived virtually untouched, and there was little meaningful redistribution 
in many central and southern districts where significant levels of poverty existed in more 
confined areas 
Changes in valuation of property in the period studied (to 1871) clearly took 
place, although it was to be almost ten years after the passing of the Metropolitan Poor 
Act before the first fully revised quinquennial uniform valuation list for the metropolis 
could come into force under Goschen's Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869.118 A 
comparison between the two years 1868 and 1871 shows that increases for four major 
payers were proportionately a little more; the contrasts were slightly more marked in St. 
George in the East, which experienced almost no increase and therefore benefited 
proportionately more, and St. George Hanover Square, which had a slightly higher 
11832 & 33 Vict., c. 67. 
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increase than other payers. In 1876, with full revaluation presumably achieved, this 
tendency continued, although it was now the City and Kensington where valuation 
increases were highest, in the other three East End unions valuation increases had 
slowed down further, although not yet to the almost static level of St. George in the 
East (Figure 4). 






Cf1Y StGH PADD KENS BETH WHIT StGE SHOR 
Parishes/Unions 
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Figure 4: As at Lady Day 1868 and Michaelmas 1871 & 1876. 
StGH=St. George Hanover Square. PADD=Paddington. 
KENS=Kensington. BETH=Bethnal Green. WHIT=Whitechapel. 
StGE=St. George in the East. SHOR=Shoreditch. 119 
The valuation figures indicate that, despite widespread agreement that uniform 
property valuation and assessment across the metropolis would be an essential factor in 
the achievement of meaningful redistribution, changes took place gradually and to a 
limited extent. 120 
Greater redistribution in the middle band would only have been achieved if a 
much wider range of annual rateable values had been established, to enable the a. r. v. 
multiplier to have a more severe effect on the rates paid by the wealthy. Indeed, only 
really punitive differences in the rateable values of individual properties would have 
addressed the continuing issue of proportionately unequal burdens not only between 
119PP 1871 lix, Accounts & Papers, 839; PP 1873 xxix. 2nd Annual Report of Local Government 
Board, 327; PP 1878 xxxvii pt. 1,7th Annual Report of Local Government Board. 
120The Times 29.10.1868,4e-f, a comprehensive article on re-valuation (a copy of which is pasted at 
the front of St. Mary Newington board of guardians minutes. LMA P92/MRY/308, indicating that local 
practitioners found it authoritative); flansard 11.3.1867.1682-5; N. Johnson. The Diarv of (Tathorne 
Hardy (Oxford, 1981), 27. indicates that Hardy intended in 1866/7 to introduce a Bill for uniform 
valuation to accompany the Metropolitan Poor Bill. PP 1867 vi, 553 & 591. Valuation of Property Bill 
1867 did not, however, cover the metropolis and NN as in any case withdrawn on 18.7.1867. 
119 
RHETORIC, POLICIES, RESULTS 
wealthy, middle-range and poorer parishes and unions but also between wealthy and 
poorer ratepayers and parishes within unions. 
Annual Expenditure 
1865 - 1870 
i£ 
Parishes/Unions 
L65 [-A L66 M L67 
L! L68 L L69 VA L70 
Figure 5: Lady Day 1865-70. 
SGH=St. George Hanover Square. PADD=Paddington. PANC=St. Pancras. 
KENS=Kensington. BETH=Bethnal Green. WHIT=Whitechapel. POPL=Poplar. 
SHOR=Shoreditch. LAMB=Lambeth. SGE=St. George in the East. 121 
Expenditure figures for individual parishes and unions only partly bear out the 
argument that increased spending was a significant part of the problem in the later 1860s 
(Figure 5). Although expenditure rose in some areas by about 100% between Lady 
Days 1865 and 1870 (for example, Kensington, Bethnal Green, Poplar), the increases 
between Lady Days 1868 and 1870, when expenditure under the Act began to take 
place, are in many cases not strikingly greater than those of immediately preceding 
years. 
12 1PP 1866 xxxv, 84-84.18th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board (year ending Lady Day 1865); PP 
1867 xxxiv, 160-163,19th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board (}ear ending Ladd- Day 1866); PP 
1867-8 xxxiii. 182-5,20th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board (year ending Lath Day 1867); PP 
1868-9 x viii, 168-171,21st Annual Report of the Poor La%% Board (year ending Lade Day 1868), PP 
1870 xxxv, 158-161.22nd Annual Report of the Poor La,, % Board (year ending Lady Day 1869). PP 
1871 xxvii, 262-5.23rd Annual Report of the Poor La« Board (year ending Lade Da} 1870). The 
figures shown are those for "Total Relief to the Poor. irrespective of any Contribution to or Repay ment 
from the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund", comprising spending on "In-Maintenance, Out-Relief, 
Maintenance of Lunatics in Asylums or Licensed Houses, Workhouse Loans repaid and interest 
thereon. Salaries and Rations of Officers including the Suns repaid by Her Majesty's Treasury and 
Superannuations, and Other Expenses of or immediately connected with Relic[". 
Given the nature of 
these expenditure heads there are. not surprisingly, some apparent anomalies in individual years for 
some parishes and unions - for instance. when out-relief was heavier than usual or when repayment of 
loans started. 
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The fact that the fund was needs-driven would clearly have contributed to the 
increase in expenditure and therefore to the increased burden borne not only by the high 
payers but also by the middle band. The larger the claims of the big receivers, the larger 
was the amount they were likely to receive, because the difference between their low 
a. r. v. -based assessment of liability to pay and their claim would be correspondingly 
greater. A parish or union with a middle range valuation would qualify for a similar- 
sized payment only if it spent even more than a poorer area. There was therefore good 
reason for a local body to increase its spending, provided that it took care not to fall at 
the audit fence. 
Goschen's comment in 1870 about the need, in any further equalisation, for 
avoiding "the risk ..... of affording the opportunity to certain parishes of 
being exceeding 
liberal at other people's expense" 122 therefore reflected unfairly on local bodies to the 
extent that the needs-driven system as set up in 1867 supported local high spending 
(including capital spending required of local bodies by the Poor Law Board123) because 
the size of the redistributory pool depended on the claims of individual parishes and 
unions. The alternatives - payment of a wider range of items from a more resource- 
driven Consolidated Fund, or control by an electorally accountable county body with the 
power to set a "general" or wholly equalised rate and monitor spending more closely at 
the local level - do not appear to have been considered by Hardy or indeed by his 
immediate successors. 124 
The evidence suggests that in the early years the equalising mechanism of the 
1867 Act, widely welcomed initially but criticised soon as being "little better than a 
delusion and a snare", was undermined by four factors: the delay in establishing 
uniform property valuation; the constrained nature of the chosen instrument, the 
Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, the role of which was simply to apply redistribution 
on the basis of property valuation; the fact that the only decisions left to local politicians 
were about the size of their claim from the common pool, and the increases in rate-borne 
expenditure (including un-redistributed building costs) required by a central government 
122Hansard 18.2.1870, col. 574. 12330 & 31 Viet. c. 6, s. 15,18,38. 124The Times 23.3.1869,10a. Goschen told a metropolitan deputation that the issue was one of 
"efficient control of the common purse", but clearly envisaged this process as one where local boards 
would have to give up some of their power rather than one where electoral control was extended more 
widely. 
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intent on improving poor law services in the metropolis out of the pockets of local 
ratepayers. 
The Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 provided answers to a number of problems 
confronting the new President of the Poor Law Board. While doing so the Act also 
avoided passing political control of rate equalisation to the local bodies whose support 
for the economically radical policy had been so effective, and limited significant 
redistribution to the most dramatically apparent examples of metropolitan wealth and 
poverty. 
122 
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The policies pursued by Ayrton and the Rate Equalisation Association 
represented a threat to significant interests, but because this strand of metropolitan 
radicalism has received less attention that it deserves, the nature of the reaction to it has 
also not been recognised. Ayrton himself has generally been undervalued as a Radical 
politician; he played a major role not only in the building of support for rate 
equalisation and the passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act but also in other radical 
reform issues. 
This chapter presents evidence of his stature as a politician involved in 
metropolitan issues, and considers the question of why he has been under-recognised 
historiographically despite his achievements. Because of the Association's close 
relationship with Ayrton, this relative neglect of his Radical career has perhaps 
contributed to the failure to search for their records, which were in an accessible London 
archive waiting, in effect, to be found. 
1 
A scarcity of non-public material on Ayrton has probably also contributed to this 
modem neglect, but other scattered but fairly copious evidence enables a wider 
assessment of him to be made in this chapter, with particular emphasis on his 
metropolitan role and the reactions to it. 
When five policy-making models were considered in Chapter 2, Ayrton was 
associated particularly with the simple logic of the Rational model, in which 
identification of a problem - the metropolitan wealth/poverty divide - led to a proposed 
solution (rate equalisation) that could, objectively, be expected to resolve the difficulty. 
He was also part of a Pluralist policy-making process through his role as representative 
of some of the forces pressing for change: his Tower Hamlets constituents, 2 radical and 
I GL MS 1088,1089 and 1090 (which include the Association's minute books) were found in the 
Guildhall Library, card-indexed under catalogue number L. 65.7, Local Rates and Taxes, a section 
containing mainly Corporation of London drainage and sewer rate records but also a few miscellaneous 
association records. I am grateful for the advice of Andrea Tanner (op. cit. ) that it was worth persisting 
in the search of Guildhall records on the grounds that it was here that she had found material on the 
earlier city-based rate equalisation association. 2 East London Observer, 29.5.1858,2b (edited by ex-Chartist, trade unionist and 1862-76 MBW 
member William Newton), supported Ayrton after his "threats" to the Commons and failure of his rate 
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reformist East End clergymen, and the Rate Equalisation Association. However, as 
shown in Chapter 4, the particular format advocated by Ayrton and other leading 
members of the Association - redistribution through an elected metropolis-wide board - 
conformed with Radical principles and conflicted with the political perspective that was 
to be embodied in the Act. This configuration of forceful rational arguments, political 
radicalism and active support for East End and metropolitan demands, apparent first in 
the rate equalisation issue, was to become a key characteristic of Ayrton's career. 
His parliamentary career conforms in many respects with Miles Taylor's analysis 
of the developmental relationship between independent radicalism and parliamentary 
liberalism. 3 Starting as a Radical who sometimes opposed Whig/Liberal policies, he 
became a Gladstonian Radical Liberal and recognised as a prominent member of the 
government, even though never in the Cabinet. 
4 Recognition came not only from his 
own party but from Conservative minority governments at two major stages in the rate 
equalisation struggle - when his rate equalisation Bill was given First Reading support by 
Sotheron-Estcourt in 1858, and when Hardy negotiated for and acknowledged his 
support on the 1867 Bill. 5 His political achievements - as a radical backbencher, an 
active and frequent member and chairman of select committees and a junior minister - 
were significant and in some respects unique. He was also clearly able to build effective 
political alliances, despite his alleged unpopularity. His most unpopular qualities, in the 
eyes of his political enemies, may have been his ability to win sizeable parliamentary 
support and often majorities for his views, and his willingness to launch into battle 
against powerful vested interests, using as his weapons a forthright and incisive 
vocabulary (or "evil tongue", as a contemporary defined it6), sharp political skills and, 
from 1868, his ministerial office. 
There is the further relevant factor that his sphere of activity was largely the 
metropolis, and the focus of his attacks included the wealth and power of the City as 
well as the wealthy and often powerful residents of the West End - both well- 
equalisation Bill; the paper commented that "if Mr. Ayrton had done less than he did, he would have 
betrayed his duty and failed to represent his constituents who feel quite as strongly as he spoke". 3Taylor, op. cit., 338-46. 4See chapter 2, p. 34. 5Hansard 23.3.1858 col. 635,11.3.1867 col. 1681-97. 6Sir Algernon West, Recollections 1832-86 (London, 1899), vol. 2,14. West had been Gladstone's 
private secretary; despite this comment, he tells a couple of not uncomplimentary anecdotes about 
Ayrton. 
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represented in the Commons. Ayrton may have been one of the first, but he was 
certainly not the last, to be demonized (and ultimately neutralised) because he was an 
effective radical politician based not at a comfortable distance away in the North or the 
Midlands, but on Members' doorsteps in the capital itself. 
Previous chapters have shown Ayrton's highly effective advocacy of rate 
equalisation in Commons debates and his close relationship with the Rate Equalisation 
Association. This chapter will consider his prominence as a leading metropolitan 
radical in parliament and therefore as a factor in the reaction against some of the 
movement's proposals. 
II 
Ayrton's chairing of complex local taxation select committees, his acknowledged 
mastery of the issues and financial details, and his active membership of many other 
committees demonstrate the reputation he earned as an able politician. 
Particularly significant in relation to the Metropolitan Poor Act were his 
achievements, together with John Locke, in the complex interactions of final 
amendments to the committee's draft 1864 Report of the 1861-4 Select Committee on 
Poor Relief. Their tactics of establishing principles that could later be incorporated in 
government-sponsored legislation - instead of proposing detailed solutions that might 
fall at the early hurdles of vested interests - were consistent with those of the Rate 
Equalisation Association as agreed in February 1859.7 
Ayrton, having chaired the Association's 1859 meeting on tactics, is likely to have 
led the manoeuvring as the two MPs bided their time during the President's successful 
steering through the select committee of the various so-called "whitewashing" decisions 
(confirming the standing and responsibilities of the central Board), keeping a low profile 
during voting and in fact not always attending nor, if present, casting a vote. They 
launched their bid for redistributive policy-markers for the metropolis in the latter half of 
the report debates under the report headings of "Metropolitan Distress in 1860-61 ", 
"Equalisation of Rating" and "Casual and Houseless Poor". 8 
7GL MS 1088/1,15.2.1859. See also chapter 3, p. 70. 8PP 1864 ix, Select Committee on Poor Relief, Proceedings of the Committee, 56-7. 
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Ayrton's first attempt was only partially successful. He proposed that a 
statement in the draft report approving the adequacy of poor law administration in the 
winter of 1860-61 and guardians' powers to raise funds to relieve severe distress 
receive the addendum " but the legal charge would have pressed very heavily on some 
parishes within the metropolis, and very unequally on different parts of it". The 
committee rejected the last eight words, which emphasised the element of inequality. 
However, a further amendment was added that did introduce into the report the 
concept of inequality but did not suggest change. Unattributed, and therefore perhaps 
negotiated with Villiers himself or other Members, it referred to "much evidence" having 
been given showing "the unequal pressure of the charge for the relief of the poor in 
different parts of the metropolitan district", and the fact that various plans had been 
submitted to the committee for equalisation of the poor rate. But the next sentence - 
"Your Committee are not, however, prepared to recommend any legislation on the 
subject limited to the metropolis ..... " made 
it clear that this amendment did not signify 
an active response to such evidence. 
It was here that Locke moved what was to become an extremely significant 
amendment: the deletion of the refusal to recommend, and the insertion of the words 
"and your Committee recommend the general question of extending the area of rating to 
the further consideration of the House; but the circumstances of the metropolis are so 
peculiar, that in any legislation to extend the area of charge or management, it would be 
necessary to have regard to those circumstances". 
The "peculiar circumstances" were to be the key that opened the door for 
Parliament to introduce redistributive legislation for the Metropolis without having to 
consider the rest of the country, and this statement was quoted often in the three years 
leading up to the Metropolitan Poor Act. Crucially, it offered country gentlemen the 
opportunity to support metropolitan rate redistribution without compromising their 
opposition to a wider redistribution scheme. 9 
Locke's triumph - achieved without a division - was built on by Ayrton four days 
later at the next sitting of the committee. In three successive unopposed motions he 
achieved a framework for the Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act, which was introduced 
later in the year. Ayrton's first motion proposed that the charges for the metropolitan 
9Caplan, op. cit., 267, details the opposition of a section of the landed interest to union chargeability 
between 1845 and 1865. 
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houseless and casual poor should be paid "out of a rate assessed on the annual rateable 
value of the whole of the said metropolis": a radical proposal, as a charge for poor 
relief had never before been extended over so wide an area. Having achieved this 
success, Ayrton then proposed that the Metropolitan Board of Works be the body to 
raise such a rate. Again this was a ground-breaker, in that the MBW had never before 
been involved in poor relief. In due course there were to be criticisms - in the 
Commons and from the MBW itself - that such an arrangement infringed principles of 
accountability, but Ayrton's proposal passed through the select committee without a 
division. 
Ayrton's final proposal, that the Poor Law Board be empowered to prescribe, 
enforce and implement all arrangements for carrying out these policies, was also carried 
without division. Here, it seems, is evidence that Ayrton felt that the role of 
centralisation as a redistributive instrument was of greater importance than fears about 
its increase. In terms of parliamentary tactics it seems that he had moved some distance 
from the position he had adopted in 1858 when he had withdrawn his Bill "to provide a 
remedy for the inequality in the rates for the relief of the poor in the metropolis" on the 
grounds, he said, that he could not divide the House on the issue of "local supervision of 
local funds". 10 
The subsequent attack by F. W. Knight, former Conservative Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Poor Law Board, on the "craftily managed"' 1 way in which evidence 
had been handled referred not only to the committee's failure to criticise the Poor Law 
Board and "the disgraceful state of medical relief to the poor", but also to the crucial 
intervention of a "new" committee member who, evidence in the final report suggests, 
may have been working with Ayrton and John Locke to achieve redistributive goals. 
Unnamed by Knight, the "new" member was clearly Sir Arthur Buller, Liberal MP for 
Devonport, who attended only 14 times in the four years12 (eleven of them in the 
closing weeks, and the other three in early 1861), voted almost always with Locke and 
often with Ayrton, and successfully moved the amendment that paved the way for the 
Union Chargeability Act of the following year. 13 
'°Hansard 12.5.58 col. 515. "Ibid., 25.5.1865 col. 799. 12Stenton, 
op cit. Sir Arthur, brother of Charles Buller, Liberal MP for Liskeard (who had died in 
office in 1848 when President of the Poor Law Board) had, like Ayrton, been a lawyer in India. 13pP 1864 ix, op. cit., 59. 
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Buller's successful union rating amendment - "that any measure for extending the 
area of rating should in the opinion of the Committee embrace provisions for making the 
whole cost for the poor in each union chargeable on the common fund of the union" - 
was agreed without division, even though it followed immediately after his unsuccessful 
motion that the number of Poor Law inspectors be reduced, and the sitting after he had 
moved unsuccessfully that the President of the Poor Law Board be always a Member of 
the Commons. In both of these rejected proposals, which would have affected the 
power structure of the Poor Law Board, he had been supported by Locke but not by 
Ayrton: the voting on the President was 2-9 (with Ayrton absent), and on the 
inspectors 4-8, with Ayrton voting against. Given that the skilful political manoeuvring 
by Ayrton and Locke on metropolitan redistributive amendments had preceded Buller's 
union chargeability amendment, it seems very likely that Ayrton's and Locke's tactics 
paved the way for Buller's success - particularly in view of the fact that Buller succeeded 
despite his preceding almost unsupported attacks on Poor Law Board power. Ayrton's 
failure to support Buller's earlier proposals indicates a determination to focus on major 
goals that was to be a feature of his political career. 
The first committee that Ayrton chaired - the 1861 Select Committee on the Local 
Taxation and Government of the Metropolis14 - did not, on the other hand, produce 
any stepping-stones to redistribution, and indeed did not even make any 
recommendations. (Firth15 blamed the City members on the committee for having 
"steadily voted against anything in the report except simple narrative"; possibly the fact 
that this was Ayrton's first experience of chairing a select committee also affected the 
outcome). 
However, his second committee - the 1866 similar-sounding Select Committee on 
Local Government and Local Taxation of the Metropolis16 - was more effective, and 
heard evidence from a wide range of authoritative witnesses. Under the general 
umbrella of metropolitan improvements it not only had referred to it the earlier (1861) 
report but succeeded in producing, in its first report on 16 April, several references to 
inequality of rate contributions between southern and East End districts such as St. 
George the Martyr Southwark and Whitechapel, and West End districts such as St. 
14PP 1861 viii, Select Committee on Local Taxation and Government of the Metropolis, and the Local 
Administration ofJustice therein. 15J F. B. Firth, Municipal London (London, 1876), 569-70. 
16pp 1866 xiii Select Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation of the Metropolis. 
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George Hanover Square, Paddington, Kensington, and St. Margaret and St. John 
Westminster - albeit relating to the MBWs general fund, which dealt with environmental 
improvements rather than poor relief. 
Ayrton's persistence led to the inclusion of evidence in support of rate 
equalisation from Sir John Thwaites, chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works. 
Having been given the opportunity by Ayrton to expound at great length on his 
preference for indirect taxation (the coal tax) rather than direct taxation (the rates), 
Thwaites was prepared to agree that (in Ayrton's words) "in the parishes which appear 
to be so highly taxed ..... small struggling tradesmen, and others who might be described 
as the working classes, chiefly reside" and that "in justice to these more struggling 
people..... it would be reasonable that the wealthy and influential parishes should at least 
bear an equal amount of taxation". 17 
Given that Ayrton's 1866 committee was not actually supposed to be considering 
the question of poor relief at all but only local taxation for metropolitan improvements, 
it was a noteworthy achievement that the recommendations in its First Report on 16 
April produced the statement that "one mode of providing funds for all local purposes 
would be found in a nearer approach to the equalisation of local burtherns on the 
metropolis; but as this involves not merely the charges imposed by the Metropolitan 
Board, but the charges for the administration of the poor law, it would carry your 
committee beyond the scope of their present inquiry". 18 
The select committee continued to sit during the next three fraught months as the 
Liberal Reform Bill dominated parliamentary activities and the Conservatives came to 
power. While involved in the Reform struggles, Ayrton presided over the taking of 
evidence from a wide range of witnesses experienced in poor law questions at national 
and local level; these included Dr. William Farr of the Registrar General's Office, who 
gave information on disparities of rating, wealth and mortality in the metropolis, much 
of it drawn from the census and other official sources, Edwin Chadwick, former Poor 
Law Commissioner, whose strongly-expressed strong views on local administration 
included hints of interest in the nominee concept, and many elected local representatives. 
In this large body of evidence given from April to July, as well as in some of the 
report's conclusions, may lie some of the reasons for the co-operative links that were to 
171bid., Minutes of Evidence, Q. 615,620. 18lbid., First Report, 47. 
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be established between Ayrton and the new Conservative President of the Poor Law 
Board by the time the Metropolitan Poor Bill was introduced in Parliament the 
following February The authoritative views and evidence gathered by Ayrton's 
committee constituted an informative and new resource for a new President anxious to 
produce a metropolitan poor law policy. Formally, the position was that the 
committee's report at the end of July stated that the committee had not yet finished 
taking evidence and recommended its reappointment in the next session. 
It is clear that Hardy regarded the gaining of Ayrton's support for his Bill as 
important19 and this, together with the fact that the Conservatives were in a minority in 
the Commons and were to rely on Radical support for their Reform Bill, may have 
played a part in the reappointment in their entirety of the members of this select 
committee and Ayrton's continuation as chairman. The appointment of the committee 
"to inquire into the Local Government and Local Taxation of the Metropolis"20 was 
announced on 12 February, four days after the introduction of Hardy's Bill; the 
interpretation given by Ayrton was that the 1866 committee had "continued" in 1867,21 
although it was in fact treated procedurally as a new committee. 
The recommendations of this "new" 1867 select committee were more radical 
than anything produced by Ayrton's previous committees. Although the Metropolitan 
Poor Act became law before the committee issued its second and final report , 
22 its 
recommendations (some of which have been noted by Davis23) are relevant for the 
present study because of their sharp contrast with some of the Act's provisions. The 
effect of the report's recommendations, if implemented, would have been to increase the 
electoral power of ratepayers over a new metropolis-wide council that would replace the 
MBW, increase this body's income by creating two new sources of funds, and increase 
the range of its responsibilities. Furthermore, as it was also proposed that the boards 
of guardians should be "merged" in new all-encompassing district councils, metropolitan 
poor relief would have been radically and uniquely altered, with its new, equalised 
19Hansard 14.3.1867 col. 1864. 201bid. 12.5.1867 col. 300; PP 1867 xii. The Select Committee was known by two titles: the Select 
Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation of the Metropolis and the Select Committee on 
Metropolitan Local Government, etc. (London City Improvement Rates Bill). 21Hansard 21.5.67, col. 885. 22pp 1867 xii, First Report 15.3.1867, Second Report, 6.5.1867. The Metropolitan PoorAct was 
passed on 25.3.1867. 
Z3Davis (1988), op. cit., 59. 
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metropolis-wide system of funding far more directly accountable to the electorate than 
were those of either the existing MBW or Hardy's new bodies, and with electoral control 
of poor relief based on the new districts' single franchise rather than the 1834 plural 
voting system that applied in the rest of the country. 
24 Another recommendation - to 
give the proposed new metropolitan body responsibility for establishing a common 
property valuation system across the metropolis - raised a major issue omitted from 
Hardy's Act, and would have satisfied the long-standing demand of the Rate 
Equalisation Association that equalisation should be accompanied by "one uniform basis 
of assessment". 25 
The proposals of Ayrton's 1867 committee therefore represented a detailed and 
ground-breaking Radical alternative to the Metropolitan Poor Acts reduction of 
potential electoral control of an equalised rate through the introduction of nominees and 
the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, and also to Hardy's apparent intention of putting 
uniform property valuation in a separate Bill. 
The contradiction between Ayrton's support for Hardy's Bill (including the 
nominee proposals) and the Radical recommendations of his select committee suggests 
that, in reaching an accommodation with the Conservative government, he may have 
been taking a longer term view and have given his support in exchange for the 
24Ayrton's committee recommended that a new Municipal Council of London (to be created from an 
expanded Metropolitan Board of Works, and therefore to include the City) be given the power to raise 
rates not only, in the traditional way, from occupiers, but also - for improvements - from owners, 
including the Crown. In return, private owners would be represented on the Municipal Council by ex- 
officio Justices of the Peace, and the Crown would be allowed to appoint two members to the Council: 
provisions intended to satisfy the principle of "no taxation without representation". In place of the 
MBW's existing membership, all of whom were indirectly elected, 50% of the Council would be directly 
elected by ratepayers, and 50% would consist of the JPs, the two Crown representatives and the present 
MBW base of indirectly elected local members. The new Council would be given powers over 
metropolitan gas, electricity and railways, and would also be responsible for achieving standardised 
property valuation throughout the metropolis. New large district Common Councils directly elected by 
ratepayers would replace the existing vestries and district boards but would have to submit any proposed 
owners' rates for the approval of the body on which owners were represented (the first tier authority, the 
Municipal Council). The Common Councils would exercise "all the functions necessary for the 
purpose of local administration in the district": a reference to the proposal in the body of the Report 
(page iv) that the functions of boards of guardians be included in the role of these new local councils 
(which was in some respects a precursor of the statutory inclusion of social services departments in 
London borough and other twentieth-century district councils). 25GL MS 1088/1,12.1.1858. Goschen, with the support of Ayrton (Hansard 1.4.1869 col. 17) and 
despite opposition, brought in the Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869,32 & 33 Vict. c. 67, which setup a 
mechanism involving JPs from Middlesex, Surrey, Kent and the City sitting in general assessment 
sessions, but it was not until the Local GovernmentAct 1888 (51 & 52 Viet. c. 41, s. 40 [2] & s. 42 [10]) 
provided for Quarter Sessions for London that the Ayrton committee's proposals for a single county 
body to be responsible for a common system of valuation, and for metropolis-wide Sessions, were 
realised 
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opportunity to forge a select committee blue-print of metropolitan local government 
organisation that would incorporate ideas that he had advocated for several years. 
These included elements of JP involvement in the achievement of uniform metropolitan 
property valuation that he had suggested as far back as his unsuccessful 1858 Bill, full 
metropolitan rate equalisation of the kind that he and the Rate Equalisation Association 
had campaigned for over the ten-year period, and metropolitan administration of poor 
relief of the kind that he and Locke had manoeuvred for on Villiers' 1861-4 select 
committee and that had culminated in the 1864 Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act. As 
an East End MP he would of course have experienced difficulty with his constituents if 
he had opposed outright a rate equalisation measure, no matter how restricted its aims, 
but in failing even to join his fellow metropolitan MPs in disagreeing with the nominee 
clauses (which were so much opposed to the goals he pursued on his 1867 committee 
and elsewhere), he was, presumably, pursuing what he saw to be a wiser strategy of 
extracting as many political gains as possible from Hardy's widely welcomed measure. 
Ayrton's third appointment as chairman of a poor relief select committee - the 
1868 Select Committee on Poor Rates Assessment, 26 also under the Conservatives - 
may have been a tribute to his competence and expertise. It may also have been an 
uneasy seat to occupy, with the committee including as it did a former Liberal President 
of the Poor Law Board (Villiers), the present Conservative President (Hardy) and a 
future and perhaps aspiring Liberal President (Goschen), as well as such other 
heavyweights as John Bright, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (future Conservative Home 
Secretary) and G. J. Shaw-Lefevre, future Liberal President of the Local Government 
Board and son of one of the original three Poor Law Commissioners. The complexities 
of resolving difficulties in Disraeli's Second Reform Act such as the qualification for 
office of some poor law guardians - relating substantially to Hodgkinson's successful 
Liberal amendment on compounding27 - clearly required chairmanship by a sharp legal 
mind experienced in franchise and local government issues. Even Lumley, deputy 
secretary at the Poor Law Board, when called to give evidence, had to confess at times 
that he did not know the answers and would have to search his department's files. 
26PP 1867-68 xiii. 
27R Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1972), 107-8; A. Briggs, 
VIctorian People (London, 1971), 291-2. 
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Present and in the chair for 11 of the 18 sittings, Ayrton played as usual an active 
political role and made his own standpoint clear: so much so that, as chairman, he was 
defeated several times in the final voting on amendments to the draft report. 28 The 
draft that was worked on was, however, his: the committee had voted 10-6 that it 
should be Ayrton's draft report, rather than the rival drafts submitted by Hicks Beach 
and Shaw-Lefevre, that should form the basis of their voting. The fact that the report 
was reprinted twice in the next few years29 is perhaps an indication of its standing. 
III 
It is clear that Ayrton was an exceptionally active and persistent as well as 
prominent Member; indeed, he acquired the reputation of being the only MP to read 
every Bill brought in, and of reading "more parliamentary papers than any four 
members". 30 In addition to his major role in metropolitan poor law and local 
government issues, his involvement in Reform Bill agitation and parliamentary 
manoeuvres was greater than is usually acknowledged. He not only moved the first of 
the three major Radical amendments to Disraeli's Bill (which reduced the residential 
qualification for voting from two years to one)31 but made many Commons 
contributions in the Reform debates and was, in due course, chosen as the leading 
parliamentary spokesman at the Reform Fete banquet held at the Crystal Palace to mark 
the passing of the Second Reform Act - the Radicals' third choice, it seems, after 
Gladstone and John Bright sent their apologies. 32 
His attainment of office came after eleven vigorous and effective years as a 
backbencher. He had, said the short-lived Circle later, "an unpleasant knack of coming 
to the point, of condensing his observations, so as equally to please the House and 
discomfort officials". At last "he could be resisted no longer. A place in the 
28PP 1867/8 xiii, XVIII-XLIV, 8-18.6.1868, & report 22.6.1868. 29PP 1868-69 xi, ordered to be reprinted 8.4.1869; PP 1873 xvi, ordered to be reprinted 8.5.1873. 30G. J. Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life (London, 1893), 47,147. Holyoake, a Radical, 
criticised Ayrton severely in some other respects, so probably would not have paid him a compliment if 
undeserved. 31Briggs, op. cit., 290. 32The Times 1.10.1867,7e-f. 
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Administration became a necessity. ' Gladstone appears to have acknowledged 
Ayrton's Commons power several years later when, commenting on one of his many 
disputes with Robert Lowe, he wrote that even if "uprooting" Ayrton from his position 
as First Commissioner of Works were just, "it will, as Glyn (the party whip) would tell 
you, be very difficult"; when the Queen objected to Ayrton's second and third 
ministerial appointments, Gladstone negotiated compromises with her. 34 A similar 
view was expressed by the leading political journalist Henry Lucy. Ayrton had won 
office, he suggested, because of his great skill in debate, "so dangerous to the Prime 
Minister when exercised from below the gangway"; Lucy compared Ayrton in this 
respect with two other major Liberals, Robert Lowe and Sir Vernon Harcourt. 35 
Ayrton's ability to construct and maintain lengthy political alliances challenges the 
claim that he was by nature personally difficult and unpopular; indeed, he appears to 
have been able to maintain good working relations despite some differences on policy 
details. His many long-standing alliances included not only those with his parliamentary 
supporters on metropolitan issues and with the Rate Equalisation Association but also 
his association with the Reform League, the Tower Hamlets Non-Conformist 
Alliance, 36 the Tower Hamlets group of Anglican clergymen led by the Rev. M'Gill, and 
the Association for the Repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge, whose prominent supporters 
included Gladstone, Bright, Cobden, Milner-Gibson and Samuel Morley, and who felt 
that a difference of opinion on a particular issue "did not interrupt the good 
understanding we always had with Mr. Ayrton". 37 
Ayrton's prominence in the public mind, even though he held only non-Cabinet 
posts, is shown also by his being caricatured, together with Gladstone and Robert Lowe, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the hilarious political burlesque The Happy Land at the 
38 Royal Court Theatre in 1873. Indeed, Ayrton had some of the funniest lines and 
33East London Observer 5.2.1874,7e, f. (Reprint from the Circle). 34J. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (London, 1903), H, 421 (Gladstone letter 
20.11.1871); P. Magnus, Gladstone, a biography (London, 1954), 225-6. 35DNB 1922-30 (London, 1937), on Lucy; H. Lucy, Men and Manner in Parliament (London, 1919), 
235-6. Lucy, 1843-1924, knighted in 1909, was manager of the Daily News parliamentary staff, a 
journalist on the Observer for 20 years, a Punch political columnist, and author of popular handbooks 
on Parliamentary Procedure (1880) and Law and Practice of General Elections (1900). 36Tower Hamlets Independent, 7.2.1874,5a. 
37C. D. Collet, History of the Taxes on Knowledge - Their Origin and Repeal (London, 1899), 168, and 
also 140,144,155-6,162,174,186,193-4,196-7,199-201,205,208. 
38BL MS. 531170, which may be the only surviving copy. There have been brief references to this 
play, for example in Port (HJ, 27,1,1984), 173, and in biographical dictionaries, but there has been no 
detailed modem study of it, nor indeed modem production. 
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marginally the longest speaking part. Although one of the authors was W. S. Gilbert39 
(later of Gilbert & Sullivan fame), son of William Gilbert, chairman of the Rate 
Equalisation Association, and the family connection may have contributed to the 
particularly lively depiction of the Ayrton character, it seems unlikely that he would have 
been chosen on these grounds alone as the companion caricature to the two major 
officers of state. Eminent persons in the First Night audience included the Prince and 
Princess of Wales and the Duke of Edinburgh, and it was possibly the objections of the 
Prince of Wales - who disliked, apparently, the references to economising on the Royal 
palaces - that roused the Lord Chamberlain to banning it. Ayrton, according to his 
family record, was "much amused at the whole matter, and particularly the personal 
imitation of himself". The production was popular, and when it re-opened after the loss 
of one performance, with an adjustment of the strikingly recognisable make-up and wigs 
of the three "Right Honourables" and no reference to palaces, every place in boxes, 
stalls and pit had been taken. 40 
The burlesque is significant not only because it shows Ayrton's political 
prominence but also because it provides a further indication of how some 
contemporaries perceived him. Its major political themes - Gladstonian economising 
and post-Second Reform Act "popular" government - were policies in which Ayrton had 
played a significant part, and demonstrate Ayrton's close identification with the policies 
of the administration. 
The play's opening emphasises the Reform context, set as it is in "a fairy 
landscape on the back of a cloud", with six innocent, carefree female fairies awaiting the 
arrival of the three ministers from England in order to discover the principles on which 
their system of popular government is founded, and to introduce these, if possible, into 
Fairyland. On cue the trio, Mr. G., Mr. L. and Mr. A., come up the trap, singing about 
their popularity, with the refrain "Still we are three most popular men! We want to 
39The authors were named as "F. Tomlin and Gilbert ABecket", but biographical entries on Ayrton 
give W. S. Gilbert and Gilbert ABecket as the authors, and the play is named in the British Library's 
index and in the contemporary press as one of W. S. Gilbert's works. 40Daily News 6.3.1873,3b; PRO/LC/1/277; J. O. Baylen & N. J. Gossman (ed. ), Biographical 
Dictionary ofModern British Radicals (Sussex, 1978), vol. II, 33; N. Chaplin, The Chaplin and 
Skinner Families (London, 1902), 30; The Times 6,7,8 & 10.3.1873 (10c; 12d; 5f; 8b &l lb); BL 
MS. 53117 N, handwritten original script dated 3 February, and document on "Lord Chamberlain's 
Office" headed paper titled "Deviations from the Licensed Copy of 'The Happy Land performed at the 
Court Theatre"; BL 11779. cc. 16, Gilbert's social satire Fallen Fairies; or The Wicked World on which 
the approved first, and milder, version was based. 
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know who'll turn us out! " (See Illustration 1,41 showing Ayrton in the centre. ) The 
irony of the dual meaning of "popular" was extended for second-week audiences by the 
fact that, after losing a major division in the Commons, Gladstone was compelled to 
soldier on because Disraeli refused to assume office. 42 
Economy and retrenchment in defence and in public works (Ayrton's field as First 
Commissioner of Works) is emphasised by all three. Their response to foreign policy 
problems (the claim of the King of Bonny to Scotland and the impending invasion of 
London by the Chinese) is uniformly not to spend money. All exclaim "Oh, no - no - 
no! " at a female fairy's suggestion that they should fight for Scotland, and Gladstone 
suggests that they give London to the Chinese at once, with Ayrton reacting with horror 
at the suggestion that they should offer the Chinese an indemnity of sixpence to 
withdraw. Both Ayrton and Lowe are shocked at Fairyland's expenditure on public 
works, and Ayrton exclaims, "Solid marble temple! Here's waste! What's become of 
brick and stucco, I should like to know? " 
In one of the funniest scenes, in which ministerial posts are distributed in 
Fairyland by oral competitive examination, the allocation of Ayrton's post of First 
Commissioner of Works forms the dramatic climax. Zayda, the snappish fairy who 
becomes particularly attached to Ayrton, demands to know what's to become of her. 
"You appoint people to posts because they know nothing about them, " she says. "Well, 
I know nothing about anything. Rude am I in speech, and little blessed with the set 
phrase of peace. I've no taste, I've no courtesy, I've no knowledge of Art, and if you 
don't give me something to do, I'll make the country too hot to hold you. " Ayrton, 
bowing very low, hands her his portfolio as First Commissioner. 
The play's treatment of Ayrton is more personal than that of the other two 
ministers. While it satirises some of the political views and actions of all three 
ministers, and particularly their zeal for economy and retrenchment, and suggests that 
they are an unpopular trio, it is Ayrton whose actual personality and manner are mocked 
persistently. The DNB suggests that the burlesque "unjustifiably caricatured" him, 
43 
and the play certainly demonstrates a delight in depicting him as someone who sought 
conflict for its own sake. 
41111ustrated London News 22.3.1873,273. 
42Magnus, op. cit., 224-5. 43DNB (Ayrton), op. cit., 89. 
136 
AYRTON AND THE METROPOLIS 
On the other hand the play, in emphasising the retrenchment policies of the 
Liberal government, gives a clearer insight than the contemporary press generally did 
into the wider political framework within which bitter personal criticism was aimed at 
Ayrton for his cost-cutting at the Treasury and the Office of Works. In linking "Mr. All 
so closely with the retrenchment policies of the government, the play offers literary 
support for the point Michael Port makes that Ayrton's practical cost-consciousness in 
office was in close conformity with the Liberal government's financial policies, and 
Morley's comment that "Not thoroughly'to understand pecuniary responsibility' was 
counted a deadly sin in those ...... days. "44 Through the medium of the 
hilarious 
dialogue it confirms the financial priorities expressed by Ayrton when taking up his first 
ministerial post - that it was necessary "to draw a hard line between expenditure 
demanded by public necessities and expenditure demanded by public opinion or caprice" 
and to give the great body of the people "the greatest blessings with the least possible 
taxation"45 - while at the same time showing him as an exemplary supporter of 
Gladstone's economic policies. 
Particularly important in terms of Ayrton's rate equalisation and other 
metropolitan political activities is the fact that his East End associations were also, it 
seems, emphasised. This is not apparent in the script, but a second review in Vanity 
Fair several months later46 suggested somewhat mischievously that "as it is now quite 
settled that they do not represent those ministers", there could be no harm in the actors 
paying a visit to the House of Commons and amending their portrayals accordingly. 
One of the characters, it suggested, could speak "in a particularly Lancashire accent" 
(presumably Gladstone), one could read his words "with his paper close to his nose" 
(clearly a reference to the extremely short-sighted Lowe), and the third "might also 
aspirate his H's": an indication that the Ayrton character had (inappropriately, in terms 
of the real Ayrton) been dropping his aitches. 
Another feature not apparent in the script and therefore presumably introduced in 
production was Mr. A's "violence", which "caused repeated laughter"47 - again 
44M. H. Port, "A Contrast in Styles at the Office of Works. Layard and Ayrton: Aesthete and 
Economist", HJ, 27,1(1984) 162,174; J. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, II (London, 
1903), 419-20. 
45The Times 18.2.1869,8c. 
46 Vanity Fair 1.11.1873,143. 
47Daily News, 6.3.1873,3b. 
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probably inappropriate in terms of the real Ayrton, whose "languid manner" and 
"oratorical vitriol"48 suggest a violence more intellectual than physical. 
Overall, this neglected burlesque provides evidence that Ayrton was a more 
substantial public personality than is generally recognised. Firstly, he was a prominent 
Radical Liberal who, from the late 1860s onwards, was seen as an effective 
representative of Gladstonian political positions. Secondly, he remained linked in the 
public mind with his East End constituency base. The violence, working-class accent 
and hilarious political dialogue conveyed an image of a threatening East Ender who 
could also be laughed at when shown on the West End stage. 
Evidence from sources as diverse as Commons debates, select committee 
proceedings, Rate Equalisation Association records, the press and the theatre confirms, 
therefore, that Ayrton was not only the leading MP involved in the campaign for rate 
equalisation but also a substantial Radical politician. His especial identification with 
metropolitan radicalism will now be examined further. 
N 
The image of East End danger with which Ayrton came to be associated was one 
to which he himself had undoubtedly contributed, losing no opportunity to emphasise 
that he represented a huge constituency in a potentially threatening part of the 
metropolis. The first major instance was of course the rate equalisation campaign, 
when his inflammatory rhetoric in the Commons about "the people" aroused anger, and 
thereafter the national press was to show an exceptional interest in the activities of the 
holder of the huge Tower Hamlets seat - the largest constituency in the country in terms 
of population. 
"The right hon. and noble savage" was one of the labels the The Times was later 
to confer on him. They suggested inaccurately, on his appointment as First 
Commissioner of Public Works, that his prior experience was "parochial", and 
commented that "constant contemplation of the architecture of the East-end of London 
can scarcely provide an artistic education" of the kind appropriate for one responsible 
48Spectator, 4.12.1886,8b. 
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for "Palaces, Public Buildings, and Parks". Ayrton's subsequent cost-cutting on 
prestigious West End projects in the interests of tax-payers they described as involving a 
"well-trained habit of refusing to sanction public expenditure" which filled his 
imagination "if that be not an inappropriate term". 49 Such images must have 
reinforced caricature-like public perceptions of Ayrton as an East End bogeyman. 
In Ayrton's second year as MP The Times's continuing interest in his relations 
with his East End constituents led to a lengthy, mocking report on his having had to 
explain to nearly 1,500 of his constituents his reason for having helped (in company with 
leading figures such as Gladstone and Russell) to bring the Palmerston government 
down. The leader-writer offered Ayrton mock sympathy for having to represent the 
1832 Reform Act constituency's 600,000 people in "the vast regions of Dalston, 
Kingsland, Hoxton, Hackney, Bethnal-green, Shoreditch, Whitechapel, Commercial- 
road, Stepney, Limehouse, Poplar, Blackwall, the Isle of Dogs, Bromley, and Bow, all 
fagoted together in one huge borough containing the population of a small state" rather 
than an easier and "much more respectable" rotten borough such as "the green mound of 
Old Sarum". 50 The joke, clearly, was that democracy appeared to be presenting 
problems of accountability for those who were its most enthusiastic adherents. 
The frequent mockingly entertaining press anecdotes on Ayrton's subsequent 
ministerial activities in the metropolis - some of them clearly emanating from the 
Treasury, where his fellow-Liberal but political enemy Robert Lowe reigned as 
Chancellor - were on occasion deliberately inaccurate, and had to be corrected. 
51 
(Different in kind from the personal anecdotal barrage - although related - were the 
indignant denunciations in the press from professional interests affected by Ayrton's 
cost-cutting measures, in that they represented the legitimate mobilisation of opinion by 
public notables against threats to their position or professional interests. )52 
The nature of the contemporary press coverage of Ayrton's activities has tended 
to obscure a more important consideration. Because he was a particularly effective and 
determined politician, the fact that he paid vigorous attention to metropolitan issues 
49The Times 9.9.1871,3b, 9.11.1869,7a, 27.10.1869,7b. 
50The Times 25 & 26.8.1858,9c & 8d The vote against Palmerston had been on the Conspiracy to 
Murder Bill following the attempted assassination of Louis Napoleon: a radical issue. See also Taylor, 
op. cit., 296-7. 
1The Times 11.7.1870,10f, 21.9.1871,5c. 
52The Times 9.7.1870, l lb, 11.7.1870,10f, 2.6.1871,12d, 9.9.1871,3b, 21.9.1871,5c, 2.5.1872,11c. 
Port, op. cit., 168,171. 
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increased the likelihood that radical changes in finance and power might be brought 
about in the capital despite resistance from entrenched interests. 
He was aware, from an early stage, of the perils of disturbing vested interests. 
He was sometimes induced to think, he said, that it would be "better to leave off this 
active interference with legislation, and to become a sleeping member of parliament. " 
Being a sleeping member would be a very pleasant thing because "if you did nothing 
and attempted nothing, nobody would find fault with you; but the moment you began to 
work you could not move in this great metropolis, so full of special interests, without 
touching some one...... " 53 His own account of the principle on which he had acted 
throughout his Commons career was "that the interests of the people at large should 
always prevail over those of special or privileged classes. " Asa result, "a certain extent 
of personal or corporate hostility has been raised". 54 Although it was in his 1874 
election manifesto that he articulated this principle, when defending his seat against 
powerful opposition, the statement is supported by much evidence from throughout his 
parliamentary career. Port, for instance, notes the Spectator's 1870 comment that 
Ayrton was "always on the side of the people". 55 
City enmity was aroused as early as 1860 - if not before, given the tenor of his 
rate equalisation speeches from 1857 onwards. Contemporary historian and 
metropolitan politician J. F. B. Firth, 56 praising Ayrton's leading role in opposing City 
manoeuvres in 1860-1, cited his "scathing language" and "vigorous denunciation of this 
pusillanimous policy of truckling to the City Corporation". Ayrton's 1860 Commons 
attack on the City (in which he moved that a Bill on the Corporation be referred to a 
select committee in order to widen its remit to include metropolitan taxation and 
reorganisation) was, he said, "probably his ablest effort in the House of Commons, and 
.... scarcely second to the speech of Lord Brougham in 1843". Asa result, the City 
lost 
their Bill. An unattributed pamphlet attacking Ayrton's speech57 complained that "a 
powerful leading article the following day, in the most influential organ of public 
intelligence in the world" (The Times) had assumed Ayrton's allegations to be true and 
had "stigmatized the Corporation as 'a nuisance which ought to be got rid of"', and that 
53The Times 25.8.1858,9c. 
54BL 8139. k. 3. 
55Port, op. cit., 176; Spectator 14.5.1870,602. 56Firth, 
op. cit., 568-9, and also 588-9 for a list of the Bills opposed by the City. 57BL 8138. f. 20, Remarks on the speech ofA. S. Ayrton, Esq., MP (London, 1860). 
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subsequently the same journal had denounced the Corporation as an "incorrigible old 
hypocrite". The aim of the pamphlet, the writer said, was to defend the Corporation 
against "the numerous and heavy accusations which Mr. Ayrton so unsparingly made 
and so frequently reiterated". David Owen notes that Ayrton's parliamentary activities 
"frequently put the Corporation on the defensive", and that by 1867 he was an "old 
enemy" of theirs. 
58 Young calls him "a noted enemy of the Corporation". 59 (The 
City Corporation's political enemies, Robson has pointed out, could find themselves at 
the receiving end of corrupt and unscrupulous political manipulation, at least in the 
1880s if not before. 
60) 
Ayrton's pursuit of "the interests of the people at large" in the metropolis 
continued until his death. It made him a not uncritical supporter of the MBW despite 
his envisaging the Board, for several years, as a possible vehicle for metropolis-wide rate 
equalisation. In 1862, for instance, five years before the very radical recommendations 
of his Select Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation of the Metropolis, 
there was an outcry from metropolitan vestries, district boards and the MBW itself when 
he attempted, in a Commons committee, to amend the Metropolis Local Acts 
Amendment Bill to make the Board more directly democratic by having it elected by 
ratepayers instead of by vestries and district boards. 61 He was still fighting the City 
and arguing for metropolis-wide policies in the 1880s, ten years after he had left 
parliament. For instance, when the question of London government returned to the 
forefront of the Liberal programme62 he joined in the battle, trying at a county day 
meeting of the Middlesex magistrates to persuade his fellow-magistrates not to submit 
criticisms of the 1884 London Government Bill but to leave the question to the Liberal 
parliament. 63 During the lengthy genesis of the Bill he also proposed (via Firth to 
Lord Harcourt, one of his old Liberal political enemies but also now Home Secretary 
and sponsor of the Bill) that a political trap be set for the City. They should, he 
suggested, ask the City which of their privileges and chartered rights should be 
58D. Owen, The government of Victorian London 1855-89 (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 251-2,232,240. 59K. Young & P. Garside, Metropolitan London. Politics and Urban Change 183 7-1981 (London, 
1982), 28. 
60W A. Robson, The Government andAfisgovernment of London (London, 1948), 76-9, on the City's 
opposition to the 1884 London Government Bill. 611V BW Minutes of Proceedings 21.3.1862,214, and also 1862,204-5,214-5,222,234,237,263,256- 
8 277-8,303. 
6ýDavis (1988), op. cit., 68-79. 63 The Metropolitan, 24.5.1884,328. 
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preserved in the new Act, and if they did not respond, "throw the blame on the City". 
Firth commented, "This is what we might expect Ayrton to advise. "M 
Ayrton himself referred to rate equalisation and other issues relating to 
metropolitan power and finance as major elements in his career. Of rate eqalisation he 
remarked that he had "by his persistency ..... brought about the acknowledgment of the 
principle of equalisation of poor rates, and now it was an easy thing, when the battle was 
over, for candidates to come forward and declare themselves in favour of what had 
really been done by the efforts of him they were seeking to displace. "65 The 
Metropolitan Board of Works (Loans) Act 1869,66 which as a Treasury Secretary he 
had prepared and steered through Parliament, was, he told his electorate,, "the most 
comprehensive measure of local finance ever submitted to Parliament". (The MBW had 
resolved, at the time, to convey to Ayrton "an expression of their great appreciation of 
the value of his services in connection with the measure". )67 
The metropolitan factor was however also a weakness. Being the representative 
of an electorate that was almost in parliament's backyard was a powerful tool, 
particularly when arguing about hardship and demanding redistribution, because the 
issues were "local" and therefore potentially more threatening as well as sometimes 
being confirmed by evidence visible on streets through which Members passed daily. 
But the 1857 image of a menacing East End MP threatening popular violence and 
demanding redistribution of finance and power endured, it is clear, despite Ayrton's 
many more complex achievements and acknowledged ability. Similar associations 
were certainly present when Hardy, introducing the Metropolitan Poor Bill and anxious 
that it should be a success for the Conservative minority government, emphasised the 
East End, telling the House that he had been "petitioned repeatedly by persons at the 
East End of the metropolis to do something to bring them into a better condition", and 
pointing out that a memorial he had received the previous day from Whitechapel had 
proposed similar common charges to his own. 68 
A NIlVIBY (Not In My Back Yard) attitude to metropolitan radicalism clearly 
played a part in the drafting of some of the clauses of the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
64Bodleian, Ms. Harcourt dep. 108/9,4.1.1882. (Source ref. Davis (1988), op. cit., 59. ) 65East London Observer, 4.2.1874,3a. 
6632 & 33 Vict, c. 102. 67MBW Minutes of Proceedings 6.8.1869,939; (ed) H. C. G. Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries 
(Oxford, 1982), vol. VII, 112,6.8.1869. 
ö8Hansard 8.2.1867, col. 170. 
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(David Reeder's comment that parliament "had long held fears of a politically ambitious 
and overly powerful metropolitan city" is relevant here. 
69) While Ayrton's and Locke's 
select committee tactic of emphasising the "peculiar circumstances" of the metropolis 
had reduced the extent of opposition to rate equalisation that could be expected from 
country gentlemen anxious to support parochial rights, gentlemen with either local 
metropolitan or wider perspectives and interests might still feel vulnerable in the face of 
Ayrton's enduring image as an East End bogeyman, and the related vivid contrasts 
between rich and poor that he and other members of the Rate Equalisation Association 
emphasised. 
Ayrton's forceful pursuit of the financial and political "interests of the people" in 
the metropolis throughout his parliamentary career therefore contributed not only to the 
realisation of some of his goals but also to reactions against them. 
V 
An important question remains in relation to Ayrton. If he did indeed play an 
important part in the achievement of Radical goals in the 1860s, including metropolitan 
rate redistribution, surely his achievement would have received greater recognition? A 
brief, wider survey of his reputation and career will however confirm conclusions 
reached above: that his effectiveness as an East End and metropolitan Radical politician 
set in train a series of reactions that affected not only the nature of changes he helped 
bring about but also the weight that was to be accorded to his political record. 70 
Ayrton disappeared from the parliamentary scene in 1874, when his record 
majority at the previous general election was succeeded by a plunge to fourth place and 
the winning of the Radical Tower Hamlets seat by the Conservatives for the first time 
since 1832. 
The political reaction to his brand of metropolitan radicalism will now be 
examined in terms of its effect on historiography and therefore on modern recognition of 
69D. Reeder in Owen, op. cit., 352-3. 70The most substantial works on Ayrton are Port, op. cit., 151-76 (an account of his period at the Office 
of Public Works) and J. 0. Baylen & N. J. Gossman, op. cit. Other briefer references include: DNB, 
op. cit.; F. Boase, Modern English Biography, (London, 1965), IV; Davis (1988), op. cit., 59,62-3,64, 
78; Taylor, op. cit., 278-81. 
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the radicalism of the call for rate equalisation. The 1874 contest in Tower Hamlets 
forms a part of the argument, and will therefore be considered also. 
The first published summaries of Ayrton's career - the obituaries - were 
unusually negative, and indeed continued the kind of attacks that had been launched at 
him throughout his political career, which had ended 13 years before. The Illustrated 
London News, 71 a rare dissenting voice, noted that "the maxim that we should say 
nothing ill of the dead has been strangely departed from ...... It criticised obituaries 
in 
which "we are told of his uncouthness, of the hideous hats he wore, and of his utter 
deficiency of taste". 
The Times obituary72 remarked on his being "one of the most unpopular 
members of Mr. Gladstone's Government", and having "little or no sympathy with art. " 
Almost half of the coverage was devoted to a critical account of his disputes with 
professional men about the new Royal Courts of Justice, Kew Gardens and the 
Wellington monument in St. Paul's Cathedral. The obituary did not, in effect, treat 
Ayrton as a serious politician. The Spectator73 did go so far as to say that Ayrton 
"might have been Chancellor of the Exchequer in any Whig Cabinet", but then 
condemned him for his personality; the implication here seems to have been that he had 
great ability but (in an oblique reference perhaps to his political enemy Robert Lowe) 
needed a rotten borough to ensure his hold on a parliamentary seat. Indeed, it seems 
almost as if two different hands wrote the Spectator obituary, the one commending 
Ayrton for his "remarkable powers" and for being "absolutely honest", "feared by 
corrupt persons", and "an excellent administrator", while the other mocked him as a 
"second-rate administrator" who, once out of the Parliamentary "coach" could "never 
regain a footing, even on the steps", because he had left himself "without an official 
friend". 
The negative Ayrton obituaries conveyed the impression that Ayrton's 
disagreements with certain professional men while at the Office of Works were a major 
factor in his ultimate political "failure" and, indeed, that he lost his seat and failed to gain 
another because of a fatal flaw - his personality; they neglected to point out that there 
had been East End support for Ayrton's controversial monitoring and cutting of 
71111ustrated London News 11.12.1886,626,2b-c. 
72The Times 2.12.86,6f. 
73Spectator 4.12.1886,8b. 
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prestigious West End projects. 74 Twentieth-century biographical dictionaries - the 
major recent source for overall coverage of his career - tend to repeat this emphasis on 
personality. The Dictionary of National Biography, 
75 while acknowledging Ayrton's 
"great ability and varied knowledge, with conspicuous independence of character", 
reports that he had "brusque" manners and came into "personal conflict with numerous 
men of eminence"; three instances of much publicised disagreements are cited. The 
Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals76 provides the most 
comprehensive coverage but refers also to his "rude and abusive manner of speaking" 
and reputation in the Commons as "a gadfly and something of a nuisance", and calls him 
"the most hated member of Gladstone's ministry". Other modem writers also repeat 
this theme. Magnus says he was "generally regarded as an impossible outsider", and 
Port says he "generally behaved in an arrogant and bloody-minded way". 77 
It would have been fairer if the earlier sources had cited also comments such as 
that of Robert Lowe's private secretary that the sculptor Stevens was driven almost to 
despair, and appealed to Lowe for help, because Ayrton was "a man who carried out his 
purposes". 78 In other words, it was Ayrton's determination in pursuit of difficult goals 
that led to an escalation of the opposition to him. Gladstone's thoughts on appointing 
Ayrton to the Office of Works confirm that he was seeking someone who could actually 
implement retrenchment. The post, he wrote to Lord Granville, "should be filled by 
some one capable of exercising control". 
79 The view of the Annual Register, in its 
obituary of Ayrton, was that he had been "a dangerous opponent". Hardy, the political 
opponent to whom Ayrton clearly pledged his support on the Metropolitan Poor Bill, 
spoke of his "great intellect and ability"; Ayrton's single-mindedness undoubtedly 
contributed to the passing of the Act in that, intent it seems on achieving rate 
7`IEast London Observer, 1.10.1910,7a-b, remarks that "the textbook biographers are quite in error in 
supposing that Ayrton's early administration as Commissioner of Works was unpopular. In the Tower 
Hamlets this certainly was not the case, and his principal supporters were consistently loud in praising 
his zeal for economy in the public interest .... His cutting down of the extravagant expenditure upon the 
new Courts of Justice certainly did not annoy his East London followers. " 75DNB, op. cit. 76Baylen & Gossman, op. cit., 33-7. (The Ayrton contribution is by Thomas F. Gallagher. ) 77Magnus, op. cit., 226; Port, op. cit., 175. 78A. Patchett-Martin, Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Robert Lowe, Viscount Sherbrooke, vol. lI 
(London, 1893), 379-80, quoting Mr. (later Sir) Rivers Wilson, private secretary to Lowe. 79J. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (London, 1903), II, 419-20, letter of 18.8.1869. 
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equalisation at almost any price, he, alone of the metropolitan Radicals, ruthlessly 
supported even the nominee clauses. 
80 
The tally of eminent people with whom Ayrton fell out or whose ire he 
aroused is, indeed, impressive, ranging from the Queen and John Bright, through John 
Stuart Mill, Chadwick, Charles Dickens, leading Liberals such as Robert Lowe and Sir 
William Harcourt to leading public architects and senior civil servants. His public 
criticism at a reform meeting on 4 December 1866 of the Queen's extended seclusion 
following the Prince Consort's death (for which John Bright rebuked him but on which 
Ayrton was far from being a lone voice) led to the Queen's objecting to his second and 
third ministerial posts because she did not wish to have personal contact with him, and 
to her telling Granville that it was very important for her to have a "gentleman" at the 
Office of Works. 81 
Leading Liberals who found Ayrton a threat did not confine their opposition to 
mere differences of opinion. For instance a conspiratorial letter (published 
biographically but little noted since) links Harcourt, Lord Russell and Sir Charles Dilke 
in a plot to get rid of Ayrton. 82 Russell's enmity may have arisen partly from the fact 
that his 20-year tenure as MP for the City (1841-1861) had included the period in which 
Ayrton's made his much-resented 1860 attack on the Corporation, and partly because 
Ayrton represented Gladstone's administration, to which he was now opposed. The 
aristocratic Harcourt, an ambitious future Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and Leader of the Liberal Party, 
83 although generally professing radicalism during these 
years, took up ambivalent positions and often opposed Gladstone. (He wrote to 
Goschen the following year that Whig doctrines were his principles84 and in 1875, 
particularly significantly in terms of his opposition to Ayrton, that "if Gladstone flings 
himself into the arms of the Radicals, he cannot expect that moderate men will follow 
80Annual Register 1886 (London), II, 168-9; The Times 26.1.1867,6d; Hansard 11.3.1867 col. 1695- 
7. 
81Port, op. cit., 160-2 particularly, and 151-176; R Jenkins, Gladstone (London, 1995), 371; Dickens, 
Household Words, 1857,17,5.6.1858; DNB, op. cit. (Ayrton); East London Observer 9.2.1867 and 
also 1.10.1910,7a b, (a retrospective account of Ayrton's career which pointed out that his views on the 
Queen's seclusion "were very largely shared by the masses, and occasioned the circulation of offensive 
scandals and very pointed criticisms and cartoons in the newspapers"). 82A. G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt (London, 1923), I, 236-9. 83Stenton, op. cit., DNB Supplement 1901-11 (London, 1927). 8`IA. D. E. Elliot, Life of Lord Goschen 1831-1907 (London, 1911), I, 152 (29.12.1874). 
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him". 85 The Radical Dilke's presence in the conspiracy may appear less explicable, but 
Harcourt was apparently Dilke's "closest associate" at this period. 
86 
The immediate occasion for the conspiracy - Ayrton's new rules for the holding of 
public meetings in Hyde Park - led to Harcourt's writing to Dilke that the rules were 
"done for, and Ayrton too". He had had a letter from Lord Russell "in a great state of 
exhultation at the row", he said. Russell had written that "there never was a 
Government towards which distrust was more justifiable, and of all its members Ayrton 
is least trustworthy". The elated Harcourt suggested to Dilke that "something might be 
done in the way of getting up big petitions all over London for the removal of Ayrton. 
If a few hundred thousand signatures were got and sent in to Gladstone it would have a 
good effect. " 
The outcome - Ayrton's trouncing of the over-confident Harcourt in debate - 
provides yet another example of his dangerous ability to defeat powerful opponents 
through the use of rhetoric and reason, and win over the Commons against the odds. 
Conservative peer Lord Grimthorpe recalled 13 years later how completely Ayrton had 
"baffled" his eminent opponent. 87 Harcourt, he said, "went down to the House with 
the air of Juggernaut or a steamroller to pulverize the First Commissioner for something 
or other". The outcome was that "the Ayrtonian stones remained unbroken and the 
steamroller was seriously damaged". Journalist Henry Lucy's recollection was similar: 
Ayrton, having risen "amid a freezing silence...... sat down under a storm of cheers". 
Ayrton's concluding comment on Harcourt's attack - that he objected to any Member 
expressing his opinion in language so pretentious "as to declare that he is the only wise 
man in this Assembly, and that all the rest of us are nothing but fools" gives an indication 
of the ruthlessness of his style. 88 
The conspiracy is significant because it casts considerable light on the reasons for 
the eclipsing of Ayrton's real political record and hence the modern under-recognition of 
the significance of metropolitan rate equalisation activities in the 1860s. John Morley's 
account in his biography of Gladstone places the emphasis differently, but Morley's 
interpretation, it will now be argued, is tainted. 
85(ed. ) P. Colson, Lord Goschen and his friends. The Goschen Letters (London, 1945), 101. 86R Jenkins, Sir Charles Dilke, A Victorian Tragedy (London, 1968), 48-50. 
87The Times 6.12.1886,9c; Dod's Parliamentary Companion, op. cit. (1886), 45. 88The Times 6.12.1886,9c; Lucy, op. cit., 238; Hansard 10.2.1873 col. 199-228. 
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Morley was a major supporter of the extraordinary Radical, Captain F. A. Maxse, 
who stood against Ayrton in 1874 in Tower Hamlets and "let the Tory in". 89 The 
various occasions on which Morley refers slightingly to Ayrton - either by name or, 
more commonly but recognisably, by anecdote, may be interpreted, it is suggested here, 
as a form of justification for his participation in the vicious general election campaign 
against a prominent and effective Liberal personality. 
The incident of the parks rules he presents merely as an example of Gladstone's 
deferring to the judgment of his cabinet and instructing Ayrton to back down (with no 
indication that Ayrton nonetheless emerged the tactical victor). On the dispute between 
Ayrton and the director of Kew Gardens he develops at length Gladstone's description 
of Ayrton as being a "somewhat angular" person - an emphasis not conforming, in this 
case, with the conclusion of the official peacemaker that Ayrton was the "more 
reasonable man of the two". 90 In the case of the 1873 post office scandal91 Morley 
names Ayrton with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Postmaster General as 
being concerned in "the gross and unexcused irregularities", although noting separately 
that Gladstone had said only that it was on account of the other two that the government 
deserved a vote of censure. He also misleadingly introduces into the middle of his 
account of the post office scandal a brief reference to the ministerial accountability issue 
in which Ayrton had been involved in the Commons, giving the clear impression that this 
too related to the scandal rather than to the comparatively innocuous Thames 
Embankment question. 92 
Ayrton's political enemies, it is therefore clear, came not only from the more 
obvious sources such as Conservatives, opponents of Radical policies such as electoral 
reform and rate equalisation, threatened civil servants and professionals, and those who 
had taken personal offence at his outspokenness (such as the Queen), but from powerful 
members of his own party such as Lowe, Russell and Harcourt (whose view on the 1874 
Liberal general election defeat was that he was "not sorry .... We shall 
have a nice little 
party, though diminished"). 93 
89Tower Hamlets Independent & Advertiser, 13.12.1873,4e, f. Morley supported Maxse at his first 
public meeting in Tower Hamlets. 
91 DNB, op. cit. 9 Magnus, op. cit., 225. 92Morley, op. cit., II, 419-21,460-3. 93S. Gwynn & G. M. Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, bart., AMP (London, 
1918), I, 171-3. 
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It is possible that one of the consequences of such enmities was Ayrton's failure to 
return to parliament in a different constituency after 1874. Dilke, playing a leading role 
in the metropolis after the Liberal defeat, was in 1876-80 chairman of the Elections 
Committee of the Liberal Central Association, a position which gave him influence over 
the choice of parliamentary candidates. Furthermore, when Ayrton in 1885 made his 
final attempt to get back into parliament, the five-man central arbitration panel set up to 
resolve the Mile End dual candidature problem included Morley and Joseph Chamberlain 
(who, like Morley, had been closely involved with Maxse). Perhaps not surprisingly, 
Ayrton refused to submit to such arbitration; when warned that the dual candidature 
might let the Tory in, he allegedly made the bitter comment, "Then let him in. "94 
Another reason for Dilke's being an opponent of Ayrton may have been his close 
association not only with Harcourt but, from 1869, with J. S. Mill, who opposed Ayrton 
on several metropolitan issues. For instance (as shown in chapter 2) they were on 
opposite sides in 1867-8 in the lengthy and acrimonious dispute between medical men 
and guardians. Mill also attempted to pre-empt the Commons' consideration of the 
report of Ayrton's Select Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation pf the 
Metropolis (a committee of which he himself had been a member) by introducing a Bill 
supported in his own constituency which was in theory more favourable to the City's 
interests. 95 When his close associate, Chadwick, was seeking a parliamentary seat in 
1868, Mill suggested (somewhat ambiguously) that he offer himself for one of the two 
parliamentary boroughs into which Tower Hamlets was to be divided by the Second 
Reform Act because "you would not displace any existing member whose friends would 
oppose you". 
96 As Ayrton had given Chadwick a rather rough ride when he gave 
evidence to his 1866 select committee, 
97 the suggestion was presumably not 
unwelcome; Ayrton had, for instance, suggested that one of the first local boards of 
health to take advantage of scientific assistance from Chadwick's General Board of 
Health "had the misfortune to suffer more than any other board in the country from the 
94lbid.; J. M. Davidson, Eminent Radicals Out of Parliament" (London, 1875-80), 4-5; Jenkins 
(1968), op. cit., 43,100; East London Observer 26.9.1885,7c, f, 24.10.1885,3d, 14.11.1885,7e, 
10.10.1885,5c, 31.10.1885,5,28.11.1885,5; The Times 19.11.1885,4f. The 1885 election result was: 
Charrington (C) 2091(52.9%), Hart (L) 1442 (36.5%), Ayrton (Ind. L. ) 420 (10.6%). 
95Hansard 21.3.1867 col. 882-7; Young, op. cit., 29. See also Davis (1988), op. cit., 59-62, for Mill's 
London local government activities. 
96UCL Chadwick MSS 1401/82,19.5.1867, letter from Mill to Chadwick 
97PP 1866 xiii, Q. 6557-70. 
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course it has pursued". Ayrton's Liberal general election opponent in 1885, Dr. Ernest 
Hart, also had links with this chain of influence and common interests, having been 
strongly opposed, when a leading medical campaigner for the Metropolitan Poor Act's 
institutional reforms, 98 to the metropolitan boards of guardians; for instance, he wrote 
to Chadwick that he heartily wished for the destruction of guardians "but fear it cannot 
now be accomplished". 
99 
The origins of the historiographical under-recognition of the significance of 
Ayrton as a Radical figure are therefore wide. In terms of the contemporary record, 
once Ayrton had lost his power base in parliament, there were many who had no reason 
to draw him back into public life and who, on the contrary, would have felt publicly 
more secure or comfortable if his impact on the political scene could be forgotten. 
The 1874 voting figures offer further evidence that Ayrton's disappearance from 
the parliamentary scene was a more complex matter than merely the criticisms levelled in 
the election campaign: that he had paid insufficient attention to local interests and had 
not visited the constituency for a long time (ever since, in fact, his meeting with his 
constituents had been violently broken up, Ayrton believed by the brewing interest, in 
1871100). 
The dramatic drop in his vote between 1868 and 1874, from head of the poll with 
a record 9,839 votes101 to fourth place with 3,202,102 was the result of a pincer 
movement in which he was caught, the two prongs of which were the new Radical 
candidate and Crimean hero, Captain Frederick Augustus Maxse, RN, 
103 and a 
moderate Liberal local politician, Edmund Hay Currie. 
104 Currie had, ironically, 
gained some of his local government experience as one of the Poor Law Board's 
nominees on the Metropolitan Asylums Board set up under the Metropolitan Poor Act, 
980'Neill, op. cit., 273-5,282-4. 
99UCL Chadwick MSS, 949,17.9.1866, letter from Hart to Chadwick; three months before, Hart had 
been involved in a much-publicised dispute about the Whitechapel workhouse in Ayrton's constituency 
(ýP 18661xi, 597-601). 
1°ýThe 
Times 25.1.1871,12a, 26.1.1871,9d. 
F. W. S. Craig, British parliamentary election results 1832-1885, (Aldershot, 1989). Ayrton's 1868 
vote was the highest ever in Tower Hamlets, until 1880, and also the only vote in the constituency 
before 1880 to exceed 8,000. 
102The 1874 result was: Ritchie (Con. ) 7,228, Samuda (Liberal) 5,900, Currie (Liberal) 5,022, Ayrton 
(Liberal) 3,202, Maxse (Radical) 2,292 (Tower Hamlets Independent 7.2.1874,5a). 
103ADNf/196/37,884; London Gazette 8.10.1854,3060.1 
Tower Hamlets Independent, 31.1.1874, Supplement, la. 
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having been one of the hasty nominations made in the Goschen-Stansfeld changeover 
period. 105 
One of Captain Maxse's leading Radical supporters expected Ayrton to lose the 
"3,000 working men's votes" that his 1868 electoral alliance with Edmond Beales, 
Radical President of the Reform League, had brought him. It was, furthermore, 
Captain Maxse's refusal to withdraw and leave the two sitting Liberals, Ayrton and 
Samuda, to do battle with the Conservative that opened the door to the moderate 
Currie, who "accepted the situation and announced himself. " Despite his Radical 
platform, Captain Maxse showed little desire to attack the more moderate sitting Liberal 
MP, Samuda, and both he and Currie (who was supported by a vicious anti-Ayrton local 
press campaign)106 concentrated their fire on Ayrton, who was also the only candidate 
to have his election meetings consistently broken up or turned into uproar. 
107 
In terms of the number of votes, 1874 was not even a very good year for the 
Conservatives in Tower Hamlets; in 1868, when Ayrton achieved his record poll, the 
defeated Conservative's vote had been 7,446, whereas in 1874, at the top of the poll, the 
Conservative vote was down by more than 200, to 7,228. 
As Gladstone himself pointed out four years later, 108 if neither Maxse nor Currie 
had stood, the result might have been close but quite probably Ayrton and Samuda 
would have retained both seats for the Liberal Party, as the combined votes of the 
Liberal and Radical candidates totalled 16,416, against the Conservative's 7,228. 
Although the Tower Hamlets drink interest played a part in the abrupt ending of 
Ayrton's political career (the Conservative C. T. Ritchie was supported by local brewer 
0. E. Coope, the unsuccessful 1868 Conservative candidate, and the new Liberal 
candidate Currie was a large local distiller109) the intervention of Captain Maxse was 
undoubtedly a key element in de-stabilising the Liberal tenure of Tower Hamlets. 
Maxse, son of a wealthy Tory squire, appears to have impressed all who met him in 
Tower Hamlets with his gentlemanliness - in implied contrast to the East End's "Right 
105See Chapter 7, p. 230-1. 106East London Observer 5.2.1874, e-f. 1071bid., 31.1.1874,2d, e, 3a, 7e, 4.2.1874,3a, b, 5.2.1874,7c; Tower Hamlets Independent 31.1.1874, 
supplement, lb. 
1'U 
. E. Gladstone, "Electoral Facts", The Nineteenth Century, 4 (1878), 960-3. 109Tower Hamlets Independent, 13.12.1873,4d. East London Observer, 7.2.1874,6d. See also the 
assessment by H. J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management (London, 1978) 222-5, of the initial 
description by Gladstone (standing in nearby Greenwich) of the 1874 general election as "a torrent of 
gin and beer". 
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hon. and noble savage" (see portraits, Illustration 2110) - but had impeccable Radical 
credentials, including a remarkably wide circle of English and French radical, 
revolutionary and famous friends. 111 He subsequently rose to be a Retired Admiral, 
country gentleman and Hampshire JP who frequented the "great Whig citadel", 112 
Brookes's, 113 whereas the defeated Ayrton persisted in his enthusiastic allegiance, until 
the end of his life, to the Reform Club and the pursuit of radical metropolitan issues: a 
contrast that might perhaps have been a cause for embarrassment for someone such as 
John Morley, who had supported Maxse at his introductory public meeting in Tower 
Hamlets. 
That responsibility for the loss of Tower Hamlets could be laid at the doors of 
Liberals or Radicals who had intervened in the copstituency was clearly Gladstone's 
view. Expressing his anger more than four years later at the "mania" of multiple Liberal 
candidatures, he cited the Tower Hamlets contest as a prime example of the role of 
"sects" which could break up a Liberal majority into two or three minorities and "make 
over the seat to a Tory". 114 
Twentieth-century judgements of Ayrton - and hence of the significance of some 
of his causes and some of his political associates - have been built, it is therefore argued, 
on the less than reliable foundation of self-interested, politically influenced or defensive 
contemporary accounts of his career, and on what Vanity Fair described as "the 
malignity of Mr. Ayrton's persecutors". 115 
An important modem comment that now needs to be reassessed is that of Taylor, 
who describes Ayrton as one of the new "nabob-like candidates" of 1857 with East India 
Company backgrounds, and links him with "fears that the 'worship of Mammon' had 
taken hold amongst the London electorate". ' 16 From this perspective, and without 
access to or consideration of sources such as the Rate Equalisation Association's 
records, Taylor's reasonable view is that "the economistic radicalism of London 
110 Ayrton, aged 40, Illustrated London News, 16.5.1857, p. 479; Maxse, aged 41, Beehive, 
27.3.1875, front cover. 
11 'Morrison, op. cit., 61-69; M. C. Finn, After Chartism: class and nation in English radical politics, 
1848-1874 (Cambridge, 1993), 280,291,297-300; WSROMaxse Papers, 143,180,184-5,187,189, 
196-7,201,203,205-6,212,215; BI 341.65,76 (Maxse pamphlets). 112Blake, op. cit., 137. 113Navy Lists 1853-1887; Walford, E., The County Families of the United Kingdom (London, 1888). 114G1adstone, op. cit., 960-3. 115yanity Fair, 29.11.1873,183. 
116Taylor, 
op. cit., 280,282. 
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ratepayer politics" championed in the 1850s and 1860s by Ayrton (and others such as, 
he suggests, C. T. Bright and Torrens McCullagh) was "all in all a sad and 
inappropriate terminus for the retrenchment advocated year on year by old Joe 
Hume". 117 
Ayrton was, however, far from being either nabob-like or corrupted by Mammon. 
His family records118 show that he was the son of a London lawyer "of small means" 
and an original mind who at one stage ran a business experimenting with merino sheep 
at Richmond-on-Thames, was skilled at carpentry, upholstery and shoemaking, went to 
Bombay to practice law in order to pay for his children's school fees, and died in India 
when Ayrton was seven years old. The five children had been told by their mother, a 
Colonel's daughter, that "papa would never come back if we spent so much" 
119 
- 
perhaps an indication that Ayrton's extreme zeal for economy at the Office of Works had 
deeper roots even than Radical political convictions or a desire to carry out Gladstone's 
wishes. 
At the age of 15 the young Ayrton became a legal apprentice of one of the City 
livery companies, the Leathersellers, 120 but as soon as he turned 21 left for India, 
117Ibid, 92; Maccoby, op. cit., 45, says that the administrative reformers who entered parliament in 
1855 were perceived as "noisy and reckless agitators anxious to elevate themselves quickly from the 
position of political 'nobodies'" -a perception that ought clearly not to be applied to Ayrton who, 
arriving two years later, employed effective, consistent and more complex strategies over a 17-year 
Tod. 8Chaplin, op. cit., 30-33. Only 50 private copies of this account of the Chaplin, Skinner, Ayrton 
and Hicks families were printed; a copy survives in the library of the Society of Genealogists, London. 119Ibid., 23. 
120The Leathersellers' Company, Court Minutes Jan. 1826-Oct. 1833, temp ref. GOV/1/13. The 
records are not open to the public, but information was kindly supplied by Wendy Hawke, the 
Company's Temporary Archivist. The record shows that on 5 October 1831 "Acton Since Ayrton, son 
of Frederick Ayrton, late of Bombay in the East Indies, esquire, deceased, was bound apprentice to Bury 
Hutchinson of Russell Square, Middlesex, citizen and leatherseller of London, for seven years. " His 
master, who was also the Leathersellers' Company's Clerk, Accountant and Receiver of Rents from 
1810 (Hunting, P., The Leathersellers' Company: A History [London 1994], 139) died three years later, 
and there is no record of Ayrton (now an orphan, his mother having died the previous year) having 
been turned over to a new master. In 1875-6 (the year after he was defeated in Tower Hamlets) Ayrton 
served as steward in the Leathersellers' Company, in 1877-8 as fourth warden, and on 4 October 1882 
he was elected onto the Court of Assistants. In the 1880s he negotiated on behalf of the Leathersellers 
with the Charity Commissioners and, having as an MP shown an interest in technical education, 
represented the Leathersellers as a governor of the City & Guilds Institute. Outside the Leathersellers' 
Company it may not have been widely known that Ayrton's membership derived from the traditional 
apprenticeship route. William Gilbert, his former campaigning colleague on the Rate Equalisation 
Association, when criticising the City Livery Companies in 1877 (W. Gilbert, The City: an inquiry into 
the City Livery Companies [London, 18751,135-6) published The Times's rather mocking list of 
liverymen (who included the Prince of Wales, Gladstone and Lowe as fishmongers, and Goschen as a 
spectacle-maker) but also repeated the Times error of including Ayrton, as a leatherseller, in this 
ceremonial category. 
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followed in his father's footsteps in becoming a Bombay lawyer, and "acquired one of 
the chief legal practices in Bombay, and with it a very fair fortune. " 
121 For two years in 
his early twenties, 1839-41, he was solicitor to the East India Company, and he was 
later associated with the Indian railways. 
His living circumstances, on his return to England in search of a parliamentary 
seat, were hardly "nabob-like". In the early days he and his brother Edward shared a 
small servant-less flat off Piccadilly, and thereafter he lived on his own - for at least 20 
years in the West End, and then in South Kensington - with only one manservant, his 
housekeeper-wife and their children. 
122 The only addition to this household appears to 
have been the arrival of Ayrton's niece, Julia Chaplin, some time before 1881. 
There were, furthermore, no serious contemporary accusations of a propensity to 
worship Mammon. Indeed, the few who spoke out publicly against the negative 
obituaries in the London press emphasised Ayrton's integrity and determination: as a 
man who thought "more of the public good than his own advancement"; 
123 as 
someone opposed to corruption and having a "detestation of anything which had the 
attributes of a job"; 
124 as one who had an "unswerving love of truth", 125 and as a man 
who was "second to none in singlemindedness of purpose" and thought for himself on 
every subject, never being sufficiently "accommodating" or "partisan" to "gain the 
position to which his great abilities and public spirit entitled him to aspire". 
126 
The explanation given by some of Ayrton's opponents for his acceptance of the 
less publicly exposed post of Judge Advocate-General in August 1873 - that his 
ministerial career had taken a downward turn - may very well have been incorrect, as 
other factors relating to family and career were present. 
127 Two of his brothers had 
died in 1872 - one on the day after his return from India, and the other after a long 
121Chaplin, op. cit., 30. 
1221851 census, H0107/1476/47; 1861 census, RG9/44/18; 1871 census, RG10/101/13; 1881 census, 
RG11/49/10. 
123 The Times 6.12.1886,9c (Lord Grimthorpe, Conservative). 
124The Times 7.12.1886,7c (Capt. Douglas Galton); Port, op. cit., 167-8 (who identifies Galton as a 
civil servant drafted in by Robert Lowe, despite Ayrton's objections, to head the Office of Works). 
125The Times 8.1.1887,10f (resolution passed at a court of the Leathersellers Company). 
126The Times 3.12.1886,6f (Irish-born barrister, Joseph Napier Higgins). Also 1881 census, 
RG 11/70/301, and Post Office Directory 1881. 127East London Observer 5.2.1874,7e (reprint of article, "An estimate of Mr. Ayrton" in the new daily 
newspaper The Circle) said of his new post: "However, he has at length entered upon a new phase in 
his career; he may now occupy the dignified, respectable, and safe position of the extinct volcano. As 
Judge-Advocate General he may cease from troubling, and, if he is weary, which is doubtful, he may be 
at rest. " 
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illness - leaving the politician the sole survivor of four brothers, and the senior Ayrton, 
in what appears to have been a close family; his only other sibling, his widowed sister, 
lived nearby, he was in due course to share out his estate, in his will, between six nieces 
and nephews, and one of his nephews, Holroyd Chaplin, was to demonstrate family 
solidarity by writing to the Spectator to defend and praise his uncle when it published its 
unpleasant obituary. 128 There may, therefore, have been unpublicised family reasons 
for Ayrton to welcome the move from the publicly contentious Office of Works post in 
1873. Furthermore, his new position was sufficiently prestigious to have been occupied 
by Villiers prior to his acceding to his six-year tenure as President of the Poor Law 
Board, and earlier by the highly-regarded Charles Buller, who had also subsequently 
become President of the Poor Law Board. The Spectator's obituary, indeed, seems to 
provide evidence in support of a positive interpretation of Ayrton's ministerial move. 
As a lawyer in India, it says, Ayrton had made himself "in especial a terror to courts- 
martial, tribunals which, from the very structure of his mind, he detested". Ayrton had 
"really improved their procedure by his audacity and caustic criticisms", and the office of 
Judge Advocate-General was one "which he probably understood better than any man in 
the world". 129 
When Gladstone unexpectedly called the general election in 24 January 1874 
Ayrton was therefore still, it is argued, a political force to be reckoned with, in a 
ministerial position which might promise higher things, and therefore a potential threat 
to his enemies. If he had not lost his seat in 1874 this promise might very well have 
been realised and, as one of the consequences, the current of 1860s metropolitan 
radicalism apparent in the 1857-67 rate equalisation movement might have received 
greater historiographical recognition than has hitherto been the case. 
It is clear from the evidence of both friends and foes that Ayrton represented a 
continuing threat to many of his political contemporaries, not only because of what 
appears to have been his undoubted integrity but also because of his independent-minded 
willingness to launch merciless assaults on powerful interests. He was a significant 
driving force for change and an effective Radical political figure, and the major part he 
played in the achievement of the rate equalisation provisions of the Metropolitan Poor 
Act developed into a life-long involvement in issues of metropolitan power and finance. 
128Chaplin, op. cit., 31-3. 129Spectator 4.12.1886. 
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He was, in a sense, too successful for his own good; a journalistic comment in 1874 
that in his political battles he "generally stops nothing short of annihilation" 130 reflected 
the danger his enemies felt he personally represented. 
As a politically forceful individual and a particularly effective practitioner of the 
Rational approach to policy-making, Ayrton helped drive the concept of rate 
equalisation towards political acceptability at a faster rate than would otherwise have 
happened. The outcome of this success - the nominee provisions and the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund - constituted, to a significant extent, a reaction against the Radical 
context of the ten-year campaign. 
130East London Observer 5.2.1874,7e: re-print of article from the Circle. 
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CHAPTER 6. The Metropolitan Asylums Board 
1867-71: 
a case of gentlemanly quangoism? 
Despite the dearth of modern recognition of the significance of Hardy's unique 
nominee provisions, it is clear that they were intended to fulfil two linked functions that 
were significant in terms of electoral representation: to restrict the powers of new and 
existing representative poor law bodies in the metropolis, and to set up new managerial 
elites to influence or control decision-making on these bodies. 
The sources and manner of recruitment of these new local elites, their social and 
economic backgrounds and their decision-making activities would be relevant subject 
matter for several types of study - for instance, of nineteenth-century political elites, of 
the development of metropolitan local government, and of poor law development. For 
this thesis, however, analysis of the new managerial elite in these terms will clarify 
further the role of the nominee clauses of the Act as a potentially powerful element of 
reaction -a "restraining force" against some of the "driving forces" for change. 
' 
The study that follows conforms in many respects with Giddens'2 suggestion that 
studies of elites should combine "positional" or "recruitment" aspects with decision- 
making or "the actual use of power" - that is, the nature of the elite and the nature of 
their decisions - rather than concentrating on just one of these processes. The fact that 
the managers and their decision-making in this study constitute a comparatively small 
"closed" situation constrained by the managers' limited remit has been of assistance in 
reaching some clear, definable conclusions. 
This chapter will analyse decision-making and membership of the Board of 
Management of the Metropolitan Asylum District (MAD), 3 the first body to receive 
1K. Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (London, 1951), 259; Stivers & Wheelan (ed), The Lewin 
Legacy: Field Theory in Current Practice (Berlin, 1986), xi & 166-78. Force field analysis and the 
concepts of driving and restraining forces, commonly used nowadays in the context of management 
problems, provide a useful analogy here. While the Rate Equalisation Association and Ayrton were 
among the driving forces for change, fear of the political and financial consequences of rate 
equalisation was a restraining force, and led to the devising of the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund 
and the nominee clauses. 
2A. Giddens, "Preface", in P. Stanworth & A. Giddens (ed. ), Elites and Power in British Society 
(Cambridge, 1974), xii. 
The printed and bound minute-books of the Metropolitan Asylum District at the LMA are labelled 
"M. A. D. " for 27 years, until "M. -B. " is substituted in 1894. 
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nominees, for four years, from 1867 to 1871, with emphasis on comparisons between 
the composition and activities of the elected and the nominated groups of managers. 
The central question to be considered is whether the operation and membership of 
MAD in these early years provides evidence that the Metropolitan Poor Act had an 
effect on the distribution of political power as well as of finance: not only in the more 
obvious sense of bringing Local Act parishes' poor relief within the 1834 central 
government framework but in the more complex matter of the role of central 
government's chosen "elite" in the Board's decision-making. 
In her comprehensive study of the achievements of the Metropolitan Asylums 
Board Ayres argued that MAD "recruited from an elite accustomed to arbitrary 
leadership, free competition of ideas and opinions, and intolerance of all but a minimum 
of State interference.... " who battled with Poor Law Board bureaucrats endowed by 
the Act with dictatorial powers. 4 This study, while not disputing the extent and nature 
of the powers given to the Poor Law Board, will attempt to assess the practical 
significance of the fact that one-quarter of MAD's managers actually owed their position 
to the Poor Law Board, and will analyse decision-making and membership in this light. 
It will seek to establish whether, through their MAD nominees, the central Board's 
powers were in reality even greater than Ayres has noted in that, at times, divisions of 
opinion may have been perhaps a matter not of the central Board versus MAD but of the 
central Board and its nominees versus the elected members of MAD. This may in turn 
cast light on the role of this section of the administrative state in relation to the growth 
of government. 
Another reason for studying MAD - rather than the boards of guardians, who 
were also intended by the 1867 Act to receive nominees, or the new Sick Asylum 
Districts, two-thirds of which had a brief and rather uncertain existence - is that MAD 
represents a stable "greenfield site". It was a substantial metropolis-wide new 
organisation with no previous working relationships on the Board of Management to 
obscure distinctions and differences that might arise between elected and nominee 
members, and it lasted until 1930. Another consideration is that because there were no 
existing ex-officio members (as there were on the boards of guardians), the full total of 
4Ayres, op. cit., 32,139. 
158 
METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD 1867-71 
one-quarter non-elected members had to be nominated by the Poor Law Board, which 
again offers an opportunity for clearer analysis. 
II 
The Metropolitan Asylum District, set up less than two months after the passing 
of the Metropolitan Poor Act of 1867 under wide powers given to the Poor Law Board, 
was not actually referred to in the Act. Indeed, Members of Parliament might with 
some justification have argued that the Act's first and largest body slipped into being 
through a ministerial back door. 5 They did not however do so, in the fraught 1867-8 
Session dominated on the domestic scene by the Second Reform Bill, and it was not 
until expenditure under the powers of the Act began to escalate that the implementation 
of Hardy's measure came under sustained attack. 
The Board of Management of MAD consisted of three-quarters elected members 
(45) and one quarter Poor Law Board nominees (15), in accordance with sections 9-12 
of the Act. 6 The elected managers were indirectly elected: they were chosen by their 
local boards of guardians, whether union or parish-based, and had themselves to be 
either local guardians or local ratepayers qualified to be guardians.? The nominees had 
to be either Justices of the Peace for any place or 140 a. r. v. ratepayers, but needed to be 
residents of the metropolis. MAD's two categories of manager were called Elected 
Managers and Nominated Managers in minutes, correspondence and other documents. 
5The difference between the Metropolitan Poor Act provisions and the establishment of MAD was that 
the emphasis in the Act had been on the setting up of districts, in the plural. Section 6 enabled the 
Poor Law Board to combine unions and/or parishes into districts, "as they think fit", and Sections 7 
and 8 said there would be one or more asylums for "each" district. The Act did not indicate that an all- 
embracing metropolis-wide district might be set up. 6See Appendix IV, MAD's Board of Management, 1867-71. 7The 39 unions or parishes that sent 45 elected managers in June 1867 were: City of London, East 
London, West London, Fulham, Greenwich, Hackney, Holborn, Lewisham, Poplar, St. Olave's 
Southwark, St. Saviour's Southwark, Stepney, Strand, Wandsworth andClapham, Whitechapel, Mile 
End Old Town, Paddington, St. George in the East, St. George Hanover Square, St. George the Martyr 
Southwark, St. Giles Camberwell, St. Giles and St. George Bloomsbury, St. James Clerkenwell, St. 
James Westminster, St. John Hampstead, St. Leonard Shoreditch, St. Luke Chelsea, St. Luke 
Middlesex, St. Margaret and St. John Westminster, St. Martin in the Fields, St. Mary Abbots 
Kensington, St. Mary Islington, St. Mary Lambeth, St. Marylebone, St. Mary Magdalen Bermondsey, St. 
Mary Newington, St. Mary Rotherhithe, St. Matthew Bethnal Green and St. Pancras. 
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The parliamentary debates on the nominee provision show that Hardy saw their 
role as being to work voluntarily under the orders of the Poor Law Board; they were to 
"enter into some undertaking to do the duties imposed on them by the... Board", because 
the Board's existing "eyes and ears", the inspectors, were insufficiently numerous. It 
was therefore no exaggeration for Thomas Chambers, MP for Marylebone, to suggest 
that the nominees would be treated as the Poor Law Board's spies, and to ask, "What set 
of gentlemen would like to conduct business with persons appointed to watch their 
proceedings with a view to report them to the head office? " In fact, the nominees were 
clearly intended to be more than just inspector-style eyes and ears in that, as full 
managers, they also had the power, through voting and taking initiatives, to influence 
decisions and events on MAD (as also on the SADs, the boards of guardians and the 
school district boards) in accordance with the central Board's wishes. 
8 
The setting up of MAD may have been Hardy's last major decision at the Poor 
Law Board. On 17 May, two days after the Order constituting MAD was made9, he 
became Home Secretary. During Hardy's last few weeks at the Poor Law Board it had 
been clear that Walpole, the Home Secretary, was about to leave his post and that Hardy 
might be his successor; in his diary on 13 May Hardy wrote that Derby had told him, 
after a Cabinet meeting, that "the Houses of Lords and Commons and the public, at once 
fixed on me". 1 Ö MAD may therefore have been constructed in somewhat of a hurry. 
Hardy had indicated, in debate, that a metropolitan "district" might be established at 
some stage as an experiment, after being pressed on this point by Ayrton in the First 
Reading, and later by Mill. 1 I Whatever the reason for the sudden setting up of MAD, 
it seems that Hardy's successor, the Earl of Devon, presided over the major early steps: 
the devising of its regulations and the selection of its nominee managers. 
The next three sections of this chapter will examine the Poor Law Board's 
recruitment of its nominees, compare the socio-economic status of nominees and elected 
managers, and analyse decision-making in terms of whether the nominees behaved as 
nominees on present day "quangos" might behave: as "members appointed by central 
8Hansard 21.2.1867 col. 773 & 778,8.3.1867 col. 1620. 9LMA MAD 1,67/8,22.6.67; PP 1867/8 xxxiii, 20th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board, 17. 
corder (Order constituting the Board - 15 May; order prescribing preliminary regulations - 18 July. ) 
op. cit., 39. 11Hansard 8.2.1867 col. 175-7,8.3.1867 col. 1609-10. 
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government to supervise or develop activity in areas of public interest" rather than as 
members accountable to an electorate. 12 
III 
How did the Poor Law Board find its nominees, and are any significant tendencies 
discernible in the recruitment process? 
These are important questions to ask if it is argued that, in terms of 
representation, the nominee provisions of the Metropolitan Poor Act represented 
elements of reaction rather than of reform: a restraining force rather than a driving 
force for change. Undoubtedly the brief of MAD was to bring about reorganisation of 
a substantial part of poor law health provision within the metropolis, but it will be 
contended here that although pressure for such change, financed redistributively, had 
become irresistible, steps were taken to put in place an elite group that it was hoped 
would be able to influence or control the Board's implementation of central 
government's policy. In nominating its own representatives on MAD the Poor Law 
Board appears, in effect to have been setting up the first "quango". 
In his study of political elites Parry remarks: "There is a great tradition of 
voluntary service in British government which has continued into these days of 
professional administration. Lay advisers are regularly called in to provide expert 
counsel or merely to 'represent' the public. "13 It will become clear, however, from an 
analysis of the activities of MAD's Board of Management that such a description is 
inappropriate for the role of the nominees: their aims were to supervise and to control. 
A limited amount of documentation on the recruitment process is available in 
Poor Law Board files, but nonetheless what there is makes it clear that there were three 
sources of MAD nominees: recommendations from ministers or other politicians; a 
trawl by Poor Law Board and Home Office officials of medical men with whom they 
had associated; and unsolicited applications to the Board by individuals and their 
12Chambers Dictionary (Edinburgh, 1993) defines a quango (Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental 
Organisation) as "a board funded by, and with members appointed by, central government to supervise 
or develop activity in areas of public interest". 13G. Parry, Political Elites (London, 1969), 92. 
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supporters. A short study of this documentation now follows, with emphasis on 
political, "official" and other significant source factors. 
Significantly, despite probable difficulty in recruiting sufficient nominees at short 
notice, applications from three leading campaigners for the 1867 reforms do not seem to 
have been seriously considered. 
Dr. Ernest Hart, new editor of the British Medical Journal and one of the 
founding honorary secretaries, in 1865, of the Association for the Improvement of the 
Infirmaries of Workhouses, 14 wrote to the Earl of Devon offering to assist as a nominee 
manager in "the practical working of an Act for which I have had some share in bringing 
about the enactment". The response of the Board appears in two internal notes on the 
letter: one saying "For Mr. Lambert" (the influential Poor Law Board inspector) and 
the other, "Acknowledge receipt and reply to Mr. Lambert", indicating that Lambert 
would deal with any further correspondence. Hart's name did not appear on either of 
the Board's two June lists of nominees. 15 
F. H. Fowler, Lambeth architect and one of the joint secretaries of the still 
functioning Metropolitan Association for the Equalisation of the Poor Rates, in applying 
to be a nominee member of "the Asylum District Board in which I reside", reminded the 
President that "on many occasions" he had been a member of deputations to the Poor 
Law Board, suggested that his professional skills would be useful in the early stages of 
reorganisation, and referred to his involvement in local government. An internal note 
on his letter said, "Acknowledge, and thank for the offer. State that it will be duly 
considered by the Board with other similar communications which they have now 
received. " A letter in similar terms was subsequently signed by G. Sclater Booth, MP, 
Secretary to the Board. Fowler's name, too, did not appear on either of the Board's 
June lists of nominees. 16 
Ernest Ebsworth, FRCS, was another unsuccessful candidate who, in applying, 
pointed out that he had supported the campaign for reform. Through his 
"instrumentality and writings", he said, he had "contributed in a very large degree, to 
bring about the desired reform. " He had been the promoter of a General Nursing 
Instruction, managed nearly the largest staff of private nurses in London, and was a 
140'Neill, op. cit., 274,282. 15MH17/33,17.5.67. 
16GL MS 1088/1,14.6.1867; PRO/30/6/169; MH17/33,22.5.1867. 
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surgeon for the South Eastern District of the General Post Office -a district of nearly 
25,000 people. The internal note on his letter said, "Acknowledge and promise 
consideration. Then register. "17 However, despite a brief initialled statement, 
"Registered", by the Permanent Secretary, Fleming, a week later, Ebsworth did not 
appear on either of the June nominee lists. 
Other apparently unsolicited applications were more successful. John Young, 
architect and City deputy alderman, wrote in at a very early stage, on the day that the 
Bill passed its Second Reading in the Lords; his reference to "the London or the 
Metropolitan District" suggests, however, that even at this stage he may have had inside 
information on the likely geographical distribution of the proposed new asylum 
districts. 18 Young outlined his standing ("one of the very few persons living on their 
own property" -a house of over £700 annual rateable value, and possession of other 
freehold and leasehold properties in the City), referred to his past role as Insurer of the 
Cholera Relief Fund for the Tower Hill District and his expenditure of over £1200 in 
relief "at the homes of the poor" since January, and added that he was well-known to 
various MPs and, "being a Catholic", was well-acquainted with Dr. Manning. (Young 
believed, presumably, that his Roman Catholic reference would carry weight, and may 
have been aiming for the attention, particularly, of a civil servant rather than a Minister: 
John (later Sir John) Lambert, "a pious Roman Catholic" 19 and the influential official 
involved in the drafting of the 1867 Act, became the first Receiver of the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund and from 1871 was the first Permanent Secretary of the new Local 
Government Board. He was "on terms of intimate friendship with Cardinal Manning, 
whose gaunt, majestic figure was very frequently to be seen at the office of the Local 
Government Board". 20 
Another early name was that of Walter Carew Cocks, a wealthy senior examiner 
on the staff of the Audit Office. 21 A note by Sclater-Booth, Parliamentary Secretary, 
said simply: "Highly qualified to be a nominated manager under the new Act. "22 
17MH17/33,7.6.1867. 
18MH17/33,19.3.1867. 
19S. & J. Webb, English Local Government. vol. 8 (London, 1924), 200n. 20J. Gillow, Biographical Dictionary of the English Catholics (New York, 1885), 98-106. Lambert, a 
Liberal, supported both Gladstone and Disraeli in the preparation of major legislation. 21British Imperial Calendar & Civil Service List (London, 1867); RG 10/51/47. Cocks had six 
servants at the 1871 Census. 22MH17/33,15.5.1867; RG10/51/47. 
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The Poor Law Board drew several of its nominees from among the ex-officio 
Justices of the Peace on existing local poor relief authorities, particularly the large, 
powerful single parishes of the West End from where the only resistance to the Act had 
come. While some appear to have taken the initiative in offering their services, others 
may have been "head-hunted" by the Board. 
Sir James John Hamilton, an ex-officio member of the Directors and Guardians of 
the Poor of the Parish of St. Marylebone, and from 1867 of the new 1834-style St. 
Marylebone Board of Guardians, a Middlesex JP for 25 years, and the man chosen by 
the Poor Law Board to chair MAD's first meeting, was one of those apparently head- 
hunted. A frequent attender at the meetings of his board of guardians, Hamilton had 
been Conservative MP for Sudbury in 1837, and unsuccessful Conservative candidate 
for Marylebone in the 1841 and 1847 general elections. He owned freehold and 
leasehold land and property in the City and St. Marylebone, and was also a large 
landowner in Ireland and South Wales. His response to the Poor Law Board's 
invitation was to point out that although, as a landowner, he was necessarily absent from 
London in the summer and autumn, when present he endeavoured to discharge "any 
metropolitan duties .... as may devolve upon me, with zeal and punctuality". (The 
guardians' minutes show that this was his custom on his local body also - absent at those 
times of year when upper class London left the capital, and a meticulous attender at 
other times. ) If the Board, under these circumstances, thought fit to avail themselves of 
his "humble services", he wrote, he placed them "cheerfully at their disposal". 23 
W. H. Wyatt, another JP involved in poor law activities, wrote to the Poor Law 
Board offering his services on MAD on the basis of his six years' experience as 
Chairman of the Visiting Justices of the Middlesex County Lunatic Asylum at Colney 
Hatch, and also the services of his fellow committee-members should the Poor Law 
Board have difficulty finding suitable nominee managers. An ex-officio member of his 
local Directors of the Poor - St. Pancras - prior to the passing of the Metropolitan Poor 
Act (though not often present), he appears to have become much more active in this 
large single-parish poor law authority as soon as the Poor Law Board used its new 1867 
powers to convert it into an 1834-style board of guardians. Clearly a forceful 
personality, he stood immediately for the post of chairman on the new body (a position 
23LMA P89/MRYl, 584,22.6.1866; LMA St. M. BG. 1,2.8.1867,3.1.1868 & 28.2.1868; LMA 
MJP/Q/7; MH 17/33, June, 1867; Stenton, op. cit. 
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previously held by churchwardens), defeating an established activist and churchwarden, 
Robert Furniss, 16-5, and on his arrival at the first meeting of the MAD Board of 
Management attempted (unsuccessfully) to achieve the same feat24 
The other ex-officio St. Pancras guardian to arrive on MAD as a nominee - 
Jonathan Rashleigh, also a JP (and a Deputy-Lieutenant) - appears to have been a late 
addition to the roll of nominees, as he is not on either of the Poor Law Board's early 
June lists; he would, however, have been known to Poor Law Board staff through his 
ex-officio membership of the St. Pancras Directors of the Poor, and as a wealthy 
member of a county family he may well have been known to other nominees such as Sir 
James Hamilton in the neighbouring parish of St. Marylebone. 25 
It seems likely that, at least in the case of Wyatt and Rashleigh, recruitment to 
the nominee elite was linked to the Poor Law Board's desire to have greater control over 
their parish's poor relief administration, which had been the subject of much public 
attack. They had a clear run in representing the interests, if they wished, of St. Pancras 
on MAD, or of preventing their own parish from opposing any steps they themselves 
might wish to take as the Poor Law Board's nominees, at least for the first year of 
MAD's existence, because the two elected members on MAD from St. Pancras were not 
in a position to report back easily to the body they were representing; Eckett and 
North, sent by the Directors of the Poor nine days before the body was replaced by the 
new union, 26 (and subsequently unsuccessful candidates in the June 1867 elections for 
the new board of guardians) did not attend a single MAD meeting. 
27 There is evidence 
that Wyatt worked well with Poor Law Board officials in his post as chairman of the 
new union: in a lengthy report delivered to the guardians in the presence of the two 
inspectors (Corbett, the metropolitan poor law inspector, and Dr. W. 0. Markham, the 
Poor Law Board's medical inspector) Wyatt, recalling that St. Pancras had in the past 
been "a bye-word ..... 
for the management of its poor", and remarking how 
24LMA MJP/Q/8,175; LBC P/PN/PO/59,1866,1867, & 23.4.1867; St. P. BG/1,13.6.1867; MH17/33, 
15.5.1867; 
25LBC P/PN/PO/59,23.4.1867; LMA St. P. BG/1,13.6.67; RGl1/179/24. Rashleigh is not listed in 
the Middlesex JP Qualification Oaths 1849-1885 (LMA MJP/Q/8-10), but is described in the 1881 
Census (not present at his home in Regent's Park in 1861,1871) as a magistrate and Deputy- 
Lieutenant, so presumably held these positions outside London. 26LBC P/PN/PO/59, Minutes of the Directors of the Poor of the Parish of St. Pancras, 4.6.1867,566-7. 
With churchwarden Eckett in the chair, the meeting refused 13-6 to give the seven candidates for MAD 
representation the opportunity to address the meeting before the votes were taken; Eckett (15) and 
North (17) then defeated the other candidates conclusively. 27See Appendix 4, MAD Board of Management attendances, 1867-8. 
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"comparatively free from complaints we now are", noted "how much the parish is 
indebted" to Corbett and Markham, and the "willing assistance and advice" they had 
given in every difficulty. 
28 
It is clear that it was not only in St. Pancras that working relationships that central 
government officials had established with JPs and professional men played a significant 
part in the selection of MAD's nominee managers: Dr. Markham wrote to Lambert 
supporting the recommendation of Corbett that "Dr. Sibson of St. Mary's Hospital and 
Mr. T. Holmes of St. George's Hospital" be nominated. "Better men could not be 
found to assist in doing the work of the Board, " Markham wrote, and added that he 
hoped to send Lambert soon the name of a man "well-versed in the management of 
lunatic asylums .... 
in whom full trust may be placed. "29 As Wyatt had written his 
apparently unsolicited letter as early as 29 March (the day that the Metropolitan Poor 
Act received the Royal Assent) to Hardy (who passed it on to the Poor Law Board staff 
17 days later), it is not clear whether or not it was Wyatt to whom Markham was 
referring, but it is certainly possible that Wyatt and the inspectors had discussed the Bill 
as it made its almost unopposed progress through Parliament. Holmes and Dr. Sibson, 
who may have been motivated more by professional than political concerns, both lasted 
only a year on MAD, and there is some evidence that at least one of them identified 
more closely at times with the concerns of the elected members than with those of the 
nominees. 
Of the 16 nominees written to by the Poor Law Board in June requesting their 
"assistance in effecting the objects of this important measure" (only eleven days before 
the inaugural meeting of the Board of Management, and with a reply requested within 
two days), 12 accepted. Given the otherwise rather peremptory nature of such a 
sudden request, it seems likely that there had been more preliminary oral approaches 
than are recorded in the Board's files. 
The four "refusers" included two Liberal MPs: the Hon. D. F. Fortescue, MP for 
Andover, a Deputy Lieutenant of Devon and second son of Earl Fortescue, and G. J. 
Shaw-Lefevre, MP for Reading and many years later a member of the London County 
30 Council and a Cabinet member. Conservative MPs and future MPs appear to have 
28MH17/33,15.5.1867; LMA St. P. BG/1,13.6.1867,5-8; LMA St. P. BG/2,12.3.1868,63,79-88; LBC 
P/PN/PO/59,19. & 23.4.1867,4.6.1867. 
29MH17/33,21.5.1867. 
30Stenton, op. cit. 
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placed greater importance on being a nominee manager of MAD. The only apparent 
Conservative refuser, Spencer Charrington, Mile End brewer and chairman of Mile End 
board of guardians (and later a member of the London School Board in 1879-82 and 
Conservative MP for Mile End 1885-1905) offered a scrupulously correct excuse: 
although his firm was one of the largest ratepayers in Mile End, he wrote, he was not a 
resident of the area, and therefore "it appears I am not qualified, otherwise would be 
willing to accept. "31 Such conditions would in fact have barred at least two others 
among the first batch of nominees if they had been similarly frank - and a few of the 
elected members too, particularly from the City. 
Two other prominent Conservatives were recruited as nominees the following 
year, shortly before their election to parliament: John Gilbert Talbot (Middlesex JP and 
chairman of Kent Quarter Sessions in 1867, Conservative MP for West Kent 1868-78 
and for Oxford University 1878-1910) and W. H. Smith (Middlesex JP and the 
Conservative candidate who, a few months later, displaced John Stuart Mill as MP for 
Westminster). Both were already involved in local government in the metropolis. 
Talbot was chairman of the Governors and Directors of the Poor of the Parishes of St. 
Margaret and St. John, Westminster (where he and his family lived when not at their 
country home in Kent), although the previous year an unsuccessful attempt had been 
made to un-seat him from the chair on the issue of "the power of the Board to elect an 
absent governor as Chairman". Smith, the wealthy newsagent, had been the 
Westminster member on the Metropolitan Board of Works since its inception in 1855.32 
The appointment of prominent Conservatives continued even under the 
subsequent Liberal presidency of the Poor Law Board: Sir Michael Hicks Beach, 
Conservative MP for East Gloucestershire 1864-85, and Alexander H. Ross, Middlesex 
JP, unsuccessful Conservative candidate for Maidstone in 1874 and MP there in 1880- 
88, joined MAD in 1871. Hicks Beach's appointment is particularly noteworthy in that 
he had been Parliamentary Secretary at the Poor Law Board under the Earl of Devon, in 
the Conservative ministry that preceded Goschen's presidency. 33 Only one of the 1871 
replacements can be identified as Liberal: E. H. Currie, the Tower Hamlets distiller from 
3117/33; LMA St. B. G. /ME/9,15.2.1866; H. Finch, The Tower Hamlets Connection (London, 
1996), 172-4. 
32LMA MJP/Q/9,121 & 149; LMA MAD II, 18.7.1868; CWA E. 5231 vol. 24,30.4.1867,272; 
Viscount Chilston, W. H. Smith (London, 1965), 35,58-62. 
33Stenton, op. cit.; LMA MAD N 25.3.1871; LMA MJP/Q/9,121,149. See chapter 7, p. 230-1, for a 
discussion of the process by which this extraordinary appointment of Beach as a nominee was made 
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a Conservative family background who was to stand against Ayrton in Tower Hamlets 
three years later and, together with the Conservative candidate and the Radical Captain 
Maxse, bring about his defeat. 34 It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that while major 
Conservative politicians were very keen to join MAD as nominees and achieved this 
under both Conservative and Liberal Presidents of the Poor Law Board, Liberal and 
Radical politicians were either not proposed by those in power or not interested in the 
role. 
Currie was one of four major East End employers to become nominees. The 
other three, recruited earlier, in the Conservative government's first wave of 
appointments in 1867, were John Charrington (Shadwell coal merchant, JP, and 
chairman of Stepney board of guardians), Edward North Buxton (member of the Brick 
Lane brewing firm Truman, Hanbury, Buxton & Co., member of the London School 
Board from 1870 and later its chairman, alderman of Essex County Council, chairman of 
Essex Quarter Sessions, and Liberal MP for Walthamstow 1885-6), and Robert Wigram 
(member of the wealthy family ship-owning business based in Blackwall, a banker, and a 
member of the election committee of Ayrton's Conservative opponent in 1874). 
3 5 
It seems rather likely that the East End social distress in 1866-7 resulting from 
depression in the ship-building, engineering, water-side and associated industries36 
contributed to the willingness of these employers to become involved in decisions on 
MAD about the financing and reorganisation of poor relief provision, and to central 
government's recognition that they had a stake in such provision. The metropolitan 
poor law inspector, Uvedale Corbett, also recommended Wigram and Currie as 
nominees on the Poplar SAD, on the grounds that they (and others) were members of 
the East End Central Relief Committee and interested in the prosperity of the Poplar 
Union "both as ratepayers and employers of labour in the large shipbuilding yards, 
ironworks and other important trades in the district". 
37 
It seems unlikely, on the other hand, that the inspector's was the only hand 
involved in the selection of businessmen for MAD and the SADs. This was a period 
34Finch, op. cit., 59, points out that Currie, elected to the new London School Board in 1870, was 
knighted in 1876 for his role as chairman of the Beaumont Trustees, "who were responsible for the 
o ning of the People's Palace, We End". 
3'LMA MJP/Q/9,165; LMA St. BG/45,8.8.67; East London Observer 2.2.1867,2c; Stenton, op. cit.; 
RG11/49/17; East London Observer 31.1.1874,5e, f; Palmer, op. cit., 15,49,121,184. 36Stedman Jones (1992), op. cit., 102-6. 37PP 1867/8 xxxiii, op. cit., 124. 
168 
METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD 1867-71 
when the Conservative Party was beginning to organise the new urban working-class 
voters (a movement in which one of the nominees, W. H. Smith, parliamentary candidate 
for Mill's seat, Westminster, played a leading role in the metropolis). 
38 Mobilising 
employers of the new voters would clearly have been at least as much a political as a 
philanthropic or financial step. 
The remaining nominees were two military men (Col. Francis Haygarth, retired 
from the Scots Fusilier Guards, 39 and John Bostock, surgeon major, also in the Scots 
Fusilier Guards40), two JPs Q. A. Shaw Stewart and a barrister, Borlase Adams41), and 
an elderly surgeon, William Harvey, who chaired the St. Mary Islington Board of 
Trustees and Guardians of the Poor and who, presumably, was another in whom, in the 
view of Poor Law Board officials, "full trust may be placed". 
42 
Further insights into the nature of some of the nominees is gained from comments 
by inspector Corbett when some of them were replaced in 1871. Cocks, the Audit 
Board official, was, Corbett wrote in a minute, at present in Ireland, where he was likely 
to be for some time, "and I doubt if he has attended any meeting this year, nor has he 
been at any time a useful member of the Board". Wigram, "never a very regular 
attendant", had been in Australia on business for a year; Rashleigh had since his 
marriage practically ceased to attend "and is generally I believe in Cornwall", and the 
attendance of Young (the acquaintance of Cardinal Manning) "from the first has been 
nearly nominal". 
43 Most of the nominees, however, as the study later in this chapter of 
the activities of MAD's Board of Management will show, were good attenders and 
played an active role. 
The following conclusions are drawn from the nominee recruitment 
documentation and from other sources for those on whom there is no correspondence in 
the Poor Law Board's files: that to have been a campaigner for the Metropolitan Poor 
Act reforms - whether for rate equalisation or for the institutional or staffing changes - 
was not a particularly welcome qualification for a hopeful nominee to have; that it was 
held to be desirable to establish (Conservative Party) political control of the new 
38Blake, op. cit., 114,144-5; Hanham, op. cit., 106-7. 
39Army List 1854. 
40RG10/112/23. 
41RG10/29/50 & LMA MJP/Q/9,99; RG1O/339/11 & LMA/MJP/Q/8,199. 
42RG10/255/23 & LMA P83/MRYI, 425,440. 
4317/36, minute from Corbett to Sir James Stansfeld, Goschen's replacement as President, 
17.3.1871. 
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metropolis-wide body - or, at the least, to prevent control by those who might pose a 
threat to Conservative policies or power; that the distinctions between the roles of 
elected politicians and of professional civil servants at the Poor Law Board and Home 
Office were significantly blurred as officials selected paid (health) officials to sit as 
equals with elected members on a decision-making and spending public body, and a 
minister, similarly, selected a wealthy Audit Office official to sit as a member of the 
MAD Board; and that other reliable categories from whom the elite "eyes and ears of 
the Poor Law Board" could be drawn were JPs sitting as existing ex-officio members of 
local boards of guardians (particularly in the large "West End" single-parish new 
unions), major East End employers, and others with appropriate contacts, such as 
Young, acquaintance of Cardinal Manning. 
Such a range of sources for nominees - political, professional, civil servants, JPs 
and East End employers - might suggest a pattern of "elite pluralism" in which leaders of 
various interest groups were recruited by the Poor Law Board with the intention of 
power being in effect shared between them and the state. 
44 However, the recruitment 
documentation and the parliamentary debate (and perhaps also the rejection of reform 
campaigners) suggests rather that the nominees were appointed because they had values 
in common with those in charge at the Poor Law Board and were people who, for 
political, professional or other reasons, were trusted to implement the policies of central 
government and keep the majority elected element on MAD under control, rather than 
because the Board was seeking a means of devolving its decision-making powers. 
The recruitment processes not only for nominees but also for elected managers 
confirm the importance of membership of MAD's Board of Management in the eyes of 
those involved in metropolitan poor relief. For instance, in several authorities there 
were contests that clearly represented significant competition for the position of MAD 
representative. In Poplar there was a contest between the chairman and vice-chairman, 
and after a 5-5 vote the chairman gave his casting vote in favour of himself - 
subsequently almost overturned. In the City of London Union there were five 
nominations for two places, with Robert Warwick of the Rate Equalisation Association, 
vice-chairman of the union, nominating one of the unsuccessful candidates, City Deputy 
R. B. Whiteside, one of the Association's Vice-Presidents. In Holborn one of the 
44Parry, op. cit., 66-8,125. 
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ordinary guardians, Proudfoot, succeeded in beating off challenges from the vice- 
chairman and an acting chairman, who stood against him in two separate votes. In St. 
Giles and St. George Bloomsbury two candidates tied 6-6, and the chairman, Admiral 
Barnett, broke the tie with his casting vote. In St. George the Martyr Southwark, when 
James Barnes (a former member of the Rate Equalisation Association executive) took 
over the chairmanship he also took over the previous chairman's representation on 
MAD. In St. Pancras, when the anomalous representation by two absentee former 
Directors of the Poor came to an end in 1868, their replacements included elected 
guardian R. Furniss, who had competed unsuccessfully for the chairmanship and vice- 
chairmanship of the new union in 1867 but who, by the date of his election to MAD, had 
become vice-chairman. 45 
Just over half of the local bodies, in fact, sent their chairman or vice-chairman to 
MAD. 46 This high proportion is a further indication that the elected managers sent to 
MAD constituted in the main a consciously powerful elite group of local representatives. 
(See Figure 6) 
There was a further major issue in terms of representation on MAD: the number 
of elected representatives allowed to each local poor law authority, some being allowed 
one, and some (particularly the powerful "northern" parishes such as St. Pancras, St. 
Marylebone and St. George Hanover Square) two. The Lambeth board of guardians 
wrote to the Poor Law Board about the question, having resolved unanimously that they 
45At LMA: C. BG. 48 4.4.1867,253-4, X90/10 4.6.67; Ho. BG. 149 5.6.1867, So. BG. 22 15.4.1868. 
Also LBC P/GG/PO/13 4.6.67; GL MS 1088/1,4.3.1861; 
46See also Appendix V. Original and replacement managers (1867-71) have all been counted as 
separate individuals, as each represented a separate choice by the local body concerned; the calculation 
is based, therefore, on 57 individuals rather than on the 45 elective places on the board of management. 
At LMA: X90/10,4.6.67; Wa. B. G. /22,6.6.67 & 12.3.1868; St. M. B. G. 1001,2.8.67; 
We. B. G. /S. G. /63,10.8.67; St. B. G. /Wh/45,24.12.67; P83/MRY1/425,440; C. BG. 48,4.6.1867,253-4; 
C. BG. 22,16.4.1867; So. BG. 22,15.4.1868; P89/MRYl/584; Ho. BG. 1,24.6.1868; Ho. BG. 149, 
5.6.1867; Pa. BG. 9,18.4.1866; St. P. BG. 1,13.6.1867; We. BG. 1., 6.6.1867; Ca. BG. 13,12.6.1867; 
So. BG. 39/17,18.4.1867; G. BG. 2,18.4.1867; Hp. BG. 9,21.3.1867; St. BG. ME. 9,18.4.1867; 
C. BG. 11,7-9; So. BG. 21,17.4.1867; Le. BG. 018,21.3.1868; La. BG. 10,8.5.1867; St. BG. 45, 
8.8.1867; B. BG. 17,17.4.1867; St. BG. SG. 11,31.5.1867, CH. BG. 21,17.4.1867; Ha. BG. 23, 
14.4.1867; B. BG. 35,18.4.1867; B. BG. 17,17.4.1867; K. BG. 23,18.4.1867; We. BG. ST. 28, 
16.4.1867. The following pre-1867 sources were at borough archives, as indicated: CWA St. Martin- 
in-the-Fields churchwardens & overseers minute book 27.5.1867; CWA C1126,9.5.1867; CWA 
St. James vol. 46,3.5.1867; SLSL Y. L75,18.4.1867; FL St. Luke guardians' minutes, 1861-9, 
5.6.1867; FL St. James Clerkenwell guardians minutes 22.12.1863,355 & Vestry of Clerkenwell 
minutes, vol. 7,1866-68,23.4.1867,176. The minutes of St. James Clerkenwell guardians are missing 
for 1864-71 but Partridge, the MAD representative, had previously chaired periodically; if he too is 
counted as a chairman, the proportion of local bodies sending their chairmen/vice-chairmen to MAD is 
over 50%. 
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wished to know "why the large and populous parish of Lambeth is to have but one 
member, while the City of London and other unions and parishes are to have two 
MAD's ELECTED MANAGERS 
Positions on Boards of Guardians 




Figure 6. (Appendix V gives a detailed breakdown. ) 
members each", and the principle upon which numbers of members had been 
apportioned. The Poor Law Board's reply was that "it was deemed expedient to give a 
second member only to the six parishes and unions named in the Order which will 
contribute most largely to the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund: "47 in other words, 
that it had favoured the principle of territorial wealth rather than that of population as 
the basis for representation. 
The conclusion reached is that both the Poor Law Board's recruitment 
documentation and the records of local boards confirm that the MAD Board, certainly 
in its first four years, consisted not of a homogeneous "elite" prepared to do battle with 
the Poor Law Board as they built the beginnings of a state hospital service48 but of two 
separate "elites": central government's nominees, and the leading activists from the 
local boards of guardians. The central Board attempted to weight the composition of 
MAD still further in favour of gentlemanly and business wealth by allocating more 
elected seats to the wealthier local bodies. 
47LMA La. BG. 10,22.5.67 & 18.29.5.67,27. 
48Avres, 
op. cit., 32,139. 
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IV 
Although major analyses of local elites in urban areas at this period have focused 
not on the metropolis but on Wales and the Midlands, such studies suggest useful 
questions on which to base an examination of the composition and activities of MAD's 
Board of Management. 49 
Three questions are particularly relevant in terms of MAD: whether there was a 
socio-economic distinction between the two governing groups on MAD's Board of 
Management, whether they had different priorities in terms of policies and decision- 
making, and whether the elected members were as effective as, or more effective than, 
the nominees; that is, whether they behaved as if they were a local elite and the "natural 
leaders". 
If the answers to all three questions are in the affirmative, and if the elected 
members were in general of a lower socio-economic level, one may conclude that the 
nominees were appointed not because they provided a superior natural leadership but 
because they represented the perspectives and interests of a different elite. 
At this stage it is appropriate to define more closely the sense in which the term 
"elite" is being used in this study. Daunton and Hennock employ the concept in relation 
to large businessmen, professionals, or the upper socio-economic class. 
50 pay 
initially defines elites as "small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential 
part in political or social affairs". 51 MAD's elected managers, it is suggested, can be 
categorised as members of "governing elites", in that they were all indirectly elected to 
MAD through being members of local boards of guardians: a position of local status 
and power attained through public election, through indirect election by their elected 
vestry or, if ex-officio guardians, through membership of an additional elite, the 
Middlesex JPs. Those owing their position as guardian to an electoral process would 
have ascended their parish or union poor law hierarchy by means of their political skills, 
their social and/or economic status, or both, and can therefore be described, together 
with their local ex-officio colleagues, as members of local elites. They arrived on 
MAD's Board of Management, however, as fragmented members of separate local elites 
49See Chapter 1, p. 10-11. 50Daunton, op. cit., 150-1,155; Hennock (1968), op. cit., 318-9. 51pß,, op. cit., 13. 
173 
METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD 1867-71 
without, probably, the "cohesive, conscious" relationship with each other that a cohesive 
group would have and, indeed, quite possibly having some of the characteristics of elite 
pluralists, in that they might very well have represented competing local interests. The 
nominees, on the other hand, having all been selected by the Poor Law Board, were 
more likely to have had some sense of being a cohesive, conscious group, whether or 
not they were also "conspiratorial" - the third of the qualities which, Parry suggests, the 
student of elites should assess52 - and were therefore likely (whatever other elites they 
may individually have been part of) to have been, in effect, a newly-constituted 
management elite. 
The method adopted in studying the two groups was H. J. Dyos's 100% 
"topographical sampling", which is in some respects similar to that practised by Booth in 
1889.53 A socio-economic lifestyle study was conducted of the neighbourhood where 
each manager lived, based mainly on the 1871 census. Factors studied were 
occupational groups, number of servants, and prevalence of multi-occupation and 
lodger-keeping. The Booth-type neighbourhood approach was chosen because the 
alternative - simpler comparisons between individual managers - would have disregarded 
the fact that - as Dyos has noted - although people might have similar occupation titles, 
their social or economic standing might be very different. Conclusions on comparisons 
between two distinct groups such as the elected and nominee managers might therefore 
be over-simplified and might misrepresent the actual socio-economic relationship 
between them. (See Appendix VI, "Neighbourhood survey of MAD Managers: notes 
on the gathering and recording of data". ) 
The analysis showed clear distinctions between the two groups of manager. 
There was also, however, a significant middle stratum where overlapping occurred. 
These two elements in the findings are important because they confirm not only that the 
nominee managers were appointed largely from a socio-economic elite but also that, in 
terms of the socio-economic middle stratum, there were other factors involved relating 
to control; the existence of a middle stratum may also have provided a basis for the 
unity discerned by Ayres in MAD's later years as managers "battled with Poor Law 
Board bureaucrats endowed by the Act with dictatorial powers". 
52Parry, op. cit., 95,118. 53Charles Booth, Descriptive map of London poverty 1889 (London, 1984); H. J. Dyos, Exploring the 
urban past (Cambridge, 1982), 103-5. 
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The occupations of householders in the neighbourhoods where nominees and 
elected managers lived demonstrate both of these elements. Appendices VI-VII show 
in greater detail the rationale, method and structure of information gathering and 
analysis, but for ease of reference the occupational groups are listed below: 
la Large industrialists, manufacturers, merchants. 
Ib Aristocracy, MPs, JPs, wealthy fundholders, gentlemen, large landowners. 
Ila Professional: doctors, lawyers, bankers, military, clergy/ministers. 
Hb Professional: teachers, architects, science, accountants, curates, 
publishers, creative. 
Ma Tradesmen, shopkeepers, dealers, publicans, landlords, hotel keepers, 
small businessmen. 
Mb Clerical/administrative, including solicitors' and accounting clerks. 
IIIc Supervisory workers, e. g. inspectors, managers, NCOs, police. 
IIId Annuitants, retired, lesser fundholders and gentlemen. 
IVa Skilled workers, craftsmen. 
IVb Semi-skilled/service: postmen, mariners, soldiers, shopworkers, 
watermen, servants in own home, lesser creative (e. g. performers). 
Va Unskilled and casual workers, labourers. 
The most striking difference - as might be expected in the light of the recruitment 
documentation - was between the proportions in Group Ib, to which 39.4% of nominees 
belonged (4.4% elected managers) and in Group IIIa, where the figures were practically 
reversed (26.2% elected members and 10.6% nominees). (See Fig. 7. ) 
The elected members' neighbourhoods were also, as might be expected, 
proportionately in the majority in Groups Illb, IIIc, IVa and IVb. Some nominee 
neighbourhoods, however, also contained these categories. Though in the minority, a 
significant proportion of nominee neighbourhoods included IIId (elected 10.8% elected, 
nominees 6.2%) and lib (elected 6.3%, nominees 3.9%). 
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An apparent anomaly - almost equal proportionate representation in Group Va 
(elected 2.8%, nominees 2.5%) is accounted for by the fact that Currie, the East End 
distiller nominee appointed by the Liberal government, lived close to his distillery, with 
42% of his neighbours coming within this category. Although personally within the 
occupational category of Ia, he had comparatively frugal living circumstances, with only 
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IVa IVb Va 
two servants, in Bromley-by-Bow, where he apparently remained all his life, 
54 
surrounded by servant-less neighbours such as employed and unemployed shipwrights 
and labourers, distillery labourers, a rivet-maker, a laundress, a harness-maker, a boiler- 
maker and a lock-keeper and with only a few neighbours, also servant-less, in slightly 
higher categories such as naturalist, publican and general shopkeeper. Of the elected 
members only 11 of the 55 had any neighbours in Group Va and these were mainly in 
small proportions; four, however (from Bermondsey, Lambeth, Bethnal Green and the 
City) had 17-42% of their neighbours in Group Va. 
A potential statistical weakness in there being in total only 17 nominees is that in 
small categories such as Group Va the figures may seem to carry undue weight. 
However, Currie represents an important element in the nominee contingent, even 
though he was a latecomer to MAD. Original (1867) nominees who lived in "middling" 
neighbourhoods included John Charrington, elected chairman of Stepney guardians, and 
some of the medical nominees. 
The value of neighbourhood occupational profiling for assessing the nature of the 
elites on MAD is shown also by a study of the four medical nominees: Sibson and 
54Finch, op. cit., 59. 
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Holmes (who had been recommended by the Poor Law medical inspector Markham), 
William Harvey (physician and chairman of St. Mary Islington guardians, and regarded 
presumably as a friend of the Poor Law Board) and John Bostock, surgeon-major in the 
Scots Fusilier Guards. Bostock, if recorded simply as a fourth medical man to be 
placed personally in the Group IIa (a position for which he also qualifies as a senior 
military man) would have appeared as identical in status, for the purposes of the study, 
to the other three medical nominees, even though he had, in fact, a somewhat superior 
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IIId and no neighbours at all in any of the other occupational groups. The 
neighbourhood profiles of the other three medical nominees, and particularly Harvey, 
include much higher levels of tradesmen (IIIa) than all but one of the other nominees, 
and in the case of Harvey and Holmes also higher levels of skilled workers and 
craftsmen (IVa), apart from Currie. Their socio-economic circumstances were 
therefore lower than a simple assessment based on their professions might suggest, and 
one might conclude that their professional experience and inter-action with Poor Law 
Board civil servants played a part in their selection as nominees. 
Figure 8 shows how a simple nominee occupational analysis would look, and 
needs to be compared with the nominee neighbourhood profiles in Figure 7, in which 
the diversity of socio-economic backgrounds from which the nominees came is 
demonstrated. 
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The fact that there were also six medical men among the elected managers 
suggests that pressure to include medical men on MAD came from several directions, 
including medical men themselves concerned for their professional interests55 and/or 
involved, from choice, on local boards of guardians. A Home Office surgeon, Charles 
Bradley, arrived on MAD as one of the elected six, from Islington board of guardians 
(chaired by nominee Harvey), and it is possible that Harvey was given his place as a 
nominee in order to free up a place as elected representative for the medical civil 
servant, for whom a nomineeship may have been deemed inappropriate. 56 
Other professionals among the nominees also diverged from each other in terms 
of socio-economic circumstances. Col. Francis Haygarth and Walter Carew Cocks (the 
senior Audit Office official) lived in wealthy neighbourhoods, but the last in this 
category, Borlase Adams, a barrister appointed to MAD in its second year by the 
Conservative government, lived in a very mixed neighbourhood in Bloomsbury, where 
the largest proportion of residents were in Groups IIId (36%) and Ma (32%) and where 
there were no residents at all in Groups la or Ib. Adams, a JP for eight years, had 
political interests, being a member of the Middlesex JPs' Parliamentary Committee, 
which attempted in 1867 to broaden the qualifications required of nominees by including 
non-resident property-ownership. 57 
Large businessmen, as Figure 8 shows, were in very much of a minority among 
the nominees themselves: only 17.6% of them were individually in Group Ia. 
Nonetheless, this proportion was higher than that found in nominee neighbourhoods 
(10.2%) or elected managers' neighbourhoods (4.2%)(Figure 7). Nominees whose own 
census descriptions of their occupations placed them as individuals in Group Ia were 
Charrington, a Shadwell coal merchant (who added that he was also as a magistrate and 
landowner), Currie (who simply used the term "distiller"), and Robert Wigram of the 
shipbuilding and banking family (who described himself as ship-owner and banker). If 
Buxton, a Brick Lane brewer, had lived within the metropolis and therefore been 
55W. J. Reader, Professional Men. The rise of the professional classes in nineteenth-century England" 
(London, 1966), 158-61, describes the growth of professionalism and professional values in the medical 
profession at this period. 6The six elected medical men were Bradley, Beevor (Chairman of St. Marylebone guardians), Bird (a 
JP from Fulham), Brewer (Vice-Chairman of St. George Hanover Square, in due course Chairman of 
MAD, and later a Liberal MP), Cortis (from Newington, and a recent churchwarden) and Griffith from 
Camberwell. 
57LMAMJP/Q/8,199; LMA MA/RS1/233. 
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included in the survey, and if W. H. Smith, who described himself in the 1871 census as 
"MP and landowner" but was of course also head of the newsagents' business, had also 
been counted as a member of Group Ia, the proportion of large businessmen among the 
nominees would have been larger. 
Of the 55 elected members only one - Thomas Spence, a shipbuilder employing 
92 and representing Stepney on MAD - has been placed in Group la, but he was not a 
really major employer; a possible further elected manager candidate for Ia, William 
Stutfield, an ex-officio guardian in St. George in the East but the boards's elected 
representative on MAD, was a "Magistrate58, Deputy Lieutenant and wine merchant" in 
1871, and has been classified as a Group Ib wealthy gentleman. 
The only large businessman, therefore, to reach MAD through the elected route 
was Spence, a moderately large local employer; even Charrington, who, judging from 
his subsequent performance on MAD, must have been a powerful chairman of the 
Stepney guardians, apparently preferred to join MAD as a nominee and leave the elected 
Stepney representation to Spence. Practically all of the few large businessmen on 
MAD were, therefore, not present as representatives of a "natural" local elite involved 
in the politics and administration of the boards of guardians. Furthermore, to the extent 
that a small study of 17 nominees can do so, the analysis indicates that the large 
businessmen became MAD managers in a proportion greater than their incidence in the 
72 neighbourhoods studied. The special steps taken to get them involved - with efforts 
apparently concentrated on those whose businesses were in the East End - thus suggest 
a concern to co-ordinate the interests of large employers or extend their opportunity to 
influence events. 
Davis's conclusion on the involvement of employers in metropolitan politics is that 
"individual industrialists participated in local politics, and generally stressed their place in 
the local economy when they did so" but that London lacked "the interlinked, 
consolidated employer caste of the factory towns". Paul Johnson concludes that 
employers' organisations had little place in the "dynamic and thriving small-scale 
manufacturing economy" of the metropolis. 59 These assessments are relevant here in 
that in 1867 the Conservative-led Poor Law Board found it appropriate to initiate some 
58LMA MJP/Q/8,147. Stutfleld, hon. treasurer of the board of guardians, was absent when elected to 
MAD, and the Board agreed to write and tell him; there was no contest for the post. 59Davis, op. cit., 20; Paul Johnson, "Economic Development and Industrial Dynamism in Victorian 
London", LI, 21,1(1996). 
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government-led consolidation and organisation of East End employers, bringing them 
together with members of the metropolis's gentlemanly elite for the purpose of what was 
to be, in effect, political action. 
The next measure of the socio-economic status of MAD managers, servant- 
keeping, is somewhat simpler, and used frequently in socio-economic studies based on 
censuses; Booth, too, as noted in the Notes at the end of this chapter, used this 
measure. 
Although there were some exceptions, the general pattern of servant-keeping was 
one of more servants for the nominees and fewer for the elected members. Five of the 
nominees in particular - Sir James Hamilton, Alexander Ross, W. H. Smith, Sir Michael 
Hicks Beach and Robert Wigram - were very well provided with servants. Hamilton 
kept 12, Beach and Ross 14, Smith 12 and Wigram 10. The first four were past, 
present or future Conservative MPs, and Wigram was a leading supporter of East End 
Conservative candidates. If the other Conservative MP among the nominees, John G. 
Talbot (Chairman of Kent Quarter Sessions and of Westminster board of guardians) had 
not been excluded from the census study for residential reasons, the number of nominees 
with an exceptionally high tally of servants would have been six, as Talbot had 11 at his 
Westminster home, and presumably others in Kent. Not far behind were J. A. Shaw 
Stewart with seven, Walter Carew Cocks (from the Audit Office) with six, and Wyatt 
(chairman of St. Pancras) and surgeon-major Bostock with five. 
Four of these top Conservative servant-keepers - Hamilton, Beach, Smith and 
Ross - also lived in the most exclusive neighbourhoods in terms of occupation, with 
neighbours in Groups la, Ib and IIa only, and the other one - Wigram - had only one, 
apparently anomalous, neighbour in a lower category. 
Figure 9 shows the number of servants kept by each nominee, with known 
wealthy Conservatives (Hamilton, Hicks Beach, Ross, Smith and Wigram) towering 
above the rest, East End businessmen Charrington and Currie among the lowest 
servant-keepers, Holmes and Sibson, the medical men who left MAD after the first year, 
also in the foothills, and Wyatt, the forceful new chairman of the new St. Pancras union 
who stood as the nominees' candidate for the chairmanship of MAD, very comfortably 
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placed with five. Harvey, the only nominee with no servants, was the 71-year-old 
practising physician, surgeon and chairman of the Islington Board of Guardians who 
lived near the workhouse that MAD converted into a smallpox hospital60 and who 
possibly won his place as a nominee as a means of making an elected place available for 
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Home Office surgeon Bradley. In terms of residential areas, 25% of nominees lived in 
neighbourhoods averaging six or more servants per household, and 40% in 
neighbourhoods averaging 3-5. (Figure 10. ) 
Elected managers, on the other hand, lived in neighbourhoods where the figures 
were vitually reversed, with 40% of households having 1-2 servants. Their degree of 
servant-keeping indicates mainly comfortable, moderately comfortable or poorer 
lifestyles. As individuals, all but three of the elected managers had at least one servant, 
and many had two or more. The servant-less, and possibly poorest, elected managers 
were two tradesmen and a craftsman: Duff (a draper representing the wealthy parish of 
St. James Westminster), Partridge (a Clerkenwell manufacturing jeweller), and Lockyer 
(a pharmaceutical chemist in Greenwich). 
The middle stratum incorporating some nominee and some elected managers is 
apparent in the servant-keeping analysis. Figure 10 shows this overlap of levels of 
60RG 10/255/23. 
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wealth, with 20.6% of elected managers' neighbourhoods having household averages of 
3-5 servants, and 17.3% of nominee neighbourhoods having household averages of 1-2. 
The middle stratum overlap is shown also in the figure 11 illustration of the 
range of neighbourhood servant-keeping within the two groups of managers - the 
highest, lowest and median figures. While there is a noticeable difference between the 
highest numbers for each group of managers - 11.3 and 6.5 - this figure for the elected 
group is still sufficiently high to surpass the median for the nominees. Of the four 
elected managers sufficiently wealthy for the servant-keeping in their neighbourhood to 
be at a higher level than the nominee median, three, significantly, represented large, 
powerful parishes and boards of guardians north of Oxford Street and the fourth, a JP 
and large businessman, had roots both in the east and the west: Attenborough (4.5 
servants, a silversmith and the new St. Pancras representative in 1868), Beevor (5.2, 
surgeon, chairman of St. Marylebone), Seymour (6.5, JP and chairman of St. George 
M. A. D. Managers 1867-71 
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Hanover Square) and Stutfield (5.2, JP, magistrate, Deputy Lieutenant and wine 
merchant, living in St. Marylebone but ex-officio member and treasurer of the East End 
guardians in St. George in the East). Although part of MAD's elected contingent, they 
therefore contributed also to the presence of wealthy gentlemen on the board of 
management. 
The high-median-low range is useful also in illustrating that the immediate 
neighbourhoods in which most of the elected managers lived were comfortable by 
contemporary standards, and might be termed "middle-class". (Booth in 1889 
described households with 1-2 servants as "well-to-do". ) The 24 elected managers 
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living in neighbourhoods below this standard (average number of servants per household 
from 0.1 to 0.9) came from all parts of the metropolis, 61 with the largest contingent (7) 
coming from small West End parishes. 
While the neighbourhood analysis of servant-keeping provides a more 
sophisticated picture than a simple comparison of managers' individual servant-keeping - 
for instance, in its ability to communicate neighbourhood servant-keeping that averages 
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which the manager can afford to live -a comparison of the two methods confirms the 
overall reliability of both, in that differences between individual nominee and elected 
groups are proportionately broadly the same as the differences between the two groups 
of neighbourhoods (Figure 12). The fact that individual figures are consistently higher 
than neighbourhood figures reflects the fact that managers tended as individuals to be 
among the higher, or the highest, servant-keepers in their neighbourhoods: a 
complement, perhaps, to their roles as members of local governing elites. 
The analysis of MAD managers' servant-keeping using various measures has 
shown not only clear differences overall between the two groups of managers, with most 
of the nominees having much higher numbers of servants than the bulk of the elected 
managers, but also elements of overlap which cast further light on the composition of 
both groups. 
61 East End 4, West End 7, South 6. East-Central (St. Luke, Clerkenwell, Shoreditch) 3, and others 
(Chelsea. Greenwich and City) 4. 
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The final analyses (Figure 13) relate to the extent of multi-occupation ("flats") 
and lodger-keeping in the two neighbourhood groups. Differences between nominee 
and elected managers are far greater in the multiple occupation comparison and are 
broadly similar to those found in the occupation and servant-keeping comparisons. In 
the case of lodger-keeping, however, the contrast between the two groups is much less, 
and the results here may have been affected by the nature of residential practices in the 
metropolis and therefore be less valid for the purposes of this study. For instance, 
people in small accommodation and multiple occupation were less likely to have space 
for lodgers, and lodgers may also have been under-counted, as some of those recorded 
as visitors may have been lodgers. (See Appendix VI, Notes on the gathering and 
recording of data. ) 
Multiple occupation was found in nominee neighbourhoods in only four cases: 
Currie in the East End (6%), Harvey, the Islington chairman and physician-surgeon 
(14%), and the two medical men who left at the end of the first year and who lived in 
streets in the West End which had a substantial proportion of other medical men, hotels 
and lodging houses - Holmes (22%) and Sibson (24%). Of the elected members, on the 
other hand, 31 (56%) lived in neighbourhoods where there was multi-occupation, which 
ranged from a mere scattering of households to high proportions, such as 88% (Collins, 
a Bethnal Green builder), 77% (Doulton, of the Lambeth pottery), 76% (Duff, the 
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servant-less draper, in one of the poorer parts of the wealthy parish of St. James 
Westminster) and 64% (Hickson, superintendent of the East and West India Dock in 
Poplar, and Symons, a retired butcher in Chelsea). 









ED Nominees C' Elected 
Figure 13 
i 
Lodger-keeping followed the same pattern for the nominees, with two additions: 
a substantial proportion (29%)in the neighbourhood of Borlase Adams, barrister and 
member of the Middlesex JPs' Parliamentary Committee, who lived in a mixed area in 
the West End, and a few (5%) in the neighbourhood of Wyatt, magistrate, powerful new 
St. Pancras chairman and a "merchant" 20 years before, who in 1871 lived in a largely 
comfortable but mixed road with some tradesmen, clerks and lesser gentlemen. As 
lodger-keeping is, however, clearly a flawed criterion for assessing the socio-economic 
circumstances of elected managers and, indeed, of anomalous nominees such as large 
businessman Currie, living as he did in a poor river-side neighbourhood, its figures will 
not be taken into account. 
The comparisons that give consistent results - occupations, servant-keeping and 
multi-occupation - show that in socio-economic terms there were three groups of 
managers. Proportionately the largest single group of neighbourhood occupations 
among the two types of manager was Group lb in the nominee group; this socio- 
economic stratum (the aristocracy, MPs, JPs, wealthy fundholders, gentlemen and large 
landowners) was therefore represented to an extent that might help them influence 
MAD's activities. Large businessmen, although comprising only a small proportion of 
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residents in all neighbourhoods studied, also had a significant presence in terms of the 
residential backgrounds from which nominee managers came. The very wealthy "Top 
Five" nominees (or "Top Seven" if one includes Buxton and Talbot, who have been 
excluded from the figures for residential reasons) came from these two groups. 
The majority of elected managers lived in moderately comfortable 
neighbourhoods with fewer servants and a significant degree of multiple occupation. 
However, representatives from somewhat poorer neighbourhoods were sent by several 
local bodies in various parts of the metropolis, with the most numerous geographical 
concentration being a group of small West End parishes. 
There was also, however, an area of socio-economic overlap between the two 
groups in a middle stratum which included wealthier elected members, nominee JPs, and 
nominee and elected professional men. Although the Metropolitan Poor Act had 
created two distinct categories of manager there were, therefore, other lines of interest 
and influence along which the new body might divide. . 
V 
Although very wealthy gentlemen were in an actual minority on MAD's 60-strong 
Board of Management, they and their well-to-do nominee colleagues were a distinct and 
potentially cohesive elite group because of the manner of their selection and the 
confidence placed in them by the Poor Law Board. Whether their potential for 
influencing or controlling MAD was in practice achieved, and whether the goals they 
pursued were distinct from those of most elected members, will be examined in this 
section. The main source is the published minutes of the Board, which have hitherto 
62 been studied only in relation to the development of health institutions and services. 
The manager chosen by the Poor Law Board as provisional chairman of MAD's 
first meeting was Sir James Hamilton, one of the "Top Seven" and the only titled 
62LMA MAD I, II, III, IV (1867-71); Ayres (London, 1971), viii, the major writer on MAD, says that 
she used the minutes, "bleakly succinct but complete", as the "factual skeleton" for her history of the 
organisation. 
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member. As Hamilton was, however, out of London for substantial periods of the year 
on his landed estates, it was not appropriate for him to hold the chair on a more 
permanent basis. Given the Poor Law Board's seminal role in the setting up of MAD, it 
seems likely that the Board was involved also in the decision that nominee Wyatt, new 
JP chairman of St. Pancras, should stand for the permanent chairmanship of MAD. 
In this first decision of MAD's Board of Management63 a division of loyalties 
partly in accordance with members' status as elected or nominated seems to have 
occurred. When Wyatt was proposed as chairman by one of the East End employers 
(nominee Charrington) and one of Wyatt's fellow-JPs (Marshall, elected manager from 
Hampstead), two elected managers from small west/central parishes (Holborn and St. 
Luke) attempted to delay the decision by proposing that the question be adjourned for a 
week. 
Two further elected managers (from Poplar and St. Marylebone - the provisional 
chairman's own parish) then proposed Dr. Brewer of St. George Hanover Square, who 
would clearly have been a strong candidate for those critical of the Poor Law Board 
because of his role the previous year in mobilising guardians across the metropolis in 
protest at problems relating to the Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act during the 
preceding winter, and who was also a known Liberal. 
64 
From a show of hands "it appeared", the minutes record, that there was an even 
division between the two candidates of 23-23. A second vote, with voters' names 
taken, resulted in Dr. Brewer winning 29-24. A further elected member, Alfred Suter 
from the City, was then agreed unanimously as Vice-Chairman. While at least nine 
elected members must have voted for nominee Wyatt, it seems likely from the 
preliminaries that the division of support was largely between nominees and elected 
managers. 
The setting up of committees of the Board of Management also appears to have 
involved disagreement, with elected members from South London and the East End 
proposing the successful five-committee formula (Finance, Fever Patients, the Insane, 
Smallpox Patients and General Purposes) despite an attempted nominee amendment to 
set up a committee to make decisions about the committees. 65 The Poor Law Board's 
63LMA, MAD I, 67/8,22.6.67. 
64LMA Le. BG. 17,1.2.66,208; Times 5.2.1866,12b, & 9.3.1866,5e. Brewer, standing as a Liberal, 
failed to gain a parliamentary seat in Colchester in February 1867. 65LMA MAD I, 67/68,20.7.67. 
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regulations66 allowed the Board a great deal of freedom - they were able to appoint "at 
any time" one or more committees of 3-5 members with powers and authority that the 
managers wished to delegate to them - so it appears that either the elected members 
were better prepared when the question came up or the nominees would have preferred 
smaller scale back-room consultation on the issue. 
The allocation of committee responsibilities among Board members a month 
later67 showed a distinct division between the preferences of elected and nominated 
members. 
The most political of the five new committees - in terms of health emergencies, in 
which the Poor Law Board and the government might find themselves liable to criticism 
for ineffectiveness - was at this stage probably the Committee for Fever Patients. For 
instance, the ten-year metropolitan typhus epidemic received frequent and prolonged 
coverage in the Lancet, and "London society was shocked", by the death the previous 
year from typhus of a distinguished St. Bartholomew's Hospital doctor. 
68 It was also 
likely to become one of the highest-spending committees. 
It was to the Fever Committee that the nominee members flocked: five of its nine 
members were nominees, a total which, with the standard addition of the Board's elected 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, placed the nominees only just in a minority and certainly 
in a very influential position. The fact that a nominee, Dr. Sibson, was chosen to chair 
the committee suggests that in practice they were in a dominant position. 
The Finance Committee, on the other hand, attracted only one nominee member, 
John Young (Cardinal Manning's acquaintance), whose involvement in MAD became 
rather minimal. He had the lowest attendance of any of the nominees at Board of 
Management meetings in the first year: only five out of 20. 
Given that the Finance Committee would be involved in the raising of funds 
channelled through the boards of guardians for what was to become an extensive 
building programme, the interest shown in membership of the Finance Committee by the 
elected representatives of the guardians was to be expected. It was also to the Finance 
Committee that complaints from guardians about inequalities in metropolitan rating 
6617/33, No. 12,496/67, Regulations for the Board ofManagement, The Metropolitan Asylum 
District, June 1867: Article 15. 
67LMA, MAD I, 67/8,27.7.67. 
68A. Hardy, "Urban famine or urban crisis? Typhus in the Victorian city", in (ed) R. J. Morris & R. 
Rodger, The Victorian City 1820-1914 (London, 1993), 221-9. 
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assessment were to be referred As early as August a letter was reported from Mile 
End Old Town board of guardians "calling attention to the inequality that exists in the 
method of assessing rateable property throughout the metropolis, and protesting against 
any contribution being levied by the Board upon the basis of the present assessments 'for 
the relief of the poor"'. 69 
The reason for the apparent lack of interest shown by the nominees in this 
committee is less obvious, but MAD's minutes indicate that the allocation of members to 
particular committees was agreed without dispute. It seems likely that nominees were 
more concerned about achieving authorisation by MAD of expenditure on the expansion 
of poor law services than about the details of the sources of the income: about strategic 
issues rather than about local concerns relating to the rates. (In this respect there is a 
similarity with Daunton's comparison between the strategic regional or even 
international interests of the "mercantile elite" in the availability of suitable docks and the 
more local concern for the continued prosperity of Cardiff by those involved in local 
government. 70) Until the provision of funds became a problem, nominees had no need 
to concentrate their energies on finance. A further, related, factor may have been the 
close financial control that the Poor Law Board had been given by the Metropolitan 
Poor Act: if the central Board now had greater authority to do its own barking in terms 
of finance, there was no need also to have watchdog nominees on the Finance 
Committee. 
Two other service committees acquired a low proportion of nominees - one only 
on the Committee for the Insane and two on the Committee for Smallpox Patients - but 
both were chaired by a nominee members. 
The fifth committee, General Purposes, attracted only two nominee members at 
this stage; later, when it increased in strategic importance, the nominee membership 
increased too. At this early stage the chairmanship of General Purposes was left in the 
hands of the elected Whitechapel member Thomas Brushfield. Finance, likewise, was 
chaired by an elected member, John Proudfoot of Holborn. 
Monitoring of the Board's activities took place not only through the minutes 
(which were circulated to the Poor Law Board and to members but were not available to 
the public in the earlier years) but also through the attendance of Poor Law Board 
69LMA MAD 1,67/8,24.8.67. 
70Daunton, op. cit., 159. 
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officials at Board meetings. The first two meetings were attended by W. G. Lumley, 
Assistant Secretary of the central Board, as well as two inspectors; thereafter at least 
one and often both of the inspectors were present at each Board meeting, in observer 
capacity. 
In terms of who controlled the reins of power within MAD, the Poor Law Board 
seems originally to have intended that the committees should be closely accountable to 
the Board of Management. Their Order of 18 June7l required all minutes of the 
committee meetings to be read at the next Board of Management meeting. Perhaps at 
this stage, prior to MAD's first meeting, the Poor Law Board expected that one of their 
nominees would win the chairmanship of the Board of Management. 
A change in committee accountability rules was announced at MAD's third 
meeting72 a week before the allocation of committee membership: the Poor Law Board 
had issued a new order rescinding the requirement that committee minutes be read at 
Board meetings. The change would clearly have increased the independence of 
committees from detailed oversight by the Board which, in plenary session, had an 
elective majority over nominees of 45-15. 
Despite the Poor Law Board's change of rule, and despite an apparent nominee 
attempt to reinforce the change, the Board of Management established the practice of 
considering committee recommendations in detail. At the first Board meeting that 
received committee reports, 73 Charrington proposed that the recommendations of the 
Finance Committee (which were mainly about acting on the redistributive provisions of 
the Metropolitan Poor Act) should not be considered one by one but that the 
committee's report should simply be adopted and referred back to them for 
implementation. His amendment was lost 10-20; as nominee attendance was at the 
low figure of six on this particular occasion, Charrington (who showed himself from the 
beginning to be a heavyweight nominee with a tendency to take and support significant 
initiatives) must have picked up a little elected support. But presumably it had 
occurred to the majority of Board members that allowing such independence to the 
elective-dominant Finance Committee might create a precedent that could be claimed by 
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the other committees, and would also reduce their own decision-making powers as a 
corporate body. 
The Board then proceeded to confirm their procedure by separately considering 
each of the Finance Committee's recommendations, having a relevant section of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act read to them, agreeing each of the recommendations in turn, and 
only then referring the report back to the committee for implementation. 
The Finance Committee was given an easy ride in comparison with the first 
report-back experiences of the three nominee-chaired service committees. 74 The 
Committee for Insane Patients (chaired by Wyatt, the unsuccessful nominee candidate 
for the Board's chair) had its whole report referred back "for further consideration and 
report". The Smallpox Committee had consideration of one of its recommendations 
postponed. The Fever Committee lost two of its recommendations and almost lost a 
policy statement; at a poorly-attended adjourned Board meeting75 it was able to muster 
only two supporting Fever Committee members (one of them the committee's nominee 
chairman) in an 8-17 defeat. 
Significantly, all three of these first reports from the service committees had 
outlined proposals that would lead to spending. The Smallpox Committee, which 
received the gentlest treatment at the hands of the Board, had proposed 
accommodation for a maximum of 200 patients, whereas the Committee for Insane 
Patients had suggested 3,000 and the Fever Committee, while referring to the need to 
build hospitals, was not yet prepared to suggest the total number of beds that would be 
required. 
While further disagreements seem also to have had some roots in the different 
agendas of nominated and elected members, there were, as well, clearly differences in 
the perspectives of various elected members. In effect, it seems that the elected 
members were behaving as elected representatives might be expected to behave - with a 
consciousness of their accountability to the various elected bodies that had sent them to 
MAD. 
For instance, when five boards of guardians wrote asking for details of MAD's 
expenditure and the Board's authority for levying a rate of one-eighth of a penny in the 




METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD 1867-71 
involved) and Newington proposed (successfully) that the Finance Committee be 
instructed to handle the matter, whereas two other elected members (one of them 
actually a member of the Finance Committee) attempted unsuccessfully to have the 
question considered by the Board of Management as a whole, perhaps regarding it as a 
wider policy issue with implications that related to all local bodies. 
76 
There was disagreement on whose should be the signatures to be sent to the Bank 
of England. Again there was an apparent victory here of elected over nominated 
members, with the Finance Committee's recommendation that the signatures of the 
Board's chairman and vice-chairman and all members of the elective-dominant Finance 
Committee be authorised being carried 17-2, following the 10-17 defeat of a proposal by 
Ellis (a somewhat unpredictable elected member from wealthy Paddington) and leading 
nominee Wyatt that signatures of all 60 members of the Board of Management be 
authorised. 77 
Probably one of the most remarkable achievements by elected members in MAD's 
first year was their success in getting leading nominees to accompany them on a 
deputation to the Poor Law Board on an issue seen initially as a matter for the Finance 
Committee and hence, by choice, of only arms-length concern to the nominees. 
The issue was, in effect, that of metropolitan rate equalisation. The elected 
members from Mile End Old Town and St. Olave's Southwark (Donald Munro and 
Henry Pelling Wellbourne) moved78 that MAD ask the Poor Law Board to order that 
contributions from unions and parishes be assessed on a more equitable basis than that 
set out in s. 55 of the Metropolitan Poor Act. This appeared to be a reasonable 
application to make to the central Board because s. 55 stipulated that the annual rateable 
value basis of contributions should be calculated according to the valuation lists, the 
latest local poor rate, or "on such other basis as the Poor Law Board from time to time 
direct". 
The motion having been carried, Munro then gained the support, as seconder, of 
nominee Dr. Sibson, chairman of the Fever Committee, in a further successful motion: 
that MAD set up a special committee, on the usual formula of nine members plus MAD's 
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committee - heavyweights Wyatt and Charrington who, as chairmen of their own boards 
of guardians, would have had pre-determined views on the issue, and J. A. Shaw Stewart 
- together with two elected members from the East End, three from the City/West 
London Unions, and one from St Marylebone. 
The elected members had thus managed to bring about the setting up of a 
powerful combined team of nominee and elected members to consider an issue that had, 
only four months before, been treated as a concern mainly of elected members. 
External elective pressure - several parishes and unions had already defaulted on 
MAD's first and very limited order for contributions79 - doubtless also spurred the 
nominees to join the move by representatives of poorer authorities for assessment 
changes. Without sufficient income, clearly the service committees' hopes for extensive 
building and development programmes would not come to fruition. 
The special committee's findings80 confirmed the arguments of elected members 
and poorer parishes and unions that the present systems were unfair. Having examined 
not only the poor rate but also the property tax and county, police and main drainage 
assessments, they concluded that "the greatest inequalities" existed, with a difference of 
from 5 to 40% in the various bases of assessment. Their recommendations were 
practical: that gross rental should be the basis for MAD rates, that the three-fifths of 
metropolitan valuation still not revised under the 1862 Union Assessment Committee 
Act81 be carried out speedily, and that until metropolis-wide reassessment had been 
achieved, the county rate should temporarily be the assessment basis. (A radical 
suggestion - by Suter, vice-chairman of the Board and elected member from the City, 
and Dannell, elected member for Rotherhithe - that the property tax be the basis of 
assessment - was defeated 5-31 by a Board that was clearly seeking an immediate and 
realistic way out of potential funding difficulties. ) The Union Assessment Committee 
strategy had already developed a head of steam outside, having been raised in the 
Commons on the grounds that rates payable to the Common Fund should be levied "on 
a fair and equal basis" . 
82) The final recommendation of the special committee was that 
a MAD deputation visit the Poor Law Board "to urge upon them the adoption of the 
791bid., 16.11.67. 
801bid., 30.11.67. 
8125 & 26 Vict. c. 103. 82Hansard 15.8.67, col. 1571 
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above recommendations". The deputation, the Board decided, should consist of the 
members of the special committee. 
When the deputation met Lord Devon at the Poor Law Board on 10 December, 
1867, his response was to promise to send them copies of the recently amended 
Valuation Bill, which aimed to achieve uniformity of assessment in England. Having in 
due course examined the six copies that arrived, the special committee continued 
apparently to present a united front in the face of lack of any real progress with the Poor 
Law Board. They reported to the Board of Management that the Valuation Bill was 
not applicable to the metropolis, and achieved the Board's support for their proposal that 
the Poor Law Board be asked to bring all metropolitan parishes within the scope of the 
Union Assessment Committee Act. 
As the first year drew to a close, the nominees were presumably not dissatisfied 
with this position, as the defaulting parishes and unions had, in the meantime, all paid 
their rates under the existing assessment systems. 
An evaluation of MAD's first year leads to the conclusion that the nominees, 
intended by the drafters of the Metropolitan Poor Act to fill what had been argued, in 
select committees and in the Metropolitan Poor Bill debates, to be a shortfall in the 
ability, skills and correct governing instincts of elected local members, emerged from 
their first year by no means crowned in superior glory. In a number of respects they 
had found their match in and even been out-manoeuvred by politically-experienced 
elected members. 
A shift in the balance of power in favour of nominees was clearly aimed for when 
MAD reassembled for its second year. The vehicle was to be the hitherto insignificant 
General Purposes Committee, and the aim seems to have been to establish a 
coordinating committee with a strong nominee presence. 
The first stage of the shift83 had a practical logic because MAD was now moving 
into an era of actually planning and building hospitals and asylums. Each of the three 
nominee-chaired service committees was broken up into separate committees for each 
83LMA MAD II, 4.4.68. 
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proposed institution: the Committee for Insane Patients became the committees for 
superintending the erection of the asylums at Leavesden, Herts., and at Caterham, 
Surrey. The Committees for Fever and Smallpox Patients became committees for the 
proposed hospitals at Hampstead (North West District), Stockwell (Southern District) 
and Homerton, Hackney. 
Coincidentally, perhaps, the two nominee chairmen of the Fever and Smallpox 
Committees whose committees were broken up into three hospital committees - Dr. 
Sibson and surgeon Holmes - had been the only two of the nominees not to return to 
MAD at the start of the second year. (Dr. Sibson in particular had forged co-operative 
links in the first year with elected members, and had seconded the important motion to 
set up a special committee that had led to the deputation to the Poor Law Board about 
rate equalisation. Both gave lack of time as their reason for leaving MAD. 84) 
The three chairmen of the new hospital committees were all nominees - 
Charrington, Harvey and Shaw Stewart - and these committees all recruited their 
permitted maximum of one-third nominee members. Charrington successfully 
proposed, further, that each of the hospital committees be given the power to appoint a 
sub-committee of three members (together with the Board's chairman and vice- 
chairman) to "confer upon all matters" connected with their committee, including 
matters referred by the Board of Management to the committee. This suggests that 
powerful inner circles were set up to make decisions and recommendations on the 
building of the new metropolitan hospitals. 
The two new asylum committees and the structurally unchanged Finance 
Committee were not accorded this degree of attention by the nominees. Although 
Wyatt took the chair of the new Leavesden Asylum committee, he was the only nominee 
to join this committee. An elected member particularly active in the previous year (Dr. 
Cords, who had joined forces with Munro of Mile End in support of boards of 
guardians) became chairman of the Caterham Asylum committee. The Finance 
Committee chairman remained the elected member Proudfoot, and Young, whose 
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The second stage, the restructuring of the General Purposes Committee, was built 
partly on the changes to the service committees. On the motion of Charrington it was 
agreed that in future General Purposes should consist of one member from each of the 
committees, to be chosen by each committee, with the usual addition of the Board's 
chairman and vice-chairman. 85 Giving the committees the power to nominate their 
representatives meant, of course, that the Board of Management lost control of the 
nominated/elected proportion on the General Purposes Committee. The ratio 
turned out to be 50: 50, and the three nominated members included the heavyweights 
Charrington and Wyatt. To bring the numbers up to the usual nine, the Board of 
Management added two elected members and one nominee, Sir James Hamilton, on the 
motion of Charrington. 86 
The bringing in of Hamilton at this stage was significant because it was he who 
had been the Poor Law Board's choice for provisional chairman the previous year. 
87 
He now returned to centre-stage as the chairman of the newly-structured General 
Purposes Committee, taking the place of Brushfield, elected member for Whitechapel 
and chairman of the Whitechapel Union, which the previous month had passed a 
resolution against Poor Law Board powers to order expenditure. Control of the up- 
graded General Purposes Committee therefore passed from the chairman of a 
recalcitrant East End union to the Poor Law Board's favourite chairman, with nominees 
88 in a narrow minority of 4-5. 
While the re-structuring of General Purposes clearly involved a transfer of power, 
the uses that nominees made of this are not always apparent. It reported infrequently 
to the Board of Management, and several of the matters reported appear to have been 
routine or procedural: for instance, the shortlisting of applicants for a clerkship, and a 
contract for printing and stationery. 89 The committee also produced an answer to 
MAD's lengthy search for offices of their own, away from the Metropolitan Board of 
Works: a recommendation that they rent offices in the Strand from W. H. Smith, 
85LMA MAD II, 4.4.68. 
861bid., 25.6.68. 
87lbid., 22.6.67. 
88Ibid., 23.5.68,25.6.68; LMA/St. BG. Wh. 45,7.4.68,411-2. 
89LMA MAD II, 23.5.68,19.12.68. 
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Conservative candidate for Westminster, 90 who shortly afterwards joined MAD's Board 
of Management as a nominee. 91 
Other questions handled by the re-structured committee provide a clearer 
indication, however, of its potential as an alternative source of power to the Board of 
Management, which of course still had its pronounced elective majority, elective 
chairman and elective vice-chairman. For instance, on issues of undoubted political 
significance such as rating inequalities and the Poor Law Board's and parliament's 
approach to sorting out the property valuation problem, there were proposals (not all of 
them successful) to refer matters to General Purposes. One might argue that the rates 
question ought more naturally to have been a matter for the Finance Committee, which 
continued to handle other matters involving the raising of funds for the service 
committees' land purchase and building programmes, and for MAD's administrative 
expenses. 92 On the other hand, if MAD's deputation to the Poor Law Board the 
previous year on rate equalisation had embarrassed the central Board, elevating the 
issue to the level of a newly powerful General Purposes Committee might have 
constituted an attempt to exert greater nominee control over the issue. 
It was Whitechapel, the East End union chaired by the deposed Brushfield that 
raised the issue of rate equalisation a few months after the re-structuring of General 
Purposes and almost immediately after the Gladstone government came to power. The 
union sent a memorial to MAD (signed by their chairman) protesting that the basis of 
valuation for contributions to the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund was not fair and 
equitable because of unequal systems of assessment in the various metropolitan unions 
and parishes. The memorial presented a firm proposal for tackling the problem. It 
called on MAD to recognise the need for measures to remedy the inequalities and to 
seek statutory power to call for evidence from unions and parishes. If the evidence 
proved that inequalities existed, MAD should be "empowered and required" to appeal to 
Middlesex JPs at their Quarter Sessions, who should have the power to correct 
inequalities and omissions. 93 
901bid., 6.6.68. 
911bid., 18.7.68. _ 921bid., 9.5.68. 
93Ibid, 19.12.68. The general election took place in November and the Whitechapel Union memorial 
was dated 8.12.1868. Their proposal contained elements of Ayrton's unsuccessful 1858 Bill and, 
significantly, it was to be the Whitechapel area that apparently remained loyal to Ayrton in the 1874 
election (East London Observer, 7.2.1874,6e). 
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Despite the nominee strength on General Purposes, the issue was thrashed out at 
Board of Management level, where the elected members were stronger, probably 
because of Brushfield's tactic in moving, at the Board, that MAD "adopt such measures 
.... as may 
be deemed expedient" at its next meeting. 94 By the time of the next Board 
meeting further memorials had arrived from other East End and City unions, including 
Hackney, Mile End Old Town and West London, who called for a deputation to the 
President of the Poor Law Board urging him to introduce a measure to remedy "the 
present extraordinary inequality of rating". Brushfield and a Westminster elected 
member moved that a petition be sent by MAD to parliament embodying the 
Whitechapel proposals. 95 
After an attempt by two new elected members (from St. Marylebone and the City) 
to stem the equalisation tide failed miserably - in a 5-23 vote against only acknowledging 
the existence of "certain inequalities of assessments" - the Board settled for a forceful 
compromise, proposed by the Stepney elected member and his fellow East End 
guardian, the nominee Charrington, that MAD send the Whitechapel memorial to the 
Poor Law Board with an opinion that it demanded their serious attention, "and urging 
the Poor Law Board to promote a measure for remedying the inequalities of assessment 
within the Metropolitan Asylum District". 96 The deputation and the petition had been 
avoided, but in terms of policy the East End unions had undoubtedly won the day at 
MAD, despite the re-structuring of the General Purposes Committee, which had been 
side-stepped by the elected members. 
Tensions in relation to General Purposes are apparent also in relation to its 
extended role as the committee that examined legislation. Having been asked by the 
Board of Management to look at the sensitive Valuation of Property (Metropolis) 
Bil197 that had followed the recent pressure on the Poor Law Board for re-valuation, 
General Purposes reported that several clauses required considerable consideration and 
amendment; they suggested that their committee be empowered to seek an interview 
with the President of the Poor Law Board on the provisions that "affect the interests of 
the Managers". The Board objected; an interview with the President was presumably 
interpreted as being a different process from the more confrontational deputation for 
94Lbid., 19.12.68. 
95thid., 16.1.69. 
96fid, 16.1.69; MH17/34,20.1.1869. 
9732 & 33 Vict. c. 67, Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869. 
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which East End unions had pressed. Munro and Dr. Cortis successfully proposed 21-9 
that the Bill be referred back to General Purposes for further consideration and another 
report to the Board. 
The question of having the authority to talk directly to the Poor Law Board on 
this major issue (which had aroused substantial activity on other local bodies98) was 
clearly significant for the nominees because Charrington and Wyatt persisted, taking the 
untenable position of moving that "any further reference of this Bill to the Committee be 
discharged". Not surprisingly, they had to withdraw the attempt. The eventual 
outcome of this particular item indicates the existence of an armed peace between 
leading nominees and leading elected members: Charrington and Hamilton successfully 
proposed that the Valuation Bill be referred to a special committee, which then attracted 
the permitted maximum of three nominees, together with elected members mainly from 
poorer unions, including Munro himsel 9. 
By the end of 1868-9 Hamilton and Wyatt had, however, obtained agreement, on 
grounds of convenience and through the medium of the General Purposes Committee, 
that not only the Finance Committee but also other committees could incur expense; 
they had also successfully moved that General Purposes be empowered to consider and 
report on "any Bills affecting the Managers" which were introduced in Parliament that 
session. 
100 
At the end of the second year, therefore, it seems that while the elected members 
were continuing to benefit from their own tactical skills and political experience, and 
were still able to achieve majorities on the Board on matters where there were clear 
differences of interest, the nominees, led by the powerful team of Hamilton, Charrington 
and Wyatt, and aided by changes in the committee system, were becoming more 
effective than they had been at the end of the first year. 
98LN A 29, Report of the United Metropolitan Vestry Committee to the Vestries and District Boards of 
the Metropolis, 1869 (London, 1869), 6-16e, shows that this recently formed voluntary metropolitan 
body held lengthy discussions on the Valuation Bill and also negotiated in detail with the Metropolitan 
Board of Works and Members of Parliament about it, succeeding, they believed, in getting it amended 
to a significant degree. 99lbid, 24.3.69. 
100Ibid., 24.3.69. 
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Evidence supporting the contention in this chapter that the relationship between 
the Poor Law Board and its nominees was a mutually supportive one appears in the 
minutes early in MAD's third year. In the previous year the harmful effect of 
parish/union amalgamations on the tenure of MAD's elected members had been raised to 
no effect; early in 1869, however, it became clear that nominees would also be affected, 
and a remarkable change of position by the central Board followed. 
The issue had originally been raised when the Poor Law Board, under its 
Metropolitan Poor Act powers, attached the parish of St. Martin in the Fields to the 
Strand Union, and ruled that the existing St. Martin's delegate was no longer eligible to 
occupy a place on MAD's Board. Despite a recommendation by the General Purposes 
Committee (attended by an elected member majority of 4-3 and with Sir James Hamilton 
absent from the chair) supporting the Strand Union's view that the excluded member 
should be allowed to continue on MAD, the Poor Law Board refused to yield. 
101 
The following year, however, when proposed further amalgamations by the new 
Liberal President brought the issue to the fore again, General Purposes produced a more 
powerful argument. If further elected members were deprived of their MAD seats, the 
nominee position would also be affected, they pointed out, because the number of 
nominees would then exceed the one-third proportion allowed by the Metropolitan Poor 
Act. The implication was, of course, that some of the nominees would also have to lose 
their seats. 102 The committee wrote directly to the Poor Law Board, expressed "the 
willingness of the committee to see the President upon the subject, should he desire it", 
and recommended that the Board of Management empower them to take legal advice on 
the changes, which had "a vital bearing on the constitution of the Board". 
In notable contrast to their previous position, the Poor Law Board replied103 that 
the matter had not escaped their attention and that there would be a clause in the 
proposed Bill amending the 1867 Act in order to allow current elected managers to 
retain their positions until the period of appointment expired. 104 
101Ibid., 25.4., 9.5., 23.5., 6.6., 4.7., 18.7.68. 
1021bid., 22.5.69. 
1031bid., 5.6.69. 
104Metropolitan Poor AmendmentA ct 1869,32 & 33 Vict. c. 63, s. 7. The 1867 Act had in fact given 
the Poor Law Board the power to prescribe the tenure of both elected and nominated managers, and 
from March 1868 a three-year tenure operated, so it appears that the Board could, if it wished, have 
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The issue of the raising of finance, initially surrendered to the elected members on 
the Finance Committee, also received increasing attention from General Purposes105 as 
questions well removed from routine financial decision-making continued to press 
themselves upon MAD. There was an escalation from the early rate 
equalisation/valuation concerns relating to revenue spending financed through the 
Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, to problems of severe difficulty in raising loans for 
the large capital programme because of defective provision, in the 1867 Act, for loans 
security. 106 As with revenue spending, capital expenditure had to come ultimately from 
the ratepayers through the boards of guardians, hence the rapidly developing interest of 
the nominees, whose sponsors, the Poor Law Board, were wholly dependent on 
metropolitan ratepayers for the financing of the extensive institutional developments that 
the Act had authorised them to embark upon. 
In negotiating with the Poor Law Board on an amendment to the 1869 Bill that 
would overcome the loan security problem, it is clear that the General Purposes 
Committee had a considerable degree of freedom. 107 For instance, having been 
empowered to "take the necessary steps, by conference with the President of the Poor 
Law Board or otherwise", they instructed solicitors "to confer with the President, if he 
should desire it" or to submit their views in writing, and only subsequently reported 
these steps to the Board of Management. 
On the other hand it is clear also that the Board, with its elected majority, retained 
a certain degree of control over the issue: while voting to receive the General Purposes 
report on the matter, the Board held back from approving it formally: Hamilton's 
motion for approval was, after discussion, withdrawn. Instead, a proposal by Dale (of 
St. Luke) and Munro that the matter be deferred pending a reply from the Poor Law 
Board was agreed. 
Parliamentary attacks on the costly building programme and escalating 
expenditure arising from the 1867 Act, in relation both to MAD and to the six Sick 
Asylum Districts, might be expected to have rallied a more or less unanimous defensive 
position by elected and nominee members, in that its building programme was, in effect, 
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MAD's raison d'etre. There appears however to have been an element of reluctance, on 
the part of leading nominees at least, to become involved in the question. 
The attack had come from W. M. Torrens, Liberal MP for Finsbury (under 
pressure not only from constituents but also from some medical men), who gave notice 
that he would move in the committee stage of the Metropolitan Poor Amendment Bill 
1869108 that new asylums should be for the use of people living within the local parish 
or union only -a denial of the metropolitan context of MAD's objectives. 
109 
Elected members Dr. Cortis (Lambeth) and J. W. Butterworth (West London 
Union) moved, not unreasonably, that Torrens' proposed provision would cause "great 
inconvenience" to the operations of the Board of Management, and proposed that the 
Poor Law Board be written to accordingly. They succeeded in their move only 
narrowly. Having fought off (11-13) a blocking "next business" motion by Wyatt and 
Charrington, Cortis and Butterworth achieved 16-12 support for their motion. 
The voting figures indicate that at least some of the support for Wyatt and 
Charrington came from elected members, but nonetheless the positions taken by the 
leading figures appear to have represented a division between nominee and elected 
interests. The majority were, in effect, supporting the position of the Liberal 
government, with Goschen at the Poor Law Board. This may have been a matter of 
political loyalties, but an alternative explanation hinges on the "great objective" of the 
Bill, which Goschen described as being "to classify by amalgamation rather than by 
increased buildings". ' 10 This objective related not to MAD but to the Sick Asylum 
Districts, which Goschen was seeking Poor Law Board power to dissolve and replace 
with union amalgamations: that is, to abolish at least some of the 1867 nominee-headed 
bodies and replace them with more elective structures. If this is what the dispute 
between MAD's managers was about, it makes sense that the elected members would 
support Goschen. The nominees' apparent support for Torrens (whose first sally 
against the Bill had been an attempt to delay it through the setting up of a Royal 
Commission or select committeeI 11) suggests that they may have been motivated by 
stronger loyalties to the nominee concept to which they owed their influential positions. 
Indeed, six MAD nominees became nominees also on Sick Asylum Districts: Wyatt, 
10832 & 33 Vict. c. 63. 109LMA MAD I1I, 19.6.69; Hansard 7.6.1869 cot. 1348; Hodgkinson, op. cit., 506. 110Hansard 28.5.1869 col. 962. 111 Ibid., 7.6.1869 cot. 13 50. 
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Borlase Adams and W. H. Smith on the Central London SAD, and East End employers 
Charrington and Wigram on the Poplar and Stepney SAD, together with Spence, an 
elected member but also an East End employer. 
112 A seventh employer, Currie, was 
first a SAD nominee and only later joined also the MAD nominee ranks. Alternatively, 
having been appointed nominees by a Conservative government, the nominees may 
simply have been opposing a Liberal measure on political grounds. 
At the end of the third year of MAD's existence, therefore, there appears still to 
have been a distinction between the interests of nominated and elected members. The 
General Purposes Committee had by this stage become in some respects a partly 
autonomous body dominated by nominee interests, but it remained accountable, 
ultimately, to the Board of Management, where leading elected members were still able 
to achieve a majority. The Committee seems to have been orientated towards trouble- 
shooting and achieving control on issues regarded by the Poor Law Board's ministerial 
or official elements as sensitive or particularly significant. 
MAD's fourth year, 1870-71, appears to have been the stage when the role and 
activities of its managers began to focus to a proportionately greater extent on practical 
health goals. In his annual chairman's report at the end of the year, Dr. Brewer pointed 
out that all of the proposed hospitals and asylums had opened, and that the year had also 
seen a serious outbreak of disease, which had "severely tried the resources and 
endurance" of the Board of Management. The most serious feature had been that 
almost half of these patients were normally self-supporting, and not of the type usually 
to call on the poor law for help. 
Brewer's address had an inspirational tinge, with the use of rhetoric such as ".... 
have a fair prospect before you of turning back the tide" of disease, and "..... your 
energies and self-denial will not be less than the occasion may demand". 
Another significant reference in his report was to a further change in committee 
responsibilities: the members of each committee would apportion the duties of 
"constant supervision" of the four hospitals at Homerton and Stockwell among 
112pp 1871 lix, Accounts & Papers, 465-99. 
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themselves, "onerous as the task may be, and despite the risk and cost". It was likely, 
of course, that problems of time and cost would weigh more heavily on tradesmen and 
other working members of the committees than on those of independent means with the 
leisure to donate their time to magisterial and other unpaid social duties. 
However, Brewer's address, with its emphasis on unity, past achievements and 
future goals, avoided any suggestion of disagreements or divisions other than those 
between the Board and external opponents who had, for instance, levelled "bitter 
vituperation" against the managers for their choice of residentially desirable sites for 
their new institutions. With a common enemy, and the prospect of parliament adding 
"an additional series of duties", there was clearly a basis for the future strengthening of a 
sense of corporate loyalty on the Board of Management. Brewer himself spoke of a 
"strong feeling of regard for our colleagues (that) has grown up in the breast of every 
member of this Board". 
Whether there was evidence thereafter of a continuation of distinct nominee and 
elected perspectives is not a concern of this study, which stops at the end of the 
watershed year 1870-71. In 1874, however, The Times, in a leading article, attacked 
both MAD and the indirectly elected Metropolitan Board of Works as "authorities which 
are estranged from the people of the Metropolis, and distrusted as they are 
estranged". 
113 
This analysis of the first four years of the Board has confirmed, it is suggested, 
that MAD exhibited some elements found in present-day "quangos". Funding, while 
not provided by government, was raised on its authority, and although the choice of 
three-quarters of the managers was not in the hands of government, its own nominees 
wielded significant power. Nominees had in effect had executive authority delegated to 
them by the Minister, and the 15 nominees appear largely to have acted together, 
sometimes with the support of some of the elected members (who were, or are likely to 
have been, sympathetic colleagues on the boards of guardians from which some of the 
nominees came - particularly from Stepney, St. Pancras and other "northern" parishes 
such as Paddington and Hampstead). The nominees clearly saw their role as being "to 
supervise or develop activity in areas of public interest", 114 and sought to maintain and 
increase their influence in order to achieve the goals set by government. They were a 
113Keith-Lucas, 
op. cit., 197. 114Chambers Dictionary, op, cit. 
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conscious and, in the main, cohesive elite, largely from socio-economically superior 
backgrounds and expecting or seeking a leadership role. 
Elected managers, on the other hand, appear to have pursued the interests of the 
local bodies and localities that they had been elected to represent, and sought to 
maintain control of MAD in order to achieve policy goals acceptable to their localities. 
They were more likely to press for comparatively radical policies (for instance, 
equalisation of rates and valuation), and those most actively pursuing such policies 
tended to come from smaller West End local bodies, East End bodies not represented on 
MAD by a JP, and local bodies south of the river. Their selection as MAD 
representatives arose out of their positions as members of local governing elites, or 
"natural leaders", and they demonstrated considerable political skills in pursuit of their 
policies and interests. They appear, indeed, to have been politically more effective than 
the nominees imposed on the poor law governing process by central government, and 
were only defeated through constitutional tactics such as the re-structuring of the 
General Purposes Committee (to which they had, of course, agreed); even then, defeat 
was only partial. 
The analysis of MAD's minutes also shows that a major aim underlying the 
institutional and financial provisions of the Metropolitan Poor Act was the achievement 
of higher spending on poor law health services, particularly in fields where public 
concern had been manifested. The major role of nominees in this respect was not to 
restrict or monitor Common Poor Fund spending, as suggested by Hardy and others in 
parliament on occasion, but to encourage substantial expenditure financed by 
ratepayers. ' 
15 The very significant growth in importance of the General Purposes 
Committee, and the transfer of its chairmanship from elected to nominee hands, shows 
the sensitivity of nominees to threats to the financing of poor law health re-organisation. 
When the purse became an issue, power was redistributed within MAD in order to 
enlarge nominee participation in financial decision-making. 
MAD's minutes confirm, therefore, that the state growth brought about by the 
Metropolitan Poor Act was accompanied by a conscious extension of gentlemanly 
power through the nominee provisions. 
115pp 1866 xxxv, op. cit., 13, illustrates the conflicting demands from central government for less, or 
more, local poor law spending, in that Villiers, in his last annual report, criticised spending increases in 
Middlesex and some other counties in two successive years which, though they had "not been very 
considerable", could not, he said, he justified by the state of trade or agriculture. 
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VI 
That landed gentry, members of the aristocracy and Justices of the Peace should 
see it as their role to exercise a controlling hand on local poor relief income and 
expenditure was of course far from new, and the New Poor Law, in incorporating the 
ex-officio membership of J. P. s on boards of guardians, had provided precisely for this 
perceived need, although with varying degrees of success. A problem, as has been 
noted widely, was the difficulty of finding sufficient members of these elites (and of 
larger businessmen in the urban areas) who were willing to sit on boards of guardians 
with local tradesmen and farmers for the often tedious routine administration of relief 
and localised political disagreements. 
What was entirely new on the Metropolitan Asylums Board was the fact that 
central government (ministers and civil servants) actually hand-picked and appointed 
their own nominees, who did not need to be J. P. s, and therefore were not either ex- 
officio or co-opted. This was indeed a new kind of organisation, but has not 
previously been recognised as such probably for two reasons: because MAD's massive 
programme of building "England's first state hospitals" has distracted attention from the 
innovatory nature of its political structure, and because the New Poor Law's 
introduction of ex-officios in 1834, building on centuries-old traditions, has somehow 
obscured the fact that the 1867 Act was not a continuation of this tradition but a new 
departure. 
Cain and Hopkins' 16 have argued that gentlemanly ruling elites were not 
destroyed by capitalism but absorbed and adapted it through their control of the financial 
and service sectors. In the metropolis in the 1860s gentlemanly ruling elites at the Poor 
Law Board and among the wealthy or powerful in the local communities adapted 
organisational structures and behaviour in order to maintain control of the expansion of 
poor relief. The inclusion of several substantial businessmen among the nominees, with 
emphasis on the East End - always a potential threat to ruling elites - confirms the 
existence in metropolitan policy-making at this time of an instinct for gentlemanly 
survival through compromise and assimilation. Cain and Hopkins have described this 
116P J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (London, 
1993). 
206 
METROPOLITAN ASYLUMS BOARD 1867-71 
type of process as a "distinctive form of conservative progress, one that safeguarded 
tradition and privilege while .... offering prospects of material 
improvement", with the 
co-option of "the new urban middle class .... 
into the defence of property and order". 
117 
"Gentlemanly quangoism" on MAD was the fore-runner of a new genus of political 
decision-making bodies that is still alive, well, and prolific today, and its origins in the 
reform and reaction tensions of the Metropolitan Poor Act deserve wider attention than 
they have hitherto received. 
117Ibid., 467. 
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CHAPTER 7. A Pattern of Power at the 
Poor Law Board 
Some major questions of relevance to the process of government growth in the 
nineteenth-century still remain to be answered. A central issue is the role of the Poor 
Law Board in relation to the Metropolitan Poor Act's genesis and implementation. The 
Board was one of 16 government departments that in 1854, as Roberts has shown, had 
important powers over local authorities, but it and its predecessor, the Poor Law 
Commission, also had other extensive legislative, administrative, judicial and financial 
powers, some of them unique. 
' Of particular significance to this study are the 
individuals in authority at the Board (parliamentarians and officials), together with their 
attitudes and actions. 
The top positions at the Board from 1847 to 18712 were the two parliamentary 
representatives (the President and the Parliamentary Secretary), the senior paid officials 
based in London (the Permanent Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries), and the 12 
inspectors for the poor law districts (who included the metropolitan inspector); two 
medical inspectors were added in the 1860s. The full Commission, nominally in 
charge, consisted of the President and four ex-officio major officers of state - the Lord 
President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but they "never met and were never 
intended to meet". 3 Effective power and authority was wielded by the President, 
Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and inspectors, subject to parliament's approval. 
In practice, because of other duties and habitually short tenures of office, Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb suggest, the Presidents of the Poor Law Board (of whom there were 
12 in 24 years) and their parliamentary Private Secretaries were less fully involved in the 
functioning of the department than their three Commissioner predecessors had been. It 
1D. Roberts, VIctorian Origins of the British Welfare State (Yale, 1969), 106-115. 21n 1847 the three-man salaried 1834 Poor Law Commission was replaced by the Poor Law Board 
headed by two politicians accountable to parliament and a nominal parliamentary Commission of four; 
in 1871 the Board was replaced by the Local Government Board. 3S. & B. Webb, English Local Government, vol. 8 (London, 1929), 191. 
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was the civil servants, the Webbs say, nominally the subordinates of the minister, who 
took the place of the three Poor Law Commissioners in the "detailed consideration of 
policy and the overcoming of difficulties". 4 
While there is logic in this assessment in terms of workload, the implied 
interpretation of the policy-making balance between politicians and civil servants is 
contradicted by a closer examination of the part played by the Presidents in the 1860s 
and also, as noted in earlier chapters, by the role of other political influences. For 
instance, the Webbs' claim about the Union Chargeability Act 1865 that "without 
detracting from the merits of the minister, we may recognise in the solution the 
achievement of the civil servants" is clearly inappropriate. The 1865 Act - seen widely 
as a milestone on the road to further redistribution, particularly in the metropolis - owed 
a great deal to the persistent arguments, campaigning and co-ordinated political tactics 
from 1857 of the Rate Equalisation Association. 
The Webbs reject a significant political dimension in favour of a major 
administrative and incremental policy-making role for civil servants. For instance, they 
suggest of the 1865 Act that "after half a century of confusion" the officials of the Poor 
Law Board had succeeded in resolving a range of problems which had "taxed the brains 
of successive generations of statesmen", and that "the indirect approach to the problem, 
suggested by the official mind, along the lines found to be immediately practicable, had 
proved at last successful; instead of the more logical direct assault of a position which 
passion and prejudice had made impregnable". 5 
In fact both politicians and administrators showed an acute perception of political 
implications when contesting or proposing changes in poor law administration, and 
there is little evidence of the Board being "the chimera of an agency acting free of 
political influence" that was claimed of its predecessor, the Commission. 6 The reason 
for this contrast with the work of government departments such as those involved in the 
Local GovernmentAct of 1858v and the Passenger Acts8 is the poor law political 
41bid., 192-3. 
51bid., 430-1. 
6Roberts (1969), op. cit., 134. 7R. Lambert, "Central and local relations in mid-Victorian England: the Local Government Act office 
1858-1871", VS66, (1962). 
80. MacDonagh, 'The nineteenth-century revolution in government: a reappraisal", HJ, 1 (1958), 55, 
58-61, andA pattern of government growth 1800-60 (London, 1961). 
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dimension emphasised, for instance, by Fraser, Caplan and Brundage9. In particular the 
Poor Law Board's involvement with the local boards - leaders in their own communities 
but also channels through whom central government might influence the activities of the 
poor and the destitute - was a major factor in its politicisation. 
II 
There were four Presidents involved directly or indirectly in the genesis or 
implementation of the Metropolitan Poor Act: the Liberal/Radical Charles Pelham 
Villiers (July 1859 - June 1866), Hardy (July 1866 - May 1867), the Conservative Earl 
of Devon, who led the Board from the House of Lords (May 1867 - November 1868) 
and George Joachim Goschen (December 1868 - March 1871). Devon has been 
particularly neglected historiographically, 10 or misinterpreted, with the result that the 
roles of the others have been distorted. A closer study of the manner in which they 
fulfilled their Presidential roles is needed. 
Villiers' career at the Poor Law Board indicates an identification of the interests 
and views of the parliamentary heads with those of the paid senior staff, for instance in 
the large-scale mobilisation of staff evidence on his 1861-4 "Whitewashing Committee", 
and the committee's recommendations, which were, to a significant degree, defensive. 
ll 
His long involvement in poor law questions - including participation in the 1832-4 
enquiry and the protracted struggles over removal and settlement - may have 
contributed to this affinity, and also partially explains his careful incremental political 
tactics during his seven-year term as President. 
When the Conservatives returned to power in 1866 Ayrton gave his own 
interpretation of the opportunities that had been afforded him on Villiers' committee. It 
9D. Fraser, "The poor law as a political institution" in (ed. ) D. Fraser, The New Poor Law in the 
nineteenth century (London, 1978), 111; Brundage (1978), op. cit., 183-4; Caplan, op. cit., 285-93. 1°Fraser (1984), op. cit., 93, for instance, overlooks Devon's Presidency entirely, calling Goschen 
"Hardy's successor at the Poor Law Board". "PP 1864 ix, op. cit., 49,51,54-5. The committee recommended placing the Board on a permanent 
footing, and resolved, for instance, that there were "no sufficient grounds" for interfering with the 
present system of medical relief other than with medicine provision, that the state of workhouse 
education, making allowances for various circumstances, was "upon the whole satisfactory", and that 
principal officers of unions and parishes should not be dismissed unless the Poor Law Board agreed. 
See also chapter 5, p. 127. 
210 
THE POOR LAW BOARD 
was, he said, "only when the existence of the Poor Law Board was imperilled, that 
official personages would consent to the appointment of a committee to investigate the 
operation of the poor law in the metropolis and other parts of the country". 12 A 
parliamentary comment two days before on a different matter has perhaps also some 
relevance here: that "there was a very substantial reason why gentlemen who were great 
departmental reformers before coming into office, should cease to be so after they had 
held office - namely, that official experience and information taught them that things 
were not so bad as they had imagined, and even that a great deal was right and proper 
which they had thought to be the reverse before. "13 . 
In terms of decisions to implement reforms, the unrealised undertaking given by 
the Liberal President in 1866 to introduce a measure "for more effectually securing the 
execution of the laws relating to the relief of the poor in the metropolis" 14 arose as 
much from the vigorous 1865-6 campaigns organised by Florence Nightingale and other 
major figures, buttressed by the workhouse scandals, 15 as from his own select 
committee's conclusions. (O'Neill's view is that the previous year "Miss Nightingale had 
apparently concluded either that Villiers lacked the qualities needed to convince 
parliament of the need for poor law medical reform or that the best hope might be to 
persuade Palmerston, the Prime Minister". 16) The triangular relationship that 
developed between Villiers, Miss Nightingale and the metropolitan poor law inspector, 
H. B. Farnall (who, according to his own account, tried to "push along" Villiers on the 
subject of a hospital and asylums rate) offers further evidence (if one accepts Farnall's 
account) that Villiers' style of central control was defensive rather than reformist, and 
certainly evidence that some senior Poor Law Board staff were closely involved in 
political activities. 17 Eight years earlier Farnall's political manoeuvres had included an 
attempt to persuade metropolitan boards of guardians to reject the Rate Equalisation 
Association's statistical arguments for redistribution; the executive committee's 
12Hansard 6.8.1866 col. 2102. 131bid., 4.8.1866,2066. (Reply by Corry. ) 
14lbid., 12.2.1866 col. 345. 150'Neil, op. cit., 270-8; Cook, op. cit., 131-5. 160'Neill, 
op. cit., 272. 17Cook, op. cit., 131-5; Nightingale Papers, BL Add. Mss. 45786, f. 188,20.2.1866 & f. 192,2.1.1867: 
letters from H. B. Farnall to F. Nightingale. (Farnall assured Miss Nightingale, who was anxious about 
confidentiality, that he had burned her letters. ) 
211 
TIE POOR LAW BOARD 
response was to resolve to write to the Poor Law Board protesting against his actions as 
being "inconsistent with the duties of the office for which he is paid by the public". 18 
When Hardy, the new broom, arrived at the Poor Law Board in July 1866 and in 
less than a month swept Farnall away to Yorkshire and the East Midlands - even having 
to fund the replacement inspector's sudden and unexpected transfer to London "at 
almost a day's notice" with a special payment from the Treasury19 - Villiers tackled 
Hardy in the Commons about Farnall's transfer. 20 Although Farnall had made himself 
unpopular with local elected representatives in the metropolis, Villiers defended the 
inspector's position, asking "whether his withdrawal at this peculiar time had reference 
to any ground of complaint that he (Hardy) had against Mr. Farnall personally, or on 
account of the manner in which he had discharged his duties". 
When the Pall Mall Gazette and Daily News suggested that the new President 
was supporting conservative officials (who had "captured" him) rather than reformist 
officials, Hardy confided to his diary: "Villiers, Farnall &c at the bottom of it all" and 
"the Daily News ..... aimed through me at the permanent staff. " Villiers, he believed, 
was responsible for "abuse" in the Telegraph about his transfer of Farnall and the 
implied criticism of Villiers himself, as head of the former administration. The former 
President, Hardy wrote, had also sent for Hugh Owen (the office manager whom the 
Webbs describe as holding "the most influential position in the Department"21) "and 
tried to pump out of him what I was doing! "22 (Farnall had also, it has since emerged, 
been removing papers from the office and passing them, via Miss Nightingale, to 
Villiers, but there is no indication in Hardy's diary that he became aware of this. 23) 
Such actions by Villiers after the end of his seven-year Presidency would suggest 
that he was motivated partly by simple political rivalry (as Hardy undoubtedly was also) 
and a continuing sense of "ownership" of his former department, but also by a 
continuing identification with the interests, attitudes and activities of some of the 
officials with whom he had worked. 
Hardy's short Presidency is simpler to assess. He clearly had a specific practical 
brief. to produce a measure acceptable to a Liberal-dominated parliament that, as in the 
18GL MS 1088/1,7.7.1858. 
'9M32/13 
, 11.8. & 19.10.1866. 20Hansard 6.8.1866 col. 2096-7. 21 Webb, op. cit., 196. 22Cook, op. cit., 131-5; Johnson, op. cit., 22,23 (10,15 & 16.8.1866). 23 Smith, op. cit., 171-172. 
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case of the 1867 Reform Act, might help "dish the Whigs". In this respect Blake's 
analysis of the genesis of the Reform Act is to a large extent applicable here also: 
24 
"informed, intelligent, middle class opinion" was calling for metropolitan poor law 
reform, and for party-political reasons Hardy had to produce an acceptable Bill. At 
Cabinet level the pressure to produce measures that would be political winners led 
Hardy to write that if they had time for them all "we must be in for some years! Such 
reformers of departments & general law never met. Who can call us obstructives....... 
25 
The new Conservative President took purposeful control of the Poor Law Board 
staff: as well as dispatching Farnall northwards, he noted the tendency of Fleming, the 
Permanent Secretary26 with whom Villiers had had a "feud", to "try to commit me to a 
course which I do not approve"; Fleming, he thought, was "inclined to take too much 
upon him, very civilly (sic) but pertinaceously", and to write on papers which ought to 
be dealt with by the President, leaving the President to deal with the civil servant's "milk 
and water". Hardy objected also to his senior civil servant's attempt to "tame" one of 
the medical inspectors, Dr. Markham, and told Markham that he wanted "his genuine 
and fresh opinion". Lambert (a comparatively recent recruit to the inspectoral ranks) 
would be, he decided, his "main help" because "he at all events is not obstructive" 
27 
The question of whether Hardy removed Farnall from his metropolitan post for 
political reasons - such as Farnall's close working relationship with the outgoing Liberal 
President or his commitment to policies that may have been unacceptable to the 
Conservatives - needs to be considered because it casts further light on the Conservative 
President's relations with the permanent staff. Hodgkinson, 28 in her sympathetic 
account of the medical reformers' struggles, suggests that the new President "punish(ed) 
Farnall for his activity in aiding the Workhouse Infirmary Association". Johnson 
(editor of Hardy's diaries), more even-handed in her analysis, suggests that Hardy 
24BIake, op. cit., 100-103. Similarly to Blake's analysis of the genesis of the Second Reform Act, the 
Metropolitan PoorAct was not, apart from one minor instance, the product of Liberal or Radical 
amendments (although background manoeuvres by Ayrton - subsequently also the mover of a major 
Radical amendment to the Reform Bill - appear to have had some effect), and there is no evidence that 
the Act represented true aspirations of Disraeli for "Tory democracy" (and indeed the nominee clauses 
provide decisive evidence to the contrary). 
z5Johnson, op. cit., 22-3,14.8.1866. 26Webb, op. cit., 196. Henry Fleming was a poor law civil servant for nearly 30 years: Assistant 
Secretary 1848-59, Permanent Secretary 1859-71, and joint secretary at the LGB from 1871 until his 
death in 1875. The Webbs describe him as "an undistinguished member of the Civil Service of the old 
2gJohnson, op. cit., 
18,22,24 (8.7,7.8. & 19.9.1866). 
R Hodgkinson, The origins of the National Health Service (London, 1967), 442. 
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disagreed with Farnall's particular plan for the management of the metropolitan 
workhouses and took the opportunity to reorganise the Poor Law Board's staff. 29 
Hardy's position as a JP, ex-officio Kent guardian and chairman of Quarter 
Sessions30 may however have played a greater part in the decision: Farnall's attitude to 
boards of guardians in his 1866 report on metropolitan workhouse infirmaries would 
have caused offence, and was in this respect in strong contrast to the report of Hardy's 
replacement inspectors. A comparison between the initial reports by Farnall and Dr. 
Edward Smith on the infirmaries and the subsequent joint report ordered by Hardy from 
the new metropolitan inspector, Uvedale Corbett jun., and Dr. W. 0. Markham, 31 
shows that the conclusions reached in all three reports on the physical and institutional 
changes needed in the metropolis were broadly similar, in conformity with contemporary 
educated thinking and in due course to be incorporated in the Act: that there should be 
classification of paupers according to their needs in separate institutions, that the pay 
and conditions of medical men and nursing staff should be improved, and that further 
buildings would need to be provided if these recommendations were to be implemented. 
The striking differences between the reports of Farnall and the replacement inspectors 
were in the attitudes they displayed to relations with local bodies. The replacement 
inspectors, in their courteously reasoned report, made brief, appreciative remarks about 
ratepayers and local poor relief and noted that instances of ill-treatment in workhouses 
"which have naturally excited the indignation of the public" were accidental and 
exceptional, with the neglect of the few unjustly being "indiscriminately visited by the 
public upon all". They referred briefly to the benefits of uniform standards being laid 
down by the Poor Law Board. Farnall, on the other hand, attacked guardians and 
called explicitly for a great increase in the powers of the Poor Law Board, a common 
metropolitan rate to pay for the additional spending required, and all additional poor law 
expenditure to be raised from ratepayers. 
29Johnson, op. cit., 21(3.8.1866, footnote). 30Hodgkinson, op. cit., 442. 31TIlLHL, L. 2541.335.1: Report of H. B. Farnall, Poor Law Inspector, on the Infirmary Wards of the 
several Metropolitan Workhouses, and their existing arrangements, 12 June 1866, laid before House of 
Commons 2 July 1866; Report of Dr. Edward Smith, Poor Law Inspector and Medical Officer to the 
Poor Law Board, on the Metropolitan Workhouse Infirmaries and Sick Wards, 26 June 1866; Report 
of U. Corbett, Junior, and W. O. Markham, MD., Poor Law Inspectors, relative to the Metropolitan 
Workhouses, 8 February 1867. 
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The arrogant and authoritarian manner in which Farnall presented his conclusions 
may have caused as much offence as the criticisms and recommendations themselves, for 
instance in his remark that there were "always one of two reasons which the guardians 
adopt to avoid building a new workhouse..... that the times are so bad that the ratepayers 
cannot then bear the taxation necessary ..... that the times are so good and pauperism so 
low that there is then no necessity to build a new workhouse. "32 Farnall himself was 
doubtless to some extent using attack as the best means of defence; he admitted that 
many of the faults in workhouses had been known to him for many years prior to the 
current medical campaigns for improvements. The same point was made two weeks 
after the report was laid before parliament when Hardy was asked in a Commons 
question "how it has happened that Mr. Farnall and others whose duty it has been to 
inspect these workhouses have not made known the lamentable condition of these sick 
wards until attention was directed to the subject by non-official persons? "33 
The Farnall issue is important because the question that arose, following the 
scandals, was whether the major part of the blame should be laid at the doors of the 
metropolitan guardians or of the Poor Law Board and its salaried servants. The 
Metropolitan Poor Act appears to support the position of the Poor Law Board, in that it 
weakened the power of local elected members, but, as has been argued earlier and 
demonstrated in evidence, the aim of the nominee policy was to maintain or increase 
gentlemanly control as the Act brought about government growth. Hardy was not the 
only Conservative minister to make clear his objections to the activities of the Poor Law 
Board's metropolitan official. Earl Fortescue, who had previously been, for four years, 
Poor Law Board Secretary, indicated to the Lords in 1865 that in his opinion Farnall's 
speeches and tone when in the cotton districts had been unsuitable. The metropolitan 
district, he added, needed a man possessing "soundness of judgement and kindliness of 
feeling" and who showed "constant care and vigilance "; 34 the implication of 
Fortescue's comments was that Farnall had none of these qualities. 
32Ibid., Farnall's Report, 7-8; Report by Corbett & Markham, 4,6,9; PP 18661xi, 598, minutes of 
the Whitechapel board of guardians, who concluded that if allegations by Farnall about their workhouse 
were correct, he himself would be implicated in the mismanagement. 33Ibid., Farnall's Report, 8; Hansard 17.7.1866 col. 939. Hardy gave the House Farnall's response - 
that he had made many reports to the Poor Law Board from time to time - but, as the newly-appointed 
President, did not commit himself further on the issue. 34Hansard 23.2.1865 col. 580. 
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The case of Farnall is symbolic of a major difference between the Presidencies of 
Villiers and Hardy. While the Liberal President clearly identified with the interests of 
the salaried staff and the central Board, Hardy, although the recipient at the end of his 
short Presidency of "the very hearty regrets of my Poor L[aw] Board people at my 
leaving", 35 showed a wariness of over-mighty central officials, using his position as a 
Conservative minister in a consciously political way to maintain, influence or strengthen 
the positions of certain local elites and professionals whilst also maintaining central 
political control. This conclusion about the Conservative tenure at the Poor Law 
Board, which may appear somewhat tenuous at this stage, will be further developed by a 
study of aspects of the poor law career of the next President, the Earl of Devon. 
Assessments of the governmental career of the Earl of Devon - brief accounts by 
Hodgkinson, the Webbs and (less accessibly but indicative of opinions that are likely to 
have contributed to the Webbs' views) a letter in the Chadwick Papers - are not 
particularly complimentary. However, some early letters about the poor law by Devon 
himself (Lord Courtenay until 1859) help clarify his political priorities and are relevant 
to an understanding of the genesis and implementation of the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
Devon' s poor law career spanned the divide between paid official and politician. 
As MP for South Devon from 1841 to 1849 he chaired the momentous 1846 Select 
Committee on the Andover Union36 that preceded Chadwick's downfall and the 
replacement of the Poor Law Commission by the Poor Law Board, a performance for 
which he received praise from both sides of the House for his conduct, "courtesy and 
good judgement". From 1849 to 1850 he was a poor law Inspector employed by the 
central Board, for the substantial period 1851-9 Permanent Secretary (until he 
succeeded to the earldom and was replaced at the Board by the long-lasting bureaucratic 
Fleming), in 1859 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and in 1867-8 Hardy's 
successor as President (despite Liberal protests at the fact that he sat in the Lords). On 
the fall of the Derby-Disraeli government, he retired from national politics. The reason 
for Devon's career as a paid Poor Law Board officer was financial - his father had been 
"financially embarrassed", and he was appointed inspector when the Liberal Viscount 
Ebrington, a relative, was Parliamentary Secretary to the Poor Law Board. It does not, 
however, seem to have been merely a matter of finding a source of income. Devon had 
35Johnson, 
op. cit., 40 (18.5.1867). 36PP 1846, v. 
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a very long-term voluntary interest as a country gentleman and JP in poor law matters, 
including 52 years as chairman of Devon Quarter Sessions. 
37 
The Webbs suggest that Devon "proved better fitted to be a member of the 
legislature and a minister than a civil servant". Under him, they say, the central Board 
"made no great advance in either vigour or efficiency". 38 Hodgkinson (writing from 
the perspective of medical interests) concurs with the Webbs, saying that Devon 
"previously supported all the worst parts of the old system, and as a poor law inspector 
had always yielded to the boards of guardians". Although Devon's Presidency lasted 
only 18 months, she blames him for the fact that the dispensary clauses of the 1867 Act 
were not implemented for six years. 
39 
A broadly similar view to the Webbs' but in much greater detail was expressed in 
1871 by the ageing poor law inspector Gulson, one of the long-standing inspectors who 
had worked with Chadwick from 1834. Chadwick, out of government office but still 
actively pursuing poor law and other public issues, had written to at least four of his 
former inspectoral colleagues about model unions, and Gulson's reply consisted of an 
attack on the policies of the Poor Law Board - from which he had recently retired - and 
particularly on Devon. 
40 Blaming the Board itself for an increase in pauperism and 
vagrancy, Gulson lamented the departure from "sound principles of relief'. No one, he 
said, had done as much to break down the proper administration of the poor law as 
Devon. "First as Secretary, & afterwards as President, he gave way to the most 
pernicious propositions. " In particular Gulson cited the allowing of "non-resident 
relief' (relief to local poor who had moved away), relief in aid of wages (a major 1834 
issue which Gulson said had now become "very common"), and failure of the Board to 
support auditors who had disallowed items of guardians' expenditure. 
37Webb, op. cit., 195; Hansard 28 May 1846, cols. 1409-14; Foster's Peerage, Baronetage and 
Knightage (London, 1882). Viscount Ebrington, MP for Plymouth 1841-52 and for Marylebone 1854- 
9 was secretary to the Poor Law Board 1847-51. 3$Webb, op. cit., 196. 39Hodgkinson, op. cit., 443. Goschen himself offered practical reasons in 1869 for the non- 
implementation so far of some of the 1867 dispensaries provisions (PP 1868/9 xxviii, 21st Annual 
Report of the Poor Law Board). 
40IJCL Chadwick MSS 795, no. 149; S. E. Finer, "The transmission of Benthamite ideas 1820-50" in 
G. Sutherland (ed. ), Studies in the growth of government (London, 1972), 13-19, names Gulson as one 
of several Poor Law Board officials who, "after contact with Chadwick...... behaved as though 
impregnated with Benthamite notions", and who were involved in a process he defines as "irradiation, 
suscitation, permeation" with Benthamism. 
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These accusations suggest that the Board - particularly during Devon's two 
periods of office - encouraged or allowed more generous and less punitive policies 
towards the poor and showed less sympathy for the auditors' role of policing local 
guardians' spending. Gulson's comment that "exception became the rule" under Devon 
suggests a flexible and less rule-bound approach by the Conservative peer. His remark 
that "... medical men and the ladies became masters" may indicate that Devon also had a 
political instinct for taking account of interest groups and sources of influence. 
Devon's own expression of his views on poor law policy and administration are 
available not only in Hansard but also in a few of his inspectoral reports in 1849-50. 
These are a more private and confidential source than his parliamentary speeches, and 
therefore particularly useful in assessing the nature of his contribution to the process of 
government growth at the Poor Law Board. Neither of these sources seems to have 
been taken into account by the Webbs or Hodgkinson. 
Hansard shows that Devon's publicly expressed views in his earlier parliamentary 
days occupied the wide middle ground of poor law opinion. He supported the 
replacement of the Poor Law Commissioners by "a more direct parliamentary 
responsibility", believed that poor law principles were "upon the whole sound and safe" 
and, while opposed to "a harsh and unbending series of rules and regulations", supported 
"that degree of uniformity which was essential to the just administration of the law". 
He condemned the Andover Union for its "very unnecessary harshness", criticised the 
Commissioners on the issue (but not as severely as some did) and (more unusually) 
defended Chadwick, on the grounds that he "manifested the greatest energy and anxiety 
to promote sound principles in the administration of the poor law .... and to 
improve the 
moral and physical well-being of the labouring classes". 41 
Devon's confidential inspectoral reports indicate that he saw the poor law 
operating in "the transitional period through which the agricultural population of the 
South of England of all classes will have to pass" as a result of "the low prices of 
agricultural products". There was a hint of class anxiety in his call for "watchful and 
anxious consideration" of the agricultural poor because it was they who would 
experience the most severe hardship and difficulties. 42 
41Hansard 18.5.1846 col. 1080 & 1083,17.6.1846 col. 680-2. 42MH32/1,11.6.1849, 
early 1850 & 15.1.1851 (shortly before Devon's appointment as Permanent 
Secretary). 
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This was the closest that Devon came in his reports to hinting at anxieties about 
rural instability. The only poor law guardians he referred to were "the more intelligent 
guardians" with whose ideas on reform of the poor law he concurred, and there was no 
indication of disagreement with guardians' exercise of authority: an issue that sometimes 
arose in other inspectors' districts, including the metropolis. Also absent were 
references to poor law discipline, authority or efficiency - apart from reporting that in 
hard times in some unions he had recommended outdoor relief for the aged and children 
in order that guardians might apply the workhouse test to the able-bodied. His interest 
in allotments places him among Brundage's "Tory paternalists" 43 
Two of his themes were to be relevant nearly 20 years later to aspects of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act. He distinguished between unenlightened employers (often men 
of little or no capital) who, fearing low prices for their produce, reduced wages or 
numbers of labourers in disregard of the effect on "the general social condition of the 
community" and the poor rate, and "enlightened men of the upper classes" who tried to 
improve the condition of the agricultural labourer, often in their own localities. From 
the example and influence of these more enlightened views, he said, he hoped for "a 
gradual extension of sound opinions and more humane feelings". The second theme 
was growing dissatisfaction with the removal and settlement laws; his generalised 
solution - reform of the law - became more explicit on the eve of his appointment as 
Permanent Secretary. The opinion of the more intelligent guardians with whom he had 
spoken, he wrote, "points to an extension of the area as well for settlement as for rating" 
- that is, in favour of union-based settlement (and therefore chargeability) rather than a 
parish-based system 44 
It is unusual to cite rural poor law evidence in support of metropolitan arguments, 
but the Earl of Devon's unique position as a leading member of the West Country 
territorial aristocracy who became a Poor Law Board civil servant and later minister 
makes his inspectoral views significant. His perception of wealthy "enlightened" and 
poorer "unenlightened" agricultural employers (and "enlightened" guardians who are 
likely also to have been among the wealthier members of local boards) appears to have a 
43A. Brundage, England's "Prussian Minister": Edwin Chadwick and the Politics of Government 
Growth 1832-1854 (London, 1988), 37, describes allotments as "a favourite device of Tory paternalists 
like Michael Sadler, who had proposed a bill in 1831 that would have provided quarter-acre allotments 
with government-subsidised housing". 44ME 32/11,11.6.1849, early 1850 & 15.1.1851. 
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parallel in the nominee selections that he presided over in 1867 and the role that they 
clearly were given on the Metropolitan Asylums Board of delivering expanded medical 
services despite the financial reservations of metropolitan guardians. His inspectoral 
comments on removal, settlement and chargeability suggest, however, sympathy with 
those in parliament who struggled to extend union authority against the 20-year 
opposition of the landed gentry; 45 some of his phrases, indeed, are identical to some of 
those used in the resolutions of the radically reform-minded 1847 Select Committee on 
Settlement and Poor Removal. 46 
The Webbs' criticism of Devon seems therefore to represent a simplification of a 
rather more complex approach to the role of central government regulation of poor 
relief. Gulson's attack indicates that Devon was no supporter of Chadwick-style 
regulation and Benthamist efficiency as ends in themselves, and similarly the analysis, in 
an earlier chapter, of MAD's composition and activities while Devon was in charge at 
the Poor Law Board shows that the President maintained his earlier aristocratic 
identification with the interests of the traditional wealthy local elites who controlled 
many boards of guardians. But Devon's explicit and consistent inspectoral support for 
the 1834 framework of union-based rather than parish-based control suggests an 
approach to government growth that involved accepting the need for social change 
while working to ensure ultimate control remained in the hands of traditional 
gentlemanly elites. 
Brundage's conclusions that the "purpose and result" (of the New Poor Law) 
were "to reorganise and strengthen the power of the country's traditional leaders over 
their localities", and that JP-guardians' tendencies to liberality helped keep rural areas 
"relatively trouble-free", clearly have a degree of relevance here. Similarly his finding 
that poor law reforms benefited landed magnates needs to be taken into account when 
noting Devon's support for reforms such as union chargeability and the freer movement 
of labour. Such interpretations cast a clearer light on the more comprehensive picture 
now emerging of the Conservative President's gentlemanly perspective when 
47 implementing the Metropolitan Poor Act in 1867-8. 
45Caplan, op. cit., 273-8. 46PP 1847, xi. (Nine resolutions are reproduced in Caplan's article. ) 47A. Brundage, 'Reform of the Poor Law Electoral System, 1834-94", ALB, 7 (1975,205; Brundage 
(1978), op. cit., 182,184. 
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In terms of the party perspectives of both Conservative Presidents, Blake's 
conclusion that their party needed, in the Derby-Disraeli period, to show that it was not 
"the 'stupid' party, likely to provoke revolution by pursuing a narrow agrarian class 
interest", but "fit to govern" and "the party of government"48 may also be relevant here. 
Devon's record prior to his Presidency shows, indeed, that his own aristocratic 
governing instincts coincided with such an approach, and places him somewhat far from 
the "red-faced country squires who thronged the back benches". 
49 
That both Devon and his Liberal successor, Goschen (and also Villiers and Hardy) 
followed an administrative rationale involving broad principles of efficiency and 
economy within a framework of orders and rules is clear from the voluminous and 
detailed Poor Law Board files, and is not disputed in this study. The two major Poor 
Law Board Acts passed in the two years following the Metropolitan Poor Act (under 
Devon and under Goschen) both sought to achieve greater standardisation of poor law 
provision under the Poor Law Board within the 1834 framework. Devon's Poor Law 
Amendment Act 186850 increased the Poor Law Board's powers to dissolve or amend 
unions, including Local Act unions and the 1782 Gilbert Unions, throughout England, 
and Goschen's Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 186951 specifically extended some 
of the 1868 additional powers over Local Act parishes to the metropolis and removed 
the still existing requirement of the consent of two-thirds of guardians before a 
metropolitan union could be dissolved; the central Board was also enabled to issue an 
order and make regulations "as the nature of the case shall in their judgement require", 
without the confirmation of parliament. In practical terms, by the end of his first year 
Devon was able to report that, in addition to getting MAD under way, he had formed 
five Sick Asylum Districts (SADs), issued orders for the election of boards of guardians 
for the ten Local Act parishes, and instructed 17 boards of guardians to set up 
infirmaries detached from workhouses. 52 
MacDonagh's legislative-administrative process53 is relevant here insofar as the 
Poor Law Board's pursuit of increasingly centralised standard procedures may have 
derived part of its momentum from officials' identification of deficiencies in systems. 
48Blake, op. cit., 104-5. 49ibid, 104. 
5031 & 32 Vict. c. 122. 
5132 & 33 Vict. c. 63. 52pp 1867/8 viii, op. cit., 15-24. 53MacDonagh (1958), op. cit., 58-61. 
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However, these two Acts were passed by Presidents anxious that their parties remain in 
power in the politically turbulent mid-1860s, and it is clear that there was a conscious 
political assessment of the legislation needed to achieve standards that a more widely 
informed public was growing to expect. Expansion of Poor Law Board power passed, 
therefore, through the two very different filters of the Earl of Devon's aristocratic 
instincts (towards paternalism, stability and prosperity) and Goschen's City 
businessman's background. 
But Devon's 1868 Act went further. It not only extended the Poor Law Board's 
powers to standardise the law and control local bodies but also repealed the requirement 
of the previous year that Metropolitan Poor Act nominees be resident within the area of 
their board. 54 The change widened still further the difference in the recruitment bases 
of elected and nominated members, in that elected members continued to have to live 
within the local union that they represented, whereas the elite nominees did not even 
have to be resident ratepayers within the wider area of their district board but could have 
property occupancy anywhere. It may have followed renewed requests from JPs, who 
had previously tried unsuccessfully to persuade Hardy to include this concession in his 
Bill as it passed through parliament. 55 Devon's willingness to appoint to positions of 
power any approved individuals, several of whom had rural estates, may indicate an 
interest in extending to the metropolis the benefits of gentlemanly control more 
commonly found in the countryside, and in finding "enlightened" and more generous 
guardians of the kind that, as an aristocratic JP and inspector, he had approved in the 
west country. 
The Goschen Presidency produced distinctive policies that confirm again that 
change at the central Board was driven not only by administrative considerations but 
also by political perceptions. The hand of Liberal policy was apparent most clearly in 
Goschen's Gladstonian economising - the application of a brake to the escalating costs 
of the Conservatives' generous plans to expand poor law services at the expense of 
metropolitan ratepayers - and in further rate equalisation: the addition, in 1870,56 of the 
indoor maintenance of paupers in workhouses and asylums to the Metropolitan 
Common Poor Fund. The Act also, however, tightened Poor Law Board controls in the 
5431 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 9. 55LMA MA/RSI/233, Middlesex April General Session, 1867, report of the Parliamentary Committee, 
28.2.1867, on Bills referred to them by Quarter Sessions. 5633 & 34 Viet. c. 18 s. 1. 
222 
TIE POOR LAW BOARD 
metropolis considerably by introducing financial penalties and inducements. 
57 
Guardians or managers who failed to follow the Board's orders - about altering or 
enlarging workhouses, providing proper drainage, sewers, ventilation, fixtures, furniture, 
surgical or medical appliances, or complying with classification requirements - would 
not be reimbursed from the Fund for that category of expense; on the other hand, a 
capitation allowance for indoor paupers, also from the equalised Fund, was to be 
payable only for a certified number of paupers, to encourage utilisation of facilities but 
discourage overcrowding. 
These principles of cost-cutting and poor relief discipline appeared also in the 
famous "Goschen Minute", 58 which regularised the role of charitable giving (in keeping 
with the approach of the Charity Organisation Society, set up in April 1869, seven 
months before the Minute, which "claimed to reconcile the divisions in society"59), 
defined the parameters of state action at the local level and emphasised "one of the most 
recognised principles" underlying the New Poor Law, that relief should be given only to 
the "actually destitute". The following year, in his annual Poor Law Board report, 
Goschen in effect called specifically for cost-cutting by metropolitan guardians when he 
suggested that they should make greater use of the workhouse test ("strict adherence... 
to the rules and regulations... . (for) out-door relief'60). In all, this was an approach 
somewhat different in emphasis from that of the apparently more flexibly-minded 
Conservative J. P. who had preceded him in office. 
However, although Goschen emphasised in parliament his intention of reducing 
extensively the costs of implementing the Metropolitan Poor Act, the only major cut was 
the virtual removal of four of the six SADs61 set up by Devon as smaller companions to 
MAD. Goschen, placing the blame on errors in Hardy's estimates and also on increases 
in pauperism and building costs, admitted that removing the SADs would reduce only a 
small part of the overall increase, but pointed out nonetheless that cutting them would 
57Hansard 25.4.1870, col. 1783. ("The power of the purse", Goschen argued, should be available to 
the Poor Law Board in place of the more cumbersome legal power of mandamus. ) 58PP 1870 xxxv, 9-12. The Minute was issued on 20.11.1869. 59C. L. Mowat, The Charity Organisation Society 1869-1913 (London, 1913), 1-22. 
60PP 1871 xxvii, 23rd Annual Report of the Poor Law Board, ax. 61Hodgkinson, op. cit., 505-9; Ayres, op. cit., 28. Hansard 28.5.1869 col. 946-61. Hodgkinson, who 
has written the most detailed account so far of the early history of the SADs, refers frequently to 
decisions, views, statements and actions of "the Poor Law Board" rather than of particular ministers or 
governments (with a few references to "the officials"); her perspective is mainly that of Dr. Rogers and 
other medical men. 
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also reduce revenue spending on management and administration of their boards and 
staff. 62 The figures given by Goschen to parliament (with gaps and inaccuracies) show 
that the SAD removal represented a deletion of only one-sixth (£20,000) from Hardy's 
projection for the SADs. Goschen's explanation that Hardy's estimates had been low 
because they had omitted the costs of purchasing new sites and of some of the furniture 
and fittings suggests extraordinary incompetence by civil servants; the fact that the 
obvious expenditure item of changes to workhouses arising from classification had also 
been wholly omitted suggests, however, that Hardy himself may not have been 
blameless. Goschen himself massaged the figures to some extent by presenting two sets 
of estimates, the first of which showed a massive increase in all capital costs over the 
1867 estimates, and the second of which then brought these estimates down a little. 
The differences, however, were startling: from Hardy's £360,000 to Goschen's first 
estimate of £1,400,000 and then second estimate (minus the four SADs and small 
reductions on schools and in MAD spending on smallpox/fever hospitals) to £1,050,000. 
(See Figures 14 & 15. )63 
Capital Spending Projections 
Per Institutional Category 
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Figure 14. Comparisons between Hardy's predicted amounts in 1867, 
Goschen's 1869 revised estimates, and Goschen's new 1869 proposals. 
(Note: Hardy gave no figures for spending on workhouses. ) 
62Hansard 28.5.1869 col. 952-5,957; PP 1868/9 xxviii, 21st Annual Report of Poor Law Board, vi. 63Hansard 8.2.1867, col. 173 ; 28.5.1869, col. 946-52 
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Capital Spending Projections 
Projected Tdals 
Figure 15. Comparisons between Hardy's 1867 predicted total, Goschen's 
1869 revised estimated total, and Goschen's new 1869 proposed total. 
The enormous rise in estimated expenditure over the two years and Goschen's decision, 
nonetheless, to maintain three-quarters of the programme suggests that despite Liberal 
retrenchment priorities he concurred with his Conservative predecessors on the policy of 
using high rate-borne spending as a means of resolving metropolitan poor relief 
pressures. 
Indeed, the only major cut Goschen did make - the four SADs - appears to have 
been forced on him by local and radical pressure against these nominee bodies (the last 
of which had been set up by Devon only six days before parliament was dissolved and 
the general election called64). The two that survived in their intended gentlemanly- 
headed form each had three powerful and experienced Devon-appointed MAD nominees 
committed to the concept among their own nominees: Poplar and Stepney 
(Charrington, Spence and Wigram) and Central London (Wyatt, Smith and Adams). 
The third element of "quango-isation" in the 1867 Act - the appointment of nominees to 
boards of guardians - was left untouched by Goschen. There was no financial reason 
to remove the provision and, perhaps significantly, the minority of unions (six out of 30) 
that had received nominees were broadly in the same two areas in which the SADs 
survived: the East End (five) and Central London (one, the controversial Strand union, 
over which medical men and guardians had clashed). Both of these were also areas 
where contrasts of wealth were particularly apparent, with wealthier employers or 
gentlemen working or living close to poorer tradesmen and labourers. 65 
64PP 1868/9, viii, op. cit. The Finsbury SAD was formed on 5.11.1868 and parliament was dissolved 
on 11.11.1868. 
65PP 1871 lix, Accounts & Papers, 465-99. The six unions were Bethnal Green (where the nominees 
included E. N. Buxton, brewer and MAD nominee), Mile End Old Town (where nominees included 
Spencer Charrington, brewer, who won the Mile End parliamentary seat for the Conservatives in 1885, 
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The argument that the demise of four out of Devon's six SADs was pressed on 
Goschen by public hositility is supported by parliamentary debates and Goschen's annual 
report; 66. they had been an unpopular concept in the metropolis since first proposed in 
1844,67 and as nominee bodies aiming to redistribute within smaller areas than the 
whole metropolis were clearly now the rivals both of boards of guardians and of the now 
acceptable metropolis-wide approach to redistributive funding. However, the fact that 
the four discontinued nominee bodies were probably politically the least significant of 
the six, and the other two were retained, indicates that the SAD concept itself was not 
rejected by Goschen. 
There are three further important points that one can note about Goschen's 1869 
Bill. The first is that one of Goschen's two named supporting ministers was Ayrton, 68 
at this stage the new economy-minded parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury. Given 
Ayrton's tenacious pursuit of metropolitan issues (and his objection, in the 1867 First 
Reading, to Hardy's proposed "multiplicity" of district boards on the grounds of 
unnecessary expense and inefficiency69), it is likely that he contributed to the content of 
the Bill. Second, the removal of some of the Conservatives' new cohorts of 
management and administration, and their replacement by enlarged unions in some 
cases, constituted a re-instatement of some of the powers of boards of guardians - 
although some smaller Local Act management bodies of longer-standing were also 
removed. Third, the new programme of union and parish amalgamations not only 
retained but extended the major institutional principle underlying the 1867 Act, the 
classification of paupers: an 1834 principle that, in the context of the new 
amalgamations, would achieve further rate equalisation within the new unions through 
enlarging the area of chargeability and would also further reduce removability. 70 
and William Newton, Radical and newspaper owner who supported Captain Maxse against Ayrton in 
1874), Poplar (where C. H. Wigram was an active nominee), Whitechapel, Shoreditch St. Leonard, and 
Strand (where Gladstone's son, W. H. Gladstone, MP, became a nominee but attended only three times 
in 1869-70). 
66Hansard 28.5.1869 col. 946-52,957; PP 1868/9 xxviii, op. cit., 17-18. 677 &8 Vict. c. 101, Poor LawAmendmentAct 1844. In contrast, Villiers' organisation of the 
metropolis into five poor law districts - East, West, North, South, Central - (PP 1866 xxxv, op. cit., 12) 
which appears to have been for statistical purposes only, and certainly did not involve either 
redistribution or changes in control, was unopposed. 68Hansard 28.5.1869 col. 946. 691bid., 8.2.1867 col. 175-7. 701bid., 
28.5.1869,959-60; PP 1868/9 xxviii, op. cit., 17; PP 1868/9 iv, 63, Metropolitan Poor Amendment 
Bill. 
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The 1869 Bill, it is clear, conformed with several long-standing political priorities 
associated with Ayrton and other radicals in and out of Parliament, and also with the 
interests of various metropolitan local representative bodies. At least initially, 
therefore, when Goschen was finding his feet at the Poor Law Board, there was a 
distinct change in political emphasis at the Board, with the interests of more radical local 
elected representatives experiencing a brief surge of support. This change of political 
approach -a process that had occurred also when Villiers was succeeded by Hardy - 
confirms that legislative direction was influenced to a significant extent by the political 
process. 
Subsequently, however, as Goschen's tenure at the Board lengthened, the political 
emphasis changed again, and support can be found, in this early period in his career, for 
the view of Cooke and Vincent that, while showing in some respects a "precisian and 
technocrat" approach, Goschen was by nature a creative manipulator, a rigorous 
theorist, and interested in "creating a new basis of power for an anti-democratic ruling 
party". 71 One of Goschen's biographers reached a similar conclusion: that he was 
"repelled by the idea of democracy, for he had no faith in the ability of the lower classes 
to govern the country and expected to be plundered when they obtained the vote. 
Democracy, he feared, would lead to equality". 72 This "anti-democratic" tendency in 
Goschen was apparent, it is suggested here, in his earlier days at the Poor Law Board, 
and may therefore have been among the influences he brought to bear on decision- 
making there. 
His Rating and Local Government Bill - produced at the end of his Presidency - 
which sought, by ground-breaking means, to increase local standardisation and central 
control while protecting gentlemanly interests (particularly town and City gentlemen, of 
which he was one), adds thematic support for this interpretation. The grounds given by 
Goschen for this and his other 1870 Bill, on local taxation - the "chaos" of existing 
systems73 - have been widely quoted. The content of the Bills themselves, however, 
and the parliamentary debates, suggest a somewhat different emphasis - on reducing 
local representative power - particularly when compared with a wide range of related 
71A Cooke & J. Vincent, The Governing Passion (Brighton, 1974), 84-5. 
72T. J. Spinner jr., George Joachim Goschen: transformation of a Victorian Liberal (Cambridge, 
1973), x. 73Hansard 3.4.1871, col. 1115-30; PP 1871 v, Rating and Local Government Bill. Neither of the two 
Bills was passed; although the first excluded the metropolis, the ideas it contained are relevant 
nonetheless when assessing Goschen's priorities and achievements at the Poor Law Board. 
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proposals from other sources, including those of the Rate Equalisation Association in 
1862, Goschen's successor Stansfeld's in 1874, Ayrton's 1867 select committee and even 
those of Sclater Booth, Conservative President in 1878. 
Two major elements in Goschen's Bill - increased central control and the creation 
of a single powerful figure in each parish - underpin his proposals not only for two new 
bodies - Parochial Boards and County Boards (or County Financial Boards) but also for 
changes in the composition of boards of guardians. A major advantage, Goschen 
pointed out, of his proposed Parochial Boards - which would virtually take over the 
functions of vestries, consolidate all local rates including the poor rate and have a 
powerful "civil head", the directly elected chairman - would be that decisions by central 
government ("parliament") could be implemented immediately; his chairmen could be 
brought together "for unity of action for any purpose whatever, a thing which at present 
is entirely impossible", and a central decision having been made, "the thing is done". 
The proposed voting rights - for rate-paying occupiers and registered owners, to be 
accompanied by the ballot and removal of plural voting for guardians - were 
appropriate Liberal elements for a post-Second Reform Act situation, but accompanying 
proposals were clearly intended as safeguards against electoral power. The County 
Boards would consist of the Lord Lieutenant of the county, chairmen of quarter sessions 
and other JPs, and an unspecified proportion of parish "civil heads" whose numbers 
would be approved by Quarter Sessions and the new Local Government Board. The 
perceived problem of there being insufficient ex-officio JPs on some boards of guardians 
was to be resolved by giving the various parish "civil heads" in a union the power to 
"select" additional ex-officios, either from among themselves or from those of a similar 
level of wealth. 
What Goschen was proposing here for the boards of guardians was a slightly 
different version of Hardy's Metropolitan Poor Act nominees, with parish "civil heads" 
awarding nominee, or "selected", status in place of the Poor Law Board; it would of 
course have been unworkable for a central Board to attempt to take on such a role 
throughout the country and, as noted in chapter 6, they appear to have had difficulty 
even within the smaller area of the metropolis in finding sufficient nominees. Goschen 
had emphasised in his first reading speech74 the stature of the "civil head", or Parochial 
74Hansard 3.4.1871 col. 1124-5. 
228 
THE POOR LAW BOARD 
Board chairman: he would be "responsible for the affairs of that parish" and, it was 
hoped, "the principal person in the parish". So here, it seems, was an extension of 
"gentlemanly quangoism" to the localities, with local elected gentlemen appointing 
themselves or fellow-gentlemen (whether JPs or not) to boards of guardians. The 
network of gentlemen, or new local elites, would be linked to central government 
explicitly through the Local Government Board's power to call them together to 
implement central directives, and through its power to control their proportions on the 
County Boards. 
What sharply distinguishes Goschen's proposal from others before and after in 
both political parties is the greater weight given by others to electoral representatives. 
The much earlier County Financial Board draft of Warwick (of the Rate Equalisation 
Association)75 proposed that each board of guardians or other local poor relief body 
elect a representative on the Board. The even earlier proposals of Milner Gibson, MP in 
1850-2 had been for equal representation for J. P. s and guardians, and the next legislative 
attempt, the 1869 County Financial Boards Bill moved by Knatchbull-Hugessen, Liberal 
MP for Sandwich, had proposed mixed J. P. -guardian boards. 
76 Stansfeld, Goschen's 
Liberal successor at the Poor Law Board, proposed in an 1874 Cabinet paper77 that 
County Boards should include substantial representation by elected local guardians, and 
all Cabinet members agreed, other than Goschen, who declined to consider Stansfeld's 
proposals; the major difference of opinion was on whether guardians should comprise 
part or the whole of such boards, and two Cabinet members suggested a third possibility 
-a wholly directly elected board. Sclater Booth, as Conservative President of the 
Local Government Board, proposed in 187878 that County Board membership include 
representatives chosen by rural elective guardians and town councils. The proposals of 
Ayrton's 1867 Select Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation of the 
Metropolis79 - which included amalgamation of the metropolitan boards of guardians 
with directly elected large district common councils - related to Goschen's 1871 
proposals insofar as both envisaged some degree of convergence of poor law and other 
75GL MS 7754,20.11.1858 & draft Bill for May 1860. 
76Hansard 11.5.1869, col. 604-9. 77T168/82, Hamilton Papers, Cabinet Paper on "Local Government in connection with Local Taxation: 
Mr. Stansfeld's Proposals and Questions with the Answers", 7.1.1874. 78HLG29/43,857,859. 
79PP1867 
xii, First and Second Reports. See also Chapter 4, p. 124. 
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local government administration and control, but differed strikingly in the fact that the 
Ayrton committee supported the safeguarding and extension of local elected power. 
This contrast between Goschen and Ayrton is particularly important in terms of 
the theme of control that is traced in this and earlier chapters. Ayrton was in some 
respects the Liberals' President-in-waiting whom the City would never have accepted, 
whereas Goschen, a member of the City firm of financial agents Fruhling & Goschen, 
was City MP 1863-80. Cain and Hopkins' comments on the symbiotic relationship 
between the state and the City, the City's influence on economic life and economic 
policy, and "the charmed circles of power" inhabited by top gentlemanly financiers and 
"those who controlled the machinery of state" are relevant to the political careers both 
of Goschen and of Ayrton. While Ayrton frequently attacked the City and was, in the 
Queen's view, definitely not a gentleman, Goschen was undoubtedly a City gentleman - 
as well as clearly wishing to place firmer restraints on local elected power than did a 
wide range of his contemporaries. 80 . 
Were there any distinctive differences between the attitudes to nominees of the 
two Conservative ministers and their first Liberal successor other than Goschen's 
extension of the idea to local implementation? Their major political difference may 
have been the traditional broad distinction of interest between the "town" and "country" 
parties: for instance, the question of whether Goschen's 1870 Bills and report were 
correct in their assumption that the burden of taxation needed to be shifted from house 
property in the towns to the land. 81 In terms of control, all supported major extensions 
of central administrative power, and saw an integral link between the sharing of a 
common purse and the distribution of power. For instance, Goschen emphasised, in 
1870, the link between equalisation and the further growth of the central state, saying 
that every further step towards equalisation must be taken in ways that did not allow 
parishes "to utilise the common fund without the control of those who represent the 
common interests"; 82 he clearly saw the common interest as being represented not by 
local elected metropolitan poor law bodies but by central government. In two 
anonymous articles written after the passing of the Second Reform Act he had described 
the Act as "nothing less than a revolution", but believed that "the classes who have 
80City of London Directory 1878 (London, 1878), 398, which describes Goschen's firm as "Fruhling & 
Goschen, financial agents, 12 Austinfriars"; Cain & Hopkins, op. cit., I, 26-7; Port, op. cit., 161. 81Hansard 3.4.1871 col. 1136,1142-3; PP 1870 lv, Accounts & Papers, 222. 82Hansard 18.2.1870, col. 572. 
230 
THE POOR LAW BOARD 
hitherto exclusively wielded political power will still retain ample strength to prevent 
their being overwhelmed by numbers" if they had right and justice on their side. 
83 
The puzzle of the appointment of two leading Conservatives, one of them Hicks 
Beach (former Parliamentary Secretary of the Poor Law Board under the Earl of Devon) 
to MAD during the changeover period between the Liberal Presidencies of Goschen and 
the radical Stansted may also be relevant here. 84 Although Stansfeld was by this time, 
as President, answering minor Poor Law Board questions in the Commons, and 
Goschen, as the new First Lord of the Admiralty, was doing the same for his new 
department, Goschen remained closely involved for some time with the Poor Law 
Board; for instance, his introduction of the Rating and Local Government Bill in the 
Commons on 3 April would have involved his working closely with the Poor Law 
Board's civil servants. 85 
Goschen would therefore have been in contact at this time with Uvedale Corbett, 
the metropolitan inspector, who, in a minute to Stansfeld, 86 urged that "not a day be 
lost" in the annual re-constitution of MAD's committees because of the "great amount of 
work" they were doing, and offered eight names to fill five expected nominee vacancies. 
The political process by means of which the inspector's list was drawn up is far from 
clear, but Corbett appears to have discussed the question with Goschen, who suggested 
a fellow-cabinet minister, who turned out not to be willing. The choice presented 
urgently by the inspector to the newly-arrived Stansfeld became one essentially of either 
two major Conservatives or two retired military men. 87 Whatever the manoeuvres 
behind the two remarkable appointments, it seems politically unlikely that the Radical 
Stansfeld had an initiating role, whereas certainly Goschen was actively present at the 
Board at the time and was involved in the issue. One of the outcomes of the new 
appointments was of course the strengthening of opportunities for gentlemen of 
83Elliot, op. cit., 157,162. 84See chapter 6, p. 167; Stenton, op. cit. Sir James Stansfeld, MP for Halifax 1859-95, is described by 
Stenton as "a Radical and Home Ruler". When the Local Government Board succeeded the Poor Law 
Board in August 1871, he became its first President. 
85Hansard 20.3.1871, col. 268-9; 21.3.1871, col. 339; 3.4.1871, col. 1115. 86MH17/36,17.3.1871. 
87The list consisted of E. H. Currie (Liberal chairman of the London Hospital and three years later one 
of Ayrton's general election opponents in Tower Hamlets), J. W. Proudfoot (an elected guardian whose 
seat was to disappear because of boundary changes), Alexander Ross (Conservative chairman of the 
Middlesex Hospital), Sir Michael Hicks Beach, MP, Lieut. Col. Hon. W. E. Sackwille West (retired 
from the Grenadier Guards), Lieut. Col. Arthur Fremantle (retired from the Coldstream Guards), and 
Dr. Thomas Jervis. Goschen's recommendation, who withdrew, was Dr. Lyon Playfair. 
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property, whether of the "town" or the "country" party, to influence the way that 
contributions to the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund were spent. 
Significantly, Hicks Beach articulated two months later a strongly-felt political 
reason for maintaining judicious gentlemanly control over local poor law bodies. The 
principle that every man had a right to relief if he required it, he said, "was a great social 
safeguard, and had much to do with the fact that for the last 50 years and more England 
had been free from the social movements and revolutions which had so often occurred in 
other countries of Europe". 88 
Having restored Devon to a significant position in the pantheon of four 1860s 
Presidents - as a power-broker and political mover rather than a mere inefficient 
administrator - and having cast a rather wide but, it is argued, relevant net in analysing 
Goschen's presidency, one can discern a presidential pattern. While Villiers, the former 
Radical and Benthamite, appears to have identified particularly closely with the 
machinery of government, his three successors, presiding in the new political 
environment engendered by the Reform period, showed a noticeable concern for 
gentlemanly power. Hardy and Devon sought to maintain a stable poor law 
environment under gentlemanly ascendancy even if this meant enlarging the extent and 
powers of the state, while gentlemanly financier Goschen, seeking to reduce public 
expenditure in line with Gladstonian retrenchment, nonetheless maintained the nominee 
provisions, developed the Poor Law Board's powers further, sought also to maintain 
gentlemanly power through novel local government proposals, and may possibly have 
had a hand in the appointment of two major Conservative gentlemen as nominees. The 
political priorities of all four, though varied, clearly contributed to the growth in power 
of the administrative state. 
III 
The nature of this growth can also be assessed in terms of the views of several of 
the Poor Law Board's senior civil servants. These were to a considerable degree not 
88Hansard 5.5.1871 cols. 300,306. Hicks Beach was opposing his fellow-Conservative MP and MAD 
nominee, W. H. Smith, who had protested at high metropolitan poor law spending, clearly in response 
to pressures from his Westminster constituency. Smith, it has been suggested, was not accepted as a 
gentleman; W. L. Arnstein, "The Survival of the Victorian Aristocracy" in (cd. ) F. C. Jaher, The rich, 
the well born, and the powerful (London, 1973), 239, says that Smith "remained fully conscious of his 
origins", and points out that in 1862 he had been blackballed in his attempt to become a member of the 
Reform Club because he was a "tradesman". 
232 
THE POOR LAW BOARD 
hidden but available to MPs and others during the policy-making processes of the 1860s, 
in that officials wrote reports ordered by the Commons and gave evidence to select 
committees. The 12 district inspectors, furthermore - the "eyes and ears" of the central 
Board - had their detailed personal Observations on the 1860 petitions against the Poor 
Law Board submitted as evidence to Villiers' four-year Select Committee on Poor Relief 
and printed as an appendix to the final report (although they may possibly have believed 
initially that their comments were to be confidential). 
89 
The evidence in the Observations of poor law inspectors' attitudes does not agree 
wholly with the Webbs' assessment, which was that their relationship with local bodies 
was "merely as consultants and visitors" - "never giving orders but everywhere 
explaining and advising, discussing problems and smoothing out difficulties". The 
inspectors were, the Webbs thought, "of finer function than anything that Jeremy 
Bentham had conceived, or that Chadwick had contemplated" and "a constitutional 
innovation, characteristically British", as well as being, initially, men of superior 
education and of a higher social class that most guardians. 
90 Clearly this was a 
somewhat idealised conception of the inspectors; Roberts' view, however, that in the 
administrative state personality and intelligence were all-important because Victorians, 
"averse to a powerful bureaucracy, .... put their 
faith 
.... 
in men" serves to support the 
case for examining the views of some of the senior Poor Law Board officials in the years 
preceding the Metropolitan Poor Act. 
91 
In contrast to the Webbs' assessment of inspectors' roles and attitudes, 1860s 
evidence shows that they and the central officials generally adhered to an emphasis on 
centralised efficiency and a Chadwick-like tendency to under-value or even oppose 
representative power; in a few cases there was also a desire to participate very actively 
in policy-making, Farnall, the metropolitan inspector, being a prime example in 1866, as 
noted above in the study of Villiers' presidency. 
89PP 1864 ix, Select Committee on Poor Relief, Appendix 2. The phrase "eyes and ears", originating 
with Sir James Graham, Home Secretary 1841-6, was first applied to the Assistant Poor Law 
Commissioners, and subsequently and often to the inspectors; Gulson and Sir John Walsham, for 
instance, used it in the Observations, as did Hardy in the Second Reading of the Metropolitan PoorAct 
when suggesting that the existing system of inspection of metropolitan workhouses was insufficient 
ýIlansard, 21.2.1867, col. 773). OWebb, op. cit., 206-7. "Roberts (1969), op. cit., 136. 
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Farnall showed noticeably hard-line support for strong central powers. For 
instance, when, in the Observations, the inspectors were asked to comment on the 
"proposition" in the petitions that the inspectorate should be either abolished or reduced 
in size, all but Farnall responded with reasoned, detailed explanations of the importance 
of their role as links between the central Board and the local boards of guardians, 
tending to emphasise the importance of the relationship with the guardians. Farnall, 
however, started with five quotations from authoritative sources - four from MPs and 
one from a committee of inquiry - and then concentrated largely on the authority role of 
an inspector: their mastery of the arrangements and statistics of every union, their 
sheltering of the poor from local abuse and local tyranny, their acquisition of "direct and 
distinct local knowledge" that enabled the central Board to "enforce its central power in 
any locality", and their role of enabling the President to be "as it were, everywhere 
through his inspectors..... to secure respect for and obedience to the law, together with a 
wholesome and strict economy in its administration". 
He criticised "humanity-mongering" (a Chadwick phrase92), by which he meant 
giving outdoor relief on a generous scale to the poor, and emphasised the inspectors' 
role in preventing guardians from abandoning tests of destitution such as the workhouse 
test, the stone-breaking yard and oakum-picking. Through such tests, he wrote 
approvingly, "humanity-mongering - which is still defined by many persons as the good 
old system" was repressed. There was a Benthamist tinge in his later comment that the 
1834 Act had been founded on the principle of providing for the interest and the 
"happiness, rightly understood", of the poor. 
Other inspectors also argued for more power for the central Board and greater 
implementation of the 1834 principles, and suggested that, rather than having its powers 
reduced, as the petitioners wished, the Poor Law Board should have greater powers. 
For instance Hawley, one of the original 1834 Assistant Commissioners who had 
remained as inspectors, pointed out that there were still Gilbert unions to be dissolved, 
single parishes to be dealt with, Local Act parishes and unions to be remodelled, and 
1834 unions to be modified. Lambert's view was that restrictions on the central 
Board's powers to order local authorities to purchase land, spend money above a certain 
92Brundage (1988), op. cit., 38. 
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amount or build or enlarge workhouses unless a majority of guardians consented, 
constituted "serious obstacles to the due and efficient administration of the law". 
Although, therefore, he was by no means the only inspector to disagree with the 
calls in the 1860 petitions for a reduction in the control of the central Board over boards 
of guardians, the metropolitan inspector's comments indicated a particularly strong 
distrust of guardians. Good management among guardians, Farnall said, was "partial 
and accidental, and dependent wholly on the exertions of some particularly intelligent 
person". When a "true system", he said, had been introduced into a country, there 
should always be "some supervising authority with discretionary power to maintain and 
regulate it, otherwise a relapse to false systems will ensue". Other inspectors remarked 
on the "malcontents" on local boards, "interested and ignorant persons" who objected 
to the withholding of relief from able-bodied paupers, and also on the large proportion 
of guardians elected from "the lower and less educated class of ratepayers" who were 
often "amongst the most constant attendants at the Board"; there was also the comment 
that while rural guardians tended to be parsimonious, "in commercial districts, where 
popularity more frequently animates guardians, there is occasionally a tendency to 
excess". 
Further political contributions by Farnall included his citing of "the people" or 
"the public" in support of what were clearly his own and far from universal views: for 
instance, that "the people" did not ask for a "restitution of the controlling power to local 
authority", and "the public" were contented that "the present system shall be maintained, 
and the boards of guardians shall not be allowed to exercise, each in their own locality, 
their own unaided discretion". 
Inappropriately, one might argue, the inspectors were also asked their views on 
guardians' electoral power being extended through the system of election by thirds for 
three-year terms. Although most of the inspectors had no strong feelings on the issue 
(and indeed, a few of them seemed uncertain as to the implications) those who did 
understand were opposed to it. Farnall, one of those who realised that extending 
guardians' tenure would strengthen the elective element, wrote that there would be no 
"beneficial result" in the change. It might be "the means of seating objectionable 
persons as guardians for three years, when it might be very desirable that they should 
vacate office". Andrew Doyle suggested that a "thirds" system would remove a safety 
valve, as "a great deal of parochial excitement passes off through annual elections. 
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Lambert, 93 later to rise to the powerful position of first Permanent Secretary of the 
Local Government Board, and a significant participant in the drafting of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act, also objected to "thirds", which he saw as aiming to make the 
office of elected guardian more "permanent". 
Lambert was clearly a key official. From the mid- to late-1860s his position 
appears to have been that of trusted adviser to Poor Law Board Presidents (including 
Hardy, as noted above) and also to leaders of both political parties on issues such as the 
rate-based Reform legislation. 94 Although one of the newer generation of inspectors 
who had not previously been on Chadwick's staff at the Poor Law Commission, he 
displayed what seem to have been conventional Poor Law Board values: seeking 
evidence in defence of the central Board when asked to do so in 1861 (by getting the 
written views of local personages "likely to be in favour of the existing central authority 
and mode of supervision", and then sending the Board a list of those "who either from 
their experience or intelligence will probably be the best witnesses"; 95 noting the 
problems caused by uncontrolled charitable giving - "when misdirected private charity 
assumes the form of public relief, and anticipates the application to the relieving 
officer", 96 and expressing early reservations about the activities of reformers such as 
Louisa Twining, founder of the Workhouse Visiting Society in 1858 (whom he 
described as providing "scant and feeble evidence" and making remarks that were 
"contrary to fact and experience, or based on a few exceptional and isolated cases"97 - 
inspectoral opinions that conform with Crowther's statement that the central Board 
"grudgingly recognized the society". 98 A Liberal from a gentlemanly Wiltshire 
background and the first Roman Catholic mayor of Salisbury, 99 he held, it is clear, 
conventional inspectoral and official views. 
Inspectors and other senior Poor Law Board officials in the 1860s seem, despite 
occasional forays into political fields, to have operated most commonly in the context of 
an 1834 administrative-legislative agenda that had still to be completed and that was to 
lead, inexorably, to greater control by central government. Those elements in Devon's 
93Webb, op. cit., 200-1; Johnson, op. cit., 29. 94Webb, ibid., 201. 
9532/30,17.1.1861, Lambert to Fleming, Permanent Secretary. 
96M32/30,28.1.1861, Lambert to Fleming. 
97MH32/30,19.12.1861, Lambert to Fleming. 
98Crowther, op. cit., 69-70. 99Gillow, op. cit., 98-106. 
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1868 Act and Goschen's 1869 and 1870 Acts (discussed above) that were clearly aimed 
at increasing standardisation and controlling the efficiency and effectiveness of local 
bodies would have derived a significant degree of their impetus from this long-standing 
administrative agenda. Another example of this continuity of administrative policy was 
Villiers' ill-fated Poor Law Board Continuance etc. Bill 1865; the rejected "etc. " 
included the power to direct guardians to make arrangements for better classification of 
workhouse inmates, the power to dissolve Gilbert unions without the consent of 
guardians, and changes in the enforcement of penalties for infringing Board orders: all 
passed by parliament later in the decade under subsequent Presidents. ' 00 
A twin-track pattern of government growth therefore existed at the Poor Law 
Board in the 1860s, particularly in relation to the metropolis. While ministers clearly 
addressed wider political agendas, generating state growth "in almost absence of 
mind", 101 officials generally followed the administrative/legislative agenda set by the 
1834 Act. 
The distinction between these two policy-making processes at the Poor Law 
Board - characterised in chapter 2 as Political and Bureaucratic Power models - is 
apparent also in the major institutional provision of the Metropolitan Poor Act, the 
policy of classification, which had not been insisted upon anywhere in the country prior 
to its inclusion in Hardy's Act but which, by 1867, had become a largely uncontroversial 
proposal, at least in relation to the parliamentary debate. The Webbs, in a detailed 
discussion of the widespread early rejection of classification of paupers despite the 1834 
Report's having recommended it, in favour of its alternative, general mixed workhouses, 
suggest several organisational reasons relating to policy contradictions, impracticality 
and the small size of most unions, and point out the influence of the Assistant 
Commissioners (later inspectors) in these largely administrative questions. 102 
However, it is clear that there was also a political dimension. Classification of 
paupers into separate institutions would generally only be feasible in very large unions; 
sharing facilities between unions might threaten local interests, at least as much in the 
counties as in the metropolis, and only became realisable in the metropolis in 1867 
10028 & 29 Vict. c. 105. The Act was passed without its 32 "etc. " clauses, becoming simply an Act to 
continue the Board for another year. '°'Roberts (1969), op. cit., 318, borrows this phrase when writing of centralisation. 102Webb, 121-33. M. E. Rose, The Relief of Poverty 1834-1914 (London, 1981), 35, suggests single 
union workhouses were chosen in order to keep down costs. 
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because it was organisationally consistent with the newly acceptable funding instrument 
of an equalised metropolis-wide rate. (Indeed, the least metropolitan of the 1867 
classification processes - the sharing of workhouses between unions - became, it seems, 
a "dead letter" because of continuing local opposition, 103) Ayrton pointed out the 
association between equalisation and classification as early as 1858, in the First Reading 
of his Bill, when he linked rate equalisation with the ability to "get rid of the want of 
division of the poor in workhouses", 104 but there appears to have been no Poor Law 
Board support, either ministerial or official, for this case for several years; indeed, an 
1864 recommendation from Villiers' Select Committee on Poor Relief in support of 
classification was only achieved when a "Popular Liberal" succeeded, despite 
opposition, in drastically amending a Villiers motion. 105 This institutional cornerstone 
of the Metropolitan Poor Act was, therefore, not an administrative but a significant 
political issue. Its acceptability developed not through the pursuit by Poor Law Board 
officials of 1834 administrative goals nor, initially, through the philanthropic campaigns 
of the medical and workhouse lobbies but, essentially, because it became part of a 
metropolis-wide poor law perspective that won political acceptability. 
A further possible influence on policy-making at the Poor Law Board needs to be 
noted: the copious in-letter files containing numerous unsolicited suggestions from 
individuals for policy or procedural changes. Hardy, shortly after arriving at the Board, 
told parliament that he was "wading through a vast mass of information" 106 and 
therefore not yet ready to embark on new policy-making. His search for a policy that 
would expand and fund metropolitan poor relief while maintaining appropriate control 
may well have encompassed such correspondence. 
For instance, one of the fairly recent in-letters (received while Villiers was at the 
Board) bears a striking resemblance to the nominee provisions that were to appear in 
the Bill of the following year. Thomas Massey, a London solicitor, suggested107 that 
the Crown appoint members to boards of guardians, or Visitors with the power to call 
in the Poor Law Board, to overcome the problem of guardian elections being dominated 
103Firth, op, cit., 485,496. 104Hansard 23.3.185 8 col. 633. 105pp 1864 ix, Proceedings of the Committee, 22.4.1864; Charles Neate, MP for Oxford, moved the 
amendment. 
106Hansard 17.7.1866 col. 939. 1075/17,26.3.1866, letter from Tho. Massey of 5 Grays Inn Square, W. C.; 1871 London 
directory. 
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by poorer shopkeepers and licensed victuallers; men of "more education and refinement 
and of higher principles and influence" would in these circumstances, he said, have the 
authority on the boards of "Crown servants", while at the same time rendering "willing 
and uniform deference to the proper control of the Poor Law Board". Another letter 
on the same theme of strengthening gentlemanly power was raised in a proposal from a 
Norfolk JP, John Hill. 108 Hill suggested physically separating ex-officio JP-guardians 
from elected members by putting them in separate rooms, with the ex-officios 
constituting a "court of appeal" that should have to follow "stringent rules" drawn up by 
the central Board so that they did not "fall into the error of the magistrates - giving too 
large allowances to the paupers". In both letters the proposed solution to a perceived 
problem was broadly the same: that gentlemen, placing themselves under the orders of 
the Poor Law Board, should resolve local spending problems through being in a 
position to control elected members more effectively. 
The extent to which any of the Presidents took account of letters such as these, 
some of them clearly from reputable sources, is of course impossible to assess. 
Nonetheless, they serve to emphasise that this was a problem-solving and policy-making 
as well as administrative department, and that in this environment senior officials, 
including the London-based metropolitan inspector, were in constant contact with 
external influences. More than in many other government departments, the line drawn 
between political policy-making and administrative management may at times have been 
a tenuous one. 
Irrespective, however, of any such fine distinctions or role ambiguities, the 
Webbs' dismissal of the existence of a significant political dimension at the Poor Law 
Board, and their major policy-making claims on behalf of the Board's officials, are 
clearly inappropriate, at least in relation to metropolitan policy-making in the 1860s. 
IV 
This study of the people at the Poor Law Board in the 1860s has shown a distinct 
"pattern of power". While the permanent stafFs continuing support for and advocacy 
of some of the policies and ideas of 1834 suggest that they played a significant part in 
1085/17,2.7.1866, letter from Hill to Villiers. 
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the devising of some legislation, the political contributions of the Presidents to policy- 
making need to be emphasised more than they have been hitherto. 
Changes of government brought distinct changes of policy at the Poor Law 
Board, although there was also a continuation of support for the nominee concept, and 
hence for the strengthening of gentlemanly power on metropolitan local poor law 
bodies, when Goschen succeeded the two Conservative Presidents. Opposition to the 
SADs and the nature of some of Goschen's later legislation suggests that his position 
differed in some respects from that of some of his fellow-Liberals and from Radicals, 
many local politicians and his former fellow-members of the Rate Equalisation 
Association. 
The Earl of Devon is a crucial figure in a proper assessment of the implications 
and implementation of the Metropolitan Poor Act. He was not the weak, incompetent 
official and President that the Webbs portrayed but a territorial aristocrat committed to 
the maintenance of social stability through comparatively generous poor relief policies 
controlled by "enlightened" gentlemanly guardians. Although it was Hardy who 
created the legislative framework for introducing this rural perspective into the 
metropolis, Devon's implementation of the nominee provisions, accompanied as it was 
by further increases in central control, showed a determination to defend and extend 
gentlemanly power in the Second Reform Act era. 
Both Conservative Presidents, it is clear, in establishing their party as "the party 
of government", were prepared to foster the process of government growth. They 
increased the powers of central government over local bodies in the metropolis to a 
remarkable degree, using the 1867 Act's new governing instrument, the nominee 
provisions, to maintain gentlemanly control of expanded poor relief organisation and 
financial systems; Goschen, Liberal City financier, in following them, supported these 
policies and developed them further. All three were prepared to order or encourage the 
spending of vast amounts of money on building and redeveloping poor relief institutions 
at the expense of metropolitan ratepayers, in order to satisfy demands for reform. 
There seems to be no evidence, on the other hand, that the legislative provisions 
studied in this thesis - nominees, rate redistribution and the Metropolitan Common Poor 
Fund - arose to a significant degree out of pressures from officials. They were the 
choices of politicians and therefore emphasise decisively the political dimensions of 
metropolitan poor law in the 1860s. 
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The metropolis and the country were not, said a leading figure in the 
implementation of the Metropolitan Poor Act, at the tail-end of a gentle and progressive 
transition state, but "at the snout-end of a fierce and bitter struggle". The struggle was 
between "a new, hitherto untried system of centralised social government and an old 
system - the most ancient and once the most popular of all systems", now in disfavour 
with all governments. 
This emotive analysis by Dr. Brewer, elective chairman of the Metropolitan 
Asylums Board and from 1868 Liberal MP for Colchester, ' points to some of the 
reform/reaction tensions apparent in the genesis and implementation of the 1867 Act. It 
was made in MAD's earliest years when conflicts of interest between its elected and 
nominee members were at their strongest, and clearly came from a significant 
spokesman. 
Brewer warned the Commons that the 1867 Act had placed guardians 
"not.... under the operation of fixed and known laws" but "under the arbitrary impulses 
of a central power which issued its edicts, according to the shifting policy of every 
varying controlling head". His attack on the operation of the new system does not seem 
to have arisen from sentiment about the "ancient" system, as his own parish had in 1867 
willingly surrendered its Local Act poor law status and was in 1870 to become the major 
partner in an amalgamated union. 2 His comments therefore provide support for the 
argument that the changes in governmental power brought about by the Metropolitan 
'Hansard 7.6.1869 col. 1356. Brewer may at the time have been motivated partly by the need to 
perform a careful public balancing act between his roles as MAD chairman, St. George Hanover 
Square guardian, past public opponent of the Metropolitan Houseless PoorActs 1864-5 (an initiative 
which had probably won him the MAD chairmanship), and Gladstonian Liberal. 2Hansard 7.6.1869 col. 1356-61 (Brewer), 21.2.1867 col. 752-3 (Colonel Hogg, chairman of St. George 
Hanover Square board of guardians); LMA, Notes on formation of boards of guardians: City of 
Westminster. Brewer made his comments in the course of a speech objecting to his fellow-Liberal 
Goschen's 1869 Metropolitan Poor Amendment Bill. 
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Poor Act and its amending Acts were recognised by contemporaries as involving a 
struggle for control. 
Brewer's "ancient and once the most popular of all systems" was doubtless the 
system of parish control of poor relief which was superseded in many areas of the 
metropolis under the 1834 Act and almost entirely following the 1867 Act. 3 His rural 
metaphors of "tail-end" and "snout-end" have, however, to be taken as referring not to 
the two different systems (parish-based and centralised) but to the nature of the change 
process. The contrast was between a gentle transition not to be feared (the "tail-end" of 
his metaphorical animal) and a potentially more aggressive change scenario. 
The evidence in this thesis about reform-reaction tensions embodied in the 1867 
Act confirms a "snout-end" interpretation of this major period of poor law change in the 
metropolis. The changes were brought about both by the radicals' pursuit of rate 
equalisation and by other pressures, but were also to a large degree the product of a 
desire to maintain political, but more particularly gentlemanly, power. As such they fit 
the Rational and Pluralist models of change, but suggest also a Political model. This 
was not, therefore, a "gentle and progressive transition state" moving by consent 
towards centralised provision of better poor law services. It was a struggle for control 
of the expanding state in which power over the equalised common purse was a central 
concern of those who hoped to benefit from it, those whose wealth was to be 
redistributed, and those who feared the consequences of unredressed grievances. 
The hitherto unresearched records of the Rate Equalisation Association, together 
with contemporary published material about the Association to which little attention has 
previously been paid, show that it was a radical reformist organisation whose ideas 
posed a threat to wealth and gentlemanly power in the metropolis, and that was 
therefore operating at the snout-end. The call for redistribution of wealth in support of 
the poor, with control to be exercised by a metropolis-wide representative body, was 
supported by poor law activists from across the metropolis. Vigorous radical support 
in parliament for rate equalisation strengthened the movement still further. 
The lack of modem recognition that this ten-year campaign was a significant 
political event can be attributed not only to the less than obvious cataloguing of the 
Association's records4 but also to several other factors. The career of Ayrton, the 
3See chapter 2. Also LMA, Notes on formation of boards of guardians. 4See chapter 5, p. 123. 
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leading MP on the rate equalisation issue, has been historiographically largely neglected 
(for reasons discussed in Chapter 5), and therefore some of the questions on which he 
took a lead in parliament have also been ignored (or, in some cases, seen through the 
distorting glass of contemporary animosity). Ayrton himself, as a Tower Hamlets MP, 
emphasised in parliament the role of East End pressure: a version that has endured in 
the pages of Hansard and the parliamentary columns of the press but which has also 
distorted the political picture. Hardy, concerned above all to get his 1867 Bill through 
parliament, similarly over-emphasised East End pressure while ensuring, through its 
provisions, that control of the common purse would not fall into the hands of elected 
bodies of metropolitan poor law activists intent on redistributing wealth radically to 
poorer areas, and providing instead for an extension of Poor Law Board and 
gentlemanly power through the Fund and nominee provisions. 
The state growth that arose out of the Metropolitan Poor Act occurred because 
two Conservative Presidents of the Poor Law Board and their Liberal successor were 
willing to foster it. They required, and authorised, the spending of vast amounts of 
money on institutional change and development in response to vigorous campaigns for 
improvements in medical services for the poor. Their responses were party-political to 
the extent that there were some differences of policy between the Conservatives Hardy 
and the Earl of Devon and the Liberal Goschen (though Hardy in particular focused on 
achieving the cross-party support necessary for the survival of his party's minority 
government). All, however, supported strongly the gentlemanly nominee and 
administrative Metropolitan Common Poor Fund policies. They all, therefore, it is 
argued, responded both defensively and aggressively to the threat posed by metropolitan 
radicals to the power and the purses of commercial and residential metropolitan 
gentlemen, at a period when the Second Reform Act was extending representative 
liberties. The Presidents and those they represented, as also the radicals who believed 
in a more substantial degree of rate equalisation controlled by elected representatives, 
were indeed "at the snout-end of a fierce and bitter struggle". 
The summary above of the argument of this thesis raises issues that have been 
considered, in different contexts, by others. Two areas of historiographical debate will 
now be discussed in the light of the above conclusions: the growth in government, and 
the nature of poor law local government and politics in the metropolis. Most of the 
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secondary sources have been referred to either directly or by implication in earlier 
chapters. 
It is clear that the Metropolitan Poor Act contributed to the nineteenth-century 
growth in government in that it established new managerial and service institutions and 
new centralised financial systems which needed to be financed, staffed and administered, 
and that it also established, in effect, central government's first "quangos" through the 
nominee provisions. It is therefore appropriate to consider what the Act's place might 
be in the much-debated subject of the Victorian expansion of the administrative state. 
Perspectives that need to be taken into account include the "pattern of government 
growth" discerned by Oliver MacDonagh, with its emphasis on the growth of systems 
and processes, 5 and other approaches provided by historians such as Anthony 
Brundage, Derek Fraser, Royston Lambert, William Lubenow and Jenifer Hart. 
At first sight MacDonagh's initial stage of bureaucratic growth - the 
"intolerability" trigger and "exposure of a social evil" - appears to play a particularly 
significant part in the genesis of the Act, in relation to the workhouse scandals that led 
to the Act's institutional developments but also in relation to rate inequalities, which the 
Rate Equalisation Association and MPs such as Ayrton "exposed" extensively to the 
metropolitan public and to parliament. However, Jenifer Hart's criticism of the term 
"intolerable"6 - on the grounds of its subjectivity, its elasticity, its time-scale, and the 
willingness to bring about change - is relevant here, in that, certainly as far as rate 
equalisation was concerned, the gross inequalities having been publicised systematically 
for at least ten years, there had been only very limited attempts to make the situation 
more "tolerable", for instance in the 1865 Union Chargeability Act, which was 
applicable on a national basis and made matters worse rather than better for several of 
the large single parishes in the metropolis. Indeed Hardy, reporting in retrospect7 the 
1867 decision to equalise a portion of the poor rates, made it clear that he had done so 
on instrumental grounds and not on grounds of intolerability by quoting a section of the 
Report of Ayrton's 1866 Select Committee on Metropolitan Local Government8 (not 
even a poor law report but one of Ayrton's many equalisation vehicles): "So heavy is 
the charge of local taxation become in the less wealthy districts that the Metropolitan 
5MacDonagh, (1958), op. cit., 58, and (1961), op. cit., 8,345-9. 6J. Hart, 'Nineteenth-century social reform: a Tory interpretation of history", P&P, 31(1965), 50-1. 7PP 1867 Div, 19th Report of the Poor Law Board, 17. 8pp 1866 xiii, First Report, paragraph 46. 
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Board is of opinion that direct taxation on the occupiers of property there has reached 
its utmost limits". The Conservative President omitted the accompanying more 
political and class-focused statement that while expenditure that reflected inequalities 
(poor relief) remained local, that which benefited the wealthy districts (environmental 
improvements) had been distributed across the metropolis - even though this statement 
would have offered further justification for the new poor rate equalisation provisions. 
That rate equalisation had political impetus - as opposed to being more closely 
related to what MacDonagh describes as "the great body of (centralising) changes" that 
were "natural answers to concrete day-to-day problems, pressed eventually to the 
surface by the sheer exigencies of the case"9 - is clear from the history of the ten-year 
campaign. Metropolitan poor rate equalisation was a collectivist policy in that the 
centralised sharing of financial resources enabled institutions and systems to be 
established that, transcending existing local boundaries, constituted collectively a more 
extensive provision of services. The political challenge for those in power at the Poor 
Law Board was to ensure that although local poor law authorities across the metropolis 
would jointly be paying the piper, the tune would be called in accordance with the 
established poor law principle of the dominance of property over population numbers - 
since 1834 through plural voting for guardians, and ex-officio JPs, and in 1867 through 
the additional vehicles of the nominee clauses and the limitation of the equalisation 
device to an administrative process. There is a clear difference between this situation 
and MacDonagh's description of a five-stage "legislative-cum-administrative" process 
that "spread like a contagion out of sight" towards collectivism, "... the corrosion 
working steadily for many decades". The collectivist 1867 rate equalisation provision, 
its form dictated by overtly political considerations, constituted both an administrative 
instrument and a conscious political reaction. Ironically, the first challenges that 
confronted the Poor Law Board's safeguarded equalisation system came not from the 
local guardians against whose unwise over-spending or under-spending the central 
department's administrators were supposedly providing a superior overlordship, but 
from two professional groups who almost immediately showed their recognition of the 
value of the new centralised funding by putting in collective claims for pay rises: the 
workhouse medical officers and the workhouse chaplains. 
9MacDonagh, 
op. cit., 65. 
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Lubenow'sl0 conclusion, too, that the growth of government (up to 1848) 
involved an incremental process of "cautious modifications", while bearing some relation 
to the tenacious tactical select committee "political incrementalism", several years later, 
of Ayrton and Locke, does not place sufficient emphasis, in terms at least of the poor 
law, on politico-socio-economic power conflicts. His assessment of poor law reformers 
as "proceeding according to modest goals and pragmatic methods", seeking neither to 
restore idealised traditional authority systems nor to create a new utopia, is of little 
relevance either to the genesis of the Metropolitan Poor Act or to the tone of the rate 
equalisation debate, which abounded in rhetorical flourishes. Rate equalisation 
campaigners argued vigorously for equalisation across the metropolis in many political 
forums, and MPs such as Ayrton and Locke aimed for small, limited policy goals only 
when, as in the final voting on Villiers' Select Committee on Poor Relief, bolder steps 
were inappropriate. 
More immediately comparable to elements in the Act's genesis and 
implementation is Royston Lambert's conclusion on the Local Government Act Office" 
that central government's scientific, legal and practical expertise significantly influenced 
the central-local balance - an example of "the extraordinary potency of technical 
authority in government at this time". The presence of several medical men on the 
Metropolitan Asylums Board, both as nominees and as elected members, from its 
inception in 1867, indicates a similar respect for technical expertise both on the Poor 
Law Board and on the local boards of guardians, to the extent of including these 
metropolitan health professionals among the membership of a politically-charged 
decision-making body. This was not only a "technical" decision but also a political one, 
in that health professionals had become a powerful interest group whom politicians 
ignored at their peril. 
The major characteristic, however, of the Metropolitan Poor Act's expansion of 
poor law services and centralised control was that it was conscious, planned growth 
formulated as a political response to reformist and radical demands. While the 
workhouse scandals represented in several respects the conventional "evil" to which a 
practical answer - the institutional changes - was provided, the financing and control of 
10Lubenow, 
op. cit., 67. 11R Lambert, "Central and local relations in mid-Victorian England: the Local Government Act office 
1858-1871", YS, 6 (1962). 
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these changes was politically particularly significant. These conclusions on the 
solutions devised and supported by three successive poor law ministers in the 1860s 
conform with conclusions reached by several historians on other poor law questions. 
Derek Fraser, 12 noting that social historians interested in poor relief have concentrated 
heavily upon social administration and ignored political dimensions, points out that the 
poor law was "a vital political institution, granting to those who directed affairs in their 
own community great powers and much patronage". A struggle for power within the 
poor law, he says, "was often part of a much broader contest for total local control". 
Anthony Brundage's contention that the poor laws, "vitally important in maintaining the 
economic ascendancy of peers and gentry" and "the area of the greatest involvement by 
the dominant interest group in society", were not substantially centralised in 1834 
because the Act reorganised and strengthened the power of traditional local leaders, is 
grounded also in an emphasis on political power. Particularly relevant is Brundage's 
focus on the pro-active nature of the approach of large landowners to poor law re- 
organisation. 13 In the later debate on the issue14 the common ground between 
Brundage and Peter Mandler includes the centrality of gentlemanly local political power. 
Daunton agrees that the New Poor Law was one of the legislative developments that 
represented a new order "without displacing the landed aristocracy from control of the 
central state". 15 
Caplan, tracing the eventual achievement of union chargeability in 1865 (one of 
the Metropolitan Poor Act's forerunners), comes to a fairly similar conclusion about the 
power of the gentry and aristocracy: that the reasons for the passing of the 1865 Act 
included changes in the composition of the Commons that reduced the landed interest, 
and landowners' concern for social stability. 16 This view supports, in essence, a major 
theme of this thesis: that while new services were developed because convincing cases 
were made for them through a pluralist process, additional provisions aimed to maintain 
gentlemanly political power and financial strength; the ascendancy of gentlemanly 
12Fraser (1978), op. cit., 111. 13Brundage (1978), 181-2; A. Brundage, "The landed interest and the New Poor Law: a reappraisal of 
the revolution in government" in EHR, 87 (1972), 27-31. 14p idler, "Debate. The making of the New Poor Law redivivus", P&P, 127 (1990), 194-201; A. 
Brundage (as for Mandler), 183-6. 
15M. J. Daunton, Progress and poverty (Oxford, 1995), 495. 16Cap1an, op. cit., 296-7. 
247 
CONCLUSION 
interests was a major factor in the passing of the Act for those who drew it up, most of 
those who supported it in parliament, and those whose interests it sought to preserve. 
The contribution of this thesis to the debate on the growth of government is, 
therefore, the assertion that one of the reasons for the expansion of state control in the 
late 1860s was the desire to increase gentlemanly power on local metropolitan poor law 
bodies as the common purse and wider spending requirements were introduced; 
gentlemanly power was one of the forces involved in the struggle taking place at the 
snout-end. The nature of the other forces - local poor law activists, radical reformers 
and their policies - will now be discussed in the light of conclusions reached by several 
historians on a range of related questions 
Crucial to the argument of this thesis is the identification of the rate equalisation 
movement and its major adherents as radical reformist, and their policies as among the 
most radical of the various alternatives available to a government intent on passing some 
kind of redistributive measure. The aim is to show that the form of rate equalisation 
achieved in 1867 was not the result of a gentle, agreed progression towards the sharing 
of financial responsibility for better and wider services, but a political compromise 
arising from a hard-fought ten-year struggle between radical reformers pursuing the 
interests of poorer ratepayers and the poor, and those within and outside parliament 
concerned to protect the power and the purses of the wealthier. 
17 Chapters 3,4 and 5 
present evidence supporting the contention that the rate equalisation movement was 
substantial and radical reformist, but in doing so these chapters disagree to some extent 
with recent major analyses that have not found significant local radical activity in the 
metropolis at this period. In particular Eugenio Biagini and Miles Taylor, although 
identifying as radical many elements that have been found in this study to be integral to 
the Rate Equalisation Association's rhetoric and policies, have either made no reference 
to, or rejected after brief consideration, the activities of rate equalisation campaigners. 
Taylor identifies the themes of public accountability, control of strong executive 
power and emphasis on popular representation (which can be found in Association 
arguments for a county model for redistribution) and the "pursuit of public over private 
interest" and concern about public expenditure (which were issues that Association 
17Hart, op. cit., 61, comments of nineteenth-century social reform that the role of men and ideas should 
not be belittled, and emphasises (relevantly for this thesis) the "considerable effort and determination on 
the part of men (even if only obscure men) who realised that it was worthwhile making a conscious 
effort to control events". 
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supporters pursued). 18 Biagini similarly cites popular radical policies such as local 
autonomy, self government, popular hostility to the expansion of the state and 
retrenchment. 19 While both writers generally refer to retrenchment in relation to 
central government expenditure, this term might clearly also be applied, it is argued 
here, to the policies of at least some metropolitan boards of guardians who tried to keep 
down local public spending while providing adequately for the poor. This interpretation 
is in conformity with Biagini's quotation from the radical Reynolds's Newspaper that 
"the great art of taxation in a well governed state [was] to spend as little as possible, and 
to collect that little from the people better able to pay". 20 
In terms of radical involvement in rating issues, Biagini makes two brief 
references to Ayrton's 1866 Select Committee on Local Government and Local 
Government of the Metropolis. In the first reference he notes only that J. S. Mill was 
an active member and that the committee had highlighted the "peculiar problems" of the 
capital, including its lack of "a system of equalisation of the rates". This committee 
was, of course, empowered to consider only the MBW rates and not the poor rates, and 
it is not clear whether Biagini considers poor rate equalisation at all. He concludes, 
after a further reference to "the commitment of J. S. Mill and the radicals", and to "the 
campaigns of A. S. Ayrton, Tower Hamlet's Liberal MP, in favour of the equalisation of 
the rates", that because of popular apathy, municipal reform for a long time interested 
exclusively the middle classes, and notes also Radical George Howell's lack of success in 
starting a ratepayers' movement in the 1870s. 
Taylor, concentrating largely on parliamentary Radical activity, makes relatively 
few references to other forms of metropolitan radicalism and, as noted in Chapter 5, 
refers dismissively to Ayrton's support for "the economistic radicalism of London 
ratepayer politics". This is his nearest reference to the rate equalisation issue (although 
his conclusion, in general, that "criticism of the tax burden remained a hallmark of the 
radical movement long after the death of Cobden and the demise of Chartism" needs to 
be noted. 21 His view that 1850s London municipal radicalism was "backward-looking, 
based on a romantic vision of semi-rural democracy" must refer, clearly, to the anti- 
18Taylor, op. cit., v, 6,31-2, 19E. Biagini, "The debate on taxation 1860-1874" and E. Biagini and A. Reid, "Currents of 
Radicalism", in (ed. ) E. Biagini & A. Reid (Cambridge, 1991), "Currents of Radicalism. Popular 
radicalism, organised labour and party politics in Britain, 1850-1914), 10,17,137-8. 20Biagini, op. cit., 138, quoting Reynolds's Newspaper 22.4.1877,3. 21Taylor (Oxford, 1995), 339. 
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centralisation campaigning of Toulmin Smith and his supporters, opponents of the Rate 
Equalisation Association, and has no bearing on the Association's advocacy of 
metropolis-wide elected control of an equalised poor rate. 
22 
Although neither Biagini, Taylor, nor other historians of radicalism and reform 
(other than Caplan and, briefly, Gillespie23) have recognised or shown the significance 
of the rate equalisation movement, it clearly has to be acknowledged as an important 
presence in metropolitan radicalism. As such, the radical reformist policies it promoted 
represented a force to be taken seriously at the snout-end of political change when 
Hardy set out to devise a broadly acceptable redistributive policy. 
From a wider perspective the Rate Equalisation Association's activities fit, to 
some extent, within Taylor's framework of the failure, by around 1860; of radicalism's 
political strategy of the independent monitoring of and pressure on government and its 
replacement by, or absorption within, parliamentary liberalism and the two-party 
structure. In fact, in a very practical sense the Association's important first joint formal 
meeting of its executive with its parliamentary vice-presidents in February 1859 signalled 
a similar change of direction when it decided to adopt a select committee strategy as a 
successor to its previous vigorous campaigning in support of an independent Bill. 
However, this change was in some respects more apparent than real, in that Ayrton's 
first ploy, in 1857, had been a motion for a select committee; furthermore, while on 
occasion the Association's E. C. found it politic to be less prescriptive about the form of 
rate equalisation they favoured, and to suggest that the actual choice of scheme be made 
by the Liberal government, they clearly maintained their preference for a radical 
reformist elective option, and pressed for this as late as January 1867.24 
It is important to note also that, after having operated very publicly at the surface 
of national politics for ten years, leading members did not disappear from the 
metropolitan radical scene but instead continued their involvement in poor law activism 
at their own local levels or in other fields. Warwick, for instance (as shown in Chapter 
6), from the vice-chairmanship of the City of London Union, attempted unsuccessfully 
to get one of the Association's vice-presidents elected to MAD's board of management. 
Gilbert in 1873, seeking a solution to the high metropolitan rates that had followed 
22Taylor (Oxford, 1995), 92. 
23Gillespie, op. cit., 135. 24See chapter 4, p. 107-8. 
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equalisation, and arguing in support, yet again, of the interests of poorer ratepayers, 
pointed out that the value of the land, buildings and revenues of the three great endowed 
metropolitan hospitals - Guy's, St. Bartholomew's and St. Thomas's - would probably be 
sufficient to build and largely maintain every metropolitan poor law infirmary and asylum 
"without the cost of one shilling to the ratepayer"; 25 this was, in effect, a suggestion 
that these hospitals' inherited wealth and income be transferred to public ownership. 
Ayrton, after achieving ministerial office, continued strenuously to pursue metropolitan 
radical reform issues, despite exceptional levels of political and personal attack, until 
defeated by a range of forces in 1874. Evidence about changes in the Association's 
tactics after 1858 and about post-1867 activities of some of its leading figures, as well as 
the large amount of information available about their rhetoric and policies, suggests 
therefore that the radicalism of the rate equalisation movement was not superseded by 
1860s Liberalism but continued as a strand within it. 
The other major area of debate in relation to the conclusions of this thesis - the 
composition and nature of local bodies - has been considered by several historians, 
although little such work has been done on metropolitan poor law bodies. Insights by 
Daunton, Davis and Owen into the nature of non-poor law bodies are, however, relevant 
here, and need to be discussed. 
A more general conclusion formulated by Ken Young is also, it is suggested, 
relevant when considering the structure and functioning of the new and modified local 
bodies established under the Metropolitan Poor Act. Young, pointing out that the 
Conservative record on metropolis-wide authorities was "one of unremitting hostility" to 
the concept, suggests it is a paradox that the London County Council and its successor 
(the Greater London Council) "should have been created by the very party which 
thereafter strove to limit and fetter them both". He dates such hostility to at least as far 
back as "a Conservative tradition of thought" linked to the writings of Toulmin Smith in 
the 1850s. Young's explanation for the paradox (an explanation that should be 
considered also in relation to the Metropolitan Poor Act) is that "matters of political 
strategy and tactics appeared to pose a contradiction between government rhetoric and 
government action". 26 The significant difference, it is suggested here, between the 
LCC and GLC political paradoxes and those evident in Conservative policy-making in 
25Gi1beri (1873), 4,9,10,307. 
26K. Young, "The Conservative Strategy for London, 1855-1975", LT, 1 (1975), 57. 
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1867 is that Hardy integrated his limits and fetters with other provisions within the Act 
itself a strategy which has contributed to their being overlooked historiographically. 
As Chapter 6 has, however, made clear, some of the fetters (in the form of nominees) 
were only partially effective on the Act's largest and most important board; it is this 
question of the control and policies of local bodies that will now be considered further. 
MAD's elected managers came from the same socio-economic strata as elected 
metropolitan vestrymen and MBW members, and indeed were sometimes the same 
people; just as membership of the MBW was drawn, either directly or via the district 
boards, from the local vestries, so the elected section of MAD's managers came from the 
local boards of guardians. Conclusions about the effectiveness of local non-poor law 
representatives are therefore relevant to an assessment of poor law representation. 
One of the reasons John Davis gives for the ineffectiveness, in his view, of 
London local government -a "councillor calibre" problem arising from the restricting 
qualification for office (which reduced participation) and the lack of either an active 
civic social elite or an economic elite - is contradicted in a number of respects by the 
findings of this thesis. What has been found instead in the study of MAD is that the 
"shopocratic" and tradesman tendency identified by Davis in the composition of many 
vestries as a result of the restrictive qualification for office, though present also among 
MAD's elected managers, does not seem to have adversely affected their ability, as 
apparently a fairly cohesive group, to achieve their goals. Indeed, the social and 
business elite drafted in by the Poor Law Board had some difficulty holding their own, 
and were defeated quite often until a constitutional change in the committee structure 
strengthened their position. 27 
The issue in 1867, it is argued, was not generally one of ability or calibre; if, 
furthermore, Hardy had perceived the problem as being a lack of numbers of potential 
guardians in some areas, he could have remedied the qualification barrier without even 
changing the law, because the 1834 Act allowed him to do so. 28 The governmental 
problem, however, was one of achieving politically different and elite, rather than more 
participant and popular, control of decision-making on metropolitan poor law bodies. 
27Davis (1988), op. cit., 17-23. 28See chapter 2, p. 20. 
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In terms of local policies David Owen, 29 also having found that the make-up of 
the new vestries and district boards was "what one would expect, dominated as they 
were by tradesmen, publicans, builders and solicitors" (with the exception of wealthy St. 
George Hanover Square), came to the conclusion that the metropolitan vestries seem to 
have been guided by "a penny-pinching, pound-foolish philosophy"; he balances this 
view, however, with an acknowledgement that vestrydom was "firmly committed to 
economy as a principle of local government", and that economy is "a legitimate 
consideration in government". Davis, despite his concern about calibre, similarly offers 
a corrective to a narrowly critical view of metropolitan local government - that "the 
tradesman and petty bourgeois have dominated the British local government system, for 
good or ill, since its inception"30 - and rejects Hennock's31 "attempts to correlate 
municipal performance in Birmingham and Leeds with the social standing of 
councillors". 
Evidence in this thesis not only confirms and extends these correctives but shows 
that MAD's elected managers were competent local politicians concerned about the 
effect that high spending would have on ratepayers, particularly in the poorer areas, and 
about effective redistribution of charges. The fact that there is often a clear policy 
demarcation between most of the elective local governing elites, many of whom appear 
to have been economy-minded, and the Poor Law Board's largely socio-economically 
superior nominees, should not, however, be taken as supporting Hennock's case that 
socio-economic status as such influenced the quality of local government decision- 
making. The differences in policy priorities arose from the differences in the interests 
that they represented: the local members had to be responsive to the needs of their 
constituents, whereas the influences bearing on the nominees were of a wider political 
nature. 
Daunton's discussion of the role of elites32 is relevant here. His rejection of 
Hennock's view that "elite rule was 'natural', and also that it was superior" relates to a 
business and social elite who correspond, in a different and metropolitan context, much 
more closely to MAD's nominee elite than to its elected local governing elites. His 
suggestion that what needed to be explained was "not the replacement of the elite as 
290wen, op. cit., 39,218-9. 30Owen, op. cit., 217-9; Davis (1988), op. cit., 18. 31See chapter 1, p. 13-14. 32Daunton (1977), op. cit., 149-51. 
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natural leaders by lower groups" but "why the lower groups as natural leaders might 
sometimes be replaced in certain circumstances by the elite" expresses a central issue in 
this thesis. In the metropolis in 1867, of course, the change was conscious and 
deliberate; the replacement or the reduction in the power of local governing elites on 
boards of guardians, district school boards, SAD boards and MAD's board of 
management was not a "natural" process in the sense that one might normally use the 
term, but one imposed by Hardy's Act with the aim of achieving control over elected 
representatives who were largely of a lower socio-economic level. 
The analysis of MAD's composition and activities has shown that the governing 
elites from the local bodies represented a threat to wider political and gentlemanly 
concerns. They competed for and won the chairmanship of the board of management 
and consistently pursued the interests of the local bodies to whom they were 
accountable, usually with success, despite opposition from the Poor Law Board's elite 
nominees. The nominees, on the other hand, selected almost entirely from socio- 
economically superior social, economic and professional elites, focused on achieving 
high rate-borne expenditure on an extensive programme of poor law institutional 
development. Their aim, clearly, was to establish a level of services that would satisfy 
the insistent demands of moderate reformers but would also relieve pressures, emanating 
particularly from the poorer parts of the metropolis, that might come to represent a 
threat to gentlemanly and business interests. Elite nominees on the other 1867 bodies 
were intended to fulfil a similar function for workhouses, local infirmaries and casual 
wards for the wandering homeless, where metropolitan paupers congregated in 
extensive numbers. While Goschen, the next Liberal President of the Poor Law Board, 
pursuing retrenchment, was to emphasise the need for centralised control of spending 
under the equalised rate, the two Conservative Presidents, with the assistance of their 
nominees, set about spending their way out of trouble with the aid of a compromise: a 
partially equalised metropolitan poor rate that made limited extra demands on the purses 
of the wealthy. 
Whether, from a different perspective, it was natural for socio-economic elites in 
the metropolis to seek to control elected lower leaders when the legislative opportunity 
occurred, is a wider question. It is clear, however, that such a process was embarked 
upon in 1867 and that it followed radical reform pressure, the extent and significance of 
which has not hitherto been recognised, for redistribution of wealth from richer to 
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poorer areas. A consequence of the success of the arguments for rate equalisation over 
a ten-year period was that the conscious, planned and more centralised growth of 
metropolitan poor law services took place within a context of gentlemanly ingenuity in 
finding new ways of retaining influence and power. 
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Metropolitan Movement for Rate 
Equalisation 1857-67 
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The Conservative government's 1867 Metropolitan Poor Act' brought in three types of 
change: to institutions, to local control and to the financing of poor relief. It provided for 
large-scale reorganisation and building of institutions, added central government nominees to 
local Poor Law bodies, and set up the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund. Studies referring to 
the Act have focused mainly on its connections with the origins of the health service or with 
East End hardship and distress, or have noted some of its financial results or its contribution 
to the standing of the medical profession. 2 There has been little research into the genesis of the 
redistributive policy embodied in the Common Poor Fund, which sought to 'tax the wealth of 
the West End for the relief of poverty in the East End'3 as a means of funding some of the 
social policy goals of the Act. 
There has been even less study - in fact, almost none - of a remarkable largely middle-class 
movement in the Metropolis4 that worked for ten years towards the Act's policy of redressing 
the imbalance of poorer areas paying higher poor rates than wealthy areas. Credit has instead 
been awarded, with differing degrees of justice, to a number of other candidates, including 
Florence Nightingale5, other leading medical campaigners6 and East End campaigners7. In 
fact it was several years before the intervention of Miss Nightingale and the Poor Law medi- 
cal lobby that a vigorous and highly effective campaign for Metropolitan rate equalisation 
began, and its major co-ordinating figures, apart from one East End representative, were from 
the West, the City and the South. 
The Association for Promoting Equalization of the Poor Rates and Uniformity of Assess- 
ment throughout the Metropolitan Districts (later to become the Metropolitan and County 
Association for the Equalization of the Poor Rates) was inaugurated on 17 February 1857, and 
its minute books run from that date until it was disbanded on the passing of the Metropolitan 
Poor Act ten years later8. For the purposes of this study it will be referred to as the Rate 
Equalization Association, or the Association. 
The aim of the article is. primarily to examine the characteristics of this organisation but 
also to investigate its contribution to a redistributive taxation approach. 9 
The Association was an early vehicle for the sort of co-ordinated Metropolitan political 
activity combining `local interests and questions of political principle"0 that, Davis and 
others suggest, did not generally appear in the Metropolis until the mid-1880s. Although its 
membership was based on parish delegates and its goals emphasised the needs of local 
ratepayers as well as of the poor, the equalisation rhetoric of the Association and its leading 
members indicated wider perspectives and interests than those merely of vestrymen trying to 
keep their local poor rate down. The resolutions, reports, speeches, petitions, draft legislation, 
Select Committee evidence and published works of the Association and its members provide 
many examples of their articulation of taxation issues that related to a wider discourse. 
The national context included budgets in which both Liberal and Conservative Chancellors 
- in 1852,1854,1863 and 1874 - allowed for a redistributive role for income tax. From 1853, H. C. G. Matthew notes, income tax and death and succession duties (all essentially redis- 
tributive in nature) `increasingly played a preponderant role' in Gladstone's budgets, and in 
0 London Journal 22, (2), 1997 
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1855 his aim was 'explicit and deliberate: to bring within the income tax the "educated" part 
of the community, leaving the "labouring part" outside the tax'. Buxton notes that Gladstone 
chose tea and sugar duties for reduction in 1866 because this would 'tend to ameliorate the lot 
and improve the position of the labouring population'. '1 
At the local level, relating the level of taxation to the ability to pay had been part of the Poor 
Law for over 350 years, and the 'Law of Elizabeth'12 was cited frequently in Parliamentary 
and other public debates in the 1850s and 1860s on redistribution of poor rates. 'Ability' had 
originally implied income, but difficulties inherent in the assessment and collection of a 
personalised local tax by unpaid officials had resulted in the retention of traditional methods 
of levying the poor rate on the basis of the occupation of land and property. ' The concern of 
the Rate Equalization Association for redistribution of the poor relief burden had roots, 
therefore, in principles of ability to pay deriving from centuries-old tradition and legislation. 
It was a concern the history of which far pre-dated redistributive considerations of nineteenth 
century budget-making Chancellors. 
Nonetheless, however traditional the objectives of the Association may have been in 
essence, they were clearly in contrast with the more limited, immediate and in essence static 
goals involved in the massive but 'temporary' charitable baling out of East End hardship by 
West End volunteers which occurred particularly in the harsh winters of 1860-61 and 1866- 
67.1E To raise the question of the incidence of local taxation ('one of the great and constant 
preoccupations of Victorian and Edwardian politics' 15) - and particularly the wealth-poverty 
axis - was dynamic, in that the mere raising of the issue postulated redistributive change. 
Of the tax comparisons of particular concern to the Association - inequality between poorer 
and wealthier rating districts, and the balance between local and national taxation powers - 
the first appeared in a number of respects to be satisfied in 1867 by the Metropolitan Common 
Poor Fund. The Fund was to finance local revenue spending through direct, progressive and 
redistributive taxation based on annual rateable value. The second concern was, however, 
resolved less satisfactorily in terms of Association policies. The Act established direct central 
control of the new Fund - while nonetheless steering well clear of funding an expansion of 
Poor Law spending from the national budget - and also gave the central Poor Law Board the 
power to place its own nominees on local boards where revenue and capital spending deci- 
sions were made. 
With the aim of casting further light on the part the Association played in the development 
of these extended redistributive poor relief policies, three aspects of its role will be examined: 
its membership, its tactics and alliances, and its rhetoric and policies. 
Membership of the rate equalization association 
The 1857 launch was not the first Metropolitan attempt at getting a redistributive campaign 
off the ground, but the new Association was by far the most effective. It was set up as a body 
to which Metropolitan parish vestries, Boards of Guardians and similar local bodies sent their 
nominees. Constitutionally it functioned at two levels: the large Central (also called General) 
Committee, which met only occasionally, and the smaller, very active Executive Committee, 
which met often weekly or fortnightly. The role of the Central Committee developed into one 
of validating the activities and recommendations of the energetic Executive and confirming 
the Association's broad institutional base. Geographically the new Association gained its 
major support not from the East End, but from the West, the City and the South; indeed, the 
initiating parish was Kensington. Fully involved within the first month were delegates from 
Kensington, Chelsea, Fulham, and St. Andrew Holborn (West); Lambeth, Bermondsey, St. 
George the Martyr, St. Thomas and Christ Church Southwark, Wandsworth and Tooting 
(South); St. Ann Blackfriars, St. Bartholomew the Great, St. Katherine Cree, All Hallows, St. 
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Soith 
Note 
West: 5 (Kensington, Chelsea, Holborn, 
Fulham, Hammersmith) 
South: 7 (Lambeth 3, Southwark 2. 
Bermondsey, Wandsworth) 
City: 3 (St. Ann Blackfriars 2. Aldgate 1) 
East: 2 (Shoreditch. Limehouse) 
(Source: GL MS 1088/2, Report to General 
Committee 7.7.1857 ) 
Figure 1. Composition of Executive Committee July 1857 
(5) 
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Dionis Backchurch and St. Olave Silver Street (City); and St. Mary Whitechapel and Lime- 
house (East). Within three months of the formation of the Association, delegates and/or sup- 
port had been received also from Hammersmith (West); St. James Dukes Place and All 
Hallows by the Wall (City); Camberwell, Rotherhithe, Greenwich and St. Nicholas Deptford 
(South); and St. George in the East and St. Leonard Shoreditch (East). " 
This gives an initial count of 5 from the West, 8 from the City, 11 from the South and four 
from the East End: a total of 28 parishes. Although this simple head-count does not take into 
account the size of the parishes or the number of delegates they sent (or the fact that in nine 
cases the parish was also the local Poor Law authority) it nevertheless indicates that there was 
a wide spread of interest across the Metropolis in the goals of the new Association, and that 
the parishes of the East End were in a minority. The two great West End parishes of Maryle- 
bone and St. Pancras, and their neighbour St. George Hanover Square, with its particularly 
large proportion of wealthy inhabitants - who stood to lose most from a rate equalisation 
policy - declined to participate in the movement, as did the smaller parishes in the heart of the 
West End. 
The extent of interest shown in rate equalisation was in fact even wider than the initial list 
indicates, in that 150 of the 188 Metropolitan parishes had 'consented' to the holding of a 
public meeting two days before, chaired by the Lord Mayor, and 500 parochial officers had 
signed the requisition for the meeting. " (This large number of parishes indicates that the City 
of London Union, with its 98 small parishes, was among those consenting). When it came to 
nominating individuals to attend the General and Executive Committees, the figures are also 
sizeable when compared with the maximum possible. Of 38 local Poor Law authorities in the 
Metropolis, 20 were represented geographically on the EC, either as a whole or by one or 
more of their individual parishes. '8 
The composition of the 15-strong Executive Committee19 confirms that it was from the 
West, the South and the City that the predominant support came; there were only two East End 
representatives, and only one of them had a reasonable attendance. The EC and Central Com- 
mittee members were mainly small local businessmen, professional men, small shopkeepers 
and tradesmen. 
The man chosen as Chairman, William Gilbert of Kensington, a man of intellectual as well 
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as political vigour, of independent means, and previously a surgeon, was a Kensington vestry- 
man, and it was in this role that he had moved for the setting up of the special vestry commit- 
tee that was to lead to the establishment of the Rate Equalisation Association. Gilbert himself 
later emphasised the instrumentality of the Metropolitan Board of Works from 1855 in bring- 
ing Metropolitan vestries together frequently in `combinations ... for the purpose of carrying 
out some object for their common good. ' However, he himself was not a member of the 
MBW, and it is clear that it was from the Kensington vestry that the actual initiating move 
came. 
In addition to his political publications Gilbert, a member of the Reform Club, wrote 
several novels, some of them dealing with `his favourite subject, the deepening contrast 
between the lots of rich and poor', and he was the father of W. S. Gilbert of Gilbert & Sullivan 
fame. (The younger Gilbert is reported to have said, 'He thought that if I could write, anybody 
could'). The family connection with the Rate Equalization Association may have contributed, 
in 1873, to the younger Gilbert's hilarious burlesque, 'The Happy Land'. ° 
Robert E. Warwick, one of the Secretaries, was a grocer and tea-dealer by trade but also an 
articulate and prolific writer and speaker on poor law affairs. He was one of the founders and 
joint secretary of the Association's largely City-based predecessor, The Metropolitan Associa- 
tion for the Abolition of the Laws of Settlement and Poor Removal and the Equalization of the 
Poor Rate, and was to become a City Common Councilman for St. Ann Blackfriars and Vice- 
Chairman of the City of London Poor Law Union. It was probably through Warwick that 
papers and minute books of the Association have survived? ' 
Francis Hayman Fowler, the other Secretary, a Lambeth architect and surveyor, was later 
Lambeth member of the Metropolitan Board of Works for 20 years (and was accused by a 
Royal Commission in 1888 of voting and acting improperly on MBW committees for profes- 
sional and private gain) 22 John Blachford, Vice-Chairman, of Fulham, was an Irish-born 
solicitor who had practised in London for over 40 years, and by 1861 had been a Fulham 
Guardian for 14 years and chairman of the Board for seven. 23 
Another major figure on the EC was John Day, a multi-purpose local government officer in 
Southwark St. George, one of the parish's first guardians under the 1834 Act, an occasional 
Poor Law auditor and a writer on rate equalisation. Day had drawn up a Bill in 1853 with 
Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark, for national rate equalisation that had not survived its First 
Reading, and had been involved in two previous rate equalisation associations. 24 
There was, not unexpectedly, a tendency for Central Committee delegates from the same 
parish to come from similar occupational classes. For instance, two of John Blachford's fel- 
low members from Fulham were also professionals: John E. Panter, a barrister (in a two- 
servant household), and Thomas Cooper, headmaster of a 65-pupil boys' school. The fourth 
Fulham member, William. Deller, whilst not a professional man, was a substantial market 
gardener, with 60 acres and 20 employees 25 
The small City parish of St Dionis Backchurch sent a solicitor, but the occupations of other 
members from the City reflected the square mile's retailing and small tradesman sector: two 
jewellers, a linen-draper, a hairdresser, a coffee shop proprietor, a printing proprietor, a tin- 
plate maker, a net and tent maker, the owner of a silk and ribbon dyeing, embossing and 
printing business, and a seedsman and florist (who was probably also leech importer, sponge 
dealer and herbalist). Riverside Bermondsey sent practical entrepreneurs involved in local 
trades: a wharfinger and a young builder employing 27 men. From neighbouring Southwark 
came mainly shopkeepers and tradesmen: baker, chemist, coal merchant, tin-plate worker, 
pawnbroker, bootmaker and two woollen drapers, and also a doctor. Still on the South side of 
the river but further to the West, parishes sent three landlords, an insurance company manager, 
hop and hemp merchants, a doctor and a surveyor. 26 
There was little difference between the occupations of the South/West/City representation 
and those from the East End: a brush and turnery manufacturer, a coffee rooms proprietor, a 
stationer and a pawnbroker. The most apparent difference was their number. 27 
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However, although the East End's secular representation was limited, East End parish 
clergy gave the Association 'invaluable aid' from an early stage. When a meeting on rate 
equalisation was held in St. George in the East it was a clergyman, the remarkable Rev. G., H. 
M'Gill (who, as "An East-End Incumbent", wrote letters on rate equalisation to The Times), 
who convened it in the George Tavern in Commercial Road. Either around the same time or a 
few months later, a separate Tower Hamlets Association was set up, with strong support from 
the clergy, and the two associations agreed to assist each other 'to the best of their abilities'. 
M'Gill, elected chairman of the Tower Hamlets Association, attended the Rate Equalization 
Association's EC on a fairly frequent though irregular basis 28 
The brief study above of EC and Central Committee members indicates that, drawn as they 
were almost entirely from local bodies in the west, south and centre of the Metropolis, they 
reflected a significant middle-class and tradesman interest in these areas in rate equalisation. 
Tactics and alliances 
The Rate Equalization Association's activities showed a sharp perception of where its strengths 
and its potential for success lay - in the generation of public support for change, in the build- 
ing of links with those who had the potential for changing the law (the Members of Parlia- 
ment) and in the seizing of every opportunity to promote their cause. 
One of the most public demonstrations of the Association's consciousness of the importance 
of alliances and the building of significant support was the enrolment of over 60 Vice- 
Presidents in its cause, the Central Committee having resolved to 'solicit Noblemen and other 
influential gentlemen to become Vice Presidents of the Association '29 
The tally of over 60 influential gentlemen included the Lord Mayor of London and over 30 
MPs. 30 They never did settle on an agreed and willing person for the top job of President. 
Perhaps having 60 influential Vice-Presidents was found to be an acceptable compromise; it 
certainly avoided the danger of the executive power of the EC becoming diluted. 
Although only 11 MP-Vice Presidents were in Parliament continuously from 1858 to 1867 
(election losses and other external factors taking their toll), a further eight were there for a 
substantial part of these years, and another eight in the earlier years only; all but two were 
Liberals or Reformers. They were mainly backbenchers, with only three ever holding govern- 
ment office. The three included Acton Smee Ayrton, MP for Tower Hamlets, 31 who played an 
exceptionally active part in the campaign for the ten years of the Association's existence. 
Many of the MP-Vice Presidents were dually influential in that they held significant posi- 
tions in commerce, manufacturing and trade. For instance Robert Crawford, MP for the City 
of London, was a Director of the Bank of England (and previously Deputy-Governor), Chair- 
man of the East Indian Railway and an East India Proprietor. Sir William Tite, MP for Bath, 
was Chairman of the Bank of Egypt, a Director of the London & Westminster Bank, and 
President of the Institute of British Architects. Herbert Ingram, MP for Boston, who met an 
untimely death by drowning in Lake Michigan in 1860, was Proprietor and Manager of the 
Illustrated London News. William Schneider, MP for Norwich and later for Leicester, was a 
merchant and shipowner. William Cubitt, MP for Andover and Lord Mayor of London 1860- 
62, was one of the founding brothers of the wealthy building firm. 
Merchants included City of London Alderman (and former Lord Mayor) Thomas Sidney, 
MP for Stafford and tea dealer and importer; James White, former Alderman, MP for 
Plymouth, and a merchant chiefly engaged in trade with China; Peter Rolt, Conservative MP 
for Greenwich to 1857 and a timber merchant and contractor; Samuel Morley, MP for Not- 
tingham and then Bristol; member of a firm of wholesale hosiers (and also a leading Radical 
involved in the Administrative Reform Association32); R. J. R. Campbell, MP for Weymouth, 
merchant in Bengal and London, and author of works on banking and exchange; William 
Price, MP for Gloucester, a timber merchant and later a Railway Commissioner, and William 








Figure 2. The leading Parliamentary campaigner for rate equalisation, Acton Smee Ayrton, MP for 
Tower Hamlets 1857-74. From Illustrated Leindon News, 16 May 1857. (By permission of the 
University of London Library). 
Manufacturers included Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark and head of a Southwark glass 
manufacturing firm; E. G. Salisbury, MP for Chester and proprietor of extensive gasworks; 
Donald Nicoll, MP for Frome, merchant tailor, manufacturer of cloth, and partner in a Regent 
Street finn; and J. J. Colman, Sheriff and Mayor of Norwich, later to be MP for Norwich, 
merchant, manufacturer, and head of the mustard firm. 
Others in (present or past) senior magisterial or other public positions included Sir James 
Duke, MP for London, past Sheriff of London and Middlesex, past Lord Mayor, and Alder- 
man; Charles Butler, MP for Tower Hamlets and Chairman of Tower Hamlets Quarter Ses- 
sions; Thomas Perronet Thompson, MP for Bradford, Radical Lieut. Colonel, and former 
governor of Sierra Leone; Sir Charles Napier, MP for Southwark, a former Admiral in the 
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Portuguese service and Royal Navy Admiral of the Blue; Captain Charles Mangles, MP for 
Newport, Isle of Wight and a former captain in the East India Company's service, and John 
Locke, MP for Southwark, son of a Southwark tradesman, and Recorder of Brighton. 
Also significant in the business world were almost all of the non-MP Vice-Presidents. Of 25 
whose addresses were given as 'London', 17 have been identified as merchants, manufactur- 
ers or wholesalers/retailers/dealers and one as a printer-publisher; for a further five there is a 
highly likely similar identification, bringing this category of businessmen to 23; for two only 
has it not been possible to identify an occupational or industrial grouping. A further miscel- 
laneous group of six -a clergyman (the Rev. M'Gill), two doctors, and three from the 
provinces - brings the tally of non-MP Vice-Presidents to 31. At least two-thirds of the non-MP Vice-Presidents, therefore, and probably more, were men 
with significant business interests in the Metropolis. Their fields of operation included the 
wines and spirits, oporto, wool and fur trades (merchants); silk, linen, lace, glass and china, 
gloves, and hosiery (wholesale, retail, dealing and warehousing); and leather goods, lace, 
cutlery, tobacco and snuff, hats, brewing, glass and china, furs and skins, soap and candlesticks, 
furniture, oils and colours, and animal charcoal and ivory black (manufacturers). 
The enlisting of influential Vice-Presidents was, however, only one of the Rate Equalization 
Association's tactics, and was started in the second of what one could term the four phases of 
its history. It is possible here to indicate only some of the major features of these phases. 
The first phase (involving unsuccessful moves for a Select Committee and a Bill) began with 
campaigning success in the March 1857 General Election. Candidates advocating equalization 
of the poor rates had been placed at the head of the poll in Middlesex, the EC noted, and all the 
candidates had `openly avowed their support to the cause'. The press had also begun to discuss 
the question `in a manner well calculated to give us valuable aid', as had clergy in the East End. 33 
In less than three months Ayrton, new MP for Tower Hamlets, had raised Metropolitan rate 
equalisation in the House of Commons by moving the setting up of a Select Committee on the 
issue. 34 While the Association's minutes do not reveal the first contact with Ayrton, it is clear 
that a productive relationship developed at an early stage, and the Association organised 
widespread public meetings and petitioning in support of the motion. 
Defeat was taken as an opportunity to use the list of Ayes and Noes" as a checklist: while 
the 121 Noes are untouched, 13 of the 81 Ayes had been ticked, and five have been crossed 
out. At the next General Committee meeting the EC reported that 13 Metropolitan Members 
(those ticked) had voted in support of Ayrton's motion, and only one had voted against. The 
five names crossed out were those of MPs who either died or left the Commons later in 1857; 
it seems likely therefore that in late 1857 or in 1858 the list of Ayes was used for canvassing 
MPs still in the Commons for further support. This may have included the canvass for 
`influential' Vice-Presidents, as 15 of the 81 Ayes later took on that role. 
The list indicates how distant the prospect was at this stage of achieving rate equalisa- 
tion. The Ayes were, overwhelmingly, Liberal backbenchers: only four of them ever held 
government office, either before or after the vote on Ayrton's motion. The sparse non- 
Liberal support consisted of seven Conservatives and seven Liberal-Conservatives (Sten- 
ton's classification). 
Front-bench Liberals led the opposition: two-thirds of the Noes (80) were Liberals, and of 
these, 26 were present, past or future front-benchers. This large proportion of office-holders 
and seekers was headed by Palmerston himself. Such a heavy-weight mobilisation to defeat 
Ayrton's proposal for a Select Committee suggests the government may have feared the 
impact on MPs of Ayrton's striking images of East-West disparities (images that were to be 
the staple of Rate Equalization Association rhetoric). Indeed, such a turn-out can be taken as 
a measure of success: four years before, when Apsley Pellatt, MP for Southwark, had 
attempted to move for leave to bring in a rate equalisation Bill (drafted with the support of 
John Day) the House had been counted out. 36 
The next step - the drafting of a Bill - led to a major difference of opinion between Ayrton 
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West: 8,070 (West End, St. Luke, Clerkenwell, 
Holborn, Marylebone, Chelsea, Fulham) 
South: 20,993 (Lambeth, Southwark, Bermondsey, 
Rotherhithe, Greenwich, Putney, Camberwell) 
East: 3,697 (Poplar, Limehouse, Tower Hamlets) 
(Source: GL MS 1088/1,19.5.1858) 
Figure 3. Rate Equalisation Petitions May 1858 
and the Association. The Central Committee supported the EC in their interpretation of the 
difference: that Ayrton's less radical proposal was 'objectionable' because it made the ques- 
tion 'exclusively a ratepayer's question', proposed to equalise only half the rates, and did not 
tackle the poor removals issue. The Central Committee unanimously resolved that, having 
considered Ayrton's proposal for 'mitigating the inequalities of the Poor Rate', it was their 
opinion that 'nothing less than an Equalization of the Rate on a uniform basis of Assessment 
will do Justice to the Ratepayer or to the Poor', and ordered that the EC's draft Bill be passed 
on to counsel for further development.;? 
It was the more radical approach of the 'West' that formed the basis for the new, vigorous 
programme of canvassing, petitioning and public meetings that the Association now embarked 
upon, with resolutions at public meetings and petitions calling for 'an equalized rate levied on 
rateable property throughout the District' [the Metropolitan district]. Association meetings 
were held, for instance, on the following dates in early 1858: Jan. 20 Bermondsey, Rother- 
hithe and St. Clement Danes; Jan. 21 Woolwich; Jan. 26 Lambeth; Jan. 27 Chelsea; Jan. 28 
Hammersmith; February 3 Chelsea; Feb. 5 Fulham; Feb. 9,18 East London Union; Feb. 12 
Clerkenwell; Feb. 24 West London Union; Feb. 26 City of London; March 2 Marylebone. The 
Association was now functioning, in effect, as a professional campaigning organisation, with 
a paid Parliamentary agent. 
They also reached an accommodation with Ayrton on his draft Bill, noting that although 
their own Bill had the advantage of incorporating a representative body, his would now 
achieve the Association's objectives, and began campaigning vigorously for it. As a result, 
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West: 3,540 (Clerkenwell, Finsbury, Fulham, St. Pancras) 
South: 5,537 (Lambeth, Southwark) 
East: 5,650 (Tower Hamlets only) 
Other: 490 (Aylesbury, Gloucester, Stafford, Worcester) 
(Source: GL MS 1088/1,25.2 & 4,11,18.3.59. ) 
Figure 4. Rate Equalisation Petitions February/March 1859 
II5 
twenty-two MPs presented petitions bearing a total of 37,833 signatures to the Commons. The 
largest number of signatures came from the two large districts south of the river, Southwark 
and Lambeth (16,680). If Clerkenwell and St. Luke are counted as West (in accordance with 
the EC's perception), the 'West End' total was 10,019. Tower Hamlets (Ayrton's constituency, 
and base of the Tower Hamlets Association) raised 3,630 signatures. The remaining 7,500 
came from the City, from East End districts organised by the Rate Equalization Association 
such as Poplar and Limehouse, and from other districts further afield such as Greenwich, 
Putney and Wandsworth. 38 
The failure of the Bill brought to an end the first phase of the Rate Equalization Association's 
history. In the second phase (1858-60) three major steps were taken: the Association went 
'nation-wide', the enrolment of influential Vice-Presidents began, and further Parliamentary 
tactics were planned formally and embarked upon. 
From November 1858 the Association operated as the Metropolitan and County Associa- 
tion for the Equalization of the Poor Rate, and a hectic schedule of meetings outside the 
Metropolis was embarked upon. For instance, in one week in January (hardly the easiest time 
of year to travel) Warwick and Bennett were in Worcester (21st), Gilbert and M'Gill in Staf- 
ford (24th), Blachford and Chester in Macclesfield (25th) and Fowler and Day in Plymouth 
(25th). In all of these places resolutions supporting the Association were passed and Local 
Committees formed 'for the purpose of assisting the Central Committee'. ] 
At the Association's next major joint activity with Ayrton - the first meeting of the 
Parliamentary Vice-Presidents, on 15 February 1859 at the Union Hotel, Charing Cross, with 
six EC members and eight Parliamentary Vice-Presidents present - the framework was laid 
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for Parliamentary activities that were to culminate, eight years later, in the passing of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act. The only two East End representatives were Ayrton, in the Chair, and 
the Rev. M'Gil140 
The major decision of this meeting was tactical: to launch a two-pronged manoeuvre to get 
the issue of rate equalisation placed on the agenda of an existing Select Committee, and to get 
the remit of this Committee extended to encompass the general working of the poor law. This 
formula, initially unsuccessful but subsequently pursued tenaciously by Ayrton and John 
Locke, MP for Southwark, on Villiers' 1861-64 Select Committee on Poor Relief4l and in the 
Commons, was to open the door to the achievement, in large part, of the Association's redis- 
tributive goals. The 'piecemeal, step-by-step'42 Poor Law legislation of the next few years, 
including the 1864 Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act, 43 the immediate precursor of the 
Metropolitan Poor Act, arose out of these tactics. 
In the third phase (1861-2) EC members gave Select Committee evidence (some of them 
in both years) and major public campaigning continued. For instance an 'influential' and 
'most crowded and respectable meeting' at the Guildhall, chaired by the Conservative Lord 
Mayor William Cubitt (one of the Association's Vice-Presidents) and attended by 'a large 
number of the clergy, merchants, guardians of the poor and others', voted with only five dis- 
sentients in favour of several Association resolutions. " 
With some justification the Association, in their Fifth Annual Report'45 looking back at the 
past year, felt they had 'just cause for congratulation' at the progress and interest shown, both 
by the public and the legislature, `in the injustice, as well as the inadequacy, of the existing 
mode of raising ... Funds for the Relief of the Poor. . . 
'They noted the role of winter distress 
in bringing to prominence the defects in the system of poor relief, but made the point that their 
own efforts had played a significant part in focusing attention on the inequities of the 
Metropolitan rating system. 
In response to Ayrton's rallying call in June 1862 that Villiers' Committee was ready to 
receive any evidence they 'might wish to give on the subject of the equalisation of the poor 
rates', the EC resolved to send a strong contingent of nine 46 Only one of these (the Rev. 
M'Gill) was to represent the East End (specifically, Tower Hamlets). Three were to be from 
the three City unions, two from Southwark, and three from the West (Kensington, Chelsea and 
Fulham, and Hammersmith). Once again, it is clear, the Association was functioning almost 
entirely as an organisation based in the West, the South and the City. 
In the event, six EC members gave evidence. They were the only witnesses on rate 
equalisation, and the only non-official witnesses to come from the Metropolis in 1862. Not 
even the 1862 medical officer witnesses (nor the petition handed in from the Executive 
Council of the British Medical Association 'representing 2,100 medical men') focused on the 
rating issue; instead, they raised the conditions of appointment, employment and pay of medi- 
cal officers. This suggests, as noted earlier, that significant and specific medical support for 
rate equalisation developed only later. 47 
The contributions of the Rate Equalization Association six were acknowledged in the 1864 
Report, which noted 
'that much evidence was adduced showing the unequal pressure of the charge for the 
relief of the poor in different parts of the metropolitan district; and various plans were 
submitted to Your Committee for the equalisation of the poor rate; and Your Committee 
recommend the general question of extending the area of rating to the further considera- 
tion of the House ... '48 
In phase four, 1863-7, the Association appears to have begun responding to events rather than 
taking a pro-active role; one could argue that the Association had done as much as it was able 
at that time to achieve an equal rate in the Metropolis. The status of the Association and its 
EC members appears to have remained high, and it continued to be politically appropriate for 
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an MP to be a Vice-President: for instance, the Ninth Annual Report of the Association shows 
that one of the two new Vice-Presidents was the Rt. Hon. George Goschen, MP for the City 
and a future President of the Poor Law Board. 49 
In response to the 1867 Metropolitan Poor Bill of the new Conservative President of the 
Poor Law Board the Association held two meetings of guardians, overseers and vestrymen at 
the London Coffee House, where it was agreed that attempts should be made (unsuccessfully, 
it turned out) to have additional charges placed on the intended new Metropolitan Common 
Fund. so 
With the passing of the Metropolitan Poor Act the major principle underlying the formation 
of the Rate Equalization Association in 1857 had been achieved, even if some of the practical 
details differed from proposals put forward by the Association over the years. This was 
recognised by the EC in typically decisive fashion. On 14 June 1867 they agreed that the time 
had now arrived when the Association should be dissolved 'inasmuch as the great object for 
which it was founded had been in a great measure effected by the passing of the Union 
Chargeability Act of 1865 and the Metropolitan Poor Law Act 1867 ... 's1 In terms of tactics and alliances, it is clear that for ten years the Equalisation Association, 
and particularly its Executive Committee, played a significant role on two fronts: in the 
influencing of opinion, and in the battle of Parliamentary tactics. It seems very likely that 
prominent among the reasons for their success when compared with the lack of progress of 
earlier attempts were (as Gilbert believed) the significant and powerful alliances that they 
built, both within and outside Parliament. They could rightly claim success when, in 1867, 
they saw their goals largely achieved. 
Rhetoric and policies 
The strength of the Rate Equalization Association's rhetoric and policies was, essentially, 
its simplicity. The concept of inequitability, while underpinned with rating statistics, was 
conveyed in emotive, concrete images and contrasts - for instance, the distant poor 
families of the `powdered lacqueys' of Belgravia, the 'old and incapable' servants of the 
aristocracy, and the farthing-in-a-pound poor rate paid by the Bank of England, `that great 
organ of monetary circulation' 52 
However, its strength could also be its weakness, as Ayrton in the Commons in 1857 and 
1858 was made sharply aware: redistribution of the local taxation burden from Spitalfields to 
St. George Hanover Square was not only a promise but also a threat. In 1861 Villiers (whether 
for tactical reasons or from conviction) warned the Commons (a number of whose Members 
were Vice-Presidents of the Association) that if they rejected his 'moderate' Irremovable Poor 
Bill53 they would give great impetus to 'the movement in favour of a general and immediate 
equalization of rates throughout the whole country' . 
54 
The Association's rhetoric of wealth and poverty appealed even to Charles Dickens, despite 
his disapproval of Ayrton's 1858 speech. He weighed in on the side not only of the poor but 
also of the ratepayers, drawing contrasts between 'the wealthy ratepayers in the squares and 
terraces of Paddington' and 'the impoverished ratepayers in the lanes and small streets of 
Saint George's-in-the-East' 55 On a Parliamentary level even Villiers, in moving the Irremove- 
able Poor Bill, employed the by now familiar style of comparisons. 56 
While the Association was not, in fact, the initiator of the idea of setting up a specific 
mechanism for equalising the poor rate - G. L. Hutchinson was probably first in the field in 
terms of being, as he claimed, the nineteenth century 'originator' of the proposal - the Metropolitan focus was original to the Rate Equalization Association. Indeed Hutchinson 
tried to delete the word `London' from a motion at a meeting in 1857, and attacked Ayrton's 
1858 Bill on the grounds that in restricting its proposals to the Metropolis, it- was 'too 
confined and selfish', asking, 'If a great good is to be obtained, why should the metropolitan 
districts alone enjoy it? '57 
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In terms of policy, the Association's perception was that there were, basically, four options 
for raising and redistributing the poor rate: a national rate levied, as was the present parish- 
based poor rate, on real property; basing poor relief on the `Property Tax', or Schedule A of 
the income tax, which was likely to bear more heavily on the wealthy than did the existing 
parish assessments; redistribution within Poor Law unions [which was achieved in 1865 
through the Union Chargeability Act but did not relieve the Metropolitan single-parish 
unions]; and redistribution within counties, which is what the Equalization Association 
campaigned for and what the Metropolitan Common Poor Fund in effect implemented within 
the Metropolitan 'county-equivalent', although on a much more centralised basis than the 
Association had proposed sa 
The Association showed least interest in a national rate, although Gilbert himself offered to 
'take up the question of a National Rate' and perhaps at least one other member of the EC, 
John Day, having worked with Apsley Pellatt, MP, in 1853 on his Bill for a national rate, 
would have supported such a policy. One of the Association's objections to this radical option 
was that it would be a 'simple socialistic tax'. Others were that it would centralise 'the whole 
management of the poor' in the hands of government and'increase the powers of the Poor Law 
Board, and would lead to lack of accountability to local ratepayers and lack of a check on 
government extravagance. 59 
The property tax option, 'Lord Malmesbury's proposal', was rejected reluctantly, but on 
more or less the same grounds and also, Gilbert wrote, because of 'an apparently unsurmount- 
able obstacle' - opposition by Members of both Houses of Parliament, who were 'so power- fully interested against' a property tax. In connection with this option the Association flirted 
also with the idea of an alliance with the radical Liverpool-based Financial Reform Associa- 
tion, supporters of direct taxation, but found that they could not agree with the financial case 
put by the FRA 60 
It is clear that a major reason for the Association's settling on a county-based model of rate 
equalisation was that it was less centralised: their published draft version incorporated 
indirectly elected local members. The proposal also had recognised radical credentials in that 
as far back as 1836 Joseph Hume had argued for county taxation to be controlled by elected 
boards, and a version of this proposal had been defeated in Parliament as recently as 1852.61 
There were two major fields in which the debate had to be won: the pro-active or more 
aggressive arguments on class, wealth and poverty in the Metropolis, and the mainly reactive 
or defensive arguments relating to centralisation, local powers and the fear that a bottomless 
public purse would lead to local extravagance. 
Gilbert was one of the Association's most vigorous and wide-ranging debaters on wealth, 
class and inequalities. In 186062 he succeeded in drawing together arguments about the roles 
of capital, labour and classes, of charities, philanthropy and self-interest, and of the settlement 
laws, East-West disparities and the record of the Poor Law Board: a rather notable achieve- 
ment. His linking theme was the increasing separation of rich and poor - through Metropolitan improvements, through the settlement laws, through Poor Law Board failure to act, and 
through accumulation of capital - and he insisted that it was government's responsibility to 
put things right. 
His many contrasts of wealth and poverty included dock labourers and weavers who had to 
support each other through the poor rate when out of work while merchants, manufacturers 
and shipowners were absolved from contributing, and the 'enormously wealthy' Inns of Court 
which were exempt by tradition from any contribution to poor relief while their surrounding 
parishes were 'frequently in a state of the most abject destitution' 63 
It was the tireless Warwick who argued most strongly on the issue of centralisation and 
local control. Opposed at one stage even to the continuation of the Poor Law Board (which 
he saw as having powers 'greater than the Crown or either branch of the Legislature'), he 
contended that a general uniformity of standards could be achieved without the intrusive 
control of central government, drew up a County Financial Board model for the Metropolis 
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with members indirectly elected through local guardians, and emphasised the role of the 
representative bodies. (He nonetheless also saw 'no valid objection' to a Parliamentary grant 
- in effect, a rate support grant - for certain parishes. )T' In putting the case for local control Warwick was contesting the accusations of opponents 
such as Joshua Toulmin Smith, who argued that the word 'levelling' would better represent 
the aims of the Association, and who attacked those whb 'seek covertly to gain the ends of 
centralisation'. It was, Toulmin Smith said, ignorance and selfishness if 'you try to get a great 
end, towards which there are twenty or thirty steps, by smoothing over the first two or three, 
so that they gradually lead on to the twentieth step, whence they will plunge you into the 
abyss' 65 
One of the Association's many public resolutions provides a further illustration of their 
arguments and style, linking as it does political principle and practical policy: 
That the Poor of the Metropolis are the Poor of the Whole Metropolitan Community and 
as such ought in the time of their distress to be relieved and supported by an Equalized 
Rate levied on rateable property throughout the District such Rate to be levied on one 
uniform basis of Assessment " 
The rhetoric and policies of the Rate Equalization Association, it is suggested, indicate that 
this largely middle-class organisation from western, southern and City parishes of the Metropolis 
employed a substantially radical discourse in pursuit of radical-reformist polices. 
Conclusions 
The nature of the-Association's membership, its tactics and alliances, and its rhetoric and 
policies were all significant factors in its achievements. An early example of a co-ordinated 
radical-minded Metropolitan political movement grounded in, and focusing on, elected bod- 
ies - and operating at an earlier period than has hitherto generally been expected - it built a 
powerful constituency of support for the policy of Metropolitan rate equalisation long before 
the 1864-6 workhouse scandals67 made it politically imperative for the government in power 
to find an acceptable new funding instrument. 
A notable degree of this support came from those whose own parishes or unions would not 
have benefited a great deal, or at all, from rate equalisation; there may therefore have been, it 
seems, much support for increased redistribution as a principle. 
The Rate Equalization Association clearly gained much of its strength from a latent local 
Metropolitan radicalism that had been denied a wider forum through the failure to give the 
capital municipal status in 1835-7 and the limited extent of Metropolitan government - only 
a Board of Works - established in 1855. In deriving its delegates from boards of guardians and 
vestries, the Association seems to have drawn on a natural local radical constituency - politi- 
cal activists at the sharp end of implementing settlement and other poor laws. The radicalism 
of EC members such as Gilbert, Warwick and Day clearly had strong roots in such experience. 
Thus the potential Radical backbench support in Parliament for rate equalization and the 
Liberal/Radical sympathies to be expected among a significant proportion of large business- 
men68 were capable of being mobilised consistently over a ten-year period because the move- 
ment was underpinned by local radical-minded politicians with an active consciousness of 
Poor Law weaknesses and disparities of provision. Significantly the Metropolitan Poor Act, 
when it was passed, provided yet another instance of central government's wariness on the 
London government question: although it tackled the rate redistribution issue, it set up an 
administrative Fund and asylum boards rather than the Association's proposed elected County 
Board. 
In terms of its ultimate policy achievements the Rate Equalization Association, it is 
contended, made a significant contribution to what Dicey was later to describe, in the context 
of other issues, as 'permanent currents of opinion': 69 in this case, opinion about the need for 
more equalised spreading of the burden of paying for the poor and the sick. 
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Appendix H. Rate Equalisation Association: delegates to 
the Central Committee, 1857 
Delegates notified to the Association by June 18571 
St. Dionis Backchurch, City: George Gutteres, solicitor; George Singer, letter press, 
copper plate and lithographic printer. 
St. Bartholomew the Great, City: William Evans, jeweller; James Butcher, linen- 
draper. 
St. Ann Blackfriars, City: Robert Warwick (chapter 3); William Catchpole, 
hairdresser; Stephen Twymann, coffee shop proprietor; Robert Bennett, tin-plate 
maker; Job Allen (net and tent maker). 
All Hallows, City: J. H. Borley, jeweller. 
St. Katherine Cree, City: City Alderman Robert Whiteside, Berlin wool business, 
formerly tailor and draper. 
St. Olave, Silver Street, City: Samuel Green, owner of silk and ribbon dyeing, 
embossing and printing business. 
St. Andrew, Holborn: Henry Potter, seedsman and florist, and probably also leech 
importer, sponge dealer and herbalist; James Harvey, woollen draper, woollen and 
manchester warehouseman. 
Kensington: William Gilbert (chapter 3); Captain I. Heather, retired civil servant; W. 
Banting, retired upholsterer. 
St. Luke: Mr. Phillips, coal exchange (from 1860). 
Bermondsey: William Darnell, wharfinger; William Smith, builder employing 27 men. 
St. George & St. Thomas, Southwark: John Day (chapter 3); H. Thruppe, coal 
merchant; William Howard, tin-plate worker; William Clothier, pawnbroker; G. 
Hayward, baker; William Gilpin, woollen draper; Beriah Drew, chemist; Edward 
Palmer, woollen draper; Joseph Pash, bootmaker; Dr. Evans; James Barnes, landlord 
(from 1860). 
Christ Church, Southwark: Thomas Gannon, probably grocer. 
St. Saviour's, Southwark: I. N. Monnery; T. Baston (or Bastow); C. D. Field, 
probably poor rate collector. 
Fulham: John Blachford, John Panter, Thomas Cooper, William Deller (all chapter 3). 
Wandsworth: Dr. J. Howell; Charles Dagnall, hemp merchant. 
Hammersmith: W. F. Ainsworth; James Curtis, coffee rooms proprietor. 
Putney: Alfred William Ray, manager, World Life Insurance Co. (from 1860). 
Chelsea: John Perry, surveyor, estate agent and valuer; William Lawrence, landlord; 
James Miles, landlord. 
Tooting: W. D. Norriss. 
Lambeth: F. H. Fowler (chapter 3); Thomas Giles, landlord of land and houses; J. 
Rhodes, hop merchant. 
Whitechapel: W. H. Black, brush and turnery manufacturer; Thomas Sherwood, 
coffee rooms proprietor. 
Limehouse: Stephen Skillett, stationer; J. Dicker, pawnbroker. 
I GL MS 1088/1, February-June 1857; 1841,1851,1862 PO Directories, commercial; 1851 census, 
H0107/1560/285v, H0107/1559/198r, H0107/1473/67v, H0107/1473/240v; 1861 census, 
RG9/322/79v, RG9/372/77v, RG9/30/86v, RG9/356/80-1, RG9/365/108r, RG9/20/99, RG9/16/53; PP 
1861 IX, Q4681-4695; SLSL, Southwark St. George Annual Reports, 1857,1858. 
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Appendix III. Rate Equalisation Association: non-MP Vice-Presidents, 1861 
Februa 18612 
Of the 31 non-MP Vice-Presidents listed in the minute book, the occupations of 21 have 
been firmly identified. 
J. P. Gassiot, oporto merchant. 
George Hitchcock, warehouseman, wholesale & retail silk mercer, linendrapers, 
shawlman, hosier, laceman, etc. 
John Derby Allcroft, wholesale glover (with addresses also in the Midlands, in Paris 
and Grenoble). 
J. Moritz Oppenheim, fur and skin merchant. 
G. William Petter, printer and publisher. 
Joseph Sterry, oil and colour man. 
George Torr, manufacturer of animal charcoal, ivory black, etc. 
Robert Charles jun., soap and candlemaker. 
J. J. Mechi (Alderman), cutler, and manufacturer of writing cases, travelling bags & 
other leather goods. 
John Vickers, distiller, wine and liqueur merchant, importer and exporter. 
Henry Vyse, merchant and manufacturer of millinery, mantles, flowers, etc. 
Thomas Brankston, cigar, tobacco and snuff manufacturer. 
Henry Jenkins of Goding & Co., brewer. 
Arthur Wilcoxon, plate glass manufacturer, wholesale cabinet maker and paperstainer. 
Samuel Morris, furrier and skin dresser. 
Alderman Robert Whiteside, Berlin wool business. 
Sampson Copestake, lace manufacturer. 
J. K. Hooper, wine and spirits merchant. 
Rev. G. H. M'Gill, clergyman. 
Dr. John Challice, physician, health officer. 
Dr. Josiah Stallard of Worcester (Alderman, and later Deputy Lieutenant). 
J. Fenning, Southwark. 
William Leaf, London. 
John Bradbury, London. 
Thomas Gooch, London. 
John Knowles, London. 
Francis Cook, London. 
James Green, London. 
Humphrey Bull, Aston Clinton, Bucks. 
Henry T. Lomax, Stafford. 
Samuel Barton, Macclesfield. 
2GL MS 1088/1, the Association's 4th Annual Report (for the year 1860), dated February and March 
1861; P. O. Directories, 1851,1862, court; 1851 and 1861 censuses. 
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Appendix IV. Metropolitan Asylum District: 
Board of Management 1867-711 
Elected managers 
City of London William Clements 
Alfred Suter 
East London (City) Thomas S. Owden 
Fulham William Bird, JP 
Greenwich George Lockyer 
Hackney William Turner, JP 
Holborn John W. Proudfoot 
Lewisham Rev. Francis Cameron 
Poplar William Hickson 
Saint Olave's Henry Pelling Wellborne 
Saint Saviour's Charles Harris 
Stepney Thomas Bennett Spence 
Strand George Wilkinson 
Wandsworth & Clapham George Alder 
West London (City) Joshua W. Butterworth 
Whitechapel Thomas Brushfield 
Mile End Old Town Donald Munro 
Paddington William Goslett 
William Ellis 
St. George in the East William Stutfield, JP 
St. George Hanover Square Hugh H. Seymour 
William Brewer, MD 
St. George the Martyr Southwark Thomas Park 
St. Giles Camberwell John T. Griffith, MD 
St. Giles & St. George Bloomsbury Richard Cull 
St. James Clerkenwell Thomas Partridge 
St. James Westminster Peter Duff 
St. John Hampstead James Marshall, JP 
St. Leonard Shoreditch Henry Dodd 
St. Luke Chelsea Thomas Symons 
St. Luke Middlesex John Dale 
St. Margaret & St. John Westminster George Burt 
St. Martin-in-the-Fields William Goodchild 
St. Mary Abbots Kensington John Thomas Wilkins 
St. Mary Islington John C. Hillman, 
Charles L. Bradley 
St. Mary Lambeth John Doulton 
St. Marylebone Charles Beevor 
James Tavener 
IMAD I, 22.6.1867; MAD II, III, N. 
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St. Mary Magdalen, Bermondsey Henry Youngman 
St. Mary Newington William S. Cortis, MD 
St. Mary Rotherhithe Edmund G. Dannell 
St. Matthew Bethnal Green William Davis Collins 
St. Pancras Henry North, 
Henry Eckett 
Nominated Managers 
John Ashton Bostock 
Edward North Buxton 
John Charrington 
Walter Carew Cocks 
Sir James John Hamilton, bart. 
William Harvey 
Col. Francis Haygarth 
Timothy Holmes 
Jonathan Rashleigh 
Francis Sibson, Ml) 
John Archibald Shaw Stewart 
John Gilbert Talbot 
Robert Wigram 
William Henry Wyatt 
John Young, jun. 
Elected managers 
City of London Charles Crane 
East London (City) Henry William Nind 
Hackney Rev. J. Godding 
Lewisham Brownlow Poulter 
Paddington Robert Evans 
Poplar James Barringer 
St. George Southwark James Barnes 
St. Marylebone Edwin Henry Galsworthy 
St. Mary Magdalen Bermondsey Thomas Suffield 
St. Pancras Robert Attenborough 
Robert Furniss 
Wandsworth & Clapham Michael Sarson 
Nominated managers 
Borlase H. Adams 
William H. Smith, MP 
Alexander H. Ross 
Edmund Hay Currie 
Sir Michael Hicks Beach, MP 
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Appendix V. MAD's elected managers: 
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Appendix VI. Neighbourhood survey of MAD's managers: 
notes on the gathering and recording of data. 
The 1871 Census Enumerators' Books were the main source of information on the lifestyles of 
MAD's managers, with the 1861 CEBs as an alternative source when managers were not found in 1871, 
and very occasionally the 1881 census. Post Office directories, electoral registers and the 1881 census 
and surname index were used for confirmation of identity where needed 1 
The approach adopted was in some respects similar to that practised by Charles Booth in his 
1889 Descriptive Map of London Poverty, in that socio-economic status was assessed on a street by 
street basis, or even on the basis of part of a street, rather than the wider residential area in which the 
manager lived. This small-scale approach was necessary because of the differences in social level often 
found in adjacent streets. Reeder, commenting on Booth's results, points out that "even in relatively 
prosperous areas there was always a significant proportion of the working class who were distributed in 
some degree throughout London, and also frequently a group of streets which had degenerated into 
dark blue (Booth's 'very poor, casual. Chronic want') or black streets ('Lowest class. Vicious, semi- 
criminal')" .2 Booth's West End map, for instance (the "North-Western sheet"), shows contrasts such as 
yellow-coded Bryanston Square ("Upper-middle and upper classes. Wealthy") with dark blue Moore 
Street; yellow Blandford Square with dark blue Devonshire Street; and Crawford Street with sections 
that are yellow, red ("Well-to-do. Middle-class" and pink ("Fairly comfortable. Good, comfortable 
earnings") .3 
An alternative to the street by street approach in this study of MAD's managers might have been 
to compare merely the individual households of managers. Dyos notes difficulties in this approach: 
two heads of household with apparently similar occupations might live in very different kinds of street, 
which might indicate a difference in their occupational or social standing. He suggests that the only 
reliable way of judging social status from census returns may be the study of the whole street or 
neighbourhood: a 100 per cent. "topographical sampling". Even then, errors to guard against, he 
11871 Census RG10; 1861 Census RG9; 1881 Census RG11; 1881 census surname index for England 
and Wales published by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons); Post Office 
London Directories, commercial, court, law and city sections, 1862,1871,1881; electoral registers for 
Middlesex and City, 1874. 2Booth, op. cit., introduction by David Reeder. 31bid., north-western sheet, C4, C5. 
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says, are that the sample area may be socially mixed, or perhaps contain just one or two untypical 
households. 4 
The decision was made, for this survey, to adopt a 100 per cent. topographical analysis of small, 
more or less socially homogeneous, street-based areas - with the proviso that being socially mixed 
should itself be recognised as the character of some streets. (Booth took account of this factor in his 
purple-coded streets: "Mixed. Some comfortable, others poor. ") The occupations of heads of 
households only would be noted, it was decided, together with three other criteria: number of servants, 
whether there were lodgerstboarders, and whether the family lived in multi-occupation ("flats"). 
S 
The question of validating the results of the street surveys against wider statistics such as those 
found in the census Population Abstracts did not arise, for two reasons: the fact that the present survey 
was not sample-based but a 100 per cent. non-random analysis based on specified individuals, and the 
fact that the criteria on which the Population Abstracts (the usual source for comparisons) are based are 
inappropriate for this study. For instance, the occupational summaries in the Abstracts6 are based not 
on heads of household but on the whole enumerated population of a district, which distorts statistically 
the social character of a district; an example relevant for this study is the wealthy district of St. George 
Hanover Square, where the Abstracts' inclusion of large numbers of servants makes their occupational 
analysis meaningless for the purposes of this study. 
Other difficulties are that in the Abstracts' occupation/district analysis tables the occupational 
classes and orders are too broad and the districts to which they relate too wide: the most detailed 
analysis of occupational data is in terms of age-groups, and the smallest geographical areas - the 
Registrar's sub-districts - are also broken down only in terms of ages, not occupations. There are also 
some well-known general occupational classification infelicities: Class I (Professional), for example, 
includes the exceptionally broad category 1.2, Persons employed in the defence of their country, and 
Class VI (Indefinite and non-productive class) groups together VI. 16, Labourers and others, branch of 
labour undefined, and VI. 17, Persons of Rank or Property not returned under any Office or Occupation. 
In order to assess whether there were meaningful lifestyle differences between MAD's nominated 
and elected managers, data categories were selected that took account of the metropolitan context of the 
survey and the expected top-heavy and tradesman-heavy socio-economic range on the Board.? 
4Dyos, op. cit., 103-5. 
5Edward Higgs, A clearer sense of the census (London, 1996), 150-2, suggests that the latter three 
categories are appropriate for contrasts between a well-to-do suburb and a working-class area. High 
proportions of households in multiple occupancy and containing boarders or lodgers are indicators of 
low social status, he notes. 61871 Census Population Abstracts, Vol. III (London, 1873). 
7See Appendix VII and chapter 6, p 175. 
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Firstly, three categories of servant-keeping were devised: 1-2,3-5 and 6+. The reason for 
structuring this differently from Booth's almost contemporaneous classification (1-2 servants, well-to- 
do; 3 or more, wealthy; 0, from "working-class comfort/comfort mixed with poverty" downwards) was 
the expectation that the nominees might include some very wealthy men among whom it might be 
useful to distinguish degrees of overt household wealth. The presence of households with no servants - 
expected to be only a few - would be apparent from any difference between the number of households in 
a street and the total households in each servant-keeping category. As actual numbers of servants were 
also recorded, it was possible to calculate an additional measure: the average number of servants per 
household for each manager's residential area. 
The questions of lodgerstboarders and multi-occupation were recorded as simple 
postive/negative. Again because of the expectation of the relative comfort of most managers, and also 
because the actual size of a multi-occupied property would not be known, it was decided not to record 
the actual number of separate households at an address. In terms of lodgers/boarders it was decided 
that distinguishing between those who did and those who didn not take in lodgers would be a sufficient 
measure. Servants working in lodging houses were not recorded as personal household servants unless 
this distinction seemed clear. The ever-present problems in census analysis of "visitors" who might in 
fact be lodgers, and a smaller number of apprentices and shop/work staff who were additionally 
described as servants, were handled in accordance with the actual information enumerated: as non- 
lodgers and non-servants. The lodger-factor may therefore have been under-counted, but this was felt 
to be preferable to over-counting, which might have exaggerated the differences between nominated 
and elected members. Hotel-keepers were counted as tradesmen (occupational group IIIa) who had 
lodgers and, according to circumstances, sometimes one or two personal servants. 
Occupational groups were selected in accordance with metropolitan population norms; farming 
and mining occupations were, for instance, omitted. Peter Tillott's 1966 occupational and social 
groups for urban analysis were the broad basis for classification, 8 but some categories were omitted or 
altered. For instance his "private income recipient" was moved into an extensive new Group Ib, created 
because of the expected large presence of its categories among the nominee managers. Parallel to some 
extent, in terms of wealth, is the new Group Ia, containing large industrialists and manufacturers (such 
as shipbuilders and brewers) and merchants. A large Group III was created, with four sub-groups, to 
provide for the expected extensive presence of tradesmen, shopkeepers, clerks and supervisory workers 
among elected members . As in Tillott's groups, skilled craftsmen were placed in a separate group 
8A. Rogers, Approaches to Local History (London, 1977), 101. 
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(unless they qualified for Group III by running their own small business). A minimal Group V was 
created because it was not expected that many unskilled and casual workers would be found as heads of 
household in managers' residential areas. 
All nominated and elected managers over the four-year period 1867-71 were researched apart 
from two ministers of religion (elected members) whose place of residence and presence on the Board, it 
was decided, related more to their calling than to other factors. Two nominees were subsequently 
omitted from calculations because they lived outside the metropolis in semi-rural areas where the 
residential structure did not conform to a homogeneous urban street pattern and therefore could not be 
analysed meaningfully for this study. A third nominee, J. G. Talbot, had substantial family homes 
both in rural Kent and in Westminster, but as his Westminster home was one of only four out of 36 
properties occupied residentially, the remaining 32 being occupied by "office-keepers" and 
"housekeepers", it was, again, not possible to do a meaningful neighbourhood analysis within the 
parameters of this study. The metropolitan homes of two nominees could be found only in the 1881 
census but they have been included because it seems very likely that the 1881 neighbourhood 
information was representative of their own and their families' backgrounds in 1871. 
In total, socio-economic profiles based on census data have been constructed for 17 out of 20 
nominated managers and 55 out of 57 elected managers, a total of 72 out of the full roll-call of 77 
during the years 1867-71. Fifty-seven of the profiles are based on the 1871 census (RGIO), 12 on the 
1861 census (RG9) and three, as explained above, on the 1881 census (RG11). 
The number of neighbouring households recorded has varied for each manager, depending to a 
large extent on the length of the street, or the case or difficulty with which the homogeneity of an area 
could be established. For instance in Lower Brook Street (West End) the address of nominee Dr. 
Sibson, data was gathered on 55 heads of households because of the mixed social composition of the 
street. In Deptford High Street, however, the home of elected member George Lockyer, data was 
gathered on only 12 heads of households because of the clear social homogeneity of this separately- 
enumerated section of the High Street: three butchers, a baker, a corndealer, a fishmonger, a licensed 
victualler, a commercial traveller, a milliner, a chemist, a grocer and a draper, all of whom came within 
the 1-2 servant category or had no servants. In some wealthy streets in particular, the number of heads 
of household recorded might be considerably fewer than a house number-count might suggest would be 
the case because of the absence of the family, with the house (and sometimes children) left in the charge 
of a few servants. The largest proportion of such absentees was found in nominee Sir James Hamilton's 
area, Portman Square. Of 45 houses recorded, 16 had only servants (and one upholsterer) present. 
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As has been remarked in numerous other studies based on the Victorian censuses, information on 
occupation usually consists, unavoidably, of the respondent's own valuation of himself, particularly in 
the case of heads of households, who often filled in the census forms themselves. However, as has also 
been widely agreed, although this factor may lead to minor inaccuracies in data gathered, the 
proportion of significant error is probably very small in relation to the massive amount of data that a 
census provides. In this particular study, the subjective element in occupational descriptions is likely to 
be significant in positions such as "gentleman", "fundholder" and "annuitant", who are found living in 
a wide range of socio-economic circumstances. These occupations have therefore been allocated to two 
separate categories. "Lesser fundholders and gentlemen" (with 0-2 servants) are in group IIIb, which 
also contains "annuitants" and "retired", while "wealthy fundholders and gentlemen" (with 3+ servants, 
and including wealthy "annuitants") are in group lb with the aristocracy, MPs, Justices of the 
Peace/magistrates and landed proprietors. Heads of household who were clearly wealthy but declined 
to give an occupation have also been allocated to Ib (wealthy fundholders) on the grounds that they 
must have had the support of a fairly large private income; the alternative, to omit them from the count 
altogether, would have meant omitting also much servant data and, as a result, sometimes 
misrepresenting proportions. As the four socio-economic criteria - occupation, servants, multi- 
occupation and lodgers - are calculated separately at the end and treated as four independent measures 
rather than as elements in a formula for a single, composite measure of status, the occasional recourse 
to overlaps of data of this nature does not compromise the conclusions but in fact increases the degree of 
accuracy. 
- Census references, the number of households recorded for each of MAD's managers, summaries 
of data and totals are listed in Tables 2 a-d. 
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Appendix VII. Sample data collection form 
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Table 1. Redistribution: proposed and actual 
(1866: Hardy's prediction. 1868: Metropolitan Common Poor Fund) 
Prediction Actual 
L 1866 M. 1868 
£ £ 
City -27709 -24638 
St. George Hanover Sq. -12137 -9957 
Paddington -9480 -10023 
Islington -6118 -5616 
Kensington -5437 -6340 
St. Marylebone -5179 -930 
Lewisham -4326 -1723 
Wandsworth/Clapham -4176 -3040 
St. James Westminster -3541 -2151 
Poplar -2332 3202 
Hampstead -1908 -2172 
St. Martin-in-the-Fields' -1363 
St. M/J Westminster -1327 -3624 
Hackney -814 -3015 
St. G/G Bloomsbury -368 -1269 
Fulham 442 -1401 
Camberwell 1089 418 
St. Olave Southwark 1156 368 
West London (City) 1198 2052 
St. Pancras 1234 2889 
Holborn 1265 241 
Rotherhithe 1685 1067 
Chelsea 2187 2003 
St. James Clerkenwell 2218 1160 
Mile End Old Town 2286 1923 
Bermondsey 2503 715 
St. Saviour Southwark 2754 685 
St. Luke 2885 193 
Greenwich 3072 8053 
East London (City) 3328 2455 
St. Mary Newington 4070 5870 
Strand 4536 4028 
Bethnal Green 5301 9328 
St. George-in-the-East 5922 4654 
Stepney 6618 6311 
St. George Southwark 7009 2641 
Whitechapel 7133 7910 
Lambeth 7687 4174 
Shoreditch 8635 4682 
Woolwich " -3842 
Charterhouse -36 
Gray's Inn -237 
St. Peter Westminster -27 
Inner Temple -373 
Middle Temple -243 
Lincoln's Inn -324 
*St. MarUn4n4he-Fields was added to StranC 1888. ''Woolwich was detached from Lewisham 1868. 
Minus figuns: overall payers. Others: overall receivers. 
L88: year ending Lady Day 1866. M68: two half-years ending Michaelmas 1868. 
(PP 1871 lix, 839,841; PP 1867 Ix, 117) 
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Table 2a. MAD's nominated managers (See also Figures 7-13) 
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Table 2b. MAD's elected managers, A-D (See also Figures. 7-13) 
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Table 2d. MAD's elected managers, N-Y (See also Figures 7-13) 
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Acts of Parliament 
22 Geo. III c. 83, Act for the Better Relief and Employment of the Poor 1782. 
58 Geo. III c. 69 & 59 Geo. III c. 85, Vestries Act 1818,1819. 
59 Geo. III c. 12, Poor Relief Act 1819. 
1&2 Will. IV c. 60, Vestries Act 1831. 
2&3 Will. IV c. 45, Representation of the People Act 1832. 
4&5 Will. IV c. 76, Poor Law Amendment Act 1834. 
5&6 Will. IV c. 76, Municipal Corporations Act 1835. 
5&6 Vict. c. 57, Poor Law Amendment Act 1842. 
7&8 Vict. c. 101, Poor Law Amendment Act 1844. 
9& 10 Vict. c. 66, Poor Law Amendment Act 1846. 
10 & 11 Vict. c. 109, Poor Law Board Act 1847. 
11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, Public Health Act 1848. 
11 & 12 Vict. c. 110, Poor Law Amendment Act 1848. 
13 & 14 Vict. c. 11, Contributions to School Districts Common Fund Act 1850 
14 & 15 Vict. c. 105, Poor Law Amendment Act 1851. 
15 & 16 Vict. c. 81, County Rates Act 1852. 
16 & 17 Vict. c. 97, Lunatic Asylums Act, 1853. 
18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, Metropolis Management Act 1855. 
19 & 20 Viet. c. 112, Metropolis Management Act Amendment Act 1856. 
21 & 22 Vict. c. 104, Metropolis Local Management Act Amendment Act 1858. 
24 & 25 Vict. c. 55, Poor Removal Act 1861. 
25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, Metropolis Local Management Acts Amendment Act 1862. 
25 & 26 Viet. c. 103, Union Assessment Committee Act 1862. 
25 & 26 Vict. c. 110, Union Relief Aid Act 1862. 
26 & 27 Vict. c. 110, Act to Amend Lunacy Acts in Relation to Building of Asylums 
for Pauper Lunatics 1863. 
27 & 28 Vict. c. 39, Union Assessment Committee Act 1864. 
27 & 28 Vict. c. 116, Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act 1864. 
28 & 29 Viet. c. 34, Metropolitan Houseless Poor Act 1865. 
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,ý 
28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, Union Chargeability Act 1865. 
28 & 29 Vict. c. 105, Poor Law Continuance Act. 
30 & 31 Vict. c. 6, Metropolitan Poor Act 1867. 
30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, Representation of the People Act 1867. 
30 & 31 Vict. c. 106, Poor Law Amendment Act. 
31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, Poor Law Amendment Act 1868. 
32 & 33 Vict. c. 41, Assessed Rates Act 1869. 
32 & 33 Vict. c. 63, Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 1869. 
32 & 33 Vict. c. 67, Valuation (Metropolis) Act 1869. 
33 & 34 Vict. c. 18, Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 1870. 
34 & 35 Vict. c. 15 Metropolitan Poor Amendment Act 1871. 
34 & 35 Vict. c. 70, Local Government Board Act 1871. 
35 Vict. c. 2, Poor Law Loans Act 1872. 
51 & 52 Vict. c. 41, Local Government Act 1888. 
56 & 57 Vict. c. 73, Local Government Act 1894. 
Official publications 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 
PP 1857-8 iv, Poor Rates (Metropolis) Bill. 
PP 1857-8 xii, Select Committee on the Irremovable Poor. 
PP 1859 vii, Select Committee on the Irremovable Poor. 
PP 1860 xvii, Select Committee on Poor Removals. 
PP 1861 ix, 1862 x, 1863 vii, 1864 ix, Select Committee on Poor Relief. 
PP 1861 viii, Select Committee on Local Taxation and Government of the 
Metropolis, and the Local Administration of Justice therein. 
PP 1866 xiii, Select Committee on Local Government and Local Taxation of the 
Metropolis 
PP 1866 acv, 18th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board. 
PP 1867 xii. Select Committee on Metropolitan Local Government, etc. (City 
Improvement Rates Bill). 
PP 1867 xxxiv, 19th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board. 
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PP 1867 lx, Accounts and Papers. 
PP 1867-8 xiii, Select Committee on Poor Rates Assessment. 
PP 1867-8 xxxiii, 20th Annual Report of the Poor Law Board. 
PP 1868-9 xxviii, 21st Annual Report of the Poor Law Board. 
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